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B enjamin Silas Arthur Schuster. It sounds a peculiar yet familiar name, right?e same unplaceable strangeness struck the Viennese onlookers and
well-wishers gathered at St. Stephan’s Cathedral in 1778. ey had assembled for 
the baptism of baby Benjamin, whose parents, Johann and Maria Schuster, had 
decided to name him in honour of the three American representatives in Paris: 
Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee. So great was their admiration 
for the revolutionary trio that the baptism entry recorded the American repre-
sentatives as godfathers in absentia.1 Buoyed by ineable feelings of fatherhood, 
Johann Schuster wrote to his new-born son’s 
rst namesake within a week. He 
informed Franklin of his pride in their “little American” (notre petit Améric-
ain) who served as a daily reminder of the “illustrious and dear people” who 
strove for liberty half a world away.2 Five years later, at the close of the War of 
American Independence, Schuster wrote again. He congratulated Franklin on 
the successful independence of the United States, a cause “engraved upon [his] 
heart” and for which he had earnestly prayed. In the meantime, however, his wife 
Maria had died. “She took with her to the grave, a consideration equal to mine 
for you and all your comrades,” he found some comfort in con
ding to Frank-
lin.3 e Schusters’ enthusiasm for the revolutionary cause lasted throughout 
the American Revolution and beyond. History does not record what happened 
further to the Schuster family or how Benjamin S. A. Schuster felt growing up 
as Vienna’s embodiment of revolutionary heroes from across the Atlantic.4 ey 
are a family with little trace except for their unbridled dedication to an America 
which they never visited apart from in their minds and hearts. ey are a family 
whose reaction, enthusiasm, and voice in the story of the American Revolution 
has been almost forgotten.
e Schusters were by no means alone. Across the entirety of the Habsburg
lands, which stretched from the Austrian Netherlands (present-day Belgium) in 
the West to the furthest reaches of the Transylvanian hills in the East, the Ameri-
can Revolution inuenced the lives of Habsburg inhabitants. e Revolution was 
a diplomatic conundrum for Habsburg rulers, a commercial opportunity for some, 
and a cultural phenomenon for everyone. e Revolution altered the economic 
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fortunes of Habsburg merchants. John Adams noted how the towns of Bruges and 
Ostend in the Austrian Netherlands had “grown out of the American Revolution,” 
at the same time as Hungarians rejoiced over the devastation of Virginian tobacco 
crops which “now [allowed] the Hungarians a share of their one-time pro
ts.” A 
group of Bohemian glassmakers, meanwhile, assembled in the town of Nový Bor 
(Hajda/Haida) for a great feast to celebrate the end of the war which had sapped 
their trade and disrupted exports.5
Unravelling the meaning of the American Revolution in the lands of the 
Habsburg Monarchy forms the core of this book. It is admittedly an unfamiliar 
territory for viewing the eects of one of the most consequential political mo-
ments in history. Yet, when viewed from this vantage point, the familiar American 
Revolution looks rather dierent. Developing a political consciousness centred on 
individual rights and protection of liberty against tyranny was a key component in 
the American Revolution and, to be sure, there were some 
gures in the Habsburg 
lands—as there were elsewhere—who recognised the potency and danger of this 
emergent ideology. Fundamentally, the Revolution represented the struggle for 
the birth of a new nation. Yet this was not the only understanding of the Ameri-
can Revolution. We might assume the Habsburgs would be unwelcoming to such 
an event, but the chaos of war bred challenges as well as opportunities in equal 
measure. To the Habsburg monarchs and their subjects, the American Revolution 
contained great commercial opportunity and not just potential threats to their 
Figure 1. Baptismal entry of Benjamin Silas Arthur 
Schuster in St. Stephen’s Cathedral, Vienna
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security. In this 
rst instance of democratic revolution, individuals in power in 
the Habsburg lands were not the reactionary and repressive bogeymen we tend to 
think about from the nineteenth century, but rather, they formulated a cautiously 
interested, and, in many cases, enthused response to the creation of the United 
States of America.
Mental landscapes and worldscapes changed fundamentally for many 
Habsburg inhabitants. For centuries, ‘America’ had been 
ltered through vari-
ous lenses, from the religious frescoes adorning village churches to the doubtful 
propaganda peddled by recruiters who sought to lure prospective emigrants.6
But the Revolution made America an event for the 
rst time, a point of 
xation 
and fascination about which conversations formed and about whose future de-
bates raged. Habsburg authors devoted books to the topic; some to ride the wave 
of fascination over America and others to praise its virtuous revolutionary lead-
ers. In Viennese salons and palaces, the incessant chatter over the Americans en-
raged the British ambassador, who warned his superiors that “everyone here talks 
wildly about liberty.”7 is obsession existed beyond the aristocracy. e “shot 
heard ‘round the world” reached keen and supportive ears across the Habsburg 
Monarchy.8 e American Revolution advanced the concept of “revolution” in 
Habsburg minds to mean a more sudden political change rather than the literal 
revolving around a 
xed point such as the Copernican orbit of planets.9 Re-
ecting on the transformation in public awareness of American revolutionary 
events, the Hungarian author Ferenc Kazinczy asked rhetorically, “What be our 
gatherings in villages until now than mere discussion of which hound is more 
worthy, the tan or the black, and what number among us knew whether the At-
lantic Ocean lies East or West of us?”10 e American Revolution widened the 
intellectual horizons of many in the Habsburg Monarchy and, in doing so, le 
an indelible legacy which lasted into the next century.
is book is about the meaning of the American Revolution for the Habsburg
Monarchy and, at the same time, the Habsburg moment in the American Rev-
olution. It is a story about how one of Europe’s most important dynasties man-
aged the 
rst opening salvo in what would become a succession of revolutionary 
crises stretching into the mid-nineteenth century. is was both a moment of 
challenge and opportunity for the people living in the Habsburg realms. Some 
like Schuster and his family welcomed the dawn of this new age; others, like 
the Habsburg monarch Maria eresa and her State Chancellor Prince Wenzel 
Anton von Kaunitz greeted these developments with more scepticism. Oppor-
tunity lay in the chance to engage with the wider world through commercial 
channels created in the wake of the American Revolution. It also represented a 
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potential realisation of long-held dynastic designs for imperial projects beyond 
the European mainland in emulation of rival powers.11 Pursuing this potential 
extended the Habsburg inuence in the western hemisphere. e 
rst Habsburg 
representative beyond Europe arrived in Philadelphia as a result shortly aer the 
conclusion of the war.
Di­culty accompanied opportunity. e upheavals of the War of Ameri-
can Independence presented individuals in the Habsburg Monarchy with new 
challenges. At several points, the American Revolution threatened the interna-
tional position of the Habsburg Monarchy, and its rulers’ struggle to remain a 
neutral power continued throughout the war. For all neutral powers, assuming 
impartiality was a di­cult process oen fraught and marred by international 
controversy. In the Habsburg case, neutrality pitted the Monarchy against bel-
ligerents who sought to either erode or entrench their neutral status. Crucially, 
the Habsburg position vis-à-vis the war was at one point or another a concern 
for all belligerents, including the American patriots. Later, as the war progressed 
and American independence from Britain became an increasingly likely reality, 
the struggle for neutrality gradually became the struggle for a relationship with 
the sovereign United States of America. Habsburg ministers believed in the po-
tential advantages of American trade and took great steps to secure it. rough 
the American Revolution, the Habsburgs imagined a transatlantic expansion 
of imperial and commercial power. Yet pursuing such dreams came at a cost. 
e Habsburg Monarchy was not immune to the eects of revolutionary fer-
vour. e American Revolution exempli
ed the best achievement of humanity 
to many in the Habsburg lands who later called for similar reforms, imparting a 
legacy which instigated conspiracy, reformism, and revolt.12 e American Rev-
olution had a deep-rooted impact in the Habsburg lands which ultimately lasted 
through to the nineteenth century.
e “Habsburg moment” in the American Revolution unites several instances 
when the Habsburg Monarchy became a focal point in the War of American In-
dependence and exerted an inuence on the war’s outcome. Few historians today 
realise the role played by the Habsburg Monarchy in shaping the American Rev-
olution economically and politically. Yet the Monarchy was a factor in the Amer-
ican Revolution despite how unlikely and unexpected this may seem to readers 
today. e Habsburg Monarchy was one of the great neutral powers in the War 
of American Independence as one of the largest states in eighteenth-century 
Europe with extensive territories, military capacity, and dynastic inuence over 
the Holy Roman Empire—the source of tens of thousands of Hessian recruits 
for the British. e Habsburg territories encompassed a population of roughly 
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25 million and employed one of the largest European armies.13 In addition, from 
the early 1770s onwards, vital munitions manufactured in Liège passed through 
Habsburg lands in the Austrian Netherlands in order to supply the patriots in 
the American Revolution.14 Moreover, the Austrian Netherlands served over 
thirty prominent Americans throughout the war as a base of operations and 
from 1780, the port of Ostend became the emporium of all belligerents seeking 
to transport goods safely into the Atlantic under neutral colours.15
Most importantly, Vienna became a fulcrum around which the war would 
have turned if the Monarchy had joined one side or another. is was especially 
true following the Franco-American alliance of 1778 when eorts to cajole the 
Habsburgs into the War of American Independence reached an early crescendo. 
Winning over the Habsburgs became a frequent aim of the British who increas-
ingly saw them as their last hope in Europe for deliverance from the war. Compe-
tition over the fate of the Habsburgs placed them unexpectedly at the forefront 
of the 
rst serious attempts for peaceful mediation to the conict which, if it had 
been successful, would have resulted in the Peace of Vienna in 1781 rather than 
the Peace of Paris in 1783. ese moments in the American Revolution have been 
overlooked but recognising the importance of this wider international context to 
the American founding is necessary if we are to fully appreciate the complexity 
and globality of the American Revolution.
Including the Habsburg Monarchy in the history of the American Revolution, 
therefore, serves to broaden the international horizon and rede
ne the spatial con-
text of American independence. e foundation of the United States was as deeply 
enmeshed within a European framework of shiing alliances and preconceptions 
as it was in North America.16 e War of American Independence all too oen ap-
pears as a war which occurred within a North American context but from 1778 on-
wards, the war’s ultimate determination, and with it American sovereignty, rested 
increasingly within Europe.17 Even American independence and the post-sover-
eign self-fashioning of the new republic transpired with a view towards 
nding a 
place in the pre-existing international order dictated by European states.18
Uncovering the continental European dimension within the American Rev-
olution requires situating the Revolution within dierent European national 
contexts. Whilst promising advances are being made for western Europe—espe-
cially Ireland and Spain, to only name two cases—there are still multiple terrae
incognitae ripe for the historians of eighteenth-century America. It seems the 
further east one moves, the less aware we are—despite the existence of many illu-
minating works.19 In the public and general academic imagination, regions such 
as central and eastern Europe or Scandinavia have boiled down to those made 
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famous by their participation in the American Revolution such as the Hessians 
or Tadeusz Kościuszko or perhaps Axel von Fersen, the possible Swedish lover of 
Marie Antoinette.20 e reduction to these 
gures, important though they were, 
oen obscures the deeper level of the Revolution’s connection to and impact on 
these regions. In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, the situation is worse still, 
with no comparable character 
rmly in the public mind as a tangible connection 
between these lands and the American Revolution. ere is no reason for this 
obscurity; as the pages that follow will reveal, there was a host of inuential 
individuals who considered themselves part of the American Revolution in the 
Habsburg Monarchy.
In expanding the international dimensions of the American Revolution, this 
book speaks directly to the 
eld of Atlantic history, which, until recently, has 
been the prevailing historiographical framework for histories of the American 
Revolution abroad. Proponents of Atlantic history posit the transit of peoples, 
ideas, and commodities around the Atlantic basin as responsible for creating a 
single connective space during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.21 At-
lantic history has brokered fruitful connections between historical foci, bringing 
historians of dierent periods and spaces into a common dialogue. Attempts to 
form a consensual de
nition have proven di­cult with the boundaries of the 
Atlantic itself functioning as the most commonly accepted parameter.22
Despite several decades of innovative histories, however, Atlantic history 
might be drying up. Atlantic fatigue has set in, especially among historians of 
the American Revolution, who have shied towards newer geographic locales 
for fresh perspectives.23 In the last decade, histories of the American Revolution 
have increasingly taken place within a continental or hemispheric space. Built 
upon a rising cognisance of Spanish-American and Native American presence in 
the Age of Revolutions, the continental and hemispheric viewpoints implicitly 
re-orientate attention away from the East of the thirteen colonies (the Atlantic) 
and present the Revolution as either inextricable from the West or as the 
rst in 
a vertical wave of revolutionary movement from the North to the South.24 is 
embrace of multidirectional approaches to the Revolution does not prejudice the 
Atlantic, but rather reframes the Atlantic world within a larger spatial dimen-
sion.25 Some have taken to calling this new convergence “vast early America” as 
a signi
er for viewing the wider entanglement of early American history from 
multiple geographies and imperial vantage points.26 Such repositioning of our 
conceptions, both of Atlantic history and of early American history, can be in-
structive when also applied in the other direction; from further east as well as 
further west. In this reformulation the Habsburg Monarchy can be seen as a 
continuation of current trends to discern the various polarities of early America.
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Atlantic history has long seemed distinct from, or even antithetical to, the 
Central European “hinterland” but the Habsburg experience in the Amer-
ican Revolution demonstrates this fallacy. Admittedly, the Habsburg lands 
did not stretch into the Atlantic. ere were no new-world outposts under the 
rule of the Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg—although ministers 
in Vienna and Brussels seriously considered acquiring such territory during 
the Revolution and one of their colonial missions ostensibly laid claim to the 
southern-Atlantic islands of Tristan da Cunha in 1777.27 e commercial en-
trepôts of Ostend on the North Sea and Trieste in the Adriatic functioned 
instead as the connective nodes to the Atlantic nexus initially indirectly and, 
as a result of the Revolution, directly in the 1780s. Despite connection through 
the transfer of people and trade, it would seem inaccurate to demarcate these 
spaces as the Atlantic, however.28 Yet for the Habsburgs faced with the up-
heavals of the American Revolution, what happened on one side of the Straits 
of Gibraltar mattered for the other. It was for this reason that Habsburg min-
isters tasked the secretary to the Habsburg legation in Madrid with planning 
contingencies for Habsburg commerce in the Atlantic and Mediterranean 
following the Spanish entry into the war.29 e maritime consequences of the 
American Revolution reverberated in the Habsburg lands despite their dis-
tance from the Atlantic Ocean.
Recently, scholars have paid ever-greater attention to the role of the oceans 
in the shaping of terrestrial human history on a global scale. e ubiquity of 
waterways and waterbodies lends itself easily to this frame of reference where 
continents and coastlines became subsumed within a globally interconnected 
and interdependent “world ocean” system.30 Island outposts and port cities, in 
particular, commanded a prominent role in facilitating connection across mar-
itime spaces—as have ecological, geological, and meteorological attributes of 
the seas themselves.31 e Habsburg Monarchy presents an interesting lacuna 
within this emerging historical perspective, for two reasons. First, the Habsburg 
Monarchy is perceived conventionally as composed of “landlocked” entities with 
little or no maritime interests—this is in spite of an extensive existing litera-
ture proving otherwise.32 Yet this “inland” nature does not deny the Austrian 
Habsburgs an oceanic past. Indirect connections through rivers and overland 
routes connected much of Central Europe to the seas.33 Secondly, the intrepid 
maritime imperialism of the Austrian Habsburgs in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries through exploration, commerce, and transoceanic colonisation 
represented a concerted eort to transcend the terrestrial and maritime under-
standings of empire.34 e American Revolution was by no means the 
rst or the 
only oceanic episode in Austrian Habsburg history but its eects, at sea and on 
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land, inuenced the development of Habsburg overseas ventures and fortunes 
in ways that have not been previously acknowledged.
In many ways, this book serves as a maritime history of the Habsburg Monar-
chy. Current accounts of the overseas activities of the Austrian Habsburgs tend 
to centre on the attempts to colonise and trade in Asia during the early and late 
eighteenth century. e Generale Keijzerlijcke Indische Compagnie (General Im-
perial India Company) of the 1720s in Ostend and William Bolts’s expeditions to 
India and China in the 1770s and 1780s are well known.35 Both of these initiatives 
ended in abject failure with short-lived commercial factories founded in Canton, 
China and along the Coromandel Coast at Covelong (Kovalam) and at Bankiba-
zar (Ichapur) in India. e American Revolution, however, oers a counterpoint 
to this Habsburg maritime experience. It enabled new commercial opportunities 
for the Austrian Habsburgs aer the established imperial Atlantic systems suf-
fered disruption. Established trading routes relied upon Habsburg neutrality to 
maintain the ow of goods, communications, and people. As mentioned above, 
American revolutionaries and other belligerents sourced munitions from Liège 
which had to be procured through the canals, rivers, and roads of the Austrian 
Netherlands.36 e Revolution similarly shaped economic fortunes in Austria, 
Bohemia, Moravia, and the Hungarian lands both during and aer the war. As 
Matyas Rát, editor of the Hungarian newspaper Magyar Hírmondó, asked his 
readers, “Who would think that the riots taking place there [the American colo-
nies] could have been of bene
t to our country?”37 e American Revolution, in 
other words, furthered the oceanic entanglement of the Habsburg Monarchy in 
the late eighteenth century through the lure of pro
t and improvement.
In general, examining the eects of the American Revolution upon the 
Habsburg Monarchy further globalises its history. Few overviews of Habsburg 
history today recognise the global contexts of the eighteenth-century Monar-
chy.38 e global backdrop appears either absent for a Monarchy usually per-
ceived (and presented) as a landlocked Central European power or takes the 
form of studies of isolated facets of Habsburg global connections. We have a 
growing understanding of the Habsburg ambition to form global linkages 
through the development of extra-European commerce, the sponsorship of sci-
enti
c missions throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the 
creation of institutions designed to enable transcultural contact.39 e ability 
of the Habsburgs to attract and cultivate individuals who broadly functioned 
as global facilitators is similarly growing in acknowledgement across dierent 
disciplines.40 Yet we still lack a uni
ed vision synthesising these threads into 
the reality which was the eighteenth-century Habsburg Monarchy. Integrating 
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the transoceanic experience of the Habsburg Monarchy and its struggles to 
acquire trading privileges and geographical information about non-European 
territories—as was the case with the new United States—therefore puts the 
eighteenth-century Habsburg experience in a more appropriate framework.41
e American Revolution was the Habsburg Monarchy’s 
rst encounter with 
what is commonly termed the Age of Revolutions, a period characterised by the 
intense political struggles that took place in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.42
In geographic terms, historians traditionally designated the Atlantic as a central 
emanating point for the Age of Revolutions with America and France as sibling 
instigators.43 Yet much like Atlantic history, the Age of Revolutions has under-
gone continual re
nement and alteration. Modi
ers such as democratic, imperial,
and global pre
xed to Revolution reect the various reframings of a turbulent 
age generally stretching from the American Revolution up to the Revolutions of 
1848.44 e recent transnational and global turns have shied attention to the 
mobility of revolutionary advocates and the smaller spaces experiencing revolu-
tionary change—but most of these eorts remain concentrated within the At-
lantic world.45 In her transnational history of the revolutionary age from Haiti to 
the Low Countries, historian Janet Polasky articulated the permeability of the 
European mainland in the transmission of revolutionary ideas.46 Polasky’s vision 
makes good on the original expansive Age of Revolutions present in Robert R. 
Palmer’s works. Palmer was one of the few historians who connected the totality 
of the European space within the period of the American Revolution.47 Yet even 
Palmer did not fully realise the impact of the American Revolution upon the 
Habsburg Monarchy. In Palmer’s works, the 1787 revolt in the Austrian Nether-
lands and the 1794 conspiracies in Vienna and Hungary were the only substantive 
responses to the Revolution.48 But the taking up of arms is not the only legitimate 
response to revolutionary movements; some, like the Schusters, were inspired in 
other ways and made their response known peacefully.
Palmer only became convinced “that an ‘American dream’ existed in Ger-
many as much as in France” some years later following the work of Horst Dippel 
who meticulously traced the reaction of German-speaking people to the Revo-
lution.49 Dippel’s richly researched account dely articulated the meaning of 
the Revolution for the German-speaking Habsburg populace but in severing 
them from the rest of the Monarchy, we are le with an incomplete under-
standing of the Revolution’s impact in the Habsburg lands. Moreover, Dippel’s 
in-depth analysis along with his bibliographic compilation of contemporary 
German-language works on the Revolution have been rather underutilised by 
historians of the American Revolution.50 As a result, the Habsburg Monarchy 
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appears as a latecomer to the party—a guest who did not quite receive the invi-
tation 
rst time around and 
rst showed up either in the 1790s brimming with 
Jacobins or the late 1840s accompanied by nationalists and secessionists.51 e 
Habsburgs only became symptomatic with revolutionary fervour, so the current 
narrative goes, when inhabitants became piqued by the Josephine reforms of the 
1780s and had witnessed the example of the French Revolution.52 By tracing the 
antecedents in the Habsburg response to the American Revolution, this book 
eectively contextualises the Habsburg responses to later revolutionary currents.
Contrary to conventional expectations, the Habsburg Monarchy was not a 
reactionary power at the beginning of the Age of Revolution, as this book will 
show. To be sure, there were individuals in the Habsburg Monarchy who were 
more guarded towards or even criticised the American Revolution, but many 
looked positively on the American cause. Ministers and merchants across the 
Habsburgs lands were attentive to the changing fortunes of their neighbours and 
sought to harness the disruption caused by the revolutionary turmoil in North 
America. Aer 1783, moreover, preserving the economic bene
t created through 
American independence outweighed the ideological gulf between monarchy 
and republic. e danger lay, however, in the cultural eects of the American 
Revolution, in its example of righteous self-preservation against tyranny. What 
America came to represent posed the real challenge. As time went on and the 
ame of revolutionary spirit spread to Europe, stakeholders in the Habsburg 
regime sought to dampen the embers of dissent in their own lands. Yet it was 
only in the wake of another revolution, which begun in France in 1789, that 
American inuence, ideals, and discussion became intolerable as the instigator 
of a turbulent, destructive era.
Divergence between the United States of America and the Habsburg Mon-
archy became a distinctive hallmark from the 1790s onwards. e 
gure of Em-
peror Joseph II, who reigned jointly with his mother Maria eresa during the 
outbreak of the American Revolution, best demonstrates the generational schism 
that emerged over the Habsburg Monarchy. John Adams once referred to him in 
1783 as “one of the greatest men of the present age,” whereas the American poet 
Joel Barlow denounced the Habsburg monarch ten years later as “e ape of wis-
dom and the slave of gold, eresa’s son, who, with a feeble grace, just mimics all 
the vices of his race.”53 In time, the United States and the Habsburg Monarchy be-
came the archetype for progressive and conservative standard-bearers and became 
increasingly uncomfortable in their connections to one another. e revolution-
ary year of 1848 proved a litmus test for such disparity, with American support 
of Hungarians against the “un-democratic” Habsburg regime almost bringing 
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the two states to declaring war in the decade aerwards.54 Prince Klemens von 
Metternich’s sense that America represented a sleeping giant which “in 
ve years 
gets to where it otherwise would have taken two centuries” still dominates our 
perception of the two countries; one as sclerotic and a declining power in the 
late-nineteenth century versus the rise of a dynamic society and international 
heavyweight.55 It has led to our perception of the two powers as having little or no 
connection. In the early twentieth century, Harvard historian and direct descen-
dant of omas Jeerson, Archibald Cary Coolidge wrote “with Austria-Hun-
gary the United States has never had much to do” and almost a century later, 
historian omas A. Schwartz declared that, “If you teach a survey course on the 
history of American foreign relations, chances are that you don’t spend very much 
time on the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.”56 is malaise originating from the 
reactionary 1790s should not obscure the actual time of connection between the 
Habsburg Monarchy and the United States, when, for almost two decades, these 
two powers were not adversaries, not antagonistic, nor dichotomies but rather 
mutually interested, inquisitive, and enterprising with one another.
e American Revolution is, therefore, the proper starting point for histori-
cising bilateral relations between the United States and the Habsburg Monarchy 
and its successor states. Although diplomatic recognition proved elusive until 
the 
rst bilateral treaties of the 1820s and the 
rst mutual exchange of repre-
sentatives in 1838, the 1770s and 1780s witnessed the 
rst concerted eorts to 
forge US-Habsburg relations.57 Political histories of this relationship have oen 
sidelined this crucial period, if acknowledged at all, as an era of “benign neglect” 
with little perceived interaction.58 is misconception explains why transatlan-
tic histories of Austria-Hungary and its successor states predominantly tend to 
focus on the extensive migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.59 American 
nancial support provided to Austria in the post–World War 
II period sparked a rise in the 
eld of American Studies (Amerikanistik) which 
centred on the more immediate relationship between the United States and the 
Austrian Republic.60 A similar situation developed in Czechia, Hungary, and 
Slovakia following the collapse of the Communist system in the 1990s.61 ese 
circumstances have undoubtedly fostered a nuanced awareness of Central Eu-
ropean ties with North America. Yet these separate historiographies have also 
inadvertently demoted eighteenth-century connections between these lands. 
e period of the American Revolution and the republic’s founding remains a
bountiful era of informal relations as a result.
Of course, this is not to say that no histories of the American Revolution and 
the Habsburg Monarchy exist. It is to say only that those available have been 
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written from a disaggregated viewpoint. Rather than treating the Habsburg 
Monarchy as a whole, as this book does, these histories present the Habsburg 
reception and reaction to the American Revolution through anachronistic re-
gional or nation-state perspectives. Austrian, Belgian, and Hungarian histori-
ans—to name but a few—have written individual histories of “Austria and the 
American Revolution,” “Belgium and the American Revolution,” and “Hungary 
and the American Revolution.”62 Nation-state perspectives arguably have merit 
as they allow for a focus on the speci
c modalities of each constituent region 
of the composite Habsburg Monarchy. e same can be said of the anachronis-
tic regional perspectives where portions of the Habsburg Monarchy have been 
repurposed as part of a wider “German” or “East-Central European” response 
to the Revolution.63 ese reorientations can create meaningful comparisons 
with other eighteenth-century polities such as Prussia or the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. Yet these nation-state perspectives run the risk of promoting 
perceived exceptionalism within the Habsburg Monarchy. When we only have 
articles written on the Hungarian military o­cers who went to 
ght for the 
American cause, it overshadows the reality that men from across the Habsburg 
lands went to 
ght for the Revolution in relatively equal numbers.64 Moreover, 
this perspective downplays the signi
cant interplay of regional interests within 
composite states. e Habsburg Monarchy of the eighteenth century was a com-
posite state consisting of several distinct territories under the rule of a sovereign 
dynasty.65 Responses to the American Revolution in the Austrian Netherlands 
ultimately aected the decision-making process in Vienna and vice versa. More-
over, one region’s actions could set the tone for the external perception of the 
entire Monarchy as a neutral power during the War of American Independence. 
us the decisions of local magistrates, committees, and governors, such as those 
in the Austrian Netherlands, for example, coloured the British impression of 
the Habsburgs. e same was especially true for Habsburg diplomats at foreign 
courts as well as those in service to other members of the House of Habsburg, 
but who were not representatives of the Habsburg Monarchy. It is for this reason 
that the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, ruled under secundogeniture terms by the 
Habsburg dynasty, is paramount to understanding the complex interrelation-
ship between the Habsburg Monarchy and the American Revolution. Ameri-
can patriots and British envoys, for instance, both interpreted the independent 
policies of the emperor’s younger brother in Tuscany as commensurate with the 
wider policy of the Habsburg Monarchy. Tuscany’s inclusion in this narrative is 
therefore crucial. Analysing various regional inuences, as this book does, is a 
fundamental step in chronicling and understanding the Habsburg response to 
the American Revolution as a whole.
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e importance of multi-archival and multilingual research in craing new
histories of both the Habsburg Monarchy and the American Revolution should 
become self-evident throughout this book. Austrian archivist-historian Hans 
Schlitter exercised this mantra in the 1880s when he completed the only other 
monograph on this topic. His Die Beziehungen Österreichs zu den Vereinigten
Staaten 1778-1787 (Austria’s relations with the United States, 1778–1787) uti-
lised sources at the Austrian State Archives (where he served later as one of the 
archival directors) and from a 
eld trip to Washington, DC, sponsored both by 
his father and the education ministry.66 Schlitter’s combination of sources made 
him realise the interconnected goals shared by American citizens and Habsburg 
subjects and allowed him to write one of the best international histories of the 
Habsburg Monarchy of his time. Although Schlitter’s work was pioneering for 
its time, it is still a work very much of its time as a study of the few great indi-
viduals of the Revolution and analysis limited largely to state-level diplomacy 
between the two states. In Schlitter’s rendering, the ideas of the Revolution were 
largely absent. e economic lure of a sovereign United States, which tempted 
the Monarchy’s mercantile classes and attracted foreign merchants to its ports, 
counted for little.67 Now, this present book considers all three elements together. 
e American Revolution was not solely a diplomatic problem for the Habsburg 
Monarchy but also a commercial opportunity and a cultural obsession. One fac-
tor did not operate without aecting the other. Analysing these elements in tan-
dem reveals the whole and showcases the breadth of the Habsburg engagement
with the Revolution and the independent American republic.
What follows is a chronological analysis of the eects of the American Rev-
olution in the Habsburg lands and the Habsburg response to American inde-
pendence before the time of the French Revolution. e United States did not 
appear out of a vacuum in the 1770s, but rather its colonial ancestry formed an 
important part in the European reception and recognition of the new American 
republic announced in 1776. In charting this dynamic episode in American and 
Central European history, it is crucial, therefore, to be aware of how the United 
States 
tted into a continuum of Habsburg perceptions of the Americas since 
the discovery of the New World. Once disquietude among the thirteen colo-
nies erupted into open conict, the American Revolution was an unavoidable 
political event to inhabitants across the Habsburg lands. e outbreak of war 
posed many initial challenges for the Habsburg Monarchy, which culminated 
in the dramatic 
rst diplomatic mission of an American representative to the 
Habsburg court in 1778. Yet by the 
nal years of the war, Habsburg o­cials had 
recognised the potential gains in the revolutionary turmoil and sought to pro
t, 
both economically and politically, from the conagration engul
ng the Atlantic 
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world. In surmounting these diplomatic challenges, the economic signi
cance 
of the American Revolution for the Habsburgs became clear and the eorts to 
secure this commercial opportunity formed an ill-fated priority of the postwar 
agenda. ough the attraction of American commerce proved great and brought 
the Habsburgs into greater contact with the peoples of North America, the fatal 
inuence of one prominent American revolutionary protected these designs for 
decades to come. is book concludes by chronicling the lingering American 
dream in the Habsburg lands which lasted for generations beyond the Revolu-
tion itself. roughout this book, a whole host of 
gures emerge. Some will be 
familiar to many; some will be unknown to most; and some may be surprising 
inclusions, but all were in their own ways central in constructing the meaning 
of the American Revolution in the Habsburg lands. If it were not for people 
like Johann and Maria Schuster aer all, we would be unaware of the immense 
impact of the American Revolution on the Habsburg Monarchy.
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“England Is the Motherland and America the Daughter?”
Colonial and Revolutionary America in the Habsburg Mind
P eople in the Habsburg lands had formed a deep connection with America long before the American Revolution. For centuries prior to the outbreak of war in the 1770s, knowledge of an “America” and then 
many “Americas” had come through several mediums. Dynastic servants, Jesuits 
missionaries, merchant traders, newspaper editors, and artists came together to 
weave di
erent strands into the tapestry of the Habsburg outlook on the New 
World; they in	uenced the wider perception of America and helped to shape 
the mental worlds of their contemporaries. is process began with the voyage 
of Christopher Columbus and was still underway by the time of the Declara-
tion of American Independence and the Siege of Yorktown. It was a muddy 
process, one shaped as much by events in the Americas as it was by events in 
Europe. In the Habsburg case, it was also a process shaped by geographical 
proximities and cultural legacies: the abjugation from Habsburg Spain and the 
abrasion against the Ottomans. Negatives—depopulation, censorship, sickness 
and disease—also played a role. By the eighteenth century, however, a singu-
lar Habsburg preconception of America came to exist, one based on a blend of 
pseudo-scientic observations largely from Catholic missionaries and coloured 
by late-Baroque rationalism. As revolution approached in the 1760s, attention 
shied northwards towards the British North American colonies. New com-
mentators focused on the potentiality of America, its bountiful landscape, and 
the harmonising nature of its commerce in more universal tones rather than a 
foreign land of oddities.
In charting this rise of colonial and revolutionary America in the Habsburg 
mind, one fact becomes clear: the Habsburg Monarchy was not a detached en-
tity from the Atlantic maritime world. On the contrary, Habsburg inhabitants 
learned about America with relatively equal pace as much of western Europe. 
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Many Habsburg subjects, moreover, contributed to the discourse around the 
Americas from the Hungarian István Budai Permanius, whose poems waxed 
lyrical about Newfoundland, to the Brno-based tax collector and publicist 
Heinrich Georg Ho
, who counted George Washington as among one of 
the most remarkable and famous people in the world.1 Entwined within the 
richly interwoven European narratives on America was a continuous Habsburg 
thread. Unpicking this thread not only contextualises the meaning of the 
American Revolution in the Habsburg world but also better contextualises that 
same Habsburg world, one which encompassed a broad, global outlook as well 
as a European one.2
Post-Columbian America and the Habsburg Monarchy
e voyages of discovery from Christopher Columbus’s arrival in 1492 to the 
conrmation of a separate hemisphere in the voyage of Amerigo Vespucci im-
planted a new spatial order in European minds. e Habsburg Monarchy of the 
eighteenth century did not yet exist at that time. Bohemia and Hungary were 
independent kingdoms. e Austrian dominions were fragmented as several 
duchies and, up until a few years before Columbus’s landing in the Bahamas, 
had been partly conquered by the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus. Emperor 
Maximilian I’s reconquest of the Austrian territories throughout the 1480s con-
solidated his reputation. Maximilian sought to commemorate his achievements 
in imperial propaganda. He ordered the completion of the Triumphal Procession, 
a series of woodblock prints, spanning 54 metres in length. Conceived by Max-
imilian and an Austrian cartographer before being worked on by several artists 
including Albrecht Dürer and Hans Burgkmair, the series depicted a fantastical 
allegorical train of carriages containing the emperor’s subjects to proclaim his 
glory. One such group was the warriors of Calicut, a malleable sixteenth-century 
term denoting people beyond the seas, including Americans.3 Half-dressed in 
feather skirts and headdresses, erroneously clutching European bladed spears, 
the ensemble re	ected the new cognizance of America in the Habsburg mind. 
On another plate, the people of Calicut appear as bare-breasted women carrying 
bountiful produce, tending to oxen and rams while one features a monkey comb-
ing her hair and headdress. In this case, the plates served Maximilian’s desire to 
display his worldly omnipotence.4 To erase any shadow of a doubt, Maximilian 
sanctioned an accompanying verse to reinforce his ties to the Calicut and connec-
tion to the New World: “e Emperor in his warlike pride, conquering nations 
far and wide, has brought beneath our Empire's yoke the far-o
 Calicuttish folk.”5
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It was a Habsburg device deployed again in the real-life procession held in 
Brussels in 1517 to mark the accession of Maximilian’s grandson (and future heir) 
Charles of Ghent to the Spanish throne as Carlos I (known more famously as 
Charles V). A group of Amerindians preceded a nal 	oat which carried a giant 
golden globe as if to full Maximilian’s earlier vision.6 For the Habsburg rulers 
contemporary to the discovery of the New World, inclusion of the Amerindian 
	oat in their displays of power meant projecting their interests upon it. As rulers 
of the Holy Roman Empire, an edice commonly understood to be universalist 
in scope, Maximilian saw new extra-European territory as falling under his pat-
rimony as a universal emperor.7 But staking a theoretical claim was not the only 
result. By incorporating America, the Habsburgs also served to revitalise their 
image as modern rulers, bringing the new, wondrous, and exotic to the people 
in such public processions and prints. Maximilian planned for the Triumph se-
ries to be hung in all major halls throughout the Holy Roman Empire and had 
various copies made of the panels. In a later version by a Tyrolean artist, the Cal-
cuttish warriors appear even further dened by the Habsburg psyche; possessing 
beards, wearing sandals, carrying rounded shields, and brandishing bows more 
akin to an Arabian style than anything related to the New World.8 Maximilian 
alluded to further claims in his written plans for the Triumphal Arch, which in-
cluded the “1,500 islands”—a reference to Columbus’s letter about 1,400 sighted 
islands—as one of his patrimonial crests adorning the monument.9 It was only 
tting that the rst Latin publications of Amerigo Vespucci’s voyages, which 
capitulated his prominence and helped enshrine the name America for the new 
continent, bore dedications to Maximilian.10
Amassing new-world objects for semi-private display was another route to 
utilise America for personal enhancement. Habsburg elites were no di
erent 
from their European contemporaries who sought to acquire American objects 
for their collections. Emperors Maximilian I through to Rudolf II all collected 
new-world curiosities for their wonder cabinets (Wunderkammern).11 Maximil-
ian’s daughter, Margaret of Austria, was one of the earliest collectors owing 
to her brief second marriage to Don Juan, son of Ferdinand and Isabella of 
Spain in the 1490s. She saw herself as a future ruler of the newfound domin-
ions over which the Spanish monarchs had claimed sovereignty for themselves. 
By 1524, she had acquired nearly two hundred American artefacts.12 In gen-
eral, the Habsburg obsession with the Spanish throne and its territories in the 
New World fostered an American prominence in the dynastic lands of Central 
Europe. Emperor Ferdinand I, who was born and raised in Spain, prized his 
collection of Americana.13 He retained personal connections with numerous 
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Spanish courtiers who informed him of the latest American discoveries.14 His 
son and heir, Maximilian II, followed much the same interest, instructing his 
ambassador in Madrid to collect the rarest and most spectacular new-world 
objects.15 Ferdinand I’s other son, Ferdinand, who ruled as a sovereign in the 
secundogeniture of the Tyrol and Further Austria, also placed great value on ob-
taining and exhibiting Americana. His most notable possessions included Aztec 
feather garments, headdresses, and shields such as those worn by the Aztec g-
ures featured in Esther und Avasver, a painting which he displayed prominently 
at Schloss Ambras near Innsbruck.16
Dreams of owning the New World and of reconnecting with Spain persisted 
throughout the dynastic line of the Austrian Habsburgs. e father of Maria 
eresa, Emperor Charles VI, yearned to recreate a Spanish-Austrian world 
empire centred on the colonial conquests in the New World.17 Aer his forced 
relocation from Barcelona to Vienna upon the death of his brother, Charles 
contorted the Central European space he found around him towards such a 
vision. He lled the court with Spanish personnel and reformed institutions to 
be more like Spanish colonial enterprises. e Karlskirche in Vienna became 
perhaps the most tangible manifestation of his imperialist aims with its dual 
columns representing the Pillars of Hercules at the Straits of Gibraltar opening 
out to the Atlantic.18 is Spanish-New World in	uence was still alive and well 
in the generation of the American Revolution. Maria eresa’s court processions 
as well as portraits of her and her husband Francis Stephan boldly showed o
 
Spanish-styled clothes and fashions.19
Illusions of the rulers oen a
ected the allusions of the ruled. Habsburg elites 
emulated the incorporation of America through collecting and self-fashioning. 
Prince Pál Esterházy, for example, acquired engravings of Amerindians aer ob-
serving the collections of Rudolf II in Vienna.20 In mimicking the tastes of the 
Habsburg monarchs, courtiers and nobles precipitated a wider craze for Amer-
icana. Fetishising parrots became one symptom of this trickle-down mania. 
e quest for these new-world birds, mainly from the “land of parrots” (Brazil), 
was a longstanding obsession of the Habsburg rulers from Rudolf II to Francis 
Stephan.21 Such imperial projects provoked a cultural fascination around the 
colourful avians. e Archduke Sigismund Francis of Tyrol and Further Austria 
purchased an ornate parrot clock, and in Bohemia, a surviving inventory of ball 
costumes features a courtly couple bedecked in parrot feathers.22 Donning new-
world dress became a fashionable exercise among Habsburg nobles as proud 
portraits of the Netolicky and Schwarzenberg families can attest.23 In Prague, 
the imperial feather-worker Jan Fuchs established a shop to cater for city elites 
“England Is the Motherland and America the Daughter?” 19 
and their fascination for colourful plumes.24 Aristocrats consciously sought 
out and absorbed Americana through friendships, family networks, grand 
tours, and diplomatic oces.25 As time wore on, these elites developed more 
consumer-orientated tastes for Americana. e exotic gave way to the luxurious. 
Consumables and commodities such as sugar, co
ee, and beaver hats became en 
vogue and with them the rst indirect commercial pathways to the Americas 
emerged.26 In turn, America became less a curious land and more a source of 
produce, industry, and exploitation for Habsburg inhabitants.27
Allegorical art was one medium in which the colonial image of America re-
mained constant. From the late Renaissance to the early nineteenth century, 
artists developed a visual metaphor for America. Continental allegories depict-
ing the four continents of the earth—Africa, America, Asia, and Europe—be-
came an artistic shorthand throughout the southern lands of the Holy Roman 
Empire.28 No less than ninety American allegories appeared on the ceilings and 
walls of parish churches, manorial houses, monastic libraries, and grand palaces 
across the Austrian lands between 1645 and 1832.29 In these frescoes, the personi-
cation of America oen took the form of a woman (or cherub) half-dressed and 
crowned with a feather headdress. Commonly associated animals, including the 
much-adored parrots, featured alongside alligators and armadillos. Inferences 
oscillated between representations of a noble savage and princely gure, but a 
sense of inferiority was always apparent, reinforced by the position of America 
as subordinate to Europe and Asia and a counterpart to Africa. e locations 
of these allegories re	ected the further trickling-down of American interest 
within Habsburg society. Prior to 1710, the majority abounded in the palaces of 
Lower Austria and Styria such as Schloss Eggenberg near Graz and the Lower 
Belvedere near Vienna. Later, American allegories appeared predominantly in 
abbeys and monasteries before reaching parish churches in the mid-eighteenth 
century. ese images introduced the concept of America to ordinary people 
who came to these everyday places of worship. Consciously and unconsciously, 
such iconography shaped the mental worldview of Catholic churchgoers across 
the Austrian lands.30 Despite this localised in	uence, parish reliefs did not hold 
a monopoly on the religious vision of the Americas in Central Europe.
e Society of Jesus was responsible for the most popular religious lens on the 
Americas in the Habsburg lands. Whereas fashion and art had solidied forms 
of the exotic, Jesuit missionaries from the Austrian Habsburg lands created a 
more nuanced picture of the Americas. Ocially formed in 1540, the Society 
of Jesus grew steadily in the Habsburg lands. Of the 5,340 Jesuits of the Ger-
man assistancy in 1750, over half originated from the Austrian and Bohemian 
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provinces.31 Jesuits from the Habsburg lands enthusiastically participated in the 
missionising e
orts of the order in the Americas. At least 737 Jesuits travelled 
westward for this purpose from the German assistancy; around forty percent 
came from the Austrian, Bohemian and Tyrolean provinces.32 A similar en-
thusiasm existed in Hungary.33 Completing this mission brought Jesuits into 
close contact with inhabitants from Brazil to the plains of North America.34
From these intense and sustained encounters, oen lasting years, Jesuits from 
the Habsburg lands formulated pejorative views of their hosts and neighbours. 
Indigenous societies seemed “primitive” even “uncivilised” rather than conform-
ing to the idyllic representations of the “noble savage” or “children of nature” 
tropes.35 Missionaries played an important role in brokering this new view to 
people in their native lands by writing reports to their peers in provincial semi-
naries and to their families.36
Central European Jesuits also aimed to publish their letters in specialised 
journals in their native lands. In the Habsburg lands, two Jesuit journals stand 
out as in	uential in shaping the Central European perception of America. In 
the rst instance, Jesuits at the University of Trnava (Nagyszombat) began 
publication of an annual almanac in 1676. Reports from missionaries in the 
New World featured throughout. Typical entries focused on the savagery and 
dissimilarity of the Native peoples.37 e 1709 issue, for example, featured 
news of the “Indos” who had dog’s teeth and barked.38 e Bohemian Jesuit 
Joseph Neumann, for instance, published in Prague a bloody memoir in Latin 
of his mission during the Tarahumara revolts against the Spanish and Jesuit 
presence in New Spain in the 1690s.39 Another Bohemian Jesuit, Adam Gilg, 
formulated his American reality with harsher words in a letter home. America, 
in his opinion, was “a garden full of spines deprived of all human consolation.”
40 Such information appeared as evidence in treatises written by Jesuit fathers 
at Trnava who strove to comprehend mankind in all its unusual forms from 
the “harmonious” to the “imperfect.”41 eir treatises on geography, avians, 
botany, and dendrology all cited examples from New World observations. 
From the men who outran deer in Florida to fantastical golden trees in the Ca-
ribbean to the worshiped Quetzaltototl birds of the Aztecs, such information 
supplemented the growing global outlook of Central European Jesuits who 
sought to conform new discoveries into a rationalised knowledge system.42 In-
formation contained in the Trnava almanac reached large audiences. e main 
editor of the almanac, the polymath professor Márton Szentiványi, repurposed 
this information for further publications which were translated into German 
and French.43 Szentiványi’s refashioning of new-world knowledge also reached 
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other Jesuit centres of the Hungarian lands long aer his death in 1708. In 
Košice, for example, parts of his treatises were printed in the Calendarium of 
the Jesuit university in 1754.44 e Jesuit father Pál Bertalan reworked much 
of the Hungarian Jesuit knowledge into his 1757 geography of the Americas.45
e endless cycles of circulation and recirculation through multiple authors, 
from Jesuits present in the Americas to the editors of almanacs in Hungary to 
their translators and readers, ensured the constant di
usion of Jesuit knowl-
edge about the New World in the Habsburg lands up to the time of the Amer-
ican Revolution.
If Hungarian Jesuits had Trnava as their epicentre of world-knowledge gen-
eration, then the Jesuits of the Austrian province had the city of Graz. For 
thirty-ve years between 1726 and 1761, Jesuits in the city produced Der Neue
Welt-Bott (e New World Messenger), founded by Joseph Stöcklein.46 Stöck-
lein’s initiative was a similar undertaking to Szentiványi’s almanac in Trnava 
and followed examples of French Jesuit journals about the New World, which 
reproduced translated accounts and transcribed oral testimonies of missionar-
ies.47 By presenting actual assertions of missionaries, albeit somewhat edited, 
Stöcklein directly transported his readers to an eyewitness position. Further-
more, accounts published in Der Neue Welt-Bott appeared in the vernacular 
German rather than Latin, re	ecting Stöcklein’s broader aims for dissemina-
tion beyond the clergy.48 In producing such rich content, around 812 reports in 
total, Stöcklein’s endeavour paid o
 as Der Neue Welt-Bott became one of the 
most in	uential sources of new-world information in the German-speaking 
lands.49 Although the journal featured reports from Jesuits across the world, 
fully one quarter (203 reports) featured the Americas.50 Der Neue Welt-Bott
presented a wondrous vision across the Atlantic. It was a land lled with mys-
terious animals and peoples in need of converting by a “civilised,” learned 
preacher.51 Aiming to serve German-speaking readers, Stöcklein selected letters 
showing non-German missionaries (except for the Bohemians and Hungarians) 
as “vainglorious and boastful” or “cruel and greedy.”52 Combined with exten-
sive imagery, Der Neue Welt-Bott served to create vindication and enthusiasm 
for the Germanic—and in this case, Habsburg—presence in the Americas.53
Stöcklein’s mission to not only to feed the “German” “appetite for knowledge” 
but also to elevate the endeavours of his fellow countrymen that increased the 
Habsburg sense of purpose in the New World and, at the same time, made it 
less alien.54 It was no surprise that young Jesuits from the Habsburg Monarchy 
who ventured to the New World aer reading Stöcklein’s journal specically 
wrote accounts intended for publication in subsequent editions.55
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First-hand accounts of America in the Habsburg lands rose aer the sudden 
prosecution of the Jesuit order in the Spanish empire in 1767. Following the 
decree banning all Jesuit activity in Asia and America, around three hundred 
Central European Jesuits attempted to return home.56 A return to normalcy be-
came increasingly dicult following the general suppression of the Jesuit order 
in 1773.57 Many ex-missionaries turned to printing their memoirs in order to sup-
plement their position, resulting in a literature boom which oen portrayed the 
colonial Americas in a nostalgic fashion.58 e fantastical series of fourty-seven 
watercolours depicting mission life in Baja California with German and Spanish 
subtitles by the exiled Ignaz Tirsch in Znojmo best represent a Habsburg Jesuit’s 
case of longing for former life in the New World.59 Jesuits in the Habsburg lands 
enjoyed relative freedom under the more pious and tolerant reigns of Maria e-
resa and Joseph II.60 Martin Dobrizho
er, a Jesuit who missionised among the 
Guraní and Abipone peoples of Paraguay from 1749, settled in Vienna aer the 
suppression, where, through the patronage of Maria eresa, he worked as one 
of her more favoured court preachers.61 In fact, she oen sent for Dobrizho
er 
to preach to her personally so that she “might hear his adventures from his own 
lips.”62 e publication of his monumental three-volume Historia de Abiponi-
bus; equestri, bellicosaque Paraquarieae natione (A History of the Abipones, an 
Equestrian Warrior Nation of Paraguay) in Vienna in 1784 was due to his royal 
patronage and an immediate German translation followed.63 In the preface to 
his work, Dobrizho
er explained his rationale for writing his account, which 
does much to illuminate the widespread interest in Americana in the Habsburg 
Monarchy by the late eighteenth century. Whereas in America Dobrizho
er 
had been continually interrogated about Europe, in Austria he was “frequently 
questioned concerning America” and sought to alleviate himself of this trouble 
but writing “this little history” on the advice of “some person of distinction,” 
referring to Maria eresa.64 e thirst for rst-hand accounts of the Americas 
from returning Jesuits peaked in the years of the American Revolution. It was 
not only Dobrizho
er and Tirsch who contributed to the blossoming eld of 
ex-Jesuit studies on America. American works continued to appear by Jesuits 
who had sought refuge in the Habsburg lands such as Bernhard Havestadt–, 
Franz Xaver Veigl, and Florian Paucke who settled in Vienna, Klagenfurt, and 
the Cistercian abbey of Zwettl, respectively.65 Such works by returning Jesuits 
and their predecessors embedded a deeper understanding of the Americas in the 
Habsburg web of knowledge.66 Yet given the geography of the Spanish empire 
and the preponderance of Jesuit missions in central and southern America, these 
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Jesuit accounts transxed the Habsburg gaze towards these regions rather than 
North America. It was only as news of the domestic grievances in the British 
colonies ltered through in the 1760s that the orientation shied northwards 
and a new American arena became the focus of attention.
e Dawn of North America
e mid-eighteenth century witnessed a marked decline of hispano-centric 
Americanism within Habsburg audiences whilst British North America cap-
tured an increasing share of the attention. Discussions over southern and cen-
tral America continued but observers in the mid-eighteenth-century Habsburg 
lands began to recognise a prosperous, yet precarious situation developing in the 
British colonies. Prognostications swirled over the future of the colonies and the 
nature of the colonists living there as new information came to light. Econo-
mists, scientists, librettists, and newspaper editors contributed to these emerging 
debates. e ideas put forward by these individuals owed a debt to the previous 
centuries of knowledge about the Americas but advanced conversations around 
the thirteen colonies that would later become the United States of America. En-
gagement with the complexity of America was not uniform across the Habsburg 
lands on the eve of the Revolution. Each region—Habsburg Milan, Tuscany, the 
Austrian Netherlands, Austria-Bohemia, and the Hungarian lands—ascribed 
their own importance to events and ideas circulating about North America. As 
the American Revolution dawned, however, the tumult occurring across the At-
lantic interested peoples of all areas of the Habsburg Monarchy.
e genre of emigration literature rst saw a shi towards North America. 
Over the course of the eighteenth century, one in three inhabitants of the Holy 
Roman Empire relocated to territories outside its imperial borders.67 Around 
100,000 German-speaking migrants sailed to British North America prior to 
1776.68 Transatlantic migration from provinces bordering the Habsburg lands 
formed part of this movement, with the most notable cases involving victims of 
religious persecution such as the Salzburgers, who arrived in Georgia in 1734, 
and the Moravian Herrnhuters, who followed Count Nikolaus Ludwig von 
Zinzendorf and David Nitschmann to Pennsylvania in 1741.69 Total emigration 
from the Habsburg lands proper to North America only reached several thou-
sands at most, however.70 Another substantial block of German speakers, total-
ling around 500,000 people, travelled eastwards following resettlement schemes 
to populate the Hungarian lands and the newly reconquered Banat of Temesvar 
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from the Ottomans in 1717.71 e resulting demand for colonists pitted migrant 
recruiters against one another over the supply of human capital.72 Popular con-
ceptions of emigration destinations in North America and the eastern lands 
became increasingly distorted by the advertising of these recruitment drives. 
Recruiters frequently depicted North America as a land of proverbial milk and 
honey.73 Land was cheap there; work was plentiful; religious persecution did not 
exist, and so on. Even hunting was easier, as the bison, to take one recruiter’s 
word, wandered into your house almost begging to be shot and slaughtered.74
e ideal of American life appeared so strongly to prospective German migrants 
that recruiters for the eastern part of the Habsburg lands chose to imitate the 
claims. e Banat of Temesvar became known as “Europe’s America” in an e
ort 
to ascribe positive connotations with North America to the Hungarian inte-
rior.75 Letters sent back from emigrants to their home communities established 
a better sense of the harsher realities, but these did little to deter future migrants 
who relied upon manuals when crossing the Atlantic.76 It was possible to walk 
through the eighteenth-century Habsburg lands and hear the buzz of excitement 
about America. Towards the close of the century, one writer arrived at a tavern in 
lower Styria and heard tales of the innkeeper’s grandfather and his adventures in 
America. e writer subsequently published his diary, calling him the “Styrian 
Robinson Crusoe.”77
Positive depictions of life in North America created defenders and detrac-
tors in Europe. A naturalist, Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Bu
on– led the 
charge in admonishing American qualities. Bu
on contended that the presence 
of smaller creatures in the New World along with the less populous Native peo-
ples pointed to a general American inferiority compared to the inhabitants and 
nature in Eurasia. Bu
on’s theory of “American degeneracy,” as it came to be 
known, ignited and fascinated readers in the Habsburg lands as it did elsewhere 
in Europe. Yet to some, these theories seemed incompatible with the economic 
vitality of British American colonists. Intellectuals challenged Bu
on’s ideas, 
especially in the Habsburg provinces in the Italian peninsula. e Milanese 
mathematics professor Paolo Frisi attacked the leading works of Bu
on and his 
supporter Cornelius de Pauw.78 Frisi argued America was a fertile land populated 
by intelligent people.79 e ultimate proof, Frisi concluded, lay in the example 
of North America, especially “in Philadelphia where all the other glories of Eu-
rope have already been emulated.” British colonists, Frisi noted, had engaged in 
a series of pioneering scientic studies, leading them to “controlling the re of 
heaven and calculating the quantity of matter in comets.”80 His examples alluded 
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to Benjamin Franklin’s electrical experiments and John Winthrop’s studies on 
comets. In exemplifying North America, Frisi shied focus away from South 
America. For Frisi, the British colonies in North America served as a repudia-
tion of degeneracy and o
ered a convincing model for American prosperity and 
contribution to European life.
Frisi was not alone in his rebuttal of degeneracy and promotion of British 
North America as the paragon of colonial virtue and enterprise. e Milanese 
nobleman Gian Rinaldo Carli published his own polemic refuting degeneracy 
ideas. Written during the course of the American Revolution, Carli’s Lettere
Americane drew more heavily on the North American example and contained 
far more vitriol for De Pauw personally. “He thinks everything outside of Breslau 
and Berlin as barbaric and savage,” Carli decried before he claimed De Pauw was 
an alcoholic who “is drinking beer at this very moment as I write.”81 Carli like-
wise extolled British colonial examples and won the greater share of acclaim for 
his ad hominem treatise with subsequent translations in French and German.82
Franklin, to whom the Lettere Americane was dedicated, wrote personally to 
Carli's publisher to extend his thanks for Carli’s “witty defens [sic] against the 
attacks of that misinformed and malignant Writer.”83 Indeed, Carli had done 
much to propagate Franklin’s reputation among the Milanese. An anonymous 
reviewer of the Lettere Americane praised Carli in 1782 for conrming that “the 
immortal American Mr. Franklin demonstrates the health and greatness of that 
new American nation.”84
Friedrich Wilhelm Taube became one of the most knowledgeable commen-
tators of his day on North American matters. Born in London as the son of 
Queen Charlotte’s personal physician, Taube spent his youth in the British capi-
tal before the queen’s death in 1737 provoked his family’s relocation to Hannover 
where the young Taube studied law at the University of Göttingen. Taube later 
worked as a lawyer but spent many years travelling, which reportedly included a 
trip to North America.85 Upon his return to Europe, Taube eventually became 
the legation secretary in the Habsburg embassy in London, utilising his German 
and English 	uency and quickly establishing himself as an expert on the British 
economy, with a particular interest in Britain’s emerging struggles to tax North 
Americans. In 1766, he published his rst work on the issue titled oughts on 
the Present State of our Colonies in North America, but no known copy survives 
today.86 One description of this work, however, attests that Taube collected the 
evidence for it from “his friends in North America.”87 e work was well re-
ceived and Maria eresa honoured him with a golden medallion. Later that 
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year, Taube unfortunately penned a critical report on the British government’s 
handling of the situation, which prompted his recall back to Vienna. Still of use 
and recognised for his talents, he joined the Council of Commerce (Commerz-
rat) as a counsellor (Hofskretär) in compensation.88
Subsequently, Taube published his magnum opus in Vienna in 1774, his His-
torische und politische Abschilderung der Engländischen Manufacturen (Histori-
cal and political depictions of English manufacturers).89 In this work, he detailed 
the nature of the British economy, ranging from the goods produced to the scale 
and health of Britain’s international trade across the world. e book’s compre-
hensiveness made it a popular success, and this work included plenty of refer-
ence to the situation of the British colonies in North America. He highlighted 
for his readers the future prosperity of North America based on its economic 
vibrancy, growing population, and abundance of land. “at the land in Amer-
ica is so plentiful and inexpensive,” he explained, “even the workers, servants, 
and day-labourers who know something of farming, can in a short time save 
so much money.”90 Such attractive economic vitality claried, in Taube’s view, 
why the population grew so rapidly since young men could easily provide for 
their families, therefore allowing American couples to marry earlier and have an 
average of eight children.91 Although much less explicitly than Frisi and Carli, 
Taube’s convictions also 	atly contradicted the ideas of American degeneracy. 
He argued, moreover, that the colonists were united by shared values of freedom 
of commerce and equal rights before the law.92 is common principle stood in 
contrast to the evermore restrictive policies imposed on them by their govern-
ment in London. Taube made a forthright prediction that open con	ict would 
come between the Americans and the British. Already in 1774, he wrote of the 
inevitability of American independence, which he believed would arise when 
Americans became “weary enough of English supremacy” and he was made all 
the more certain by the recent protests for which the colonists went without any 
chastisement for their disobedience.93 “So it seems doubtful,” Taube concluded, 
“to say whether England has more cause to fear or to hope from its colonies.”94
As the tensions led to bloodshed in the colonies, Taube wrote more works 
outlining his views. In 1776, he published his Geschichte der Engländischen
Handelscha, Manufacturen, Colonien und Schiahrt (A history of English 
commerce, manufacturing, colonies and shipping). In an appended essay on the 
“true causes of the current war in North America,” Taube squarely blamed the 
excessive taxation of the American colonists by the British, which itself lay in 
the historical development of the British economy.95 From Taube’s longue durée
perspective, quite uncommon among German commentators at the time, the 
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American Revolution was an entirely foreseeable event. “Soon aer the Treaty 
of Paris in 1763,” he explained in the introduction, “there began a longing for free 
trade in the hearts of the Americans.”96 e Tea and Stamp Acts had denied them 
this natural desire and so the British were at fault for not listening to their un-
represented colonists. A strikingly sympathetic argument, Taube touched upon 
this theme again in his revised second edition of the Historische und politische
Abschilderung der Engländischen Manufacturen, which he expanded into two 
volumes in 1777 and 1778.97 In the second volume, Taube took great pains to 
reiterate the “tremendous changes” and damage done to the British economy by 
their disastrous war in North America.98 Yet Taube planned to publish his best 
material on that topic in a new third volume focused solely on the American 
Revolution.99 What laudatory views of America and further criticisms of the 
British position this work would have contained we cannot know since Taube 
died suddenly in June 1778. In spite of his premature death, Taube’s works helped 
to pivot attention towards the peril and potential of the American colonists in 
North America. His works reached a large audience even in England, where the 
1774 German edition appeared on the shelves of the Foreign Circulating Library 
in Leeds.100 Not all reception was positive, however. e free-market advocate 
and court economist Count Karl von Zinzendorf read Taube’s volumes in De-
cember 1778 with great disgust. As a man who had studied the British economy 
and American colonial situation, Zinzendorf disagreed with Taube’s praise for 
the American boycott of British goods.101 “It is a compilation containing some 
curious facts interspersed with false or supercial reasoning,” he noted in his 
diary.102 Supercial or not, Taube had sown the seeds of discussion among the 
inhabitants of the Habsburg Monarchy. Years later, even Zinzendorf was still 
reading Taube’s texts.103
One man in Vienna undoubtedly aware of Taube’s texts was Jacques Accarias 
de Sérionne. Like Taube, Sérionne was not a native of the Habsburg Monarchy. 
Born in Châtillon-en-Diois in southeastern France, Sérionne rose through the 
French administrative ranks before several risky investments forced him to 	ee 
Paris in the late 1750s. He settled in Brussels where he advised regional authori-
ties on economic matters for almost a decade. In 1768, he relocated to Vienna as 
an advisor in the State Chancellery (Staatskanzlei) before moving to Hungary 
as an agent for the Batthyány family.104 It was during these wandering years that 
Sérionne became one of Europe’s most popular economic essayists, publishing a 
variety of in	uential texts.105 In Brussels, he founded the Journal de Commerce
which ran for forty-eight issues with state support.106 From his experience in 
France and as editor of the Journal, Sérionne became acutely aware of colonial 
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economic policies. In nine issues of the Journal, Sérionne penned essays on the 
colonial economies of Portugal and Spain.107 Sérionne took a harsh line towards 
the e
ects of colonial enterprise. He looked backwards rather than forwards and 
saw in the previous decadence of the Spanish empire how corrosively the colonial 
market could undermine the metropole. In 1761 he published his Les intérêts des
nations (e interests of nations) followed by his La richesse de l’Angleterre (e 
riches of England) in Vienna in 1771.108
In La richesse, Sérionne took aim squarely at the American colonies, which 
he felt had sapped the English commercial system. From Sérionne’s perspective 
a country could only count on its material wealth for economic strength. En-
gland, with its vast resources in timber and minerals, enjoyed a stable footing but 
the establishment of colonial projects had turned this economic system towards 
venture capitalism. Public credit served no one and private enterprise seques-
tered away the resources of the state. He noted how the American colonies had 
all been founded by private companies and had become their “richest branches 
of trade.”109 In agreement with authors like Taube, Sérionne echoed the vital-
ity of these American colonies but rather than praise their might, he predicted 
inevitable con	ict. “It is astonishing,” he wrote in La richesse, “that a nation as 
enlightened as the English, has not foreseen in the projects of its plantations 
of North America, that those colonies which gather the same fruits and which 
have exactly the same industry as their metropolis, must necessarily become its 
rivals and therefore innitely harmful.”110 Sérionne went further with added 
prescience. He awaited the eventual independence of the American colonies. 
Written during his Hungarian employment in 1771, Sérionne lamented how 
it was too late for the British. e Americans had already been allowed to be-
come too powerful for them to be subjugated indenitely.111 “e Englishmen 
of America are as good as the Englishmen of Europe,” he warned, “and three or 
four thousand troops, which are about all that a European nation can transport 
to America, would not be enough of an army for them.”112 True, he acknowl-
edged, the path to American independence had begun with the Stamp Act cri-
sis, but it was fuelled by the “unceasing” rivalry of trade between the two sides. 
It would be completed only when the “embarrassment of such division” would 
interest all the “other industrious nations of Europe.”113 In other words, not one 
but two commentators under the Habsburg Monarchy expounded the strengths 
of the American colonies and predicted the course of the War of American In-
dependence several years before its outbreak.
e economic aspects of the American Revolution became one of the most 
intriguing details for Habsburg observers as attention shied towards North 
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America. In Lambach Abbey in Upper Austria, one Benedictine monk wrote 
a play about the Revolution’s commercial fallout. Written in heavy Austrian 
dialect in 1780, Father Maurus Lindemayr’s three-act drama Der engländische
Patriotismus (English patriotism) featured two English merchants coping with 
wartime turmoil.114 e rst, Hickshot, denounces the American “rebels” he 
reads so much about in the newspapers and yearns for peace.115 “I toss and turn 
at night; you’d have to scorch Philadelphia for me and blow Boston to smith-
ereens,” he recalls in one aria.116 A proud Londoner and Tory, Hickshot denes 
his Englishness upon anti-American lines. “Good” Englishmen should, in Hick-
shot’s view, “curse the colonists [and], like the Antichrist, strike thunder into 
the rebel! To pray for that is to be a Brit.”117 Hickshot’s staunch sentiment is 
counterbalanced by a Bristol merchant named Smedley who trades freely with 
the Americans. Lindemayr’s play was not anti-American, however. Debate over 
the colonies is complicated by additional characters, such as Hickshot’s lackey 
John who acts confused by events. He asks at one point whether England is the 
motherland and America the daughter (“England ist ja das Mutterreich, und 
Amerika ist die Tochter?”).118 In a one-sided conversation between John and 
another, more cognisant Hickshot lackey, the clearest distillation of the new 
Figure 2. Portrait of Father Maurus Lindemayr of the 
Benedictine Abbey in Lambach, Upper Austria
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denition of America appears. Hagel, in response to John’s incessant misun-
derstanding of the impact of the Revolution, proclaims “for me America may 
be a part of the world but it is no longer a continent (Weltheil).”119 Before this, 
Hagel spells out for John how North America is in fact many component pieces 
including New France, “Neubritannien,” Acadia, New England, New Holland, 
New Denmark, New Spain, Virginia, Florida, and the lands of the Huron and 
Iroquois.120 In Lindemayr’s theatrical depiction, America was no longer a single 
entity but rather a fractured land re	ecting the disaggregation unfolding across 
the Atlantic. Lindemayr’s vision of America reached audiences beyond his mon-
astery at Lambach. Augustinians frequently performed his plays in nearby Sankt 
Florian and Linz and in the neighbouring Archbishopric of Salzburg, Michael 
Haydn—Joseph Haydn’s less famous younger brother—set the play to music.121
rough song and drama, they articulated the new political constellation un-
folding across the Atlantic.
Taube, Sérionne, and Lindemayr were not alone in their reorientation to-
wards North America. On the stages and in the palatial concert halls of the 
Habsburg lands, theatrical and instrumental works also guided outlooks north-
wards. Joseph Marius Babo’s 1778 play Das Winterquartier in Amerika (e 
winter quarter in America) centred on Hessian mercenaries and the quartering 
of soldiers among the colonists, for instance.122 is trend had begun already in 
the 1750s. One of the most popular and controversial dramatists in Vienna at 
that time, Joseph Felix von Kurz staged a pantomime called Arlequin, der neue
Abgott Ram in Amerika (Harlequin, the new idol Ram in America).123 e titu-
lar character Arelquin nds himself shipwrecked on the ctive American island 
of Tschaladey where, through comical altercations with a magician, he becomes 
mistakenly transformed into the deity Ram for the native “Indian” islanders. 
Kurz invoked standard stereotypes of American savagery typical of the preju-
dicial colonial lens, but the pantomime’s end implied the existence of a more 
sophisticated North America as Arlequin is rescued by Dutch traders heading to 
the West Indies or New Netherlands.124 Kurz’s drama was also popular in Prague 
and Bratislava.125 e piece was revived in Vienna in 1766 and appeared again 
in the 1770s under the name Die Insul der Wilden (e island of the savages).126
is time the elder Haydn, Joseph, wrote music for the pantomime’s arias.127
And it was not the only piece by him to deal with an American theme.
Joseph Haydn’s cosmos was lled with American imagery. His patron, Prince 
Nikolaus Esterházy, employed a servant from the West Indies whom Haydn 
knew well and whose mixed-race son he tutored.128 At the Esterháza court in 
Hungary, where Haydn lived and worked for most of his life, depictions of South 
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American characters became commonplace through adaptations of works such 
as Voltaire’s Alzire, ou les Américains (Alzire, or the Americans) (1736) and 
Graun’s Montezuma (1755).129 Haydn followed this trend by composing his own 
works to American themes, but he primarily composed around North American 
tropes. His symphonies, no. 34 in D minor (1765) and no. 49 in F minor (1768), 
made allusions to the Quakers in the popular comedy La jeune Indienne (e 
young Indian girl) (1764) by Nicholas Chamfort, a popular xture throughout 
the 1760s and 1770s in Vienna as Die junge Indianerin (e young Iindian girl). 
In 1779, Haydn set a libretto of L’isola disabitata (e deserted island) to music 
by the Viennese court poet Pietro Mestastasio. e performance referred to a 
Caribbean moral tale of an English salve-owner whose life is saved by a West In-
dian girl, who he eventually sells into slavery for social advancement.130 Within 
the walls of Esterháza, Haydn learned about America from his careful reading 
of William Robertson’s A History of America before his journey to London in 
the 1790s brought him into personal contact with West Indian merchants and 
exiled American loyalists.131
Beyond Esterháza, Habsburg audiences (mainly the nobility) digested an 
in	ux of new American imagery through operas.132 Popular works in Vienna 
oen revolved around new-world themes but in the 1760s and 1770s, the gure
of the Quaker loomed large over this cultural space. Viennese conceptions of the 
Quakers were imported from abroad, in works such as Chamfort’s La Jeune In-
dienne (e young Indian girl) and Guglielmi’s La Quakera Spiritosa (e spiri-
tual quakeress).133 e Tuscan-born librettist Ranieri de Calzabigi was one of the 
most in	uential dramatists living in Vienna; he popularised Quaker characters
and a more favourable vision of North America.134 His operatic libretto Amiti e
Ontario (1772/1774) takes place in Pennsylvania where two Native Americans,
a female Amiti and a male Ontario, are owned by a Quaker, Mr. Dull, who falls 
in love with Amiti, whilst his relative Mrs. Bubble falls for Ontario. Dull plans
to free both of the enslaved in order to go ahead with the marriages but Amiti
and Ontario have concealed their own love for each other from him. When this 
is revealed, Dull, inspired by their true love, responds leniently and honours
their freedom despite his own feelings of a
ection and his power over them.135
Although the main Quaker character, Dull, is represented as a slave owner, his
benevolence and self-sacrice shines through, even towards Native Americans.
Calzabigi’s choice of Mr. Dull as a name seemed loaded with intent as it con-
jured up connotations with the German duldsam (meaning tolerant or indul-
gent) to further reinforce the positive attributes of the character and his actions
at the end of the opera.136
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As ctive as the characters’ names sounded, Calzabigi played on the real-
istic antagonism between Great Britain and the North American colonies. 
Mr. Dull’s relative, Mrs. Bubble, is made out to be an Anglican who decries 
Dull’s plans for freedom for Amiti and Ontario and o
ers to buy one of them 
herself—her preference is, of course, for her beloved Ontario. Her interjection 
provokes an abolitionist declaration from Dull, which not only underscores 
the moral superiority of the Pennsylvanian but, in the context of the emerging 
transatlantic split, serves to undermine the British stance vis-à-vis slavery.137 In 
creating a character like Mr. Dull, Calzabigi was not only demonstrating how 
North America o
ered a more enlightened example to the world but he was 
also echoing the thoughts of other intellectuals in the Habsburg lands. It was 
as if Calzabigi had read and dramatised the reports of the Gazzetta di Milano
which announced how Quakers in Pennsylvania “gave an unusual proof of love 
for humanity [as] the majority of the residents of that colony agreed to free all 
their black Slaves.”138 Despite the re	ections in Calzabigi’s opera, discussions on 
slavery and the abolition of the slave trade in Central Europe remained muted 
until the early nineteenth century.139 Yet Calzabigi’s rendering of Pennsylvanian 
Quakers in Amiti e Ontario endured throughout the age of the American Revo-
lution and throughout the Habsburg lands. Giuseppe Scarlatti composed music 
for its premiere at the Burgtheater in Vienna and for a private performance at the 
Auersperg family residence.140 e work was subsequently adapted by Neapoli-
tan librettists and composers into Le gare generose (e contests in generosity) in 
1786, which saw Mr. Dull relocated to Boston and devoid of any Quakerism.141
e new version arrived back in Vienna the following year with additional revi-
sions by Lorenzo da Ponte and Carl Ditters von Dittersdorf whose changes re-
tained the core of Calzabigi’s vision of virtuous North American inhabitants.142
As the musicologist Pierpaolo Polzonetti points out, America in these operatic 
performances “was not represented as an exotic, primitivistic land” but rather 
as “modern, business-orientated, and politically and socially more advanced.”143
By the 1780s, North America had rmly entered the cultural zeitgeist of the 
Habsburg lands through drama and print to create a rising awareness of the dif-
ferent character of the British colonies and their increasingly uncertain future.
Conclusion
e notion of America fascinated the inhabitants of the Habsburg lands long 
before the American Revolution, and various views of the New World circu-
lated via several mediums in Central Europe. America functioned as a symbol 
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for Habsburg rulers and elites seeking to display their worldly wealth, and it 
appealed to aristocratic sensibilities for the latest fashions and curiosity for 
new-world artefacts. Religious lenses oen depicted the New World as primi-
tive and inferior, but information from rst-hand reports became the bedrock 
for new global epistemologies. Jesuit authors in Trnava and Graz contributed 
to the proliferation of American knowledge. Returning Jesuits kept alive the 
curiosity and captivation with the Americas; even Maria eresa was suscep-
tible to the opportunities to learn indirectly about American encounters. As 
the rst murmurings of the American Revolution began in the mid-eighteenth 
century, Habsburg inhabitants became increasingly aware of the situation in 
British North America, and Habsburg intellectuals developed distinct responses 
to these disturbances. Taube and Sérionne correctly articulated the colonial 
challenge to Great Britain and believed in the inevitability of American inde-
pendence. In Habsburg Lombardy, Frisi and Carli refuted ideas of American de-
generacy using examples of progress from the British colonies. e shi towards 
a progressive, industrious view of North America occurred simultaneously in 
drama and music. Colonists in the thirteen British colonies represented a toler-
ant and prosperous people on stage and in sound, and theatrical performances, 
especially, reinforced understandings of the colonial contest erupting in North 
America. England was the motherland and America was the daughter, but the 
question in Habsburg minds became: for how long?
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“Some Here Are Warm for the Part of America”
e American Revolution and the Imperial Court at Vienna, 1776–1783
“E very idle fellow talks of America,” complained the Britishambassador Sir Robert Murray Keith about his Viennese neighbours to his friends in London.1 He 
rst sounded that alarm in 1774. As time 
rumbled on, the rumours of discontent between Great Britain and her thirteen 
colonies became an unavoidable fact, much to the fascination of the “idle” onlook-
ers in Vienna. When war broke out a year later and the unilateral announcement of 
independence followed another year aer, Viennese courtiers became fully aware 
and engrossed by events transpiring across the Atlantic. ey were not merely pas-
sive observers, however. American news fuelled sympathies as well as speculation. 
ere were those who felt content to follow events closely and those who could not 
do so without expressing their support. ere were, of course, those who disagreed 
with the American crusade, but they were in a minority. e imperial court at 
Vienna was a largely pro-American scene. When the 
rst ocial American repre-
sentative, William Lee, arrived in Vienna in 1778, he could write home with pride 
about how “Some here are Warm for the part of America.”2
Identifying who these “warm” supporters of the American Revolution were 
within the Viennese court reveals the widespread interest in American aairs 
within Habsburg government circles. is includes individuals who worked 
and attended court in Vienna, from the clerks to the socialites to the highest 
echelons of political circles, including the imperial family themself. e rather 
pro-American stance to be found across this hierarchy might seem surprising at 

rst but it speaks to the cultural and intellectual power of the American Revolu-
tion. Discussing the attitudes of imperial courtiers in Vienna is a necessary step 
in understanding the American Revolution’s impact upon the Habsburg Mon-
archy, especially since courtiers’ knowledge and opinions shaped the policies of 
the Habsburg dynasty and the policy of the Holy Roman Empire.3
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e nobility, moreover, were social shapers, signifying contemporary intellec-
tual and cultural currents.4 Whilst French and British inuences were undeni-
able in their socio-cultural cosmos, a distinct American line entered the highest 
Habsburg circles as a result of the fascination surrounding the Revolution as a 
political event. Absorption of the American Revolution at the Viennese court 
produced discernible eects; it shaped the monarchs’ responses to the Revolu-
tion as well as the 
rst American envoy’s chances of success. As a continual site 
of cultural exchange, political patronage, and social visibility, the imperial court 
at Vienna also determined, in part, the cultural tone for the rest of the Habsburg 
lands. Fascination with the American Revolution, once signalled there, became 
an obsession across the whole of the Monarchy. In doing so, courtiers not only 
de
ned their own cultural cosmos but also the wider reception of America 
throughout the Habsburg Monarchy.
Imperial Courtiers and the American Revolution
Individuals rarely commit to paper with their own name something which they 
do not believe to be true. In this sense, letters written to Benjamin Franklin, 
arguably the most famous celebrity of the revolutionary cause in Europe, provide 
one of the most insightful windows into the eects of the American Revolution 
and its widespread popularity within the Habsburg Monarchy. It is, admittedly, 
an imperfect window; one which marginalises those who felt disgruntled by the 
American revolutionary inuence, or those whose letters have failed to be pre-
served. But the outpouring of sentiment manifested in the surviving letters from 
the Viennese elites does oer an illuminating perspective as to how the American 
cause was received among imperial courtiers. ree ocials contacted Franklin 
from inside the walls of the Hourg, the main residence of the Habsburgs in Vi-
enna. e earliest message came from Joseph Bek, a comptroller (Raitrat) in the 
accounting department of the war ministry (the Horiegsbuchhalterei). Bek’s 
letter gushed with his enthusiasm for the United States. He hoped to emigrate 
and serve through Franklin’s sponsorship. His desire to “sacri
ce” himself for 
the American cause came from his reading of “e History of America,” which 
likely referred to William Robertson’s volumes of the same name.5 Bek possibly 
received these tomes through his friendship with the Zinzendorfs; Count Karl 
von Zinzendorf, the governor of Trieste, who knew Robertson personally from 
his visit to Scotland and read his works, and his half-brother Count Ludwig von 
Zinzendorf who, as president of the former Court Accounting Chamber (Hof-
rechnungskammer), wrote a recommendation for Bek to Franklin.6
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Whereas Bek requested Franklin’s assistance—an example that many oth-
ers in the Habsburg Monarchy would emulate—two other courtiers sought to 
oer gis to Franklin. Paul Strattmann worked in the Court Library (Hoiblio-
thek) as a court censor when he wrote to Franklin oering a catalogue of French 
books.7 His gi to Franklin was a token of esteem but also as an oer of service
should Franklin need a librarian.8 In 1786, Johann Melchior von Birkenstock,
another member of the censorship committee and court councillor (Hoat),
gied Franklin a copy of his work commemorating Frederick II of Prussia,
which Franklin deemed worthy enough to acknowledge.9 Importantly, Birken-
stock shared with Franklin a deeply held sentiment for the United States. “I pray 
to God,” Birkenstock informed Franklin, “that he will preserve for you for the
glory of your country, for the consolation of all good people, a long succession
of years, and that he will 
ll you with blessings reserved for the most worthy
mortals.” ese were hardly empty words since Birkenstock asked Franklin to
“accept these vows, Sir, as true and sincere.” 10 Vowing to pray for the prosperity
of the United States was a remarkable promise for a Viennese courtier to make,
especially one who sat on the censorship committee within a monarchical state.
Such sentiments espoused by Birkenstock and Strattmann help explain the 
relatively lax censorship of Americana in the Habsburg lands during this pe-
riod.11 From mid-century onwards, censorship in the Habsburg Monarchy fell 
under the purview of a central committee consisting of religious ocials, uni-
versity elders, and several courtiers.12 Aer Maria eresa’s death in 1780, her 
son Joseph II relaxed many of these eorts and allowed a ood of new domestic 
works to enter market.13 From 1754 until the thaw of the 1780s, the committee 
maintained a running list of banned works in the Catalogus librorum prohib-
itorum (e catalogue of prohibited books), which mainly consisted of works 
critiquing the clergy, philosophical and literary works deemed too “radical,” and, 
of course, pornography. In all, the committee banned 5,000 works in the period 
before Joseph II’s sole accession and only a few hundred thereaer.14 e vast 
majority were French and German works; English texts numbered just over a 
hundred by 1791.15 During the Revolution, only seven works relating to America 
appeared on the censors’ lists.16 In 1776, three books received the “damnatur” 
(rejected) grade as retroactive bans on works of 
ction which portrayed America 
in an adventurous light. Apart from a German translation of William Russel’s 
History of America, the remaining texts pertained directly to the Revolution and 
included a German rendition of one of Samuel Adams’s speeches.17 No other 
revolutionary tract or American 
gure’s works were banned in the Habsburg 
Monarchy until the 1790s. e reaction was the same in other regions such as 
“Some Here Are Warm for the Part of America” 37 
the Austrian Netherlands and Habsburg Lombardy where censorship rates were 
lower and the Catholic Church determined eorts towards more religious and 
moral matters rather than political tracts.18 e relatively lenient attitude of cen-
sorship ocials towards Americana, combined with the fact most nobles could 
obtain outlawed works through various means, eectively rendered the imperial 
court and the Habsburg Monarchy completely permeable to the expansive liter-
ature surrounding the Revolution.19
Newspapers in the Habsburg Monarchy reported on American matters rather 
freely but when editors did fall foul to censorship due to the Revolution, they 
received support from the court nobility. e state-sponsored Wienerisches Di-
arium produced the highest amount of Americana in the Habsburg Monarchy 
out of twenty-four other newspapers and periodicals which discussed the Rev-
olution.20 From tumultuous Boston in 1774 to surrender at Yorktown in 1781, 
around 3,500 pages described revolutionary events in the Diarium.21 In April 
1779, its editors created a separate “American News” section.22 Texts by Ameri-
can revolutionaries frequently appeared in German translation without any dif-

culty from censors. In fact, omas Jeerson’s Summary View of the Rights of 
British America became the 
rst such published text in late 1774.23 ere were 
some signs of self-censorship, however. Prior to 1776, for example, emigration to 
North America was a reoccurring theme in the Diarium but this topic halted 
abruptly from then until the end of the war.24 When the Declaration of Amer-
ican Independence became known in Europe, most Habsburg newspapers ex-
ercised caution—with the exception of those in Lombardy and Tuscany—by 
omitting the charges against King George III and printing only the preamble 
and conclusion.25 Other newspapers in the Habsburg lands showed clear signs 
of tampering. In one Hungarian newspaper, the editor apologised to his readers 
for the blank spaces about the Revolution in previous issues due to what he called 
the “High Authority.”26
In December 1777, the Wienerisches Diarium incurred the same scrutiny aer 
publishing an article that would become known in Vienna as the “American Cat-
echism.” e article outlined the radical devotion of the Revolution’s adherents 
through a 
ctional interview with a mob of rebellious patriots in the form of 
a series of 
ctive questions and answers. e 
nal exchange provided the most 
alarming refrain: “What shall pass if you should be defeated? Answer: We would 
set everything ablaze and kill ourselves, our women and children.”27 When Maria 
eresa learned of this publication, she was incensed that such an article had 
been published and sought retribution against the editors.28 However, one noble-
man intervened to protect them from punishment. Count August von Seilern 
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had been the Habsburg ambassador in London during the 1760s where he re-
ported sympathetically about the colonists during the early disturbances with the 
British in North America.29 By 1777 he had returned from London and was the 
Governor of Lower Austria (Statthalter des Erzherzogtums Österreich unter der
Enns). He interceded in the case over the “American Cathecism” by insisting that 
the newspapers had not impinged upon monarchical supremacy by printing the 
text, but rather had merely sought to show the “fanaticism” in North America.30
Seilern’s reluctance to prosecute the editors reected the general tolerance shown 
by courtiers towards the ood of Americana during the Revolution.
Across the Habsburg Monarchy, administrators shared similar sentiments. 
e head of the regional government in Lombardy, Count Johann Josef von 
Wilczek, convinced Franklin’s Milanese friends to confer his “highest esteem” 
and sought to obtain an original English copy of the constitutions of the United 
States—this was aer one of them had lent him a copy in French.31 In the Aus-
trian Netherlands, Count Joseph Nicolas Windischgrätz declared Franklin to 
be a worldwide inspiration.32 He extolled Franklin’s wartime actions, claiming 
he had done “so much good for [his] country [.  .  .] and for humanity.”33 In a 
giddier second letter, written in response to Franklin’s simple receipt of the 
y 
copies of Windischgrätz’s latest essay, he confessed his wish to meet Franklin, 
willing as he was to travel from Brussels to Paris in order to become the “happi-
est man” in the world if Franklin accepted.34 Buoyed aer their meeting in late 
April 1785, Windischgrätz wrote once more to reiterate his “eagerness” to ful
l 
any of Franklin’s future “orders” either in the Austrian Netherlands or the Holy 
Roman Empire.35
Windischgrätz was the sort of aristocratic who enjoyed contact with famous 
minds like Franklin.36 However, his interactions with Franklin were also some-
what more sincere than his interactions with other famous scholars. In addition 
to attering words, Windischgrätz actively supported American activities by 
acting as a courier for American newspapers, which Franklin sent to Vienna.37
But Windischgrätz was an erratic intellectual whose progressive views jarred 
with his contemporaries who thought him to be wild, vain, and an overly uto-
pian thinker.38 In a series of pamphlets published in the mid-to late 1780s, Win-
dischgrätz dabbled in philosophical and political matters in sometimes mean-
dering tracts. In one treatise, his De l’âme, de l’ intelligence et de la liberté de
la volonté (Of the soul, of intelligence, and of freedom of will), he merged his 
philosophical studies with Franklin’s electrical theories, asserting that human 
intelligence was de
ned by an internal electricity.39 By 1787, his mind had hard-
ened towards the belief that government should not transgress natural rights of 
“Some Here Are Warm for the Part of America” 39 
subjects.40 Amid the revolutionary unrest in the Austrian Netherlands in the 
late 1780s, Windischgrätz advocated constitutional rights and defended these 
in radical pamphlets that “turned heads” and drew the ire of his friend, Em-
peror Joseph II.41 e American Revolution was therefore a natural attraction 
for Windischgrätz given his intellectual leaning and his admiration of Franklin.
When in Vienna, Windischgrätz was part of a close coterie of inuential 
courtiers thanks to his 
rst wife, the Countess Maria Josepha Windischgrätz 
(née Erdödy) and her friends. e “society of the 
ve dames” brought together 
prominent members of the court’s aristocracy for almost daily informal gather-
ings starting in 1767.42 As a close friend of the Windischgrätzes and 
xed mem-
ber of the group, Count Philip Cobenzl noted how the meetings in the Vien-
nese townhouses and country palaces revolved around sipping tea and chatting 
as “one of us read from an interesting work of some sort.”43 Discussions of the 
American Revolution featured in these chatty moments. Karl von Zinzendorf 
noted the oration of an American revolutionary text during one dinner party in 
1785 with several of the dames in attendance.44
Yet despite the collective being composed of “political and religious radicals,” 
it is doubtful that this coterie harboured much American support beyond per-
haps those of the Windischgrätzes.45 Although Princess Eleonore von Liechten-
stein (née Oettingen-Spielberg) delighted in reading Voltaire and became an 
epitome of an enlightened woman at court, she mistrusted revolutionary move-
ments.46 For her, the American Revolution was simply a step too far as reected 
in her distaste for the upheaval caused by the Revolution. During one meeting, 
Liechtenstein derided the ocial “sixth member” of the group whose idleness in 
trying to end the American Revolution caused her great frustration.47 e “sixth 
member” was the emperor, who joined the group from 1769 onwards. At another 
point, Joseph’s visit to the Dutch Republic in 1781 annoyed her further since she 
felt the visit was mistimed and could damage relations with the British who had 
just gone to war with the Dutch.48
Her preference for ending the American war came from her sister-in-law, an-
other one of the dames, Princess Leopoldine von Liechtenstein (née von Stern-
berg), who was friends with Lady Juliana Penn, the daughter-in-law of Pennsylva-
nia’s founder William Penn. In a letter to Leopoldine, Lady Penn had explained 
the dire situation of the loyalist dynasty whose family estates had been con
s-
cated by the patriots without compensation. Almost destitute, she appealed to 
the Liechtensteins for Joseph’s intervention, and the duo tried to help. Given the 
criticism of the emperor’s actions, Eleonore and Leopoldine likely knew that Jo-
seph would be unable or unwilling to oer any assistance and so they hesitated 
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until the end of the conict when they asked an intermediary “in the most 
pressing way” for Franklin’s intercession on behalf of the Penns.49 Franklin of 
course ignored the request as he had Lady Penn’s earlier direct appeal to him.50
ough Lady Penn was not successful, her appeal increased the negative views of 
the American Revolution held by both Eleonore and Leopoldine Liechtenstein. 
Others within the group also disliked the American cause. At the prominent 
Burghausen salon, Countess Leopoldine von Kaunitz (née Oettingen-Spielberg) 
erupted into “a grand tirade against the Americans” when the emperor raised the 
subject.51 Such an outburst greased the millwheels of gossip at court.
Apart from the dames, there were several prominent Anglophile salons in 
Vienna which harboured those more unsympathetic to the American cause. e 
houses of the Pergen and un families constituted this bulwark. Both house-
holds shared close ties to the British ambassadors serving in Vienna. Count-
ess Philippine Gabriele von Pergen (née Groschlag) and Count Johann Anton 
von Pergen considered themselves intimate friends of Sir Robert Murray Keith. 
Count Pergen command excellent English and wrote extensively to Keith on 
personal matters when out of town.52 e previous ambassador David Murry, 
then Viscount Stormont, occupied the same house as the un family on Mi-
noritenplatz and fraternisations were so close that guests suspected an aair be-
tween Stormont and Countess Wilhelmine von un (née Uhlfeld). Years later, 
Keith relocated to the same residence.53 Both households became renowned 
among British travellers for their hospitality and friendly dispositions towards 
Britain. e famed travel writer of his age Nathanial Wraxall waxed lyrical on 
their importance for such visitors to Vienna. “e houses of both [. . .] form the 
best resource for the English during their stay in this capital,” he wrote.54
Count Karl von Zinzendorf, a frequent guest at the Pergen’s whenever he was 
in town, noted the continual presence of English guests.55 On one occasion, he 
happened to overhear Countess Pergen reassuring her visitors that there were 
“ten royalists for every one American” in Vienna.56 At 
rst, Countess un was 
broadly sympathetic to the Americans. “I am a Bostonian at heart,” she wrote 
to one of her British friends in 1775, but bloodshed dampened her enthusiasm.57
Both countesses played host to the centre of British life among Viennese courtiers.
ere is no evidence of any anti-American sentiments among the wider 
court nobility apart from pro-British salons and the dames. e 
rst explicitly 
anti-American propaganda in the Habsburg Monarchy circulated privately aer 
the Napoleonic Wars when most aristocrats viewed all revolution negatively.58
In fact, courtiers contested the condemnation of the American Revolution by 
the dames. In 1781, Zinzendorf noted a “dispute about the Americans” over a 
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dinner hosted by the Liechtensteins.59 He did not describe the argument in any 
great detail nor the positions of the attendees, leaving us to surmise that the 
likely pro-American guests were Gottfried van Swieten—Strattmann’s boss at 
the Court Library—and Count Joseph Johann von Seilern, the son of Count 
Seilern who had defended the publication of the Declaration of American Inde-
pendence.60 Likely opposing them were the conservative-minded Bishop of Wie-
ner Neustadt, Johann Heinrich von Kerens and the elderly Prince Heinrich von 
Auersperg, then aged eighty-four, who were close friends of the Liechtensteins 
and the British ambassador. In any case, the divides over America between the 
dames and their guests was enough to merit Zinzendorf ’s record.
Zinzendorf himself was certainly one of the most learned men in the Habsburg 
Monarchy about the American Revolution. A Saxon by birth but scion of an 
ancient Austrian family, Zinzendorf was the nephew of the Protestant evange-
list, Count Nikolaus von Zinzendorf who had led the Moravian Herrnhuter to 
North America in the 1740s.61 Aer studying in Jena and moving to Vienna, Karl 
von Zinzendorf embarked upon a series of state-sponsored commercial tours as 
a means to gather intelligence on the latest economic and administrative ideas.62
Great Britain, as part of his tour, was where he gained his intimate knowledge 
of America. He met Benjamin Franklin in London, walked with William Rob-
ertson in Edinburgh, travelled the Highlands with Johan Murray, the fourth 
earl of Dunmore—before he became the royal governor of Virginia—and dined 
with Glasgow’s infamous tobacco barons.63 In a report prepared for the Vien-
nese court, simply entitled his Observations, Zinzendorf devoted an entire section 
to the economic and legal arrangements of British North America.64 Spanning 
nearly one hundred pages, Zinzendorf described how the colonial government 
operated in all twenty-six British-American colonies. He listed their major man-
ufactured goods, detailed various colonial currencies, explained property rights, 
calculated the populations of each colony and their tax incomes, and provided a 
history of major cities from Boston to Charleston. As a result of his British soujo-
urn, Zinzendorf became an unquestionable authority on the American colonies 
in the Habsburg Monarchy at the beginning of the Revolution.
Zinzendorf spent most of the American revolutionary years in Trieste where 
he served as governor between 1776 and 1782. He used his position to procure 
Americana in Trieste, where traders smuggled anything for a price. He developed 
a huge appetite for such literature, reading all he could about the Revolution. In 
1778, for instance, he read omas Paine’s Common Sense, John Dickinson’s Let-
ters om a Farmer in Pennsylvania, and the British radical Richard Price’s Obser-
vations on the Nature of Civil Liberty.65 Zinzendorf ’s interest persisted long aer 
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the war. In the 1790s, he read histories of the Revolution by Americans David 
Ramsay and Charles Stedman.66 His personal contacts eshed out the rest. In 
1780, Zinzendorf heard 
rst-hand accounts of the Ticonderoga campaign from 
English guests over a game of whist.67 On another occasion, he met with a British 
veteran of the war.68 Consuls and merchants became Zinzendorf ’s avid inform-
ers of revolutionary news throughout the period.69 During his frequent visits 
to the Vienna, Zinzendorf went out of his way to learn from others about the 
Revolution.70 He sought out those more knowledgeable and exchanged texts on 
American topics.71 As an inquisitive person, the American Revolution fascinated 
Zinzendorf throughout this period.
Imperial courtiers were well-informed about the Revolution and animated 
by its cause. In an age when courtly life and the governance of a nation were so 
closely linked, the personal opinions of administrators mattered a great deal. 
Positive reception of the American struggle enabled transparent encouragement 
among ocials for Franklin and his Revolution. In terms of the censorship, the 
deeply held views of two committee members accounts to some degree for the 
negligible eorts to curb the ow of Americana during the Revolution. Count 
Seilern’s defence of the Wienerisches Diarium reected his more favourable dis-
position towards the American colonies resulting from his earlier time as ambas-
sador in London and his advocacy was strong enough to question his monarch’s 
intentions. Zinzendorf ’s erudition about British North America inuenced his 
later outlook on trade between Trieste and the United States. In short, absorp-
tion of the American cause among courtiers inuenced tangible aspects of the 
Habsburg reaction to the Revolution.
Impugning the American Inuence at Court
For certain, a curiosity about the American Revolution pervaded the atmosphere 
at court in Vienna. e nobility was united by an interest in the progress of 
American aairs. During the revolutionary years, speculations abounded, and 
news of the latest victories were shared among all ranks of the nobility.72 is in-
cessant obsession of courtiers drove the British ambassador, intent on suppress-
ing the issue, to utter despair. e desperation is almost tangible in Sir Robert 
Murray Keith’s personal correspondence with a group of friendly civil servants 
in London known as “the Gang.”73 “I would give my best suit of gala clothes for 
the gi of a six months’ fore-knowledge of your American aairs,” he oered 
to one friend in the British admiralty.74 To another he proposed 
y pistols 
in exchange for any news about the “refractory ospring in America.”75 Keith 
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constantly bemoaned how he was “famished,” “parched,” “too little informed” 
about American events and implored his friends to become his “Cicerone in 
America,” or his guide with “their echo to my attentive ear,” or his “pilot to guide 
me into port.”76
When his friends in London failed him, he oen turned to others in the 
British diplomatic corps but without much success either.77 e sudden death of 
his younger brother, Sir Basil Keith, Governor of Jamaica from 1773, le Keith 
bere and without another avenue for information.78 As a member of the Scot-
tish aristocracy, however, Keith oen played host to a number of young Scots on 
their Grand Tours of Europe and came to rely on these informal channels for 
American news. When the young Scottish aristocrat Henry Hay-Macdougal 
visited Vienna during the winter of 1776, for example, Keith received letters con-
taining forwarded reports from relatives 
ghting in North America.79 Resonant 
of Keith’s desperate situation, Hay-Macdougal informed his father on multiple 
occasions how “We long much for good American News.”80
Keith laid bare the reasoning behind his desperation in his personal letters. 
He sought to combat the “public clamour” for Americana at the Viennese court 
where, in his opinion, only the voices of “the noisy brawlers for licentious democ-
racy” could be heard.81 As early as March 1774, Keith bluntly pointed out the 
precariousness of the situation:
Everybody here talks wildly about liberty, and electricity, because they un-
derstand neither; and I am shrewdly suspected to be a friend to monar-
chy and King George, and therefore to have seen everything that regards 
America and the Doctor [Franklin] with an eye of partiality. I shall 
ght, 
however, a rare battle, under your banner; only give me now and then a few 
material[s] to dumbfounder my noisy opponents.82
Keith clearly felt that an information war was being waged in Vienna between 
him and those advocating for the Americans. He also wanted to rehabilitate the 
British standing against “the absurdities with which every paper has been 
lled” 
and to “stem with honour the torrent of falsehood and presumption.”83 Follow-
ing talk of desertions in the British army in North America, Keith was relieved 
to learn from friends that this was just hearsay and he used this news “to knock 
half a dozen lies on the head.”84
Keith sensed, however, that he was 
ghting a losing battle such was the in-
terest and pro-American feeling among courtiers.85 Compounding his situation 
was the increasingly bad turn of events as Britain slowly but surely lost control 
of the American colonies. Keith could not conceal British defeats from Viennese 
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courtiers. One of Keith’s young Scottish visitors commented in a letter to his 
mother upon learning of the recent naval defeats and of the British surrender 
aer the Siege of Yorktown,
You can’t conceive how our poor country is now despised, even by those 
who acknowledge the Great Power, Patriotism, and Courage of Great 
Britain. ey ask, have you lost your Senses that you don’t procure bet-
ter commanders, and punish those who behave ill. A Foreigner asks an 
Englishman [here]: where are all your sailors who distinguished themselves 
in the last war? Your Hawke, your Boscawen, your Howe, your Keppel, 
your Gilchrist, your Elliot etc. etc. ose that never sought conquering and 
who never turned their back to their enemies. e Englishman with silent 
sorrow shakes his head.86
“Silent sorrow” summed up the feeling of shame that clouded Keith’s status 
in Vienna as a result of the war. Such was the bitterness of loss that another of 
Keith’s Scottish guests wrote home to the Highlands towards the end of the war, 
“I am almost ashamed to wear the English uniform; the taking of Minorca sur-
prises everybody here and I suppose the whole world too.”87 By 1780, the British 
chances at victory seemed so remote that Keith led his delegation and friends to 
a chapel in St. Stephen’s Cathedral to pray for England.88
Among the foreign diplomatic corps at the Viennese court, Keith was most 
certainly outnumbered by pro-American supporters. He remarked how news of 
British defeats made it “hard to hold my head as high as I shall ever wish to hold 
it,” especially among the “score of foreign ministers who [. . .] look upon the faith-
less Bourbons as the very lords of the ascendant.”89 Indeed, the French delegation 
acted as a bastion of support for the Americans in Vienna. Prior to 1778 when 
France openly took part in the conict, they ensured Franklin had open channels 
of communication with Vienna.90 In transporting back and forth letters from 
his friends, the chief secretary in one instance slipped in his own letter to Frank-
lin, oering him another means of conveyance and supporting the application 
of the delegation’s courier who wished to go 
ght for the United States.91 At the 
same time, another secretary oered to sell Franklin his recipe for improved gun-
powder, something which he felt would secure patriot victory.92 Cardinal Louis 
de Rohan, the French ambassador from 1772 to 1774, oered one of Franklin’s 
friends in Vienna the use of his palace in Paris should he not have means to visit 
Franklin.93 ese supportive acts preceded the later hosting and direction of the 

rst American envoy to the court of Vienna by French representatives.
“Some Here Are Warm for the Part of America” 45 
Keith’s only hope was the attitude of the State Chancellor (Staatskanzler), 
Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg. As his biographer points out, “no 
subsequent foreign minister, including Metternich, wielded the kind of domes-
tic inuence that Kaunitz did.”94 Kaunitz was the gatekeeper for international 
aairs. He decided what issues to bring to the monarchs’ attention and formu-
lated his own articulations before doing so. It is for this reason that Kaunitz has 
been touted as a “de facto third head of state.”95 Although Kaunitz was a noted 
fan of enlightened thinkers and many historians have pointed to his interest in 
the French philosophes and patronage of the arts, there is no evidence that he 
held any interest in American ideals.96 In all his memoranda and discussions on 
American-related events, Kaunitz adopted an opinion heavily de
ned by geo-
political considerations and a marked caution towards the upheavals caused by 
rebellion against British monarchical authority. Containment appears to be the 
byword for his initial reaction. At no other point was Kaunitz clearer about his 
fears of democratic revolution than in his remarks on 
rst reading the Declara-
tion of American Independence in the Viennese newspapers. He believed it to 
contain “extraordinary sections which may cause the spirit of rebellion to spread 
like a plague.”97 For Kaunitz, the anti-monarchical nature of the Revolution was 
the seemingly greater danger to ward against.
None of his ocial or personal writings with the Habsburg monarchs strays 
from this guarded approach.98 Much has been made of the terms “insurgents” 
and “rebels” that Kaunitz used to describe Americans in his despatches to 
Habsburg diplomats, yet these descriptions do not reveal any great insights 
into his views on their Revolution since such terms were commonplace among 
European ocials.99 What is more revealing is that Kaunitz held on to this 
terminology longer than other ocials within the Habsburg administration, 
perhaps demonstrating that his subtle bias against the Revolution persisted 
longer than those of his contemporaries.100 When confronted with the news 
of Franklin’s arrival in Paris amid rumours of an intended alliance, Kaunitz 
regarded Franklin’s intentions as “foolish” if the rumours were true.101 Kau-
nitz certainly expressed his belief that any American victory would be “hard 
to expect” but the eects of one should be prepared for either way.102 is 
black-and-white logic surrounding American events is the major characteris-
tic of Kaunitz’s reaction to the Revolution.103 In spite of his dominance over 
the State Chancellery, Kaunitz’s logic was only advisory in nature, as the 
Habsburg monarchs remained the sole arbiters of executive authority and in-
deed had rather dierent ideas.
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e Imperial Family and the American Revolution
In considering the position of the foreign monarchs, historians have tended to 
assume a natural alignment against the Americans since a revolution against 
the British crown transgressed the rights of rulers. is assumption is only half 
correct in the Habsburg case. Not all members of the Habsburg dynasty shared 
a negative outlook on American events. ey were equally aected by the same 
curiosity which intrigued the Viennese court at large.
When the Continental Congress proclaimed independence in 1776, Maria 
eresa had ruled the Habsburg Monarchy for just over thirty-
ve years. Her 
early reign endured a baptism of 
re during the War of Austrian Succession 
and the failure to reverse territorial losses in the Seven Years’ War. She lost all 
appetite for international conict and dedicated the remaining years of her reign 
to securing peace and stability for her realm. It was within this context that the 
sixty-year-old monarch received the unwelcome news of revolution across the 
Atlantic. Her initial reaction chimed with Kaunitz: the American Revolution 
was something to be ended and shielded against in the meantime. When an 
article known as the “American Catechism”—advancing the American justi-

cations for the war—appeared alongside a translation of the Declaration of 
American Independence in the Wienerisches Diarium, her response centred on 
stiing public awareness in case it should “breed incivility” within her realms.104
Maria eresa was equally fearful about the international fallout of the Revolu-
tion. She feared it would lead the whole of Europe to war. “e war in America,” 
she fretted to her daughter Marie Antoinette, queen of France, “may very easily 
cause a conagration where I could be driven against my will, especially with our 
despicable neighbour Prussia.”105 Her fears seemed borne less out of prediction 
than her memory of the Seven Years’ War when conict in North America had 
boiled over into a war in continental Europe.
Maria eresa remained highly vigilant about American events due in part to 
her paranoia over its consequences. Among the people of the Habsburg court, she 
may have indeed been the most informed about the actual events of war thanks 
to her network of informants, which she cultivated up to her death in November 
1780. Aside from the steady stream of information from Kaunitz’s ministry, she 
also relied on other court ocials for news from America, who supplied to her 
“reexions upon the present aaires of the world which she could not so well be 
informed of by her own ministers.”106 Franklin, by way of his Habsburg corre-
spondents, sensed a way to inuence the imperial court. On December 29, 1777, 
the 
rst of many long reports Franklin penned made its way into the hands of 
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Maria eresa’s secretary, Baron Karl Joseph von Pichler, which summarised 
Franklin’s views on the current state of the war.107 Franklin showed a clear de-
termination to inuence Maria eresa towards a more favourable outlook on 
the Americans. His reports emphasised atrocities committed by the British, the 
losses suered by mistreated Hessian recruits, and the signi
cance of American 
victory at Saratoga. One line spoke directly to her as a sovereign:
If America without England can become formidable, what would become 
of England combined again with America? ose who know the natural 
insolence of the British Nation will think that the common interest of 
Europe is to keep these two nations separate.108
ese lines were aimed at coaxing Maria eresa’s support for American inde-
pendence by reminding her of Britain’s propensity for expansion and the dangers 
of American defeat. Maria eresa le no written reaction to these texts, but she 
expressed gratitude to the court ocials for supplying her with these informal 
updates, which demonstrates her curiosity to learn about the Revolution.
When Maria eresa passed away in late 1780, this dissemination campaign 
continued with her son Joseph II who from then on ruled as the sole sovereign of 
the Habsburg Monarchy. He received a French translation of Franklin’s views in 
Figure 3. Portrait of Maria eresa as a widow (ca. 1767)
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1782, which was also read aloud to Joseph’s private chamberlain, Count Karl von 
Hatzfeld—such was the interest at the court.109 It was not the 
rst time Joseph 
had received and read such material. In August 1782, a similar set of Franklin’s 
reections arrived, which the emperor kept personally.110 Franklin’s direct link 
into the Habsburg court and by extension the royal family was unusual for Euro-
pean courts. In France, American envoys waited on invitations to speak with the 
king, whereas in Vienna, their desired words could be translated and delivered 
personally to the Habsburg monarch.
When Joseph II travelled to Paris to visit his sister Marie Antoinette in 1777, 
two myths regarding him and the American Revolution were born. Only one can 
be proven. In advance of his journey, Joseph made known the sort of people he 
wished to meet in the French capital, Franklin included.111 ere was one stum-
bling block, however. Joseph could not openly invite Franklin to an audience nor 
could he, as an imperial ruler, pay a visit to a rebellious commoner. Although the 
meeting between the American revolutionary and the “revolutionary emperor” 
was intended to be a meeting of enlightened minds, they could not escape the 
political rami
cations if such a meeting were to take place.112 Yet Joseph seemed 
determined to meet with Franklin. Intent on 
nding a solution, Habsburg min-
isters arranged for an intermediary to host the meeting in an unocial capacity. 
ey chose Raimondo Niccoli, the head of the Tuscan delegation in Paris and 
a supportive 
gure to the Americans, since his service to the emperor’s brother 
and his anity with Franklin would endear him to both sides.113
On Monday, May 26, 1777, Franklin received an invitation to drink hot choc-
olate at the Hotel de Mirabeau two days later with Niccoli, a Count Falken-
stein—Joseph’s customary travelling alias—and two Frenchmen.114 Franklin 
had all the reason to accept. It was a great opportunity to press the claims of the 
Americans directly to one of Europe’s great powers and to the head of the Holy 
Roman Empire, the source of German mercenaries for the British. Moreover, 
the personal admiration between these two men went both ways. Franklin had 
noted the arrival of the “very industrious” emperor a few weeks earlier.115 He 
also later commented that “I respect very much the Character of that Monarch, 
and think that if I were one of his Subjects he would 
nd me a good One.”116
Franklin and Joseph were to be disappointed, however. Franklin recollected the 
event on the back of his invitation immediately aer the arranged meeting: “e 
Emperor did not appear, and the Abbé [Niccoli] since tells me that the Number 
of other persons who occasionally visited him that morning [. . .] prevented his 
coming [. . . though] at twelve he came but I was gone.”117 As a result Franklin 
and Joseph never actually met in person and one of the greatest encounters of 
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the enlightenment, perhaps on par with the meeting of Johann Sebastian Bach 
and Frederick II of Prussia, vanished.
Niccoli obscured the truth from Franklin by telling him a “number of other 
persons” had prevented Joseph’s attendance. e “other persons” were in fact 
the British delegation in Paris. e British ambassador knew about the meeting 
and worked to thwart it. He and his secretaries descended upon Joseph that 
morning and stalled him long enough to prevent him meeting with Franklin.118
In spite of their endeavours, the British did not prevent one of the emperor’s 
subordinates from attending the meeting. Count Johann Philipp Cobenzl—the 
same count who had attended meetings with the dames—recorded in his diary 
how he enjoyed his time at Count Niccoli’s and his “appointment with Doc-
tor Franklin.”119 No further contact came between the two parties during the 
emperor’s stay, however. News of the British subterfuge eventually spread and 
even soon found its way back to Vienna. “I know he [Joseph] wished to have a 
discourse with you,” one courtier later mourned, “and he should be sorry some 
management for England had prevented him to instruct himself in the company 
of a philosopher.”120 Joseph’s plan to meet Franklin may have been sabotaged, 
but his high regard for Franklin still became widely known.
Underhand British actions could not prevent the rumours among French 
courtiers that Franklin had in fact met Joseph. In 1787, the Scottish statisti-
cian and architect William Playfair published a pamphlet titled Joseph and 
Benjamin – A Conversation, which he claimed was based upon “a French man-
uscript.”121 Whether or not such a French manuscript existed is unknown.122
Playfair’s work was a rich 
ctional dialogue in which the two men discuss 
human nature, economic theory, and exchange good humour between them. 
His version of the encounter was an idealised form of enlightened interaction 
between men renowned for their progressive inclinations. Playfair’s publica-
tion cemented the ambiguity of the meeting in the public mindset despite 
the poor reviews it received in London.123 In the 
ctional conversation, the 
character of Joseph is supportive of Franklin’s revolutionary eorts and so the 

rst myth was born.
e second myth arose from one of the many dinners during Joseph’s stay in 
Paris. A guest at one reportedly asked him whether he supported the actions of 
the American patriots. Joseph cryptically replied something along the lines of “I 
am a royalist by trade.” is remark became arguably Joseph’s most well-known 
utterance on the American Revolution. It was included in numerous contem-
porary publications but without a credible source.124 Since then this quotation 
has appeared frequently, most notably in American literature.125 ere is no 
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single veri
able trace of whether Joseph said this or not. It is likely this phrase 
was invented. As the Habsburg ambassador commented to Maria eresa a 
few months aer Joseph’s departure, “e public continues to be preoccupied 
with the details of the emperor’s journey; they amuse themselves by compos-
ing a thousand anecdotes that I do not believe are genuine.”126 Moreover, it was 
simply not in keeping with the rest of his visit where everything was carefully 
choreographed and even the meeting with Franklin was conducted under the 
strictest measures to avoid any signs of partiality. In all likelihood, Joseph kept 
his opinions on such matters close to his chest.
Joseph expressed his true feelings on the American Revolution with indi-
viduals closer to him. In his personal correspondence with his ambassador in 
London, Count Ludovico Barbiano di Belgiojoso, Joseph revealed an increasing 
disdain for British actions in the American Revolution. He disagreed with what 
he perceived to be Belgiojoso’s “slight Anglomania” considering the disastrous 
campaigns in North America. “You cannot deny,” he argued to Belgiojoso, “that 
it would be impossible to make worse all the aairs of England, that is politically 
and militarily, from the last years.”127 In subsequent letters, Joseph saw the conse-
quences of the Revolution as overwhelmingly negative for Britain. “e fruits of 
this disorder,” he warned, “where there is neither love of country, nor of the state, 
nor of the sovereign, will be felt for a long time.”128 is sorrow for the eects of 
the Revolution was the closest Joseph came to condemning it. However, he did 
not outright denounce the Americans for causing such chaos. ey appeared in 
his letters as a rather more innocent by-product of British misrule than active in-
stigators—his descriptions mimicking a line espoused by Franklin in the reports 
that made its way to Joseph at court. In a personal letter to his brother, Joseph 
voiced his belief in British comeuppance aer receiving the “happy” news from 
Belgiojoso that the famous British Admiral Rodney had been roundly defeated 
by French forces. “I am not as English as they believe,” he con
ded to him, “nor 
as they want me to be.”129
In his private correspondence with the Russian Empress Catherine II, Joseph 
went a step further. He expressed pity for the “poor Americans” who he felt had 
been beaten, bankrupted and sat “like frightened hens, waiting for someone to 
shoot them.”130 “Poor Americans” was a phrase he used oen to Catherine even as 
he described their forces as “superior” and noted that British victory was impossi-
ble.131 In the early 1780s, “Americans” was not yet a fully established term within 
the Habsburg administrative vocabulary. Kaunitz and others still used the pejora-
tives “rebels” and “insurgents” but Joseph adopted the newer demonym, perhaps 
revealing a tacit—or willing—acceptance of their political independence.
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Joseph’s view on the Revolution evolved over the course of the war from an ini-
tial interest to be informed like his mother, to wishing to meet with Franklin de-
spite the political consequences, to a natural aversion towards it brought on by the 
discord created in Britain and, 
nally, to the acceptance that the United States 
of America would be a sovereign nation. roughout it all, Joseph, along with his 
ministers, struggled to maintain a neutral balance. is was the reason why he 
came under 
re from the dames for not acting to end the war just as the British 
carefully monitored his actions for sympathising with the Americans. Caught 
in the middle of what he called a “big and furious game,” Joseph’s true feelings 
towards the Revolution centred on frustration with an event not of his design 
and outside of his control. It was the price to pay for being “a royalist by trade.”132
e same cannot be said for Joseph’s younger brother. As the Grand Duke 
of Tuscany, Pietro Leopoldo occupied an easier position.133 e Revolution still 
aected his grand duchy in a number of ways, however. Commercial ties between 
the Tuscan ports and the New England 
sheries had existed for decades and 
such connections as well as the lure of further wealth forced the Grand Duke 
to act sooner on the issue than his brother. Hence Pietro Leopoldo developed 
Figure 4. e brothers Emperor Joseph II and Grand Duke 
Pietro Leopoldo of Tuscany by Pompeo Batoni
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an intense interest in the American Revolution, its developments, and ideas. He 
corresponded with the Tuscan schemer Filippo Mazzei in order to 
nd out more 
and, knowing the Tuscan delegation in Paris had substantial inroads with the 
American commissioners, sought to gather further information from them.134 He 
received translations of American documents and subscribed to the partisan Af-
faires d’Angleterre et d’Amérique (English and American aairs), which Franklin 
published with French collaborators.135 When Pietro Leopoldo temporarily relo-
cated to Vienna in 1778 to deputise for his brother and mother during the War of 
the Bavarian Succession, he continued this subscription and had the American 
propaganda delivered directly to the imperial residence at the Hourg.136
In March 1779, Pietro Leopoldo le Vienna for Florence in a disgruntled 
mood. Over the course of his deputyship, he felt horri
ed at the running of 
the Monarchy: 
nances were poor; civil servants waged interdepartmental war, 
radicals agitated for religious reform, Hungarians decried new taxation, foreign 
alliances were either weakened or faltering, and, worst of all, the emperor only 
uttered “frightful, despotic statements.”137 Upon his return to Florence, he set 
about a new project to rede
ne the political order between subjects and sov-
ereign in Tuscany. In his Primo distesto ed idee sopra la formazione degli stati
nuova costituzione pubblica (First dra and ideas on the formation of states and 
the new public constitution), he planned to relinquish absolute power in favour 
of popular consent.138 Such ideas, he argued, were more in line with the mod-
ern ideals of French philosophers, whom he deeply admired.139 Leopold’s new 
constitutional ambitions owed a share of inuence to American thinkers, too. 
In one section, Leopold declared every Tuscan had “an equal right to happiness, 
well-being, security and property.”140 e familiar-sounding line is unequivo-
cally American. Tuscan newspapers had published complete translations of the 
Declaration of American Independence years earlier with the immortal phrase, 
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”141 But another American declaration 
might have been his inspiration; in June 1776, the Virginia Convention adopted 
George Mason’s Declaration of Rights which also proclaimed the rights to “life 
and liberty, [. . .] property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”142
Pietro Leopoldo’s new plans contained many echoes of the Virginian Declara-
tion of Rights yet it was Pennsylvania’s constitution of 1776 which provided him 
with concrete ideas about how best to enact more enlightened government.143 He 
studied a French translation of the Pennsylvanian constitution intently, produc-
ing a handwritten copy and his own ten-page Observations.144 Pietro Leopoldo’s 
notes were his gut-reactions to the ideas he encountered in the American text, 
oering a fascinating insight into a Habsburg archduke’s 
rst-hand take on the 
radical democratic experiments unfolding across the Atlantic. His Observations
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opened with a bold declaration of his own admiration for American political 
ideas: “What I ask is that, in order to make a good [legal] code in all states, even 
in monarchies, one begins with the principle posed by the Americans, the prin-
ciple of equality.”145 Pietro Leopoldo saw this core American value as the basis 
for any good form of government; “political equality,” he later noted, “is essential 
to the democratic order [. . .] there should be no exception for anyone.”146 In his 
view, the safeguarding of this equality clearly existed in Pennsylvania’s consti-
tution through innovations such as limited terms and the rotation of positions, 
which Pietro Leopoldo felt would eradicate any abuses of power.
For the next three years, the Grand Duke toiled away on his constitutional 
project, swapping ideas and dras with his chief minister Francesco Maria 
Gianni.147 Concerning the extension of what Pietro Leopoldo termed peo-
ples’ “sacrosanct natural rights”—another allusion to “unalienable rights” in 
the Declaration of American Independence—and Pietro Leopoldo’s calls for 
wider democratic participation, Gianni frequently dissented. Gianni saw the 
Tuscan people as un
t for democratic duty. e notorious Medici family had 
ruled Tuscany for the better part of three centuries before the Habsburgs took 
control in 1737; such a legacy, Gianni claimed, had corrupted the Tuscan people 
beyond recognition. ey could not be entrusted to act for the greater good.148
Pietro Leopoldo might have agreed with him. In an earlier study of his Tuscan 
holdings, the Grand Duke acknowledged that his people possessed a “certain 
shrewdness” or “deception” and were “always divided amongst themselves.”149
In his Observations, Pietro Leopoldo had already conceded, “When one under-
stands the human heart, one sees how dicult it is to sustain governments at a 
certain degree of perfection. It is men who govern and [for perfect government] 
it would be necessary that the leaders be above man, that they be angels.”150 As 
much as Pietro Leopoldo endeavoured to endow his subjects with greater rights, 
his constitutional project stagnated. e bout of intense collaboration with Gi-
anni starting in 1779 gave way to long periods of apathy throughout the 1780s.151
Despite the immensity of his reform achievements in Tuscany, Pietro Leopoldo’s 
constitutional ideas remained in dra form.152 Notwithstanding, for a brief time 
during the American Revolution, a Habsburg ruler seriously contemplated its 
ideas and sought to implement them in his own lands.
Conclusion
If we are to understand the magnitude of the American Revolution, we must 
be able to comprehend its totality. e imperial court at Vienna, far removed 
from the Atlantic coastline, was not impervious to American revolutionary 
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sentiments. Courtiers expressed a large degree of fascination for the goings-on 
in North America. e ideals they encountered, the gossip it produced, even the 
disagreements it provoked, set the imperial court abuzz. Much to the despair of 
the British ambassador in Vienna, there was a positive attitude towards Ameri-
can victories and little by way of counter-revolutionary rhetoric. ere is little ev-
idence to show that the Viennese court was a divided society over the Revolution 
and much to show that it was generally supportive. Noblemen such as Seilern, 
Wilczek, and Windischgrätz and administrators such as Bek and Birkenstock 
looked favourably upon the success of the patriots. Zinzendorf, one of the most 
knowledgeable bureaucrats, devoured whatever information he could come 
across regarding the Revolution.
Franklin gained unrivalled access to the monarchs unlike anywhere else in 
Europe. e imperial family were awash with information about the American 
Revolution: Maria eresa read tailor-made reports by Franklin whereas Joseph 
sought to meet the latter for himself whilst his brother Pietro Leopoldo mused 
upon the Revolution’s principles. It can be of no surprise to anyone that when 
the 
rst American representative arrived in Vienna in May 1778, he exclaimed 
how “some here are warm for the part of America.” e cultural phenomenon of 
the American Revolution, its spectacle and its inuence, forces us to recognise 
the magnitude of its reach—even in a place we might assume to be too remote 
and within circles previously assumed to be too anti-revolutionary.
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“Angels of the New Republic”
e American Revolutionary Inuence in the Habsburg Lands,
1776–1789
I n the Arkadenhof, the central courtyard of the University of Vienna, a gallery of pillared busts entreats the visitor. Along the row of marbled gures and underneath the Tuscan-sloped arches of amaranth pink and almond yel-
low stands a scientist with a smirk. “JOH INGEN - HOUSZ 1730 - 1799 ARCHI-
ATER CAESAREVS 1768 - 1799 QVA RATIONE PLANTAE ALANTVR
PRIMVS PERSPEXIT”—“Jan Ingenhousz (1730–1799), Court Physician 
(1768–1799), Discoverer of Photosynthesis.” An ordinary scientist for those who 
happen to notice his visage as they stroll through the hallowed hallways. Ingen-
housz was not a conventional character, however. Neither an alumnus nor ever a 
full member of the university, nor even an Austrian for that matter, Ingenhousz’s 
inclusion in the Viennese Valhalla came about due to the determination of his 
rst biographer, the botany professor Julius Wiesner. Erected in 1905, the artistic 
rendering of Ingenhousz arrived in time for Wiesner’s organisation of the second 
International Botanic Conference which took place in Vienna that year.1 As 
cognizant as Wiesner and other biographers have been of Ingenhousz’s discovery 
of photosynthesis and of his contemporary celebrity, his role in bringing the 
American Revolution to Vienna has gone unnoticed. He was Franklin’s con-
tact at the imperial court. He was the disseminator of American propaganda to 
Maria eresa and Joseph II. He explained the American Revolution to people 
like Zinzendorf. Ingenhousz was the great partisan of the revolutionary cause in 
the Habsburg Monarchy. His unfettered access to the court allowed him to be 
the spokesman for the patriots, the defender of Franklin, and the focal point for 
others interested in the revolutionary turmoil across the Atlantic. ere is still 
space for such a recognition on the plinth.
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e American Revolution became a diplomatic conundrum and a commer-
cial opportunity for the Habsburg Monarchy, but it remained throughout its 
course a cultural phenomenon. Contemporary observers and historians alike 
have noted the Revolution’s intellectual and cultural impact across Europe.2 Yet 
their accounts neither acknowledge the immediate impact of the Revolution 
on the Habsburg lands nor the breadth of its eects. e eects of the Rev-
olution simmered before they burned. e American precedent inspired the 
United States of Belgium in the Austrian Netherlands in the late 1780s as well 
as the Revolutions of 1848. Although prominent examples, these instances were 
not the rst symptoms of American revolutionary inuence in the Habsburg 
Monarchy. Instead, individuals in the Habsburg lands reacted positively and 
vehemently to the unfolding events transpiring across the Atlantic. Observers of 
the Revolution across the Habsburg lands felt compelled to act; some to promote 
the revolutionary goals, other sought to enlist for the cause, and many wished 
for the Revolution to succeed. Events begot emotions which in turn produced 
actions. We have already seen how one family, the Schusters of Vienna, named 
their child in honour of patriot revolutionaries. Across the Habsburg Monar-
chy, individuals responded positively to the struggle against British rule in the 
Figure 5. e memorial bust of the great partisan of the American cause, 
Dr. Jan Ingenhousz in the central courtyard of the University of Vienna
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thirteen colonies. is positivity signals a need for the wider acknowledgement 
of the inuence and impact of the American Revolution in Europe.
e Franklin Factor
Benjamin Franklin was undoubtedly the popular face of the American Revolu-
tion in Europe. For people across the Habsburg this famous scientist-turned-rev-
olutionary embodied the spirit of the American cause. e hundreds of sur-
viving letters from Franklin’s correspondents across the length and breadth of 
the Habsburg Monarchy are testament to the enduring appeal of Franklin and 
the Revolution he represented in the minds of many Habsburg inhabitants. His 
correspondence yet again provides a useful barometer for American interest in 
the Habsburg Monarchy. In the words of one historian, “the number of Franklin 
correspondents from that area is amazing.” “ey conrm,” he added, “the im-
pression that pro-American sympathies were widespread in this area,” especially 
in Vienna, which he also surmised “was much better informed about American 
events than the court of the Prussian king.”3 Indeed, the number of existent 
Franklin correspondents from the Habsburg Monarchy outnumbers Prussian 
correspondents by almost ve to one.4
Franklin received at least 258 letters from 97 individuals who either resided in 
or were natural-born subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy between 1775 and 1789.5
Notorious for never keeping up with his mail, Franklin sent a total of forty-nine 
letters back to sixteen individuals. Franklin’s letter exchange with Habsburg res-
idents and subjects amounted to almost two percent of his total (incoming and 
outgoing) correspondence.6 No other American corresponded with as many in-
dividuals from the Habsburg lands during this period, reecting Franklin’s over-
whelming centrality in the Habsburg interest for the American Revolution. His 
correspondents came from all corners of the monarchy and beyond; from Lem-
berg (nowadays Lviv in the Ukraine) to Linz. At one point or another, Franklin 
received supportive messages from every province of the Habsburg lands.
Professional interests played a large role in determining who chose to write 
to Franklin. Intellectuals, scientists, and men of letters were pivotal in craing 
the rst positive views of Franklin and his later participation in the Revolution. 
Many had met Franklin personally. Professor František Antonín Steinský was 
a gied polymath and professor of auxiliary historical sciences at the Charles 
University in Prague.7 He detoured to Paris during his European tour in 1780 
to explicitly meet with Franklin, whom he admired and had sign his auto-
graph book. A cordial friendship developed between them that continued aer 
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Steinský’s return to Prague, where he functioned as Franklin’s promoter among 
the Bohemian intelligentsia.8 e two kept each other informed of scientic 
developments in North America and Central Europe, exchanged books, and 
Steinský gied Franklin’s works to other Habsburg scientists.9 In 1789, Steinský 
became one of the rst Habsburg subjects elected to the American Philosophical 
Society at Franklin’s behest.10
In Milan, Marsilio Landriani helped to popularise Franklin’s scientic rep-
utation. Landriani endorsed the advantages of Franklin’s famed electrical con-
ductors. In his Dell’utilità dei conduttori elettrici (On the utility of electrical 
conductors) (1784), he praised the “immortal” Franklin’s invention and referred 
to the lightning rod as the “Franklinian bar.”11 At the same time, the director of 
the Oriental Academy in Vienna, Johann von Gott Nekrep, returned from visit-
ing Franklin in Paris and lauded him among colleagues. “Vienna,” he informed 
Franklin, “is more than ever desirous to see so sage and so able a Statesman, and 
so a philosopher.”12
Franklin’s scientic fame had secured him an admiring audience long be-
fore 1776, but his perceived support of the Revolution followed by his arrival in 
Paris as American ambassador made him the Revolution’s tangible contact for 
many Europeans. Military personnel consistently approached Franklin, both 
in person and in writing, in order to oer their services for the young republic. 
In total, twenty-one people from the Habsburg lands oered Franklin military 
Figure 6. Benjamin Franklin’s arrival at Versailles by an 
unknown engraver (ca. 1778)
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service. Applications came from across Europe, however, not just the Habsburg 
Monarchy. Many did so out of desire for employment, especially during periods 
of peacetime in Europe. In the chart above, it is possible to see the correlation 
between Habsburg military approaches to Franklin and the times of war. When 
forces were mobilised for the War of the Bavarian Succession between Prus-
sia and the Habsburgs in 1778, military solicitations to Franklin dropped but 
picked up again in the nal two years of combat in North America. Aer hos-
tilities ceased in 1783, nobody with a military connection wrote to him from the 
Habsburg lands. A majority of the oers came from ocers, but more ordinary 
soldiers also wrote to Franklin.13
Several soldiers were sincerely inspired by the revolutionary cause. Mihály 
Kováts de Fabriczy was a Hungarian nobleman and highly decorated soldier who 
found his own way to North America in 1777. In a letter to Franklin, he shared 
his motivation for doing so:
I now am here of my own free will, having taken all the horrible and trouble 
of this journey, and I am willing to sacrice myself wholly and faithfully as 
is to be expected of an honest soldier facing the hazards and great dangers 
of the war, to the detriment of Joseph [II] as well as for the freedom of your 
great Congress.14
Similar sentiments can be found in other letters to Franklin. Two cavalry o-
cers stationed in Babarc near Mohács in southern Hungary oered to desert for 
chart 1. Letters received by Franklin from the Habsburg 
Monarchy, by background, 1775–1789.
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America. “Born in the Empire,” they wrote, “where we still breathe some Freedom, 
and [are] burning with the Desire to spend our Days in a Country where Freedom 
will make so many happy.” In other words, they applied for service out of ideolog-
ical concerns.15 is zeal was widespread among Habsburg ocers. Count Franz 
Leopold Barbo von Waxenstein in Vidéz, Slovenia, described himself as “burn-
ing with a noble desire to serve [Franklin’s] country and nd glory or death” and 
Captain Hippolytus Verité, commander of the Hungarian engineers stationed at 
Olomouc, Moravia, so desired “to serve the illustrious Republic” that he planned 
to quit his Habsburg service aer twenty-six years and relocate his family in order 
to demonstrate his commitment.16 Verité sensed the wider trend of Habsburg sol-
diers oering themselves to the Americans and felt the need to distinguish himself 
among the applicants. “I would ask you not to confuse me with the many Austrian 
ocers,” he begged of Franklin, “since it is not the necessity that forces me to seek 
the services of the United American Colonies [. . .] but only my inclination which 
makes me seek this change.”17 roughout the War of American Independence,
the desire to ght on behalf of the revolutionary cause was a common sentiment
among ocers in the Habsburg lands.
Others sought to aid the American cause in dierent ways. Many felt the need 
to share their linguistic capabilities. e Viennese physician Dr. Jakob Ober-
leithner oered his medical talents to Franklin in (somewhat patchy) Latin and 
asserted his useful prociency in French and “Slavic Bohemian.”18 e radical 
author and former court secretary (Hofsekretär) to Maria eresa, Franz Ru-
dolf von Großing, professed his love for America which drove him to seek a 
secretarial role in America given his “thorough knowledge” of Latin, Italian, 
French, German, Hungarian, English, Spanish, and “Prussian.”19 Count Frie-
drich August von Grävenitz was an Aulic Councillor (Reichshoat) in Vienna, 
who, apparently as one of eighteen children in a large aristocratic family, in-
formed Franklin of his desire to retire to the United States “to acquire a small 
estate in either Georgia, the Carolinas, or Virginia.” With no shred of humility, 
Grävenitz insisted the United States, as a new country, would need such “accom-
plished” men.20
ere were also those who sought to gain from the American Revolution. 
Merchants were the most obvious collective seeking to exploit revolutionary 
upheaval to their benet. Some of them wrote on behalf of their own mercan-
tile houses—like those of Veuve d’Aubremé &Fils, de Vinck & Co., and Salucci
& Fils—whilst some represented consortiums of merchants such as Jean-Guild 
Wets in Bruges who represented a group of forty Flemish merchants.21 ese 
mercantile letters to Franklin were oen tinged with the sense of uncertainty 
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and their desperate need to obtain more information in order to begin trans-
atlantic trade. Such was the case when Aegidius Dujardin wrote from Ghent 
in 1778 as one of the rst merchants seeking Franklin’s help with forging these 
new transatlantic ties.22 e majority of Franklin’s mercantile correspondents 
in the Habsburg lands contacted him in 1783 when merchants desired to open 
and retain trading links to the United States now that peace had been declared. 
Even though merchants pursued prot more than passion, their interest in the 
United States as a trading destination greatly aected the overall response of 
the Habsburgs towards the American Revolution. It will become clear in later 
chapters just how deep this mercantile vein ran in the formation of Habsburg 
policy towards the United States.
For now, Franklin’s epistolary connections represents the wealth of reactions 
among various inhabitants across the Habsburg Monarchy. ese individuals 
overwhelmingly looked favourably upon his character and the Revolution he 
epitomised. For many, the Revolution signied opportunity, progress, or a cause 
to honour and defend. From Vienna to Vidéz, Brussels to Babarc the American 
Revolution was not held in contempt but rather praised and supported in the 
hands and minds of various individuals from a variety of dierent backgrounds. 
eir surviving testimony in their letters to Franklin reects a sympathetic 
groundswell for the principles of the American Revolution long before the rev-
olutionary turbulence of the 1790s. In the Age of Revolutions, the Habsburg 
Monarchy was not a land of latecomers but a land of engaged, observant, and 
even sympathetic inhabitants.
e Making of a Partisan: Jan Ingenhousz
Jan Ingenhousz was Franklin’s chief correspondent in the Habsburg Monarchy. 
He received over half of Franklin’s total replies and was Franklin’s most prolic 
correspondent, representing nearly one-quarter of Franklin’s Habsburg mail. 
e two men shared a close friendship which began in London during the 1760s 
when they met through common scientic interests and their acquaintance Sir 
John Pringle. In 1768, Ingenhousz le London for Vienna, where he successfully 
inoculated the imperial family and became the court physician to Maria eresa. 
Despite separation, Franklin and Ingenhousz maintained a correspondence last-
ing from at least 1773 until 1788. Ingenhousz was cognizant of the great value of 
his connection with Franklin. roughout the War of American Independence, 
Ingenhousz took great pains to ensure that this correspondence continued. He 
sent two copies of his earliest letters to Franklin—one via New York and one via 
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St. Eustatius—in the hope of reaching him in Philadelphia.23 He relied upon the 
Parisian bankers Tourton & Baur to safely transmit letters to Franklin following 
his return to Europe in 1777. Oen Ingenhousz concealed his letters in sealed, 
unaddressed envelopes which the bankers recognised. He reminded Franklin 
numerous times of the necessity of such clandestine actions and warned him not 
to trust servants with their mail as they “are too oen unfaithful and paid by the 
police.”24 By 1782, Ingenhousz had secured a more condent route through the 
Habsburg ambassador in Paris.25
e spectre of their correspondence being discovered haunted Ingenhousz 
throughout the wartime years. For him, the act of communicating to Franklin 
linked him inextricably to the patriot movement. During his travels across Eu-
rope, especially to London in 1777–1778, he acknowledged the risks attached to 
such a dangerous liaison. Verbal communication through mutual friends was a 
safer way to correspond, Ingenhousz suggested to Franklin, especially as border 
guards “could search my pockets and nd letters which they could suspect.”26
A few months later, he thought it would be safer to use ctitious names for the 
letters.27 Ingenhousz certainly was being overly paranoid. ough he imagined 
the very real threat of criminality arising from his association with an American 
revolutionary, there was little actual danger since most elites, even the monarchs 
themselves, were completely aware of his connection and permitted it. “ey 
know I am known and correspond with a man of such public concern as you 
are,” Ingenhousz demurred. Indeed, for many people in the Habsburg capital, 
Franklin was the face of the Revolution, but this increased their desire to know 
more about him and, as we have seen, prompted many to write to him. Noth-
ing ultimately came of Ingenhousz’s fears bar a few packages containing Amer-
ican newspapers held hostage in the Viennese post oce until aer the war had 
ended.28 Yet the anxiety Ingenhousz endured from maintaining this correspon-
dence forced an emotional reaction within him: he felt part of the Revolution.
Ingenhousz’s initial reaction to the hostilities was shock and dismay. Britain 
had been his home for many years and had harboured his greatest friendships. 
Moreover, the American colonies had been a retirement option in his mind, even 
to the point that he planned to emigrate with his nephew’s family29—an idea 
he never completely lost.30 Since he conceived of the colonies as a refuge for the 
persecuted and as a harmonious society across the Atlantic, he felt personally 
aected when conict broke out in the 1770s. “at country is [sic] become the 
seat of horror and bloodshed, which I took to be the seat of tranquillity and hap-
piness,” he exclaimed to Franklin before he lamented on how it could have been 
“Angels of the New Republic” 63 
“the only seat of undisturbed human felicity.”31 Ingenhousz’s early pessimism 
over the war gradually gave way to the belief that the colonists were the victims 
and the British ministers the aggressors. e sacking of “defenceless” cities and 
fermenting of Native Americans against the colonists were in his mind “unwar-
rantable and imprudent” acts of the British forces in North America.32
At the exact same time, however, Ingenhousz chose to share extracts of 
Franklin’s letters with the British ambassador, trading Sir Robert Murray Keith 
the latest account of his “old and faithful friend” in return for introductions to 
elites in London.33 Ingenhousz’s transformation took place gradually rather than 
suddenly. Following a reunion with Franklin in Paris and upon his return to 
Vienna in 1780, Ingenhousz’s resolve towards the patriot side hardened. For one, 
he never shared letters with Keith again and, moreover, he thought American 
independence would suciently hobble the British who acted so belligerently 
in his mind that they threatened to destabilise European peace. He spoke no 
longer of the calamities of the war and instead told Franklin how “necessary it 
is for the tranquillity of Europe that your Country should remain free” in order 
to undo the “haughty” British.34 Within a few years, Ingenhousz had completed 
his journey from shocked observer to a fervent pro-American supporter.
In his writings on the American Revolution, Ingenhousz’s primary motiva-
tion was to exonerate Franklin. In 1774, Franklin faced what became known as 
the “Cockpit Trial” in London: a cross-examination by the Privy Council result-
ing from Franklin leaking letters to North American publishers which demon-
strated the Massachusetts colonial governor had encouraged a crackdown on 
colonists protesting the new, unpopular taxes. Franklin’s actions had provoked a 
maelstrom of anger and criticism towards the governor, further inaming an al-
ready tense situation. British ministers held Franklin accountable and raked him 
over the coals during the hearing.35 Rumours in Vienna (and across Europe) dis-
torted the severity of Franklin’s actions, and as a result the prevailing Viennese 
perception was that Franklin had organised the resistance in North America.
Ingenhousz set out to correct the narrative and dispel the notions of the 
American Revolution being a “Franklinian plot.” In his Remarques sur les af-
faires présente de l’Amérique Septentrionale (Remarks on the current aairs 
in North America)—written in 1777 ostensibly for Maria eresa but shared 
widely among courtiers as well—he repudiated the image of Franklin as a mas-
termind of rebellion. Ingenhousz instead claried that the mistreatment of the 
colonists was the actual “source of discord and of the current insurrection.”36 His 
explanation carried weight among his peers and superiors given his standing at 
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court and his close connection to Franklin. On more than one occasion Count 
Karl von Zinzendorf visited Ingenhousz in order to nd out more about the 
American cause which Ingenhousz was all too happy to explain to him.37
In his essays written for the Habsburg monarchs that lasted throughout the 
Revolution, Ingenhousz increasingly defended patriot interests, becoming a re-
liable mouthpiece for Franklin and the American cause in Vienna. is was 
arguably his greatest intervention on behalf of the Americans during the war. To 
be sure, Ingenhousz was feathering his own nest as well. He needed Franklin’s 
information to keep Maria eresa “in good humour.”38 But Ingenhousz went 
beyond merely relaying Franklin’s reections. He made translations of Frank-
lin’s works and personal letters and accompanied them with short reports of his 
own about the Revolution.39 Without doubt, Ingenhousz was the most eective 
supporter of the American Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy. He did more 
than anyone else within the Monarchy to enable the feelings of shared interests 
with the American cause, to explain their revolutionary goals to a broader audi-
ence, and to elucidate sympathy for the American patriots among his circles in 
Vienna. But he was not alone.
Leaving the Monarchy for America
Joseph Cauman is a name unknown in the history of the American Revolution.40
Yet Cauman represents the profound radicalisation from bystander to fervent 
patriot that was possible under the ideals of the Revolution, even in a place as 
seemingly remote as Vienna. Joseph Cauman was born in Philadelphia in 1755. 
As the eldest of ten children, he embodied the best hopes of his merchant father 
Joseph T. Cauman.41 Joseph Sr. had arrived in Philadelphia in 1749 from his 
native Alsace region. A spelling mistake on his Pennsylvanian land deeds forced 
him to adopt the name “Cauman” instead of the original “Kauman,” but he 
lost nothing else of his German-Alsatian heritage.42 e Cauman family upheld 
their Roman Catholic faith, which meant Joseph Sr. found it dicult to obtain a 
suitable education for his eldest son. Like many well-to-do Catholic families, he 
decided to send Joseph Jr. to Europe for his education. us Joseph Jr. was eleven 
years old when he le Philadelphia to go, as he put it, “abroad amidst the dangerous 
rocks of intrigue, wickedness and an insnaring [sic] world.”43
Cauman studied rst at St. Omer’s College in Bruges in the Austrian Neth-
erlands. At Bruges, he could still feel part of his North American roots. Prom-
inent Catholic families, mainly from Maryland, supplied the school with pu-
pils. One of the signers of the Declaration of American Independence, Charles 
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Carroll of Carrollton had graduated a few years prior and one of his relatives, 
John Carroll, the future rst Archbishop in North America, taught at St. Omer’s 
in Bruges until the eve of the Revolution.44 Joseph spent ve years in Bruges be-
fore he enrolled at the University of Vienna. ere, he studied medicine, which 
entailed a two-year course in philosophy before he even saw a cadaver, but which 
unlocked a prestigious world for him.45 In the middle-years of his degree, he ac-
companied various renowned medical practitioners on their rounds of Vienna’s 
poorhouses and clinics such as Dr. Anton de Haen, whom he called his “partic-
ular friend” in a boastful letter to his father.46
Cauman was not being arrogant about his situation. In another letter, writ-
ten in the fateful summer of July 1776, he informed his father that he would sit 
his exams early, completing his medical degree within three years of specialisa-
tion rather than the usual ve, a feat “hitherto unknown in this University,” he 
claimed.47 Emboldened by his rst-rate education, Cauman had mulled over 
his future career plans for a while. In 1775 he had thought of going to London 
to work with the famed Dr. John Fothergill. Returning to America was no com-
parison. He showed little interest in “surpassing our common quacks in Penn-
sylvania” unless it was as an assistant to the equally famous Dr. John Morgan in 
Philadelphia.48 Edinburgh took his fancy in 1776 as he hoped his father could 
persuade Dr. Benjamin Rush to make some introductions for him there. But by 
the time he had earned his degree a year later, he had abandoned all such plans.
Cauman became the University of Vienna’s rst American-born graduate in 
1777.49 e year became a dramatic turning point in the twenty-two-year-old’s 
life. For many months he had become weary of the rumblings in North America, 
through the newspapers he read in Vienna.50 By April 1777, he had become con-
vinced of the need to act, the need to do his part in the Revolution. In a letter he 
wrote to Franklin, Cauman outlined his vehement attachment to his homeland, 
which he made clear was now the United States of America. “I shall always think 
it the rst duty of Man to serve his Country,” he proclaimed, and “touched by 
the present calamities” he wished to honour “one of the most glorious causes.”51
Cauman felt his excellent medical training made him an ideal candidate to serve 
in the Continental Army. Gone were the notions of advancing his career in Lon-
don or Edinburgh. He had expunged these wishful plans from his life’s narrative. 
“I have applied myself with an indefatigable zeal to my studies,” he professed to 
Franklin, “in order to prove one day or another, a worthy citizen of America.”52
Cauman presented himself as an ardently devout patriot and also oered to spy 
on Franklin’s behalf in Vienna. “No pains shall be thought too great, no stone le 
unturned, to procure you proper information,” he declared.53
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Cauman’s contact with Franklin came through his friendship with Ingen-
housz. Both were members of the medical community in Vienna. ey had be-
come friends already by the end of 1776 when Ingenhousz mentioned how he en-
joyed “the company of one Mr. Kauman [sic] from Philadelphia” in a letter to 
Franklin.54 When Ingenhousz departed Vienna for London to present the Baker 
lectures at the Royal Society in 1777, it seems Cauman travelled with him.55 A 
few months later, he served aboard an American frigate, the USS Randolph, as 
a medic.56 At the start of 1778, the vessel sailed along with four other American 
ships to raid British supply lines in the West Indies. On March 7, spotters faintly 
sighted a lone British vessel and over the next few hours the convoy gave chase. In 
the dark hours of that evening, the captain of the Randolph, Nicholas Biddle, or-
dered the rst shots red broadside into the British ship they felt was no match. 
It was more than a match. e British vessel was in fact a ship of the line and 
severely outgunned the plucky frigate. e return volley struck the powder stores 
on the Randolph, detonating upon impact and blowing the ship apart. Only four 
survivors made it to the other vessels as they escaped the disastrous moonlight 
engagement. Joseph Cauman was not among them. Instead, he perished along 
with most of the crew and became a martyr to the cause he had become so de-
voted to aer nishing his studies in Vienna. e rst American-born student 
at the University of Vienna died ghting in the American Revolution.
Joseph Cauman’s story is important because he was not alone. In his letter 
to Franklin, Cauman axed a note that informed Franklin about the “many 
able ocers, even of rank,” who “begged” him to include mention of their “de-
sire of taking part in the present contest.”57 Whether or not they joined him on 
his journey across the Atlantic cannot be ascertained, but there were some who 
surely planned to go with him. When news reached Vienna of his death, his 
friends were distraught. Dr. Joseph Pelligrini, who had studied alongside him 
and worked at a hospital in the Landstrasse district of Vienna, wrote to Franklin 
explaining his previous intention to join Cauman in serving America. Still 
undeterred, the unmarried, thirty-something doctor who spoke a smattering of 
English oered to fund his own travel if Franklin would help him gain safe pas-
sage to Philadelphia. As he confessed to Franklin, he wished to do so out of his 
“secret desire for America” because he so revered “the character and morals” of 
the new nation.58 Such motivation stemmed from the zeal of Cauman’s exam-
ple. Whereas Cauman had a natural attachment to the place of his birth, Pel-
ligrini’s anity for the American rose from the inspiring actions of his friends. 
It was one example of how the “contagion of liberty” permeated even to places 
within the Habsburg Monarchy.59
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Participation, however, worked both ways in the Habsburg Monarchy. As 
much as there were those who wished to or did go to ght for the Revolution, 
there were also those from the Habsburg lands who went to ght against the 
Revolution. ose who fought against the patriots in the War of American In-
dependence participated as part of the Hessian mercenary forces. Six German 
principalities supplied the war in North America with around 21,000 men.60
e Hessian regiments were not just local-born ghters, however. Like many 
European armies of that time, they were a hotchpotch of nationalities. Some of 
this patchwork had arisen from voluntary enlistments; foreign men following 
opportunities for work or signed up by recruiters sent out to ll the ranks. As 
manpower stocks diminished and demand remained steady, recruiters widened 
their geographic scope and turned to more illicit practices: bribery, impressment, 
or coercion.61 Habsburg ministers denounced such activities as an “evil” because 
Hessian recruiters interfered with their own recruitment drives for settlement in 
Eastern Europe.62 e poaching of military personnel for service in the Hessian 
regiments in North America became a grave concern to the ministers in the 
Court War Council (Horiegsrat) who met several times throughout the war to 
discuss the problem. At one point, ministers recommended resurrecting an old 
imperial edict which curtailed unpermitted migration in order to prohibit men 
from enlisting in the regiments destined for America.63 Complete prevention 
proved ultimately futile, however.
Habsburg subjects serving in so-called Hessian regiments were present at al-
most every major battle of the American Revolution. At least 192 identiable 
Habsburgs served in the Hessian forces in North America.64 ere were cer-
tainly many more, given the concern of the Horiegsrat, but archival records 
cannot indicate the exact scale. Soldiers serving in the Hessian forces originated 
from across the Habsburg lands. ere were men from core regions like Josef von 
Bosen, a Tyrolean ocer from Innsbruck, and Antonin Masorka from Krásny 
Les in Bohemia. Others came from further aeld such as George Frohnhauer 
from Trieste on the Adriatic and János Messet from Debrecen in Hungary. War 
was always a deadly business. All four men died during the conict. In some 
cases, they never reached North America. Johannes Strosser from Grieskirchen 
in Upper Austria and Bernard Schäer from Graz in Styria died at sea crossing 
the Atlantic. In other cases, some Habsburg subjects survived the war but be-
came displaced aer their service. A good number of them may have settled in 
the Canadian territories, though the majority returned home.65
Justus Eggertt was one who returned. He had seen action in almost the en-
tirety of the war. Originally from Leipzig, he had moved to Vienna in 1771 where 
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he suered a dispute with his employers, the counts of Hoym. In the summer 
of 1776, he found himself without a job and, perhaps with the help of a local 
recruiter or perhaps spurred on by the reports in the national newspapers, he 
decided to enlist in the Hessian service. He joined the Ansbach regiment at Am-
sterdam and crossed the Atlantic on a British ship, which, as his journal account 
of the war details, carried more cannons than mattresses for the 250 soldiers 
aboard.66 Aer a gruelling nine-week voyage, they reached Sandy Hook, New 
Jersey, in mid-August 1776. Days later, Eggertt took part in the largest battle of 
the entire war, the Battle of Long Island, a British victory that enabled the fall of 
New York City a few months later, which he survived unharmed. Eggertt fought 
in several more battles during the New York and New Jersey campaigns. He was 
stationed in Philadelphia and Baltimore where he quartered with German immi-
grants, who, he noted with surprise, owned slaves. Eggertt encountered slavery 
again during his nal campaign in the Carolinas, but he only remarked on the 
higher quantities of slaves working on southern plantations. Landing at Charles-
ton in 1781, Eggertt fought in the “most exceptional heat and severest storms” he 
had ever experienced. He witnessed many plantations “ruined” by his forces.67 In 
his journal, Eggertt estimated that his military life had taken him over “6,000 
German miles” before he numbered among the men who surrendered at York-
town. Eggertt eventually returned to Austria in 1783 where he found work in the 
military administration in the Trauenviertel region of Upper Austria. He shared 
stories of his experience of North America up to his death in 1823.68
Angels of the New Republic
e military heroes of the American Revolution piqued the interests of many 
observers across Europe. American military leaders became famous through 
their depictions in newspapers and periodicals but the yearning for learning 
more about them was greater still. One man in the Habsburg Monarchy was 
determined to nd out more about these generals and as a result began his own 
personal journey with the American Revolution. In 1778, Johann (Baptist) Zin-
ner was a historian and prefect at the Imperial and Royal Academy in Buda.69
He became enraptured by the War of American Independence from descriptions 
he read in local and regional newspapers. He found that these newspapers oen 
provided competing accounts and contradicting facts, however. Zinner raised 
this problem in a letter to Franklin that year. e famous turncoat, Benedict 
Arnold, Zinner complained with some exaggeration, “is sometimes made out to 
be a German of Mainz, sometimes an American of Connecticut, sometimes a 
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lapsed Capuchin monk, and sometimes a grocer from Norway.”70 How was he 
to discern the truth? Zinner’s dilemma was all the more urgent since he was at 
work on two books on the American Revolution, and, as a good historian, he 
needed to separate fact from ction.
Zinner was deeply motivated about the American Revolution. He travelled 
from Buda to Vienna in 1778 to meet with the rst ocial American envoy to 
the Habsburg court, who, he hoped, would be able to provide him with the right 
information, but he missed the American by a few weeks. He turned to Franklin 
instead who responded kindly to his request for help. In 1779, Zinner accepted 
Franklin’s invitation to visit him at Passy where he personally received copies of 
American letters and literature.71 Equipped with this rst-hand material, Zinner 
headed back to Hungary, where in 1780 he joined the juridical faculty at the 
Royal Academy at Košice as a professor of statistics and history.72 At the time, 
Košice was a provincial metropole where the university had been founded by 
the local bishop in 1660 as the Universitas Cassovensis and run by the Jesuits 
until their dissolution. e Royal Academy at Košice was one of ve new institu-
tions established under the Ratio educationis (Education Law) of 1777.73 Zinner 
joined a relatively small scholarly community, where of approximately seventeen 
sta members taught 372 students in the humanities.74 Based on his surviving 
manuscripts, it is clear Zinner shared his American material with his pupils.75
Zinner, however, was not content with bringing the American Revolution only 
to Košice; he had bigger plans.
From his academic perch nestled on the eastern side of the Tatra Mountains, 
far removed from the Atlantic, Zinner worked on several manuscripts chroni-
cling the Revolution. In his letter to Franklin, he noted how he planned two 
monographs but in fact he completed three in rapid succession. e rst book 
appeared in print in 1782, titled Merkwürdige Briefe und Schrien der berühm-
testen Generäle in Amerika (Remarkable letters and writings of the most famous 
generals in America).76 In 352 pages, Zinner retold various aspects of the revo-
lutionary struggle up to 1780 through 46 indexed letters and thirteen essays, 
proclamations, and excerpts. Overall, Zinner translated and published either 
in part or in full over 70 original letters from the leaders of both sides (Ameri-
can and British) of the Revolution. American patriots were the overwhelming 
focus of his work which included famous names like Franklin, Samuel Adams, 
Horatio Gates, Charles Lee, and George Washington as well as gures who were 
less-known to German-speaking audiences such as the politicians omas Jef-
ferson and Robert R. Livingston, and generals Israel Putnam, Benjamin Lin-
coln, and Arthur St. Clair. Most of them received an extensive and accurate 
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biography. Zinner certainly oered the most detailed accounts of these individ-
uals within the German-speaking realm at the time. On the British side, Zinner 
provided only two much shorter but equally accurate biographies of the British 
generals John Burgoyne and omas Gage.77 In his introduction to the work, 
Zinner outlined the need to show both sides of the conict in order to present 
a neutral account of the war through the most important writings of the war’s 
leaders.78 Yet the imbalance within his work already belies his true intentions 
and partisanship towards the Americans.
roughout his Merkwürdige Briefe, Zinner presented Americans in a kinder 
light than the British. Burgoyne and Gage, in Zinner’s telling, both paled in 
comparison to the military prowess of the American generals. He noted Bur-
goyne’s failure to defeat the Americans at Saratoga and Gage’s Pyrrhic victory 
at Bunker Hill and subsequent retirement to London as their most noteworthy 
biographical moments.79 Both biographies are short compared to any of those 
of the American leaders. Franklin received the most attering (and longest) 
entry which Zinner used as proof that “such a man as Franklin is never to be 
despised.”80 Combining Franklin’s victorious role in the war with his scientic 
reputation, Zinner rounded out his biography of Franklin with the attribution 
by Franklin’s great admirer, Jean-Baptiste de Beaumont, “Alterius orbis Vindex, 
utriusque Lumen” (Champion of one world, light of both).81 When Zinner con-
trasted the unequal treatment of prisoners of war between the Americans and 
British, he portrayed the British army in an almost barbaric light. He published 
a letter by the patriot Ethan Allen which described cruel and punitive British 
captivity.82 British ocers, such as Burgoyne, who turned a blind eye to the mu-
tilation of American prisoners by Native Americans was another point which 
Zinner dwelled upon and regarded as contemptible.83 By contrast, Zinner pro-
vided a favourable example of humane captivity on the American side with an 
account by a Hessian soldier.84 In case the distinction was not clear enough, Zin-
ner remarked that “the Americans meanwhile have observed better the rights of 
man” than the British who “thought that threats and destruction would lead to 
victory in this war.”85
ree texts within Zinner’s Merkwürdige Briefe aimed at rousing a sympa-
thetic interest towards the American cause. e rst was Charles Lee’s open 
letter of June 7, 1775, to Burgoyne, a polemic wherein Lee sought to tie himself 
to the patriot movement and to place the incoming British general in a tight bind 
by forcing him to take sides either for or against the nascent patriot movement.86
Zinner faithfully reproduced Lee’s patriotic words in German translation, in-
cluding Lee’s assertion that all Americans “from the rst-estate gentlemen, to 
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the lowest planters and farmers” were animated by the same spirit of liberty to 
“preserve their liberties or perish.”87 Zinner also included Lee’s immortal refrain 
that America was “the last asylum of persecuted liberty.”88 Likewise, Zinner re-
produced Samuel Adams’s speech on the steps of the Philadelphia statehouse 
made on August 1, 1776. is was the same speech Habsburg censors had banned 
in 1780, so it is striking that Zinner dared to republish such material in transla-
tion.89 Zinner’s copy of the second edition of Common Sense, from which he also 
provided translated excerpts, would have been equally shocking for the censors.90
Selected portions of the oughts on the Present State of American Aairs fea-
tured some of the most ery statements where Zinner paid particular attention 
to the justications for the American cause.91 Zinner echoed the calls to accept 
the inevitability of the United States as an independent state.92
Merkwürdige Briefe was Zinner’s rst and only published text on the Amer-
ican Revolution. His other two books, which he had mentioned in his letter to 
Franklin in 1778, were written out by hand but never published.93 ese works 
were thought lost by historians up until now but have in fact remained in Košice 
since Zinner’s time.94 Zinner completed the rst of these two works in 1783. Ti-
tled Notitia historica de Coloniis Americae Septentrionalis (Historical notes on 
the North American colonies), Zinner divided the course of American history 
into three distinct periods: rst, from the discovery of America by Columbus to 
the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763; second, the colonial disturbances in the 
1760s and 1770s and their antecedents in the political history of British America; 
and third, the alliance with the French and concluding Treaty of Paris in 1783.95
What purpose Zinner used his Notitia for is unclear but given the title and the 
fact he completed it in the teaching language of the university, it is possible this 
formed the basis for his courses in universal history at the Royal Academy.96
In 1784, Zinner earned a promotion of sorts when he became an ecclesiastical 
prebendary for the Diocese of Spiš meaning he performed religious duties at the 
Roman Catholic cathedral of Košice, St. Elisabeth’s, in exchange for a stipend.97
His extra duties in Košice did not distract him from his scholarly output as he 
completed his largest and nal work on the American Revolution that year. In 
his Versuch einer Kriegsgeschichte der verbündenen Staaten von Nordamerika (An 
attempt towards a military history of the United States of North America), Zin-
ner distilled everything he had learned from studying the American Revolution. 
It followed a similar pattern to his Notitia by outlining the entirety of Amer-
ican history from Columbus to the contemporary state of the postwar United 
States. Perhaps because Zinner wrote in his native German rather than Latin, he 
felt able to fully convey his thoughts; accounts of early America, of Columbus’s 
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voyage, and the war itself are expanded and dealt with in greater detail making 
the Notitia seem like a writing exercise in preparation for the magnum opus. In-
deed, the Versuch einer Kriegsgeschichte amounted to a gargantuan 106 chapters 
over 535 pages. All of this Zinner wrote by hand and attached his own index.98
Why did Zinner take such great lengths to write these works? Zinner’s mo-
tivation to chronicle the American Revolution in some of the most extensive 
contemporary accounts stemmed from his deep-seated sympathy for the revo-
lutionary cause. He believed in the American Revolution and its importance in 
world history. In a geographically remote part of the Habsburg Monarchy, Zin-
ner composed three monumental works on the Revolution which encompassed 
all of American history and provided European audiences with accurate material 
on its leaders and their revolutionary views. Zinner laid bare his reason for doing 
so in his rst letter to Franklin in 1778, when he wrote,
Figure 7. e rst page of one of Johann Zinner’s histories of 
the American Revolution written in eastern Hungary
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I was born the subject of a great monarch and under a government whose 
rule is mild [. . .] but I cannot tell you what joy I feel when I hear or read of 
your progress in America. To speak the truth, I look upon you and all the 
chiefs of your new republic as angels, sent by heaven to guide and comfort 
the human race [. . .] and to give public manifestation of this sentiment, I 
am composing this work.99
To “give public manifestation” was Zinner’s ultimate aim; such was the con-
viction and admiration he held for the American revolutionaries. In 1783, he 
wrote again to Franklin aer the completion of his Merkwürdige Briefe and 
informed him that he had dedicated the work to Congress, knowing that it 
supported “the bravery and courage of your heroes and the dignity of your Con-
gress.”100 In this dedication, written in Latin, Zinner exclaims,
If there was ever a time so worthy of admiration, it is surely that time in 
which the new Republic rose, [. . .] when through your eorts and through 
your diligence, you very excellent men, the ag of freedom was raised and 
defended with the blood of your citizens. In this irreproachable age, some 
peoples and families fought for the welfare and happiness of the fatherland; 
others, with exhausted forces, took upon themselves in vain the struggle 
of the war for the capital with common, good strength, but they were piti-
fully defeated; the rather hard ones were given into slavery. e Senate 
and the people of America, on the other hand, happily built the capital 
in only seven years and founded a new and prosperous republic, which is 
your glory, in the New World. is is what amazes all peoples and even the 
far-away peoples. is is what moves me most: that I pass on your young 
origin, your tireless work for freedom and the memory, that I record the 
outstanding public announcement of your fame with writings. Onwards, 
you most excellent men, your name as an example of my fully devoted vig-
ilance, follow the counsel of the just and the good, and you will be held by 
me with the most glorious praise for those who seek renewal.101
Zinner certainly felt part of this Revolution; he felt moved by it, hurt by 
the bloodshed, and jubilant by the news of American victory. His intellectual 
determination to chronicle the rise of the new American republic through his 
position at Košice and his three works reect the sense of participation and 
sympathy which he, like many others in the Habsburg Monarchy, experienced. 
In this case, it meant that some of the most vividly detailed works concerning 
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the American Revolution rst saw light at the hand of a Bohemian-born, Ger-
man-speaking professor at the Royal Academy of Košice in the easternmost cor-
ner of the Habsburg lands.
Conclusion
Zinner was not alone. Across the Habsburg lands, people felt moved by the 
events in North America. Almost one hundred of them felt compelled enough 
to invest the emotional cost and monetary value in letters to Franklin; some 
to seek his aid, some to oer praise and advice for his Revolution. rough-
out the Habsburg Monarchy, people who felt some level of sympathy with the 
revolutionary spirit in the thirteen colonies made their opinions known. Vi-
enna, in particular, was home to one of the most ardent and diligent advocates 
of the American revolutionary cause, Jan Ingenhousz. Circles around Ingen-
housz are a case in point. His personal conduit to Franklin through their prior 
friendship and scientic interests became a tradable commodity among the 
Viennese. His pro-American feelings were shared by one of his students, the 
rst American-born student at the University of Vienna, Joseph Cauman who 
voluntarily le to ght for the American cause. Cauman in turn spread his 
revolutionary sentiment among his fellow classmates who enquired aer him 
and sought Franklin’s help to enlist.
Individuals like these conrm there was an abundant enthusiasm for the 
American Revolution in the Habsburg lands. It is against this backdrop that the 
Habsburg interactions with the new United States took place. Obscured by the 
negative connotation of revolution aer the events transpiring in the French Rev-
olution, these earlier American sentiments in the Habsburg Monarchy have gone 
largely unnoticed. Such acknowledgement might have been too controversial for 
academics in the late Habsburg Monarchy of 1905, but it is still possible to add 
that dedication to Ingenhousz’s statute in the Arkadenhof where he should be 
joined again by his friend, Joseph Cauman, the university’s rst American-born 
student, in remembrance of their support for the American cause.
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Ch a pter Fou r
“e Big and Furious Game”
e Diculty of Habsburg Neutrality in the War of American
Independence, 1775–1783
O n January 19, 1776, three Tuscan sailors awoke to gunpoint. Under the impression they were helping to transport hundreds of smuggled guns across the Mediterranean to the Egyptian port of Alexandria, 
they probably never thought such weapons would be used on them in the dead 
of night. But on this occasion, Captain Eastman of the American ship Betsy had 
ordered a clear out. e three Tuscans, as subjects of the Habsburg emperor’s 
brother, were not part of the plan to haul the Betsy from Livorno, where they had 
collected wines and spices along with the smuggled weaponry, to Philadelphia 
rather than Alexandria. Although they spared them an execution, the crew set 
the Tuscan trio adri in a small boat. Aer several days, they reached the port 
of Oran on the African coast, exhausted, parched, and barely alive. From there, 
they managed to cross the straits to Alicante and send word home. News of 
their forced abandonment travelled back to Livorno and later to Florence and 
London. From the Habsburg perspective, this was the latest in a series of unfor-
tunate embroilments consequent of the War of American Independence. e 
three Tuscan sailors, for their part, realised that the American Revolution had a 
very real impact—with almost fatal consequences—on their lives.1
A subject in the Habsburg lands did not have to be directly involved in the 
American Revolution in order to feel the risks. In the port of Lisbon, a few years 
later, the family of an imperial ambassador huddled for safety aer British ships 
attempted to capture an American prize in the harbour near their home. ey 
witnessed the terrifying engagement across the bay before cannon balls came 
screeching through the air seconds later, shattering the walls, destroying the 
interior but sparing them from an untimely, gruesome death.2 In the port of 
Ostend in the Austrian Netherlands, two years aer that encounter, residents 
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awoke to the bewildering sight of a capsizing ship lodged upon the shallows of 
their coastline. Soon British warships descended like hawks to guard the oun-
dered American vessel; it was an unusual sight, which became ever more tinged 
with tension. Magistrates and merchants fretted over what came next in the 
courts and in the customs houses.3
For those who did share the risks of war—the soldiers, the deserters, the 
smugglers—their risks became the state’s as well. Disputes between merchants 
over illicit cargoes or the legalities of a deserter who enlisted in a regiment bound 
for North America marred the delicate diplomatic balancing game which every 
neutral power strove to maintain during wartime, including the Habsburg 
realms. Habsburg interests operated in a tangled web of international trade 
which brought them into disrepute with one or another of the belligerent pow-
ers. is is not to say that the Habsburg Monarchy was unique regarding the dif-
culties associated with neutrality—far from it. Other major European neutrals 
such as Denmark, Russia, and Sweden were all exposed to the uncertainties of 
the Revolution. Swedish merchants, for example, prospered from increased trade 
to the West Indies with exports skyrocketing by a factor of twenty-ve between 
1777 and 1783.4 During the same period, however, Swedish merchants endured 
conscation and legal disputes with the British admiralty. By 1779, no less than 
thirty-two Swedish merchant vessels had been tried in the admiralty courts 
and found guilty of smuggling.5 e Habsburg experience was by no means 
exceptional in comparison. It does, however, serve to illustrate the complexity 
of neutrality in the American Revolution. Habsburg ocials and mariners en-
countered a variety of vicissitudes in attempting to navigate the unsteady world 
created in the wake of the Revolution.
is chapter brings to light these challenges of neutrality for the Habsburgs. 
Two sites were of prime contention: the ports of Livorno in Tuscany and Os-
tend in the Austrian Netherlands. e former, though not a direct appendage 
of the emperor but instead ruled by his brother, became a litmus test for Brit-
ish ocials for the overall temperament of the Habsburg dynasty towards the 
American revolutionaries. Ostenders, for their part, frequently witnessed the 
most dicult contestations of neutrality in the Habsburg lands. Both British 
and American commanders chafed at the neutral principles enacted by regional 
ocials whilst merchants there took full advantage of their lucrative position,
much to the chagrin of both sides. Joining these two ports were the hundreds
of ships which served as mobile micro-legalities provoking further contestations 
at sea and in far-ung foreign ports. e Habsburg Monarchy may be under-
estimated as a maritime power throughout its history, but its mercantile web
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in the eighteenth century extended well into the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacic 
oceans. It was this web that expanded and contracted in the turbulent wake of 
the American Revolution.
Tuscan Terror
Incidents such as the abandonment of the three Tuscans were treated as seri-
ous infractions by the British ministry since they viewed the ship, its crew, and 
captain as British subjects. omas ynne, the third Viscount Weymouth, the 
British foreign secretary responsible, wasted no time in informing the British 
Admiralty and ordering a hunt for the Betsy.6 It was his express wish that this 
“piratical conduct” be curbed and Captain Eastman be brought to justice for 
such “infamous and wicked proceedings.”7 Sir John Dick, the British consul at 
Livorno, maintained a vigilant lookout and informed the city’s governor to obtain 
the “piratical master.”8 But the ship proved impossible to track down and with 
the lag of eighteenth-century communications, any alerts were too late. Fortu-
nately for the British and Habsburgs, a number of the ship’s crew mutinied while 
anchored in Tenerife and piloted the ship back to Cadiz, presumably leaving 
Captain Eastman to a similar fate as the Tuscans.9 Once the ship had returned 
to Livorno a year later, the British ministers decided to reward the sailors and 
compensate the local Tuscan merchants who had suered huge losses to their 
investments. As the British envoy in Florence noted, the whole aair had brought 
“the honour of the British colours” into question by “an Englishman unworthy 
of the name,” and warned that British trade in the Mediterranean would suer 
if generosity to sailors and local merchants was not given.10 King George agreed 
and felt the need to apologise personally to the Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo.11
A few months aer the Betsy incident in 1776, Sir John Dick reported further 
disturbances in Livorno. He had noticed that a Dutch ship, the Johanna van 
Vriesbergh, had arrived from Rotterdam back in January and loaded up a cargo 
consisting of 142 cannons, 1,463 cannon balls, 360 barrels of gunpowder, and 
eighty-four chests of small rearms. What could the Dutch be doing with so 
many munitions? At the time he did not think much about it. In the interven-
ing months, however, Dick came to realise that the ship’s Dutch owners, Otto 
Frank & Co., were in league with omas Morris, a member of the Philadelphia 
rm Willing & Morris and brother of the prominent Pennsylvanian nancer 
Robert Morris. Dick was certain that the weapons were “destined to be reship’d 
for America.”12 It appeared the Betsy had not been an isolated case. And yet 
the situation deteriorated still further. In the same report, Dick recalled how 
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he had also learned that Otto Frank & Co. had ordered an additional 500 bar-
rels of gunpowder via another ship from the Habsburg port of Trieste, where 
an unfamiliar “Englishman”—implying an American—had procured enough 
rearms for 17,000 men.13 e bad news did not stop there. A French ship also 
embarked from Trieste with equally suspicious cargo and, curiously, transported 
twenty-six imperial soldiers but with enough military supplies for four regi-
ments.14 e very next day aer he had sent his report, even more alarming news 
came to him. Another ship, this time Danish, had le Trieste with over 2,100 
muskets and other munitions.15 e whole situation seemed to suggest that the 
Habsburgs were in cahoots with traders to supply the Americans with muni-
tions. “Yet,” Dick wondered aloud in his report, “it is scarce possible to believe 
that the Emperor [Joseph II] and the Great Duke [Pietro Leopoldo] would have 
anything to do in such a Business.”16
Scarce possible, but certainly plausible. Otto Frank himself had met privately 
with Pietro Leopoldo to talk about these ships during a visit to Livorno, and 
his nephew had followed up these conversations with another private audience 
in Florence around the time of the French ship’s arrival.17 Such circumstances 
suggested Dick’s growing concerns were not without some truth to them. e 
diculty for the British, however, was that they could not force a halt to these 
conversations, nor could they direct the trade of an independent state. Dick prof-
fered one solution to his superiors, however: they could procure an edict from Pi-
etro Leopoldo which would limit the export and reshipping of munitions from 
Tuscan ports so that “no Part of them be landed in America.”18 Politicking and 
intervention in Florence seemed the best solution.
Dick’s mind must have been full of conspiratorial musings during his wait 
for further instructions but before news from London arrived, he had ascer-
tained the simple truth of the matter. e munitions were not destined for the 
thirteen colonies at all. Rather they formed part of the Habsburg trade mission 
to Asia.19 e initiative had started with Willem Bolts, “the Englishman” who 
was in fact Dutch and had worked for the British East India Company before he 
had become disillusioned and published inammatory pamphlets denouncing 
the British colonial activities in India.20 His subsequent exile had forced him to 
seek protection from the Habsburgs and, in return, he ventured the scheme to 
begin trade between the Habsburg lands and the Far East. e plan had origi-
nated two years prior with Bolts’s interview with the Habsburg ambassador in 
London and had been a plan of considerable preoccupation among bureaucrats 
in Vienna since then.21 Bolts’s project had involved a great number of merchants 
from all over the Habsburg lands, including Otto Frank and his company.22
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Habsburg administrators had taken great pains to maintain secrecy around the 
project—even going as far as having Bolts disguised as a Portuguese trader when 
travelling from London to Vienna.23 e level of secrecy was so great that it had 
successfully dumbfounded Sir John Dick in Livorno and, for a time, the British 
envoy in Florence, Sir Horace Mann.24 Unbeknownst to them both, Bolts had 
also been meeting with the Grand Duke under their noses.25
Yet something positive arose out of the scare over Bolts’s mission. Mann man-
aged to extract promises from Pietro Leopoldo that “proper security would be 
given” so that arms and ammunition did not fall into the hands of the Ameri-
cans.26 Vindication came in July of 1776 when he received a copy of the octroi 
explicitly outlawing any handover of weapons to the Americans.27 Yet British 
suspicions lingered. Weymouth’s next instructions commended Dick’s atten-
tiveness and conrmed the intelligence about the East Indies mission, but he 
also informed Mann of credible links between Americans and Livornese mer-
chants.28 It was now their task to nd out more about these new suspects.
Dick had other plans in mind, though. He spoke frequently of retirement 
and in July 1776, as the thirteen colonies declared independence, Weymouth 
granted his wish.29 e British hunt in Livorno failed before it even began. Be-
fore his departure, however, Dick le a parting blow which foreshadowed the 
diculties that his successor, Sir John Undy, would face amid rising rumours of 
Habsburg neutrality being betrayed in Livorno. In May, Dick had read a letter 
by an Irish captain printed in the London Chronicle which reported that he had 
seen “four large American vessels” fully laden in Livorno’s harbour and claimed 
the Livornese and Americans had “carried on a considerable Trade” for the last 
ten months.30 Dick described the account as “a ction and a downright lye [sic]” 
in a rebuttal addressed to the editors of the Chronicle.31 e spread of disin-
formation harmed both the British and Habsburgs, whose relations naturally 
strained as a result of such rumours and hearsay. Undy did not arrive in his new 
post until November, meaning the British had no certain ways to verify what 
was exactly occurring in Livorno throughout the summer of 1776.32
It was just as well since the British had very little idea indeed about what was 
happening. In early 1776, Weymouth had informed Mann of rumours that a 
Livornese merchant by the name of Guiseppe Bettoia was in correspondence 
with some Americans and tasked him to nd out more.33 By May, Mann had 
deduced that the person was “an Italian named Mazei [sic]” who had transported 
two ships full of corn and cargo of little consequence from America through 
Bettoia’s trading house in Livorno.34 Nothing more came of the rumour. e 
British did not realise the signicance of this connection. Filippo Mazzei—oen 
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Philip Mazzei—was a Tuscan by birth but had spent a great period of his life 
as a merchant in London where the Habsburg ambassador described him as a 
“cunning” but “supremely active man.”35 In London, conversations with Benja-
min Franklin convinced Mazzei to carry out a plan to cultivate Tuscan wines in 
Virginia.36 In late 1772, Mazzei shuttered his business in London and returned 
briey to Tuscany where he unsuccessfully tried to obtain ocial support for his 
venture before he set o for Virginia, arriving there in December 1773 on the 
suitably named Triumph.37 Mazzei’s connection with Bettoia and his father’s 
rm Stefano Bettoia e Figlio began during this period and led to many successful 
shipments.38 e disruptions brought about by the situation in North America 
slowly ruined the rm, however, and hampered the return of their latest venture 
back to Virginia. omas Woodford, captain of the Norfolk which carried the 
sundry goods for Mazzei and Bettoia, failed to reach the American coastline.39
Instead, Bettoia sent him to the safer but less protable Newfoundland region 
and re-registered the ship in Ireland. It was from there in 1776 that Woodford 
published his letter in the London Chronicle in a likely attempt to drum up 
trade—the same article that Dick had refused to believe was true.40
Woodford’s next American trading venture fell under the direction of a new 
company in Livorno, Antonio Salucci e Figlio, run by Sebastiano V. Salucci.41
It did not end well. Salucci disregarded the original plan laid out by Mazzei 
(who knew nothing of the changeover and thought Bettoia to be “a Jesuit thief ” 
because of his silence) forcing Woodford to travel to Paris in order to obtain 
corrected passports from Franklin.42 All went awry when Woodford’s newly 
renamed ship, La Prosperità, ran into the British blockade o the North Amer-
ican coastline. e ship was captured and taken to New York, where the court 
case rumbled on without success for Salucci.43 It became the rst embroilment 
between the British legal system and Tuscan traders. Salucci wished to recoup 
his losses but did not gain enough support until the end of the war.44 In 1780, 
another Tuscan ship met the same fate and was captured by the British.45
e worsening commercial situation in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean 
negatively aected British enterprise at Livorno and subsequently undercut the 
maritime commerce of Tuscany. Aer the French entry into the war in March 
1778, British ships became prey for French privateers based along the Marseilles 
coastline.46 Whilst war with the French was long expected in London, it took 
the British representatives in Florence and Livorno by almost complete sur-
prise.47 Indeed, the rst news they heard of it came from a rumour that Rai-
mondo Niccoli and the Tuscan delegation at Paris had had received advanced 
word from the Americans.48 British merchants in Livorno were le drastically 
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unprepared as a result. Before long, their businesses dried up as each ship fell foul 
to French attack, and—as Spain looked to enter the war against the British—
prospects of safe passage to British destinations seemed at best precarious as well. 
“Hardly a day passes without some French Cruiser appearing o this Port, and if 
some Frigates are not sent to Protect the Trade to and from this Place, no Vessel 
can escape them,” Undy warned in late summer 1778.49 is dilemma came at 
a time when British traders were already “greatly alarmed” aer months of fre-
quent sightings of American pirates.50 e situation intensied when the French 
moved decisively to crush British trade in the Mediterranean in the summer of 
1778. e importance of Livorno to British trade was well-known. As Mann 
reported with great trepidation, if Menorca and Gibraltar were to fall then the 
British would have “no other Port in the Mediterranean to resort to, but that of 
Leghorne [Livorno].”51 e French knew this and demanded British exclusion 
from trading in Livorno or else a French eet would “block up” the port. e 
French ultimatum sent shockwaves through the Florentine court. Pietro Leop-
oldo expressed “great surprise and indignation” at the startling request.52
e Habsburgs faced two major diculties arising from the War of Amer-
ican Independence. e rst was an obvious threat to the economic vitality of 
their region in Tuscany brought about by disruptions to maritime trade. For 
decades, Florentine administrators had acknowledged the important commer-
cial contribution of Livorno to the overall economy of Tuscany. e same was 
the case in Vienna, where “one did not speak of Tuscany except in relation to 
Livorno.”53 e second diculty arose out of the new geopolitical question 
which confronted Pietro Leopoldo and his ministers in Florence: how could 
they rehabilitate trade without showing partiality? e question came at a par-
ticularly inopportune moment as Joseph II requested the Grand Duke’s presence 
in Vienna to aid the War of the Bavarian Succession, and as his sister in Naples, 
Queen Maria Carolina, had been pushing him to “loan” his most eective naval 
administrator for Neapolitan service.54 Any response therefore became rushed, 
more ad hoc, and relied upon older Tuscan debates over neutrality.
When the Corsican Republic had fallen to French invasion in 1768, the 
Livornese governor had received instructions to dra neutral contingency mea-
sures to prevent loss of trade for Livorno’s merchants. Giuseppe Francesco Pieral-
lini, one of the governor’s subordinates, compiled the rst dra which displeased 
Florentine ministers. Debates over specic aspects stymied its adoption until 
the necessity for such legislation diminished following the end of the Corsican 
crisis. In 1771, the Grand Duke raised the prospect of introducing such a law 
again before technicalities once more dragged discussion into an inescapable 
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quagmire.55 Seven years later and faced with the more urgent exigencies of the 
American Revolution, these theoretical debates were of little importance as the 
older designs for a neutral policy were literally “dusted o” and quickly imple-
mented.56 Pietro Leopoldo issued an edict on August 1, 1778, which declared a 
“strict neutrality” in the port of Livorno.57 e new edict adhered to the long-
standing international precedent of Tuscany observing such neutrality through-
out the centuries, but for the rst time this principle became law.58 It demarcated 
all coastal waters around Tuscany as neutral, disallowed the exchange of re 
within its shores, and, to ensure Livornese merchants could thrive, all ships were 
welcome within the harbour.59
Neutrality, however, proved a dicult position to maintain. Aside from the 
continued skirmishes with rogue privateers and smugglers who shirked the edict, 
the declaration put the Tuscans at odds with their own commercial aims and 
with foreign powers. e British were suspect of Article VII within in the edict, 
which they saw as a total inhibitor to their trade in the port.60 e article for-
bade any subjects living in Tuscany to partake in any activity which supported 
the cause of a foreign war. As Mann pointed out to his superiors, the article’s 
terminology was so loosely dened that it could be construed that this included 
all foreign subjects living in Tuscany; in eect, prohibiting British merchants 
from outtting their ships.61 Silence from the Tuscan court meant British traders 
struggled under this cloud of uncertainty for the remainder of the war.
At the same time, strict neutrality was not a convenient situation for Tus-
can traders. When Mazzei returned from Virginia in 1779, his audiences with 
the Grand Duke had to be conducted with the utmost secrecy. Whereas Pietro 
Leopoldo had openly supported Mazzei and his ideas earlier in the 1770s, amid 
a European-wide war over American independence, he could not do anything 
to disturb Tuscan neutrality. e pair exchanged a series of discursive letters,62
but ultimately Mazzei’s arguments found only “deaf ears and a gaping waste-
basket” in Florence.63 Pietro Leopoldo simply could not countenance any of-
cial commerce with the Americans—despite the signicant advantages such 
transatlantic trade had to oer—for fear of reprisal from foreign powers. Mazzei 
became embittered against him for this inactivity and his unrelenting indolence 
for American prospects.64
It was not only Mazzei who Pietro Leopoldo shunned on account of neutral-
ity. In May 1777, Congress designated the South Carolinian planter Ralph Izard 
as the ocial envoy to Tuscany. Izard was an ideal candidate. He had already 
visited Tuscany in 1774.65 In Paris, Niccoli became his great friend but sought to 
dissuade him of any notions about venturing to Florence.66 e ruse worked as 
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Izard informed Congress of the fruitlessness of such an undertaking. He argued 
instead that his friendship with Niccoli, “a man of ability and very friendly to 
our cause,” enabled him to “to do my business more eectually than if I had been 
at Florence.”67 In June 1779, congressional members revoked Izard’s commission 
and ceased any intentions to establish relations with Tuscany. Talk of supporting 
the transatlantic trade between Livorno and the United States did not occur 
until aer the conclusion of the War of American Independence.68 Meanwhile, 
the codication of neutrality during the American Revolution allowed Tuscan 
legal scholars such as Giovanni Maria Lampredi to develop further the concept 
for the foundation of future neutral positioning in the French Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars.69 In the short term, however, the attempted preservation 
of the port of Livorno between 1776 and 1783 had come at the cost of postpon-
ing Tuscan relations with the United States of America. Moreover, in trying 
to ensure neutrality between all sides, Tuscans ocials had staved o an open 
attack by the French but at the further cost of British commerce in Livorno. e 
American Revolution was every bit as much problematic for the Tuscan branch 
of the Habsburgs as it was for the main dynasty in Vienna.
Disaster at Nieuwpoort
Within the Habsburg family, Pietro Leopoldo was not alone in facing the ben-
ets and predicaments of neutrality in the War of American Independence. 
By tradition, and since the reincorporation of the Burgundian Inheritance by 
the Habsburgs following the War of Spanish Succession in 1714, a member of 
the imperial family ruled as viceroy over the Austrian Netherlands. In the late 
eighteenth century, the honour had rst fallen to Prince Charles Alexander of 
Lorraine, the double brother-in-law of Maria eresa, until his death in 1780 
meant Maria eresa’s son-in-law Albert Casimir and daughter Maria Chris-
tina, the Duke and Duchess of Teschen, acceded to the position. ey exercised 
nominal power as governors-general of the Austrian Netherlands on behalf of 
the Habsburgs. Below them existed a minister plenipotentiary who headed a re-
gional government composed of several councillors of state who supervised vari-
ous administrative councils.70 On the eve of Revolution, Prince Georg Adam von 
Starhemberg occupied the post of minister plenipotentiary and along with the 
Prince of Lorraine, the Teschens, and state bureaucracies in Brussels and Vienna, 
he too faced the onslaught of diculties arising from the American Revolution.
e rst test of neutrality appeared as soon as April 1776. Captain Gustavus 
Conyngham was a man with a certain sense of daring about him. He was the 
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rst in a string of captains in support of the American cause who blurred the line 
between naval ocer and pirate as they stalked the seas and plundered enemy 
ships for prizes. Conyngham “terrorised” British commerce in particular, be-
coming one of the most successful (and notorious) commanders of the Conti-
nental Navy—in 1778, he captured twenty-four British vessels alone.71 Before 
he began oceanic raiding, Conyngham had focused on supplying the American 
colonies with war materials. In September 1775, he sailed out of Philadelphia on 
the Charming Peggy at the behest of the Maryland Council of Safety in search 
of military provisions. His mission led him rst to Londonderry where he con-
cealed his ship’s true origin before sailing to mainland Europe.
In late December 1775, the Peggy arrived at Dunkirk where the usual loading 
and unloading of goods attracted the scrutiny of the local British consul, An-
drew Frazer. e Peggy caught his attention when he sensed that barrels of gun-
powder had been loaded up in the dead of night—Frazer’s keen eyes had noticed 
how the ship sat lower in the water the next morning.72 However, Conyngham 
unexpectedly had the supplies unloaded and the vessel laid up weeks later.73 Un-
beknownst to Frazer, there was a snag. Conyngham had ordered further barrels 
of gunpowder but the Dutch shipments had not yet arrived.74 He despatched an 
agent to Amsterdam to sort out the delay, but weeks passed by until word came 
back that a consignment from the island of Texel was on its way.75 Conyngham 
prepared his ship to sail and Frazer pounced. He had the local commissioner 
search the ship for “warlike stores” to prevent illegal transport back to America. 
Instead, they found the Peggy was full of various articles but no weaponry save 
for a few cannons serving as ballast.76 Frazer was out of luck until three of the 
crewmen fought with Conyngham about carrying on under his command. As 
Irish subjects, they applied to Frazer for protection and in doing so handed him 
proof that the vessel was bound for Philadelphia as well as revealing the true pur-
pose of the voyage.77 Determined to give Frazer the slip, Conyngham sailed away 
shortly before midnight on April 2 and brought the Revolution to the doorstep 
of the Habsburg Monarchy.
Conyngham arrived at the port of Nieuwpoort in the Austrian Netherlands, 
twenty miles along the coast from Dunkirk, before dawn on April 4. ey 
halted in the main canal just outside the town.78 e supercargo of the ship, 
Jonathan Nesbitt, had seen to it that a small Dutch barge, the Eendragt, waited 
for them there with nearly six hundred barrels of gunpowder.79 Over two days, 
the vessels transhipped their cargoes, axseed for rearms; and on April 6, Co-
nyngham notied the port authorities of the new cargo. e Eendragt’s crew 
raised suspicions for Habsburg ocials by requesting that the authorities keep 
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the cargo secret but Louis Loot, the local customs ocer, had no problem with 
the operation since the Peggy’s goods were destined for St. Eustatius according 
to Conyngham’s paperwork.80 All seemed well until another crewman, William 
Bracken, decided to bolt in the dead of night. He walked the twenty-two miles 
along the coast back to Dunkirk to tell Frazer of the clandestine activity going 
on at Nieuwpoort.
e game was up. Frazer immediately informed the British representatives in 
the Austrian Netherlands and wrote back to London about the conrmation of 
his suspicions about the Peggy. If Conyngham had one saving grace, it was that 
the British ocials in the Austrian Netherlands were not so well organised. e 
British representative William Gordon was a Jamaican-born Scot who, up to 
then, had been notably absent from his post. In the years leading up to 1776, 
Gordon had been away on leave for half of 1774 and, in 1775, he was active in 
Brussels for only two months.81 His inactivity turned into complete incapacity 
following a hunting accident in September 1775 at Enghien, where Gordon had 
accidentally discharged his rie and wounded Count Louis Engelbert d’Aren-
berg. e incident le Gordon traumatised and d’Arenberg blind.82 For months, 
Gordon could not full his duties as he shut himself away from court and grad-
ually lost his mind. His secretary took over aairs since Gordon could not even 
“sett [sic] pen to paper” and was conned to bed.83 Gordon’s personal misery 
combined with a relatively inexperienced British consul in Ostend, John Peter, 
who had arrived in 1774, meant that any eective action was farfetched.
When Frazer’s alarm reached Peter in Ostend, he shared the sense of panic. 
Peter despatched his deputy, Vice-Consul Patricius Hennessy, to Nieuwpoort 
to detain the ship if it tried to leave; meanwhile, knowing Gordon’s diculties, 
Peter personally headed to Brussels at the same time.84 Gordon, meanwhile, had 
gotten up the courage to seek out Prince Starhemberg as soon as he had received 
word on April 9, but the meeting was fruitless. Starhemberg knew nothing of 
the Peggy and defended the actions of the Nieuwpoort authorities; if Conyn-
gham’s papers stated St. Eustatius, then who were the Habsburgs to question 
him. Gordon, Starhemberg insisted, would need to prove otherwise. As much 
as the meeting proved cordial as it did pointless, Starhemberg thought even less 
of the man who had disgraced himself at court only a short time ago. In his rst 
report to State Chancellor Prince von Kaunitz on the matter, he explained how 
Gordon had acted “indecently” by coming to him in such an urgent manner 
without any discernible issue.85
Gordon’s subsequent actions further inamed the situation. e next day, he 
requested in writing that the Brussels government act to detain the ship since he 
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had proof that Conyngham’s ship held munitions destined “for the Rebel sub-
jects of His Majesty.”86 is demand greatly dissatised the Habsburg ministers 
in Brussels. Starhemberg felt insulted and one of his subordinate councillors 
later described the report as uncalled for and “overly passionate in tone.”87 e 
Habsburgs resented the presumptive questioning of their local ocers and their 
prejudgements. When no ocial answer was forthcoming, Gordon decided to 
force matters along. As Gordon entered his carriage to see Starhemberg once 
again, John Peter arrived just in time. e two men moved together to press 
the Habsburg government into action. is meeting went worse than the pre-
vious one. Starhemberg described it as “tempestuous” in his account to Count 
Belgiojoso in London, whom he wished to make a complaint on his behalf to 
King George about the conduct of the British representatives.88 e reason for 
the turbulent atmosphere was Starhemberg’s refusal to act since he had received 
no word from Nieuwpoort and insisted that Gordon and Peter submit a written 
memorandum to lay out their concerns and evidence. Much to Starhemberg’s 
dismay, Gordon and Peter produced the memorandum a few hours later.89
Faced with the pressure to act, ocials in Brussels chose to delay yet again. 
From their perspective, the facts were not so clear-cut. e local magistrate, they 
decided, would have to ascertain the situation proper and charged him to inves-
tigate matters.90 is decision was also a careful ploy to deect the situation back 
to the local authorities and to absolve the regional and imperial governments in 
Brussels and Vienna of the consequences. Gordon saw through the rouse. He 
raged to his superiors in London over the government’s lethargic response, derid-
ing the “silly, weak, timid, ignorant Minister” in the process.91 John Peter, again 
full of distrust, le for Nieuwpoort to ensure the magistrate would act without 
bias. Frans de Brauwere, the mayor of Nieuwpoort and the magistrate charged 
with running the investigation, knew the stakes at hand and acted impartially. 
He ordered interviews of everyone in question and a thorough review of all the 
ship’s papers.92 e papers saved Conyngham. De Brauwere believed that the 
Peggy had arrived from Londonderry via Dunkirk and was indeed destined only 
for St. Eustatius. In conclusion, he found no grounds to detain the ship.93
However, Peter had already seen to it to have guards quartered aboard during 
the investigation and now procured a civil writ for the local baili to conscate 
the vessel in spite of De Brauwere’s ndings.94 Eectively detained, and unlaw-
fully in their eyes, Conyngham and Nesbitt staged a breakout in the wee hours 
of April 15. ey imprisoned the guards, threatening to kill them, and made for 
the open sea under an almost moonless night. Disaster struck—perhaps pre-
dictably—when the Peggy ran aground on the sandbanks of the Nieuwpoort 
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shallows. She was lodged tight. Conyngham and his remaining crew—by that 
time consisting of four seamen and two “negroes”—made a desperate dash for 
the shoreline in rowboats. ey escaped with their belongings, a few guns from 
the hold, and “a small cask of strong liquor” for their nerves. Incredibly, they 
came full circle, making their way back to Dunkirk and crossing over to New 
England on the Industry, an American vessel with Spanish papers.95 e ight 
precipitated an unimaginable diplomatic fallout for Brussels; Conyngham 
had le a piece of the American Revolution foundering on the doorstep of the 
Habsburg Monarchy.
e situation deteriorated rapidly. e Peggy began to list and started taking 
on water. e authorities in Nieuwpoort rescued the vessel over the next six days 
but goods below the waterline suered irreparable damage from ooding.96 For 
John Peter, the escape and dereliction by Conyngham had devastating personal 
consequences since he held the civil writ for the vessel that now lay semi-sub-
merged oshore. Nesbitt, who had refused to leave the Peggy when the others 
abandoned her, had chosen to stay in order to reclaim the cargo still technically 
under his purview. He now brought a lawsuit against the British consul.97 Peter 
faced nancial ruin if the Nieuwpoort magistrates found him guilty of damages. 
ey declared the rst hearing in the civil case to begin at the end of April. A 
few days before the scheduled trial, Gordon intervened at Brussels. He put it to 
Starhemberg that such a case was invalid as it was between two British subjects. 
At the same time, he revived the original argument that the Peggy had obviously 
been destined for the colonies given the vast stores of arms in the hold. All to no 
avail. He found Starhemberg impervious to any reasoning that would release the 
case to the British judiciary where, in all likelihood, Nesbitt would be the one 
ned for his actions, not Peter.
Gordon’s strained relationship with Starhemberg over this issue exacerbated 
the diplomatic tensions between the Habsburgs and the British. In his reports 
to his superiors, Gordon began openly questioning Starhemberg’s behaviour and 
voiced his concern that Starhemberg held sympathies for the Americans. “I wish 
very sincerely,” he conded to Lord Suolk, “that the Minister who presides 
so very ably of the aairs of this country was at the American Congress. His 
conduct on the aairs of America proves him to be their well-wisher.”98 Such cri-
tique, though privately held between ambassador and minister, was a damning 
indictment of the early Habsburg attempt at neutrality.
On the day of the trial between Nesbitt and Peter, Starhemberg received re-
assurances from Kaunitz in Vienna that his judgement on the matter was well 
placed. Kaunitz conrmed that it was indeed to be a matter for the local courts 
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and required no interference or oversight from Brussels. is was a curious but 
evidently calculated move by both Kaunitz and Starhemberg, who, despite the 
international gravity of the situation, both wished to leave it up to local ocials. 
is was all the more surprising given Kaunitz’s private admission to Starhem-
berg that Conyngham’s actions had clearly demonstrated his allegiance to the 
American colonies.99 Yet they had good reason for their willingness to let mat-
ters rumble on below the regional and imperial levels. On the one hand, this 
allowed for distance once the foreseeable anti-British outcome had been reached, 
but on the other hand it also abjured their direction of foreign policy to the ver-
dict of a local magistrate. If De Brauwere ruled against Peter, then relations with 
Great Britain would suer. In the end, the safeguard of being able to scapegoat a 
local ocial won out in both Kaunitz’s and Starhemberg’s minds.
Using the deferral to local authorities to shy away from international disputes 
would become a hallmark of the Habsburg approach to the dilemmas thrown up 
by the War of American Independence, and this strategy was rst enacted in the 
case over the Charming Peggy. For John Peter, the eects of this Habsburg policy 
Figure 8. e minister plenipotentiary in Brussels during most of the 
American Revolution, Prince Georg Adam von Starhemberg
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were personally devastating. Aer another month of protracted legal debates, he 
lost and received a “compromise deal” whereby he had to shoulder the full costs of 
the damaged cargo, the costs associated with the rescue of the vessel, and, nally, 
the costs of the entire lawsuit which amounted to £72,000. He might have been 
thankful that he was not charged an even higher sum as the “compromise” spared 
him responsibility for paying the damage to the ship itself.100 Conyngham, by 
contrast, went on to begin an illustrious career in the Continental Navy. In his 
memoirs about the events at Nieuwpoort, he simply mentioned that his detention 
there had been caused by poor winds and “other diculties.”101
e diculties induced by the War of American Independence for the 
Habsburg government in Brussels continued long aer the Charming Peggy
aair. Indeed, complications arising from the asco became immediately ap-
parent. On April 20, a British warship arrived in Ostend as part of British ef-
forts to secure the abandoned Peggy in nearby Nieuwpoort. Zealous customs 
ocers wished to inspect the ship as they did with every arriving vessel but the 
vice-consul protested that British warships were exempt from such scrutiny. Be-
mused, the ocers sent o for clarication to councillors in Brussels.102 Gordon, 
who by this point held nothing but bile and contempt for Starhemberg, festered 
in Brussels and used this latest incident as a test of loyalty.103 Eager to avoid a 
new political storm with Britain, Starhemberg struck down the customs request 
and argued for British exemption.104 e prospect of a rupture with Britain had 
forced the government of the Austrian Netherlands into appeasement.
e Charming Peggy aair is one example of the intense diculties over the 
construction of neutrality in the Austrian Netherlands. roughout the War of 
American Independence further disturbances occurred between an increasing 
array of belligerent actors. In this case, an American privateer caused the conagra-
tion but in subsequent years naval encounters between French, Dutch, and Span-
ish ships with the British admiralty occurred on the Habsburg coastline on the 
North Sea. Fireghts, raids, depositions, and hearings became part of the residen-
tial experience in places like Nieuwpoort and Ostend. Appeasement by ministers 
in Brussels followed a purely legalistic line. Regular ordinances forbade the trans-
portation of munitions to the American colonies in name only from 1776 until 
1778 when the French recognition of the United States prompted more muted re-
sponses from Starhemberg’s ocials to British demands for continued restrictions 
on the exportation of arms.105 By then it mattered for little. Infractions continued 
throughout the period as American merchants continued to arrive and merchants 
in the Austrian Netherlands awoke to the possibilities across the Atlantic.
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e Limits of the Law
Times of political turbulence are always good for lawyers. e American Rev-
olution was no dierent. One of the central tenants of patriot resistance was to 
question the legality of the political order they sought to overturn. “No taxation 
without representation” was as much a condensed legal argument as it was a 
rallying call.106 But the Revolutionary pursuit threw up legal questions beyond 
the thirteen colonies. e patriot need for arms and the British demand for sol-
diers provoked challenges to the authority of European states supplying these 
men and goods. Across the world’s oceans and seas, captured ships—known as 
prizes—led to contested claims between captors and captured that demanded 
legal intervention and arbitration. eir mobility as transoceanic “legal spaces 
in motion” created collisions between imperial powers who sought to either use 
the law to their advantage or their defence.107 ough static, neutral ports also 
became contested spaces as these ships entered them with their own conict-
ing legal traditions, priorities, and baggage.108 e Habsburg Monarchy, with its 
neutral ports on the North Sea and in the Mediterranean, with its pool of mil-
itary manpower, and its opportunities for trade, was deeply embroiled in these 
legal altercations. e proximity of Liège to its neutral ports made the Habsburg 
ports some of the most important entrepôts for sustaining the patriot war eort 
in the American Revolution. Without these shipments throughout the war, the 
conict may have never resulted in a patriot victory. Even though the Charming 
Peggy caused a dicult legal and diplomatic dissensus to erupt in the Austrian 
Netherlands, it was a relatively simple case compared to the more protracted 
cases that emerged between the Habsburgs and belligerent powers as a result of 
the American Revolution.
Legal imbroglios aected the lives of ordinary people in the Habsburg Mon-
archy, not just the statesmen and bureaucrats in the corridors of power. When 
the inhabitants of Ostend stood along the shoreline to witness the dramatic 
ery encounter between HMS Kite and Le Cornichon in 1778, they unwittingly 
became part of the legal process determined to settle the damage done to the 
town from the exchange of cannon re. e British Admiralty as well as the Os-
tend Admiralty took depositions from the townspeople in the days aerwards 
in order to ascertain what had transpired exactly.109 e same act of witness 
conscription occurred for the hundreds of Habsburg-born sailors aboard ships 
either seized or interrogated by British vessels during the War of American In-
dependence. At least 132 subjects working on those vessels faced detention or 
interrogation by the British over fears of aiding the rebel and enemy economies. 
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ese fears were sometimes justied as many Habsburg subjects did work on 
ships either belonging to or transporting goods to belligerent ports in France, 
the West Indies, or the Dutch Republic.110 Yet guilty crews impelled innocent 
ones along with them. Even Habsburg trade between its ports suered as the 
belligerent powers raided foreign ships without much regard. Such was the case 
for the ill-fated Dutch ship De Goede Hoop which sought to carry goods between 
two Habsburg ports, from Ostend to Trieste. Spanish ships captured the vessel 
and detained the crew in Cadiz for ve months before they were again captured 
by a British warship o the Sicilian coast. e ship was impounded at Ports-
mouth and its cargo undelivered; the Habsburg stakeholders subsequently lost 
their investments.111
As a neutral power in the War of American Independence, the Habsburg au-
thorities had recourse to seek justice, though this did not ensure either justice or 
compensation. roughout the War of American Independence, the Habsburg 
consul in London, the Milanese-born merchant Antonio Songa, petitioned 
claims to British courts on behalf of merchants from across the Habsburg Mon-
archy. In fact, Songa’s position had been created specically for this reason.112
Habsburg men and women lost vast sums from the misadventures incurred by 
the war. When the British captured St. Eustatius in 1781, Songa and his brother 
Bartolommeo Songa represented twenty-six disgruntled Habsburg investors, in-
cluding three women, who lost goods stockpiled on the island.113 e case lasted 
beyond the war itself and resulted in no compensation. e same occurred with 
the Habsburg consul in Cadiz, Paolo Greppi, who unsuccessfully protested the 
loss of one of his own ships in 1779.114 Likewise, merchants at the Trieste Sugar 
Company lost several consignments of raw sugar to British warships in a single 
year without recompense.115 e losses suered by his subjects at the hands of 
the British navy infuriated Joseph II as he complained of the “incredible and 
unbearable” burden placed on his merchants by the British “despotism at sea.”116
Joseph’s frustration reected the broader impact of the War of American In-
dependence. It aected all maritime commerce with the Habsburg lands, not 
just the consignments destined for the Americas. Intra-European trade also suf-
fered from the reverberations of the American Revolution. In May 1779, for ex-
ample, the British captured a Dutch ship, the Zeepart, o the coast of Falmouth 
on its way to the Habsburg port of Fiume.117 As a Dutch ship, several goods 
belonged to Dutch citizens but the Viennese merchant Johann Adam Bienen-
feld had the lion’s share of the cargo with over a thousand drums of saltpetre. 
Bienenfeld’s cargo was worth a tremendous sum, which he sourced on behalf 
of the Habsburg military for the war over Bavaria.118 Concerned that such a 
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considerable consignment had been conscated, Bienenfeld himself employed a 
representative to attest his case as a neutral subject and Belgiojoso, as ambassa-
dor, intervened to reclaim the costs.119 Failing to disprove the innocence of the 
captain, they resorted to the next best alternative and oered to sell the valuable 
cargo of saltpetre to the British Board of Ordinance for a reasonable sum.120
e oer turned sour as the British captured a second ship, carrying yet more 
saltpetre in Bienenfeld’s name. Suspicions arose over whether this ship, l’Union, 
had intended to sail for France. Unwilling to trade with a smuggler, the British 
coyly frustrated the oer and the case dragged out between the two sides until 
the following year. By then, however, the War of the Bavarian Succession had 
ended and Bienenfeld gained only a fraction of the cargo’s original worth.121 In 
the context of his fellow compatriots, it was better than nothing at all.
e British threat was not the only danger for Habsburg traders. e War of 
American Independence generated greater possibilities for Habsburg merchants 
to trade within the Atlantic. For the rst time, Ostend traders had extensive 
commerce with the Caribbean islands such as St. Eustatius and Dominica.122
Yet these new avenues also exposed them to American privateers who preyed 
on vessels suspected of carrying enemy goods. One particular encounter be-
tween an American privateer and a Habsburg vessel led to a court case where 
the Habsburg subjects and their backers were defenceless. ey had reached the 
limit of the law.
Troubles began on August 20, 1781, in the mid-Atlantic when the American 
ship e Hope seized the Ostend ship Den Eersten. e captain of e Hope, 
Daniel Darby, trawled the vessel along with its captain, Peter ompson, and 
his sixteen-member crew back to Boston as a prize. Upon arrival, the Admiralty 
Court of Massachusetts convened a hearing on September 6 to decide whether 
the capture was lawful. Both men procured lawyers to make their case before 
a jury of twelve American peers. Darby claimed that the ship carried cargo be-
longing to English merchants destined for French-occupied Dominica that had 
originated in London and therefore, as property of the enemy, he was entitled to 
seize the goods. He further alleged that ompson knew this fact and discarded 
the ship’s papers by throwing them overboard during the capture.123 Conversely, 
ompson argued these claims were “false and groundless” and that Darby had 
forced him under duress to sign an English adavit stating the goods had come 
from London.124 e surviving documents found aboard Den Eersten proved 
incriminating, however. True, the ship belonged to the Ostend rm, Liebaert, 
Baes, Derdeyn & Co. but there were dozens of letters between English merchants 
and Dominican planters who sought to undermine the French blockade.125 e 
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ship’s Ostend owners charged a hey premium for transporting building materi-
als to plantations which had suered damage from the French invasion in return 
for usual Caribbean goods of rum, indigo, and sugar for London’s mercantile 
houses.126 In his cross-examination, the ship’s supercargo, Johann Baptiste Pol, 
denied these claims and supported ompson’s defence that he “could not read 
two English words” and Darby had sought to trick them.127 On November 24, 
both the jury and the presiding judge, Nathaniel Cushing, declared the ship’s 
cargo to be a legal prize on the basis of the English letters. Cushing deemed 
the ship itself to be a neutral vessel and therefore not a legal prize.128 ough 
mixed, the verdict meant another group of Habsburg merchants and sailors had 
lost out as a result of the Revolution but this time, and for the rst time, in an 
American court.
e case did not stop in Massachusetts, however. Matters grew more con-
tentious when Darby protested the judgement that the ship was neutral prop-
erty and won the right to appeal in early 1782. Cushing passed the case to the 
newly created Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, the rst federal court in 
the United States, established two years earlier.129 By the time of the Eersten
appeal in January 1782, the court had only heard one previous case, meaning 
this Habsburg case was the second federal court case in American history.130
Over three days in Philadelphia, Darby and his lawyers set against ompson 
and Pol who acted as the attorneys for Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.131 e 
case revolved around whether or not the ship could be considered as a fair prize 
since, as Darby argued, they had breached the terms of the Dominican capitu-
lation and, by transporting supplies to the English inhabitants, ompson had 
not acted in a neutral way. Pol found it dicult to deny this claim since there 
had been plenty of evidence in the previous trial showing the consignments of 
British goods destined for the planters on Dominica. His only defence lay on 
the grounds that the ship had not reached Dominica before Darby had captured 
them and therefore had not broken any capitulation. In short, he conceded there 
may have been intent, but no law had been broken and the ship had still acted in 
a neutral manner. Aer a short recess, the presiding judges, Cyrus Grin and 
William Paca, reached their verdict in early February 1782. e news was not 
good for ompson, Pol, the Ostend rm, or the Habsburgs in general. Grin 
and Paca found the Eersten fair game and therefore not a neutral vessel. ey 
found ompson and Pol had done “more than a mere intentional oence with 
regard to the capitulation.”132 In their eyes, the undertaking with British mer-
chants had violated their neutrality in the rst place before the ship had le 
Ostend. As Paca wrote in the nal opinion,
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e subjects of a neutral nation, cannot, consistently with neutrality, com-
bine with British subjects, to wrest out of the hands of the United States 
and of France, the advantages they have acquired over Great Britain by the 
rights of war; for, this would be taking a decided part with the enemy.133
e result could not have been more damning for the merchants of the 
Habsburg Monarchy. e ruling of Grin and Paca entailed that all Habsburg 
ships violated their neutrality which protected them against capture by Amer-
ican and allied vessels if they acted in league with British subjects. As Paca 
put it, such “fraud and stratagem” only resulted in the “garb of neutrality” 
rather than lawful neutrality.134 Whereas Habsburg merchants had enjoyed 
neutral protection up until that point (because of the longstanding interna-
tional observance that “neutral ships made neutral goods”) this new precedent 
endangered their position.135 It is not surprising that this verdict came months 
aer the British envoy in Brussels made a similar charge against Habsburg 
neutrality:
e fact indeed is that the Imperial ag is become [sic] almost as suspicious 
(not to use a stronger word), both in these seas and in those of America, 
as that of the Dutch was at the beginning of the war, the merchants of 
this country [are] treading very fast in the steps of their neighbours the 
Dutch, both in supplying the French West-India Islands with provisions 
and bringing home their produce.136
e news of American condemnation proved unsettling to the Habsburgs 
across the Atlantic. News quickly reached Vienna via the ambassador in Paris 
and ministers in Brussels.137 e three owners at Ostend, Jean Baptiste Liebaert, 
Lieven Baes, and Alexandre Derdeyn launched a petition against the court’s rul-
ing with support from Brussels.138 eir petition claimed Darby had captured 
the ship under false pretences and therefore this “direct act of piracy” ought to 
have precluded any jurisprudential process.139
Franklin warned chances of overturning the decision were low, especially 
since the rm lacked the nancial resources in Philadelphia and Boston and had 
no means of proper representation.140 Franklin’s blunt warning ignited questions 
of whether the Habsburgs should establish a representative in the United States, 
and it certainly rang true for the trio in Ostend. In the following year, they sub-
mitted another petition and empowered an agent as their legal representative in 
anticipation of a rehearing.141
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In the meantime, ompson lost his own petition to reopen the case in May 
1784.142 e agent sent by the rm, Mark Prager, did not arrive until 1785 but he 
was immediately successful in urging Congress to allow the Court of Appeals 
the right to decide whether to retry the case.143 e move backred. During the 
hearing in November 1786, the opposing side mustered a lethal witness: John 
Baes, the nephew of Lieven Baes, who had le the company in 1783 and moved 
to Philadelphia. Baes testied that the company’s directors knowingly entered 
into agreements with the British merchants and had set up further expeditions. 
Indeed, the ship’s name, Den Eersten (e First), implied it was one of many 
more to come. Alexandre Derdeyn, according to young Baes, had himself gone 
to London in order to procure cheap ex-British ships and ll them with British 
cargo before he sailed to Ostend to reship the goods and obtain clean papers for 
the vessel’s voyage across the Atlantic.144 “Founded upon a culpable reliance,” 
the judges of the Court of Appeals found no issue in denying any rehearing and 
eectively upholding their original verdict.145
e Eersten case was the most high-prole court case between the Habsburg 
Monarchy and the United States during this period. It resulted from the lure of 
commercial opportunity oered to merchants in the Austrian Netherlands by 
the upheavals of American Revolution and their willingness to act as surrogates 
within imperial economies even if it meant supplying resources for plantation 
owners in the Caribbean. Jean Baptiste Liebaert, Lieven Baes, and Alexandre 
Derdeyn, of course, were not alone in acquiescing to this temptation. e trade 
in munitions and colonial goods skyrocketed in the ports of the Austrian Neth-
erlands during the American Revolution, facilitating surrogate trading lines 
from there to the Caribbean, Africa, and the United States. Hundreds of rms, 
businessowners, and investors like Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co. participated 
in this Habsburg interjection into the colonial maritime world of the Atlantic 
during the American Revolution and its immediate aermath.146 Not all en-
deavours lasted but historians who have recently pointed to the complicity of 
Habsburg merchants, industrialists, and ocials partaking in colonial econo-
mies of the nineteenth century may do well to dwell upon the eighteenth-cen-
tury precedents of such actions and connivances.147
Conclusions
e War of American Independence embroiled many Habsburg subjects into 
dicult, oen lethal situations. British “despotism at sea,” as Joseph II called it, 
and the audacity of American privateers to supply the patriot struggle brought 
96 chapter four
these subjects into the disruptive arena of international conict. To be certain, 
Habsburg smugglers were aware of the risks and chose to compete within a con-
tested imperial commercial world.
For ocials in the Austrian Netherlands and in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, 
the complexities of international commerce and the legal entanglements arising 
from it were a treacherous political mineeld. e American Revolution pro-
duced domestic changes in the ways these regions operated. e Grand Duke of 
Tuscany declared a strict neutrality in the port of Livorno which recongured 
the prior trading relationships of the merchants there. In the Austrian Nether-
lands, ocials found it dicult to appease both sides. Prince Starhemberg, as 
head of the regional government, exacerbated the situation by inaming British 
suspicions of his pro-American bias. Accusations of bias also occurred in the 
opposite direction as American admiralty and appellate courts ruled against 
Habsburg merchants as agents of British aid and called into question the sincer-
ity of Habsburg neutrality.
roughout the War of American Independence, ocials in the Habsburg 
Monarchy encountered challenges arising from the conict; it was not a war they 
could easily disentangle themselves from, nor was it a war conned solely to the 
Atlantic powers. e American Revolution took place in the Mediterranean and 
the North Sea. It was a war in Europe as well as North America, the Caribbean, 
India, and further aeld. It was, as a result, an inescapable challenge for the 
Habsburg Monarchy.
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“e Long, Laborious, and Most Odious Task”
e First Struggle for Recognition between the Habsburg Monarchy and
the United States of America, 1776–1779
U nder the cover of darkness on the night of Saturday, May 23, 1778, a carriage clattered along the road before the glacis of Vienna. e worn-down wheels kicked up dirt along the way, adding to the 
“dust desert” which o	en hindered the ring line of the armaments adorning 
the embankments, bastion walls, and watchtowers overlooking the approach. 
Inside the carriage, the sole occupant tried his best to shield his face from the 
lanterns which faintly illuminated the way, hiding his visage from the multitude 
of guards defending the city’s entryway. If he could look outside, the growing 
shape of the city’s defences would have been his only distinguishable destination. 
e rst contact came at the mouth of the sconce where a guard from within 
the small sentry stepped out. Toll paid, luggage fumbled, books—some suspi-
ciously in English—thoroughly thumbed, and his French papers presented, 
the occupant and his driver were allowed to proceed across the rst bridge into 
the huge triangular monolith of the Schottentor. At the second checkpoint a 
paid informer clocked the new arrival and sent word into the bowels of the city. 
As the carriage proceeded along the second and nal bridge over the defensive 
ditches and into the protective welcome of the streets near Schottenhof, the trav-
eller breathed a momentary sigh of relief. e long journey had come to an end, 
but his task had just begun. Vienna, his goal, was a fortress city: impregnable to 
conquerors, safe harbour to the imperial dynasty. Except, as far as the Habsburgs 
were concerned, the most dangerous man in Europe had just slipped in. e rst 
American envoy had arrived in Vienna.1
Why did William Lee, this rst envoy, enter Vienna under darkness? Why 
did the Habsburgs see him as a threat? e rst diplomatic mission between 
the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States is one of the most fascinating 
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and illuminating episodes in their rich historical relationship. Lee’s mission not 
only reected the embryonic state of American diplomacy but also the cultural 
clash between entrenched court etiquette and “militia diplomacy”—the Amer-
ican practice of sending uninvited envoys to European states. is clash is one 
reason, but not the only reason, for the ultimate failure in the American strug-
gle for recognition from the Habsburg Monarchy during the War of American 
Independence. e fact that Lee’s mission failed has o	en been the point of 
xation in largely one-sided accounts of this episode. e simplied narrative 
holds Lee accountable for the mission’s failure. One historian deemed Lee’s dip-
lomatic character was “better suited to the role of prosecuting attorney than 
peacemaker.”2 Others have felt content to argue that his sour demeanour led 
him to “whiling away [his] time in Paris, venting [his] frustrations on Franklin.”3
Some have stumbled in determining which Lee brother made it to Vienna4—in 
fact both William and his brother Arthur Lee made the journey—whilst some 
believed Lee never reached the Habsburg capital despite copious material evi-
dence.5 When faced with assigning who or what caused the failure of the mis-
sion, one historian concluded, “such a question is, of course, dicult to answer 
conclusively.”6 e futility expressed here, however, underscores the misdirection 
such a focus on Lee’s character brings.
If we decentre William Lee from the story and focus instead on the wider 
context of his mission and time spent in Vienna, a far more interesting and 
refreshing tale emerges: a tale of the unlikely successes of the rst American 
experiments in statecra	 at the court of Vienna. It was here that militia diplo-
macy created a cult of fascination. In breaking diplomatic norms, American pa-
triots also broke new diplomatic ground. Indeed, it goes against Horst Dippel’s 
still accepted remark that “e sporadic appearance of American negotiators 
in Berlin and Vienna does not seem to have had any noteworthy inuence.”7
Focusing only on Lee’s handling at court dilutes this wider perspective and 
the overall importance of his mission. By adopting an expanded viewpoint, I 
highlight the impact of an ocial American visitor on Viennese society and 
individuals within the Habsburg lands. Lee’s mission, his interactions, his sup-
porters, his detractors, his enemies, his visitors, and even those who only heard 
of him and never got to meet him, demonstrate the wider inuence of Lee’s 
mission in Vienna as well as the continued openness of Viennese elites towards 
the American Revolution and its cause. Rather than reducing Lee’s mission to 
an episode of failure, this more complex encounter illustrates the wider stakes 
at play in the in rst struggle for recognition between the Habsburg Monarchy 
and the United States.
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From Normandy Shores to Bohemian Fields
When members of the Continental Congress resolved on July 4, 1776, to estab-
lish a “separate and equal station” for the thirteen colonies of mainland North 
America, they also established the need for diplomatic recognition. In the politi-
cal transition towards independence, the new United States of America required 
international recognition to obtain legitimacy for itself and to engage with other 
nations on the world stage.8 e leaders of the self-proclaimed United States 
understood the necessity of these external relations since they were ghting a 
war of survival against the preeminent military power of the day. erefore, 
uninvited patriots, the “militia diplomats,” attempted to force themselves into 
European courts in the hope of procuring recognition, military resources, and 
perhaps alliances.9 Vienna, the capital of the Habsburg dynasty, was one of these 
targeted courts.
From the outset, the patriot strategic view included the Habsburg Monarchy, 
but most narratives of the American Revolution do not acknowledge this fact. 
Yet it is imperative to recognise that the patriot revolutionaries incorporating 
one of Europe’s most powerful dynasties into their political plan made complete 
sense. e Habsburg monarchs, a	er all, ruled a vast European territory with 
the second-largest European population, commanded a substantial military, and 
owned the lands surrounding one of the largest weapon manufactories in the 
world at Liège.10 Given that the exigencies of the war forced the patriots to seek 
military supplies such as uniforms, gunpowder, and monetary loans from across 
Europe, approaching the power that controlled the transit network around Liége 
became a high priority. Moreover, Joseph II’s role as Holy Roman Emperor, and 
therefore nominal head of all the German princes, including the Duke-Elector 
of Brunswick-Lüneberg (Britain’s King George III), was a considerable weight 
in the scale of patriot consideration. Joseph, the revolutionaries came to hope, 
could halt the ow of Hessian mercenaries that swelled the British forces in 
North America using this position. Indeed, since the Hanoverian succession 
in 1714 had rendered Great Britain not only an Atlantic power but also a conti-
nental one in Europe, George III’s German holdings in Brunswick would con-
stitute an exposed front if the Habsburgs—the ally of their ally France—could 
be brought onto the patriot side. e British would have to divert additional 
resources to defend it. Tensions between George III as an elector and Joseph 
II as emperor within the Holy Roman Empire was another noted weakness by 
Americans.11 Combined, these British weaknesses and the strengths of Joseph II 
appeared as favourable incentives to target the Habsburg Monarchy.
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e Grand Duke of Tuscany provided another impulse for patriots to ap-
proach the Habsburg Monarchy. Prior to Pietro Leopoldo’s edict of neutrality in 
1778, he and his ministers had attempted to keep vital trading lanes with North 
America open for business. Tuscan merchants in Livorno had traded extensively 
with British North America for cod from the New England sheries long before 
the outbreak of revolution. By 1775, Livornese merchants traded in Baltimore, 
Charleston, New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk, Virginia.12 When hostili-
ties ared between colonists and the British in 1775, Pietro Leopoldo declared 
Livorno open to all traders. One of the American commissioners in Europe, Silas 
Deane, interpreted this as a friendly overture to the patriot cause, although it 
was not intended as one. Deane described Pietro Leopoldo as “being zealously in 
favour of America,” whose actions to take o “all duties on American commerce, 
[were] to give it encouragement.”13 e Tuscan agent Filippo Mazzei, who had 
arrived in Virginia in 1773, encouraged the emerging leaders of the American 
Revolution to conduct a private mission to Florence, which he suggested would 
be “very benecial to us in our present struggles.”14 At the same time, omas 
Jeerson, in contact with Mazzei and various Tuscans, mused on whether loans 
could be obtained given this sincerity.15 In early 1777, a patriot supporter pub-
lished a Memoire and Supplemental Observations which argued, “the wisest plan 
of Conduct will be to engage some of the powers of Europe to recognize the 
Independancy of the Colonys [sic]; Perhaps the Emperor, the King of Prussia, 
with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, might be induced to Concur with France in 
making such a recognition.”16 From Pietro Leopoldo’s simple action, intended 
to protect trade, patriots gained the impression that the Habsburg dynasty, by 
extension, had shown support for their cause. One of the Americans’ major con-
victions to bring about relations between the United States and the Habsburg 
Monarchy rested on the assumption that Pietro Leopoldo’s actions reected a 
sentiment shared by his brother Joseph.
In the spring of 1777, Arthur Lee travelled unocially to investigate the 
German courts. He followed in the footsteps of Deane’s secretary William 
Carmichael who Deane had sent to Hamburg and Berlin to gather intelligence 
in the autumn of 1776.17 Lee’s mission included Frederick II’s court at Berlin, 
which, patriots generally believed, had also shown sympathetic signs.18 Lee trav-
elled with another patriot revolutionary, Stephen Sayre, who served as his secre-
tary.19 Lee and Sayre le	 Paris on May 12 and arrived in Vienna around May 27, 
1777. ey became the rst patriot revolutionaries to reach Vienna. e British 
ministry in London knew of their plans—even to the point that they trav-
elled in a carriage “painted deep green”—but this information never reached 
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the British representatives in Vienna.20 Lee and Sayre spent three days in the 
city before leaving on May 29, for Berlin. During their stay the pair met with 
commercial agents in and around Vienna. A few months later, from nearby 
Eisenstadt, a Jewish textile merchant by the name of Barruch Pincus wrote in 
order to answer Lee’s enquiry about the quality, quantities, and relative costs 
of his fabrics which could be used for uniforms.21 Since Lee had no commis-
sion to deal with the Habsburgs, it is unlikely he attempted to meet with any 
Viennese ocials. In one of the two short letters that he wrote to Benjamin 
Franklin from Vienna, Lee conveyed the error of earlier impressions about the 
Habsburgs. “ere is,” he remarked, “a Cold tranquillity here, that bodes us no 
good” and added in French, “We cannot warm up the German coldness.”22 His 
warnings came too late. Congress had already issued a dual commission to the 
courts of Vienna and Berlin, along with one for Florence, before Lee’s caution-
ary reports arrived. e ill-founded hunch about the Habsburgs had become 
an objective of patriot diplomacy.
e man chosen for the dual venture was Arthur’s elder brother, William Lee. 
is elder Lee is one of those gures relegated to the margins of history, largely 
because, as his biographer Alonzo T. Dill concludes, his abilities went “unful-
lled by the wartime tasks imposed upon him.”23 Although Lee belonged to the 
illustrious Lee dynasty, he was overshadowed by the more familiar exploits of 
his older siblings Richard Henry Lee and Francis Lightfoot Lee. A	er growing 
up at Stratford Hall situated on the tidewaters of the Potomac River along the 
Northern Neck of Virginia, in the 1760s he relocated to London and established 
himself as a businessman in the city. ere he stayed with his uncle in a “nice 
house on Craven Street, next door to Franklin.”24 By the 1770s, Lee, along with 
his brother Arthur, had become immersed in the liberal politics of the day. As 
the situation between Britain and the colonies became increasingly agitated, Lee 
found fertile ground to make powerful allies amongst those who defended the 
rights of the colonists. His inuential associates, mainly the radical John Wilkes, 
promoted him and Sayre, then a merchant in London, for election as sheris. In 
1773, William Lee and Sayre became the rst American-born sheris of London. 
Franklin wrote to his son in astonishment: “e new Sheris-elect are—could 
you believe it?—both Americans!”25
Election as sheri of London strengthened Lee’s political experience.26 As 
conict escalated in the colonies, however, Lee’s high oce and colonial heri-
tage became a focal point of contention. Twice he was attacked and denounced 
before the end of his term in 1774. Undeterred, Lee ran unsuccessfully again 
and again for public oce in numerous parliamentary by-elections. In one, the 
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Southwark constituency, one witness noted how people were “whipped into a 
Republican frenzy” a	er Lee entered the running.27 On May 19, 1775, Lee re-
gained his political standing by winning a wardmote at the Ironmonger’s Hall 
to become the rst and only American-born alderman of the City of London.28
Yet this oce earned him greater vilication as worsening news of revolution-
ary conict reached the metropole. Lee faced a personal crisis as the prejudice 
against him made his public presence untenable. A	er war had broken out, Lee 
“guessed that American tobacco would be pouring into France” and saw an op-
portunity to exit London.29 In the summer of 1776 he travelled for the rst time 
to Paris where he discovered the impossibility of trading tobacco against the 
monopoly of the French government.30 A further blow came from his painful 
rst encounter with Deane, who had taken a dislike to William’s brother Arthur 
and opposed any “meddling” with his own trading and political eorts in Paris.31
Upon his lamentable return to London, Lee sowed the seed for his role in the 
interaction between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States of Amer-
ica. Along the exposed Normandy shores at the town of Dieppe, he penned a 
desperate plea to his brother in Congress, Richard Henry Lee. “Can’t you x 
upon some employment for a certain friend of yours,” the younger Lee insisted, 
referring to himself, “[something] that is equal in his station of life, and his 
capacity, such as it is?” Given that Lee faced returning to London in the wake 
of the publication of the Declaration of American Independence, he sought to 
make use of his brother’s congressional inuence to save himself, hinting to him 
that “it would have been prudent to have had the Declaration of Independence 
authoritatively proclaimed to every Court in Europe.”32 As Lee crossed the chan-
nel back to London, he had little idea what this letter would set in motion.
Congress originally appointed Lee as a commercial agent for Nantes a few 
months later in February 1777. Discord among the American diplomats in Paris 
boiled over around this time, especially between Deane and Arthur Lee, whose 
personal diculties arose from their competing aims and culminated in Lee ac-
cusing Deane of fraud and embezzlement.33 eir spat had severe repercussions 
for William Lee’s new career. Most importantly, Congress sent his commission to 
Paris rather than directly to London for fear of interception. Deane took respon-
sibility to inform him but exercised little urgency. On March 3, Deane forwarded 
the commission via ordinary, vulnerable post and consequently word of the ap-
pointment spread through London before Lee himself received conrmation on 
April 21, adding to his vilication as one of the “aliens and improper people [put] 
to oce.”34 Lee endured this hostility in London until the birth of his rst daugh-
ter Portia Lee in early June, a	er which he felt free to move to Paris.
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In Paris, Lee discovered his rst appointment was as commercial co-agent to 
the ineective and o	en drunken omas Morris. Moreover, Deane had con-
spired with Franklin to replace Lee with Franklin’s grandnephew. To solidify 
their attempt, Deane persuaded Lee to wait in Paris rather than go directly to 
Nantes, arguing that another agent there, John Ross, should settle Morris’s ac-
counts beforehand. Without any allies—both his brother Arthur and Sayre were 
abroad—Lee reluctantly remained in Paris throughout the summer of 1777, but 
a	er realising Deane’s ploy and the unlikelihood of Ross nishing anytime soon, 
he le	 embittered for Nantes. On August 4, Lee arrived to nd Morris a “strange 
lost man,” who was blind drunk and had barricaded himself in his room. Dis-
tressed, Lee wrote to his brothers to complain of the rotten situation and fumed 
at Deane for the debacle, likening the appointment of Franklin’s grandnephew 
to “ordering your Servant to take my Coat o my back and put it on your own!”35
Seeing no good in Nantes, he returned to Paris on October 6, 1777. ere, the 
situation had declined further. Accusations of fraud amongst the commission-
ers had reached an unresolvable point. Franklin despaired how “in a court [. . .] 
where every word is watched and weighed [. .  .] one of them is oended if the 
smallest thing that is done without his consent.”36 e Lee brothers agreed the 
best solution would be to rid themselves of Deane by sending him to Amsterdam 
and Franklin to Vienna. ey began petitioning their contacts in Congress for 
such an outcome.37
Instead, Lee learned that Congress had already entrusted him to be the rep-
resentative to both the courts of Vienna and Berlin back on July 1, 1777. Con-
gress instructed him to petition Joseph as Holy Roman Emperor to stop German 
princes providing Britain with mercenaries; to gain Habsburg “acknowledge-
ment of the independence of these States,” and nally, to “propose treaties of 
friendship and commerce.”38 e day a	er he returned from Nantes, Lee ac-
cepted his newest commission but warned that he had not been able to “confer-
ence on the subject with the commissioners.” At the same time, he oered his 
resignation as an alderman of London.39
Winter precluded any immediate travel and instead Lee set to work prepar-
ing his aairs. He received the indirect help from the Habsburg ambassador 
Count Florimond Mercy-d’Argenteau in Paris, who observed immediately an 
“imperfection” in the commission. As it was, Lee’s papers permitted him only to 
deal with Joseph and not Maria eresa, whom Lee informed Congress was “ex-
tremely jealous of her power and authority, not permitting her son to interfere in 
any manner.”40 Such a transgression of courtly protocol became an increasingly 
common feature of the rst American interaction with the Habsburgs.
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e diculties of his task emerged over successive months. Lee conded 
to one brother how, as a commercial agent, “I could and assuredly should have 
been of great use to the Public,” but as a diplomat he had grave concerns. He 
confessed:
I doubt my abilities, for however anxious and zealous, it must require both 
much time and more capacity than is common for a man not versed in the 
crooked paths of courts to get into the mysteries of the most subtle cabinets 
of Europe and besides [at] about 40 years old, it is somewhat awkward to 
go to school to learn languages.41
Lee’s own acknowledgement of his inadequacies for the mission stemmed from 
his unfamiliarity with German and, by Viennese accounts, his poor command of 
French. Lee also faced nancial pressures, earning little as a commercial agent.42
In 1777, he attempted to use his knowledge of political events to manipulate the 
stock market but his trading order transacted too late and lost him his hedge.43
To compound matters, his wife Hannah Philippa Ludwell Lee arrived in France 
with their children which precipitated the move to larger, more expensive premises 
on the Parisian outskirts at Chantilly.44 In desperation, Lee pressed Congress for 
additional funds citing Vienna as “such a gay and lavish court as any,” but receiving 
no answer, he took out a personal loan of 3,000 French livres to cover the costs of 
the mission.45 No ordinary diplomat in Europe faced such diculties, and Lee’s 
nancial diculties would have a profound eect on the rst diplomatic interac-
tion between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States.
Further problems emerged as soon as the new year dawned. On January 31, 
Morris nally succumbed to alcoholism, which forced Lee, now sole agent for 
commerce, to dash once again to Nantes to resolve commercial aairs. ere, 
Lee clashed again with Ross over documents that belonged to Morris. Ross 
accused Lee of unrightfully meddling by conscating Morris’s papers, which 
Lee did regardless before he returned to Paris on February 25—only to face the 
same dispute with Franklin.46 Deane, aided by an angered Franklin, delayed Lee 
further by withholding documents provided by Congress, which Lee thought 
necessary to take to Vienna.47 ey also attacked Lee’s legitimacy of holding 
two positions.48 Indeed Lee faced an uphill battle in asserting his legitimacy as a 
diplomat. George Mercer, an American military ocer, who sojourned at Paris 
that year, wrote to his old friend George Washington,
Neither Chance [n]or Accident could ever have named William Lee a 
Commissioner to the rst Court in Europe or indeed to any Court in 
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the World. America herself cannot believe—tell it not in the Streets of 
Philadelphia nor let it be known in Virginia: William Lee an Ambassador
to Vienna and Arthur Lee an Ambassador to France—but to do Justice to 
Arthur Lee, he has every Kind of Sense and Knowledge, expect common 
Sense and a Knowledge of the World, and he is a Man of Learning, but 
what Apology can be made for the Appointment of William Lee?49
Lee’s time in service at Paris and Nantes had been the most testing period 
of his life so far, and it made for ill-preparation ahead of a more trying time 
in Vienna.
At the same time, Vienna increasingly became the fulcrum of European di-
plomacy as foreign ministers competed to inuence the Habsburgs. e fact 
that the Americans were not at all alone in their designs on the Habsburg court 
exacerbated Lee’s naivety and ill-preparedness. Many European powers, particu-
larly Britain and France, were desirous to steer the Habsburgs to their own ends. 
In the last major European conict, the Seven Years’ War, the position of the 
German powers had heavily determined the outcome, so much so that William 
Pitt the Elder famously quipped, “America was conquered in Germany.”50 As the 
Revolutionary war escalated, the same, it seemed, would be the case again. e 
British desire to induct the Habsburgs towards their side in the ght was not a 
sudden development. Rather it was a theme that had long dominated British 
Figure 9. Portrait of the rst American envoy to 
the Habsburg Monarchy, William Lee
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diplomatic aims on the continent. From 1763, the British lamented the loss of 
their powerful ally, and reversing the outcomes of the so-called Diplomatic 
Revolution of 1756—when the Habsburgs became allies of France and Britain 
allied with Prussia—became an outright objective. In 1765, then Secretary of 
State John Montagu, the fourth Earl of Sandwich, had informed the Habsburg 
ambassador “how much it was to be wished that the union which formerly sub-
sisted with the House of Austria might be re-established.” “We were,” Sandwich 
concluded, “the natural allies of each other,” especially since the British sought 
security for their Hanoverian interests and an additional bulwark against French 
expansionism in Germany.51
It was a persistent belief. In 1771, George III declared that “England, in con-
junction with the House of Austria and the [Dutch] Republic” seemed the “most 
secure barrier” against France and Spain.52 As the situation intensied and open 
war with France ebbed closer towards reality, British eorts increasingly cen-
tred on Vienna. ere, the British ambassador Sir Robert Murray Keith wrote 
proudly to his superiors that anti-French temperament existed in Joseph II who, 
he argued, “is so totally unlike a Frenchman, above all, a French monarch.”53 e 
Habsburgs seemed an ideal counterweight. If they could be dislodged from the 
French alliance and wed to British interests, then the French might reconsider 
their involvement in the American war, British Hanover would be less strategi-
cally exposed, and Britain would gain a powerful military ally on the continent. 
By 1778, the Secretary for War, Charles Jenkinson, remarked how Britain’s fate 
now lay with those “great military powers in the interior parts of Europe.”54
French policy makers were acutely aware of this situation and sought to isolate 
the British from any continental connection, especially Vienna. e French am-
bassador, Louis Auguste le Tonnelier, Baron de Breteuil, repeatedly attempted 
to convince the Habsburg monarchs of British aggression as responsible for 
the outbreak of hostilities. e initial clash between La Belle Poule and HMS
Arethusa in 1778 was, Breteuil claimed, the result of such British belligerence 
and justied the defensive actions of France.55 Yet this narrative did not wash 
with the Habsburgs, particularly the emperor, who during his recent journey 
through France had noted thousands of uniforms being smuggled across the 
Atlantic.56 To Joseph, British aggression was in fact retaliation in a war already 
begun by French action.57
e French situation deteriorated further following the death of the Bavarian 
Elector Maximilian Joseph. By late 1777, French ocials had committed them-
selves to supporting the American cause despite the consequences with Britain. 
News of the elector’s death in late December arrived in Paris by January 5, 1778.58
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e timing proved troublesome for French strategy. e elector’s passing had ex-
tinguished the main Wittelsbach line before the question over the inheritance of 
Bavaria had been settled. Habsburg forces were now poised to take the Bavarian 
lands, which the dynasty had claimed for decades.59 Concerned by the potential 
Habsburg acquisition of Bavarian territory along with its revenue, and, impor-
tantly, the electoral role within the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick II of Prussia 
immediately protested against Habsburg claims in favour of a more agreeable, 
if not neutral succession.60 e succession crisis pitted the two competing Ger-
man dynasties, the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns, against one another and had 
severe consequences for the stability of continental Europe. By April, both sides 
had raised armies and Frederick marched his troops into Bohemia.
e French foreign minister, Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, had 
worked to avoid this very situation for years. In 1775, he had sought to curb 
Joseph’s expansionist tendencies when the emperor gained the province of Bu-
kovina from the Turks. Vergennes had made it clear that the French would not 
support any further acquisitions.61 He maintained this policy, knowing any war 
between Austria and Prussia would sap France’s ability to deal a decisive blow to 
Britain through the opportunity aorded by the rebellion in America.62 In the 
eyes of Vergennes and other French ministers, Joseph had no legal right to the 
Bavarian lands. As much as Joseph would not recognise the French interpreta-
tion of the War of American Independence, King Louis and Vergennes would 
not support the Habsburg outlook on the War of the Bavarian Succession. is 
geopolitical tit-for-tat imperilled the French alliance with the Habsburgs, who 
argued that Frederick’s invasion of Bohemia had invoked their defensive alliance 
of 1757 and, accordingly, France now owed 20,000 troops to the Habsburg cause. 
As 1778 wore on, the alliance weakened and both sides insisted on neutrality 
vis-à-vis Prussia and the Americans, respectively, to spite the other.
Lee’s mission to the Habsburg court thus came at a fortuitous moment for 
France. e American mission oered a chance to break the Bourbon-Habsburg 
stalemate by potentially persuading the Habsburgs towards the American side 
without risking a French commitment to the Bavarian issue. At the very least, 
any acceptance of the patriot emissary would signal sympathy towards the 
Americans. e stakes were even higher since the French had ocially rec-
ognised the thirteen colonies as the sovereign United States of America in the 
Franco-American alliance. Any degree of Habsburg recognition, even tacitly 
through accepting an envoy, became the biggest concern for Britain’s minister 
at Vienna, Keith, who, upon rst hearing of Lee’s mission, sought immediate as-
surances from Habsburg ministers that an audience with Lee would be refused. 
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He worked to avoid such a situation where France, as he put it, could build “a 
thousand false stories upon that single circumstance.”63 e French meanwhile 
oered all means of assistance for the mission. Breteuil would chaperon Lee in
Vienna, hopefully gaining him an audience with either monarch. e American 
mission presented France with a golden opportunity to widen the American
conict and further isolate Britain with little political risk attached. War was
coming to Vienna.
ese strategies created a precarious international situation for the Habsburgs. 
A few weeks before Lee le	 Paris for Vienna, Joseph II engaged Breteuil in con-
versation at a Viennese dinner party. e pair discussed the two major wars 
now facing Europe: one for America, the other for Bavaria. Each of them held 
contrasting views. For Breteuil, the two conicts were inextricably linked; for 
Joseph, they were two distinct events.64 e French conagration held little in-
terest for the emperor. First and foremost, Habsburg policy had grown diver-
gent from French strategic interests as Eastern territories had become a greater 
political magnet for Joseph’s ambitions. He had acquired Galicia through the 
First Partition of Poland in 1772, Bukovina from the Ottomans in 1777, and fur-
ther Ottoman territories remained a continual object of future aspirations.65 By 
contrast, French xation on the Atlantic counted for little except for potential 
disturbances to the balance of power. Maria eresa’s reections on this situa-
tion to her daughter, Marie Antoinette, should be remembered here. In order to 
achieve success in Bavaria, the Habsburgs needed to avoid any involvement in 
the Anglo-French dispute. Hence Joseph preferred to view the two wars as two 
distinct confrontations. Neutrality became the only viable Habsburg position 
out of necessity given their own aims.
Given this broader European context, certain aspects of Lee’s mission were al-
ready pre-determined by wider geopolitical events. e Habsburgs, increasingly 
wary and displeased by the French, looked upon his mission before it even began 
as an extension of Bourbon policy to press them into a conict in which they 
did not desire to partake. e French meanwhile considered it an opportunity to 
break the diplomatic logjam. e British, for their part, would stop at nothing to 
prevent it from succeeding. e American patriots showed no awareness of these 
troublesome aspects, however. From their viewpoint, Lee’s mission was merely 
part of a broader strategy to attempt to secure support from any European court 
in their struggle. It was only later that Lee and his colleagues became aware of 
this paralysing geopolitical climate. Lee, therefore, was not the overall decisive 
element in determining the mission’s success. To be sure, his personal suitability 
for the position of envoy was questionable, ranging from his inabilities in French 
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to his frictions with other Americans in Paris. is ill-fated setup of militia di-
plomacy made the task at hand even more arduous, but it would have always 
been a Sisyphean task. Little wonder then, that as Lee le	 Paris in the spring of 
1778, he was beginning the journey he would later describe as the “long, labori-
ous, and most odious task” of his life.66
“You Know Mr Lee is In Town?”
William Lee set out from Paris on March 24, 1778, without any real aim. Aware 
of the growing rupture between the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns, Lee sensed 
war over the Bavarian crisis was on the horizon. His last report to Congress a 
day before his departure had laid out his concerns. He explained how Berlin 
represented the greater chance of success given Frederick II’s earlier overtures to 
recognise the United States as soon as France had done so, but, he warned, “at 
this critical moment it is impossible for any man in the world to form a decisive 
opinion because the issue will depend on events that are yet in the womb of 
time.” Lee elected to move to a midpoint in the German lands instead and wait 
for “the rst opening that is made on either side in our favour.” 67 He reached 
the Free Imperial City of Frankfurt in early April. ere, he hesitated further 
about the war, which, “if once commenced,” he believed, “promises to be the 
most bloody and desolating that Europe has known for this century past.”68 Ber-
lin remained Lee’s primary objective but in Frankfurt, word reached him that 
Frederick had reneged on his vow, and so Lee’s plan shi	ed towards Vienna. An 
anxious letter sent to his brother Arthur at the end of the month revealed his 
indecisiveness and worries:
If [I] should not be properly received at Vienna, in case the course should 
be bent that way, do you think [I] ought to remain there, to wait the course 
of events? Perhaps it may not be improper to stay and the point of indignity 
may be got over from the mistake in the commission.69 No decided resolu-
tion can be taken yet for some days in consequence of what was communi-
cated [on] the 23rd [to Congress] but as far as any judgement can be formed 
at present Vienna will be the course at last.70
Lee’s Viennese mission was completely ad hoc. Not only had he settled on 
prioritising Vienna at the eleventh hour, but his reordering set his aairs in fur-
ther disarray. In the rst week of May, Lee desperately urged the commissioners 
back in Paris for help in securing his French host in Vienna but he had little 
hope that Franklin and Deane would comply. On May 10, Lee conded to a 
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friend, “One line from [them] would make everything go smoothly, but with-
out it very little can be expected in the present situation of things . . . [and] un-
less Franklin can be counteracted, I am not to expect anything.”71 e next day, 
exactly one month a	er his arrival, Lee nally le	 for Vienna. e time spent 
deliberating in Frankfurt added to the complexity of Lee’s mission. During his 
stay there, the Wienerisches Diarium had announced Lee’s role in Vienna. e 
newspaper identied Arthur and William Lee, “the brothers of Heinrich Rich-
ard Lee [sic], the famous member of Congress,” who were assigned respectively 
to Spain and “some other court.”72 Of course certain members of the Habsburg 
court had been well aware of Lee’s intended mission from rumour and espio-
nage. e British were aware, too. Keith had already informed his superiors in 
London on April 22 that “Lodgings are taken here for Mr William Lee, who 
is daily expected.”73
Lee’s numerous delays in Paris and in Frankfurt aorded Keith ample time 
to prepare for his arrival. He successfully sought assurances from the State 
Chancellor Prince von Kaunitz that Lee would be denied an audience. Kau-
nitz gave these willingly as he resented the French imposition in the rst place. 
King George found them to be “very satisfactory” and instructed Keith to “take 
an Opportunity of assuring the Prince that His Majesty is very sensible of this 
Mark of Her Imperial Majesty’s Attention and friendly disposition, which the 
King is ever desirous to procure.”74 By early May 1778, Keith and his superiors 
in London had placed their trust in Kaunitz and were quietly condent Lee’s 
mission would result in abject failure. However, they overinterpreted this good-
will to mean the “court is desirous of breaking o the Connection with France, 
and renewing the Old System.”75 e British deluded themselves by thinking a 
Habsburg alliance against France in the War of American Independence was 
within reach. Lee’s mission in Vienna would prove the ultimate test for such an 
alliance, and so Keith monitored the situation with great attention.
As Lee arrived under the cover of darkness on the evening of Saturday, May 
23, Keith received “immediate information of his Arrival” from one of his in-
formers at the gates. For his part, Breteuil, his French equivalent, sought out 
Kaunitz at one of his usual billiard parties. He shared the news of Lee’s arrival 
towards the end of his conversation with Kaunitz by mentioning how he would 
“take the liberty to present [a] gentleman traveller, Mr William Lee, who has 
brought recommendations.” It seemed as if Breteuil had underestimated Kau-
nitz’s foreknowledge of the mission. e next day Keith, ever anxious, paid Kau-
nitz a visit. “You know Mr Lee is in town?” Kaunitz asked to raise the matter. 
“I am sorry for it,” he added, “[since] I am surprised at the Court of France 
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persisting in sending such a Person to Vienna.” As Kaunitz explained the French 
ambassador’s desire to present Lee as a “gentleman traveller,” it became clear to 
Keith that this would wreck any attempt to keep Lee out of the court entirely. 
e plot hinged on the freedom of any ambassador to present private persons 
rather than having to request an ocial audience in order to present a foreign 
emissary. In devising such a plan, Breteuil knew it counted for very little to ob-
servers whether Lee would be met as a traveller or as an American emissary since 
any reception would be enough for their aims. For the British, it was vital that 
Lee not be received at all, and so Keith replied, “I shall be very sorry, Sir, if you 
receive Lee under any Shape or Denunciation.”76 Kaunitz had been warned and 
Keith pressed further the stakes involved by meeting Lee.
It was at that point in their conversation that Breteuil arrived at the scene. 
Keith naturally avoided his French counterpart, which allowed Breteuil and 
Kaunitz to resume their conversation from the night before. Keith later noted 
how the “conversation was not very long, and the Ambassador seemed uneasy 
at quitting the Prince.” In order words, he sensed Breteuil’s desperation. Before 
Kaunitz le	, he condentially told Keith, “I have not been able to dissuade Mr 
de Breteuil from taking this rash step; He says he has positive orders . . . and must 
obey them by presenting [Lee] to me.”77 Kaunitz was caught between both sides.
Figure 10. Portrait of Sir Robert Murray Keith, the British 
ambassador in Vienna during the American Revolution
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e manoeuvres of Breteuil and Keith already aected Lee’s chances of suc-
cess. Keith held the advantage. He was a gi	ed linguist and experienced diplo-
mat in Vienna since 1773 who had fostered great respect among his Viennese 
colleagues. e only chink in Keith’s armour was the relationship with his supe-
riors in London. His constant lack of sucient instruction or information from 
them hampered his eectiveness at court. “I am forced to feed upon the scraps,” 
he decried to one friend.78 Keith’s dilemma became more acute during Lee’s 
mission because of the ill-health of his direct superior, Henry Howard, twel	h 
Earl of Suolk, whose sickness prevented him from responding in full or within 
time. By July 1778, Suolk had become so incapacitated that omas ynne, 
Viscount Weymouth took responsibility for instructing Keith.79 Breteuil by 
contrast enjoyed a good line of communication to and from the French court.80
He was, however, severely disadvantaged when it came to his relationship with 
the ministers in Vienna. His interactions with Kaunitz had turned sour when 
Breteuil had rebued Kaunitz over the legitimacy of Habsburg actions in the 
Bavarian crisis. Kaunitz “at rst smouldered, then he ew into a rage” according 
to eyewitnesses.81 It was one of several instances when Kaunitz lost his temper 
at the French representative.82 By April 1778, it had become impossible to hide 
the “coldness between the cabinets of Versailles and Vienna.”83
For all his occasional outbursts, Kaunitz was a brilliant statesman. His expe-
rience had accrued over some twenty-ve years by 1778.84 e Viennese, however, 
noted his peculiar personality. Kaunitz was by all accounts a paranoid hypo-
chondriac, prone to sudden headaches and illnesses that would remove him from 
courtly life, and from which sprang a pedantic vegetarian diet. His predilection 
for brushing his teeth a	er every meal was another point of eccentricity noted 
by his acquaintances.85 Yet Kaunitz was quite sociable despite his unusual man-
nerisms. e British traveller Sir Nathanial Wraxall provided a rich portrait of 
Kaunitz during his visit to Vienna in the late 1770s, a city he believed “oers 
more resources to a stranger” than any other.86 Wraxall experienced Viennese so-
cial life centred upon the “common rallying point of pleasure and relaxation” at 
Kaunitz’s townhouse at Freyung, which was “open every evening for the recep-
tion of company and constitutes a principal source of amusement at Vienna.”87
Kaunitz was easily accessible, “usually engaged at billiards . . . or in conversation 
as his inclinations may lead.” “Everything,” declared Wraxall, “conduces to put 
a foreigner at his ease, and insensibly to divest him of the awkwardness or em-
barrassment . . . in the midst of a society, with whose habits and common topics 
of conversation he is unacquainted.”88 is was a far cry away from the type of 
reception William Lee would encounter at Kaunitz’s home.
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When Breteuil took Lee to meet with Kaunitz a	er dinner on May 26, 1778, 
Mr. Ernest, the British chargé d’aaires, was intentionally present to keep watch 
on the meeting. “e Prince,” reportedly “without speaking one Single Word to 
either, made Lee the coldest Bow possible & turned away, leaving the Room a 
moment a	er and taking no taking no farther notice of the Ambassador or of his 
Traveller.”89 Although other visitors also found Kaunitz “remarkably cold and 
inattentive to strangers, sometimes scarcely deigning to speak,” Breteuil’s actions 
led Kaunitz to act deliberately cold in this instance.90 Duped, Kaunitz wrote 
furiously to Maria eresa about the encounter, stating he “received [Lee] with 
a simple politeness but without saying a word.” “I will give him no invitation to 
dinner,” he added, “and will continue to receive him coldly if he comes again” 
and so advised his sovereign “under no circumstance grant audience to this man 
in his capacity or as a private individual.”91 Keith summarised the event to his 
superiors by noting how Kaunitz seemed “a good deal nettled” and was “not 
much pleased with the Ambassador.”92
Other dinners went smoother for Lee. A	er taking leave of the awkward 
situation, Breteuil and Lee went house-calling to leave visit cards among the 
local Viennese nobility and foreign dignitaries before they headed to the am-
bassador’s box at the theatre.93 Fortunately for the cash-strapped Lee, Breteuil 
was “the only member of the diplomatic corps whose establishment enables him 
to entertain in a style of magnicence.”94 Accordingly, two days later Breteuil 
hosted a dinner party to honour and introduce the Viennese to his foreign 
guest. First impressions xated on Lee’s appearance as “rich, thoroughly ugly, 
[and] marked by the smallpox.”95 Lee’s popularity declined as his inability to 
converse uently in French became apparent.96 Under scrutiny from Count Jo-
hann von Saint-Julien, “a great partisan of the Americans” who “continuously 
questioned the said American about hundreds of things of his country,” Lee’s 
communicative abilities came undone.97 Another observer noted, Lee “pos-
sesses a good head and reasons very well,” but “speaks little French and expresses 
himself very badly.”98 is dinner was Lee’s rst exposition, but more were to 
follow. Despite linguistic mishaps, however, Lee acquired a level of notoriety 
amongst Viennese socialites.
e dinners connected Lee to a sympathetic Viennese audience, hailing from 
a variety of important oces and backgrounds. Among his fellow diners were 
Count von Saint-Julien who, at the age of twenty-one, was starting a promis-
ing career in the imperial army, and Countess Maria Elisabeth von Waldstein.99
Countess Maria Carlotta von Hatzfeld was married to the inuential states-
man Count Karl Friedrich von Hatzfeld, the imperial chamberlain. Lee had 
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obviously charmed the latter as she later introduced him to her husband. An-
other notable guest at the dinner table was Prince Wenzel Johann Joseph Paar, 
a well connected noble and the imperial postmaster general.100
e obvious absentees, however, were the courtiers who had already expressed 
their sympathies for the American cause. e most signicant absence was Jan 
Ingenhousz, who had le	 for London in order to present the Baker Lectures at 
the Royal Society.101 Ingenhousz, who had been the most forceful advocate for 
the Americans, was completely unaware of Lee’s mission. e animosity between 
Franklin and the Lees had robbed the mission of a vital ally in Vienna. Similarly, 
Lee’s name was unknown to Count Karl von Zinzendorf who, with equally un-
intended misfortune, had departed for Trieste three weeks before Lee’s arrival.102
at summer in Trieste, he began to read Common Sense just as the Revolution’s 
representative resided a few hundred miles away. Emperor Joseph II was also 
away on military manoeuvres in upper Bohemia. Joseph’s time away from court 
and his frequent disagreements over the Bavarian crisis meant foreign policy lay 
eectively in the hands of his mother and Kaunitz.103 is aorded Maria e-
resa a greater level of autonomy in her son’s absence; a further disadvantage for 
Lee’s success. On May 31, she responded to Kaunitz’s memorandum on his en-
counter with Lee by venting her anger at the French ambassador. She instructed 
her own, Mercy-d’Argenteau, to rearm to the French court that she “cannot 
possibly receive him . . . not even as a simple traveller.” Such a meeting, she fretted 
to Kaunitz, would “breed factionalism and cause incivility.”104 For Maria e-
resa, the anxiety that she would be “driven against her will” by the American 
issue, as she had expressed already to her daughter, seemed a plausible reality.
Lee had, a	er all, come knocking on her door. On May 27—in between 
the disastrous nocturnal encounter with Kaunitz and the rst dinner party 
the night a	er—Lee and Breteuil had travelled to the palace of Schönbrunn 
outside the city walls. e pair “made all the usual Visits there to the Grandes 
Maitresses of the Empress and Her Daughters as likewise to the Great Cham-
berlain in the manner which is customary [for] the Presentation of a Stranger 
patronised by a Foreign Minister.” ese conventional greetings were as far as 
Lee was permitted. Kaunitz reassured an increasingly concerned Keith the next 
day by reconrming “Her Royal Mistress’s rm Resolution that Lee should 
have no Admission whatever either publick or private to Her Presence.” “Since,” 
Kaunitz continued, “she is so sincerely disposed to cultivate with His Majesty, 
[and] had thought proper to render Her Determination as clear indubitable and 
peremptory as possible to preclude all false surmises and Conjectures of distant 
nations.” Within just ve days of Lee’s arrival, the door at Schönbrunn had shut. 
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Keith declared, with a sigh of relief, “I believe that I may now look upon the 
Aair as wholly terminated.”105
Lee’s own inabilities combined with the embryonic nature of patriot diplo-
macy had forced him to rely upon the French ambassador, whose shambolic 
eorts jeopardised the mission. By so hastily forcing Lee upon the court, Breteuil 
had gambled away the American’s chances. As Keith supposed, “His Excellency 
probably imagined that by this means he would leave little Time for delibera-
tion and procure Access to the Empress before any Resolution could be taken to 
shut the Door against Mr Lee.” Ostracised by Kaunitz since the Bavarian crisis, 
Breteuil could have hardly been aware of the extent of Kaunitz’s preparedness 
and the sincerity of his guard against Lee. To attempt to bypass courtly etiquette 
in Vienna, where “little is ever to be gained by surprise,” was to provide the fatal 
blow to Lee’s mission overall.106 Besides, Lee himself realised the ruse of mas-
querading as a simple traveller would not work: “all the world knows my design,” 
he wrote to Arthur.107
In a second eort to speak with the court gatekeeper, Lee made another 
appearance at Kaunitz’s home on June 2, but crucially, without Breteuil. Even 
without him, this latest ploy failed as he “remained in the room for a consid-
erable Time but Prince Kaunitz took no Notice.”108 A week later, Breteuil de-
vised a new strategy by presenting Lee to the ageing Imperial Vice Chancellor, 
Prince Rudolf Joseph von Colloredo, who harboured deep misgivings about 
the French and argued with Kaunitz for a rapprochement with the British. e 
meeting, predictably, did not go well. Lee presented himself to the “Prince and 
Princess and to most of the principal People present” at the same time as they 
were receiving English guests through Keith. “e unexpected Appearance at 
that house and in that Place,” Keith reported later, “stirred up an Indignation 
in my Breast which I was at no Pains to conceal.”109 Within no time, the whole 
court heard of “a real comic scene [lled] with sourness and emotion.”110 Kau-
nitz, in his latest memorandum on French indecency, informed Maria eresa, 
“it was a deliberate indiscretion on [France’s] part, designed to compromise us 
vis-à-vis England.”111 e Colloredo debacle seemed to cement the impossibility 
of Lee’s mission.
Perhaps revealing his inexperience, Lee appeared blissfully unaware of his 
perilous situation and the gross insults done to the court by his repeated unwel-
come appearances. e next day, on June 10, Lee wrote jubilantly to his brother: 
“the American cause seems to engage conversation much more than the dier-
ences in this country.”112 Lee did not admit this resulted from his controversial 
actions. As for Breteuil, Lee naïvely expressed admiration for the man “who is 
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polite, able, and extremely well-versed in the management of such an intricate 
business . . . and has in short done everything that I could wish.”113 e irony was 
completely lost on Lee. Breteuil’s decision to force Lee into several high-prole 
encounters within the rst few days of his mission had endangered the whole 
undertaking. But controversy at the soirees of Princes Colloredo and Kaunitz 
gave Lee an unexpected second wind. Whoever could enrage the high nobility of 
the capital was suddenly of great interest to the Viennese nobles. As the Swedish 
ambassador wrote home, “Mr Lee is causing quite a stir here.”114
During the rst half of June, Lee’s celebrity reached a zenith. On June 13, 
Keith lamented, “It has been a matter of great Uneasiness to me, to remark 
within these few Days, that the Treatment of Mr Lee is very much changed 
in his Favour.” Lee “has not only been well received in several visits to Count 
Colloredo,”115 Keith bemoaned, “but he has dined with very large Companies 
at Count Hatzfeld’s and is to have the same Honour at Prince Schwarzenberg’s, 
Great Master of the Household.”116 e latter two were particularly inuen-
tial. Both Count Karl Friedrich von Hatzfeld and Prince Joseph Adam von 
Schwarzenberg were members of the Privy Council and advisors to Maria e-
resa. Interestingly, Schwarzenberg’s daughter was married to Count Ludwig von 
Zinzendorf. American interest travelled further. Prince Johann Rudolf Chotek 
von Chotkow und Wognin, for example, had erected a “maison américaine” at 
one of his Bohemian estates.117 Lee also met with Antonia Elisabeth Susanna 
Forster, daughter of the celebrated naturalist Johann Reinhold Forster, who 
worked as a governess for a rich mercantile family in Vienna.118 Lee had nally 
made a breakthrough.
Lee’s controversy in Vienna served to make the American Revolution more 
widely known in the Habsburg lands. His unorthodox methods of diplomacy 
garnered him an air of notoriety which extended beyond the city. News of Lee’s 
activities travelled to all parts of the Monarchy. In Habsburg Lombardy, a friend 
of the wife of the imperial commissioner in Milan kept her abreast of Lee’s di-
sastrous encounters at the Viennese court, describing in detail Lee’s animus for 
such clashes, and the American cause.119 In Buda, the aspiring scholar Johann 
Zinner heard of Lee’s presence in Vienna and desired to meet him in order to 
compile his books on the American Revolution, but could not make it to Vienna 
in time.120 In Vienna itself, Lee’s brash behaviour elevated him to an object of cu-
riosity among the Viennese who invited him to dinner a	er dinner in early June. 
Whereas Lee’s mission to pry open the imperial court and obtain support from 
the Habsburg monarchs for the America cause was certainly a near-impossible 
task given Kaunitz’s reservations and Keith’s talent for keeping British interests 
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front and centre, Lee’s blunders at court ensured the American Revolution re-
mained a topic of special interest among courtiers and their networks through-
out the summer of 1778. Failure at court boosted his success in the salons and at 
the dinner tables of the Viennese elites.
Fortunately for Keith, Lee’s success stopped at the dinner table. Despite his 
tenacity at “having appeared three or four Times” at Kaunitz’s home, Keith was 
still able to take comfort in the fact that “the Prince has not hitherto opened his 
Lips to him.”121 is included one occasion when Kaunitz attended Breteuil’s 
recurring dinner parties on June 12. Keith now felt exasperated at the “gall to 
be daily exposed to meet with Lee at Houses, from which [he could] not wholly 
withdraw.” Keith had identied his rising popularity among courtiers who could 
not be persuaded to shun the Virginian. Yet before long, Keith reported with sat-
isfaction how Lee “had thought it proper not to make his Appearance at Prince 
Kaunitz’s,” and that Lee had become alienated from the diplomatic corps which 
Keith managed to press into line.122
e shi	 came from Lee’s own melancholy about his prospects in Vienna. 
On June 24, as Keith presented more English guests to Maria eresa at Schön-
brunn, Lee whiled away writing letters.123 He lamented in one how his “Aus-
trian associates have become somewhat cooler toward him . . . [especially] since 
the Emperor and King have taken their high line, mouths are in some measure 
shut.”124 In another, he revealed how his mind was turning to Sweden and Den-
mark as more likely allies, especially as they “will be much more useful than 
either Austria or Prussia.”125 By the end of the month, Vienna was awash with 
rumours that Lee would soon depart the city but with little idea about his next 
destination.126 Keith of course was more spirited to report home, “Mr Lee ap-
pears very little in Publick, never at Prince Kaunitz’s; and the other Colloredo is 
in the Country. It is said that Lee’s stay here will be very short.”127
Lee had indeed decided to move on. As June began to end, Lee thought the 
unending stalemate over Bavaria was “sapping attention towards Germany from 
the American situation,” reducing his opportunities in Vienna.128 ere seemed 
little sense to remain when the ardently isolated Maria eresa was his only 
hope, especially as she would soon become even more reclusive during her annual 
period of mourning for her late husband. Towards the start of July, Keith noted 
how Lee “has been shut up [for] several Days and constantly writing,” but he 
suspected Lee would leave “in the Hands of a private Person some wild project 
of Commerce, a Bait for all others, which the People of this Country are the 
most ready to swallow.”129 Keith was half-right. Lee lingered on for the arrival 
of his new secretary Samuel Stockton, who reached Vienna around late June.130
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In the meantime, Lee had tried to compel other diplomats at court to listen to 
his case. Filippo Vivalda, Marquess of Castellino, the ambassador for the King-
dom of Sardinia, became a focus of Lee’s eorts. Prior to Lee’s arrival, Castellino 
had been instructed to follow the prevailing opinion about Lee in Vienna; if 
Lee were to be recognised by a majority, then he would follow suit.131 Over the 
course of June, Lee set himself to dissuade Castellino of his instructions and, 
by July, he had almost succeeded. Castellino agreed to meet Lee but only in an 
unocial capacity as a “Virginian merchant.” e pair discussed the prospects 
of trade between Sardinia and the United States—but without much substance 
in Castellino’s mind, the talks amounted to nothing.132 Once Stockton had ar-
rived, the pair attempted to convince another target with only a modicum of 
success. Conrming Keith’s intelligence, Lee and Stockton delivered papers to 
Nils Bark, the Swedish envoy at Vienna, who was not in when they called.133 On 
suspicion of their interaction, Bark was later called to Schönbrunn and “passed 
a considerable time with her Imperial Majesty [and] the French Ambassador 
with whom he had a long conference.”134 e climate of fear surrounding Lee 
prevented any further diplomatic initiatives in Vienna.
On July 4, Keith, who had not heard from London since May, nally re-
ceived instructions. In his reply he triumphantly noted how Lee and Stockton 
had already le	 for “the post road back to the Empire and Frankfurt.” Relishing 
Lee’s defeat, Keith wrote how it was rightly so; Lee “was losing Ground instead 
of gaining it” as his “publick Mission must certainly have proven fruitless as it 
was contemptible.”135 Indeed, Lee had le	 Vienna on July 2,1778. is departure, 
however, was not the end to the eects of the American Revolution in Vienna but 
merely a continuation. In many ways, Lee’s visit had stimulated further the keen 
interests of the Viennese, imparting to them a tangible example of the Revolution.
Conclusion
American diplomatic failure in Vienna resulted from multiple factors, not just 
one man’s deciencies. Lee functioned precisely as we would expect from an 
inexperienced diplomat thrust into the most rigidly ceremonial court in Eu-
rope. Failure instead arose largely from two decisive factors: one, the miscalcu-
lations made by the French ambassador, Breteuil; and two, inroads made by the 
British minister resident, Keith, to obtain political promises, which impressed 
upon the Habsburgs the wider gravity of the situation. e Habsburgs could 
not acknowledge Lee because doing so risked a delicately established neutral-
ity, created to protect Habsburg interests. In part, because they also wished to 
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spite the French. Sheer bad luck did play a role in Lee’s demise as well—notable 
sympathisers were not in town—but geopolitical exigencies proved more fatal. 
Diplomats in the court understood this. e Ragusan ambassador reported 
extensively on Lee’s predicament and dismissal by the court, where, he noted, 
“most people believe he won’t be received,” but crucially added, “this is an eect 
of the harmony that reigns between the courts of Vienna and London.”136 e 
personalities of Breteuil and Keith were pivotal in the rst interaction between 
the United States and the Habsburg Monarchy.
However, just as we assign blame, we should also acknowledge success, and 
this is a crucial point: there was success in Lee’s mission. First, if nothing else, 
his weeks in Vienna demonstrated the resolve of patriot intentions to form their 
own diplomatic connections within the European system. It bolstered American 
sovereignty. Secondly, Lee’s visit to Vienna kindled a further degree of interest 
in the American Revolution. Lee’s culinary companions were powerful gures 
within the court; their informal receptions of him were enough to drive Keith 
to despair. Even through failure, Lee triumphed. His celebrity increased a	er his 
diplomatic faux pas with ministers. Lee le	 Vienna with nothing to show, but his 
legacy was the intangible, indelible impression he le	 behind. e rst struggle 
for recognition may have been mismanaged, it may have failed in its aims, but 
it was the beginning of a connection between the United States and the biggest 
continental European power.
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Ch a pter Si x
“Wedded to the System ey Have Embraced”
e Habsburgs as Mediators and Proteers in the War of American
Independence, 1780–1783
T he final years of the War of American Independence created new possibilities for the Habsburg Monarchy. In the Austrian Netherlands, Ostend ourished in the later years of the conict as the only neutral 
port in northwestern Europe. e inux of foreign ships and investments carried 
with them new prospects for local rms and business. Trading opportunities, 
which had been impossible due to the British monopoly before then, now became 
reality as Habsburg rms reaped the benets of supplying the Caribbean and 
North American markets for the rst time. For as long as peace remained elusive, 
prot would continue. Elsewhere in the Habsburg Monarchy, merchants desired 
the same fortunes. Traders and bankers in the city of Trieste, the major Habsburg 
free port in the northern Adriatic, clamoured for a share in trade. Many of them 
attempted to create the rst direct trading routes between Trieste and the North 
American mainland. In doing so, their prots rivalled those of the imperial expe-
ditions to India and China. Overall, private enterprise and economic expansion 
in the Habsburg Monarchy benetted greatly from the disruption of the Ameri-
can Revolution and the prospect of an independent United States.
New political challenges and opportunities also emerged for the Habsburgs 
during the War of American Independence. In 1779, the Habsburgs suered a 
humiliating conclusion to the War of the Bavarian Succession, which thwarted 
Joseph II’s designs on Bavaria and heralded a Prussian victory within the eyes of 
European powers. Co-mediation of the Peace of Teschen assured the Russians the 
prestige of arbiter of the Holy Roman Empire. Relations between the Habsburgs 
and France waned as a result of French participation in the peace process. For the 
Habsburgs, the War of American Independence oered the possibility to correct 
this humiliation in failing to secure Bavaria. Maria eresa dreamed of bringing 
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about a general peace within Europe, and State Chancellor Prince von Kaunitz 
and Joseph II worked tirelessly to realise this aim aer her death. Chasing a con-
clusion to the American Revolutionary war, therefore, took precedence over the 
economic advantages presented by its continuance. At stake was a restoration of 
dynastic pride, an opportunity to control the fortunes of Europe, and the chance 
to inict painful revenge upon the French and Prussians. Yet few today recall 
Maria eresa’s dying dream of peace or Kaunitz’s longed-for Congress of Vienna 
which, had it come to pass, would have supplanted Paris as the diplomatic birth-
place of a recognised United States of America.
“We Must Bide Our Time” – Ostend and the Atlantic
Across Europe, merchants vied for new commercial opportunities occasioned 
by the War of American Independence. Nowhere was this rush more present 
than in the port of Ostend. As the only neutral port on the European mainland 
at the ligature between the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean, Ostend’s mercan-
tile classes benetted immensely from the conict. British raids rst brought 
French merchants to Ostend to protect their vessels under the neutral imperial 
ensign. Dutch merchants followed suit during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. 
Between 1778 and 1780, Ostenders witnessed an almost seven-fold increase in 
the number of ships using their harbour.1 Exports to the British Isles, where Brit-
ish merchants also utilised imperial neutrality for their vessels to the Caribbean, 
soared in same period: Ostend-England trade more than doubled by 1780 whilst 
exports to Scotland rose from virtually nothing to £45,803 in 1781 and doubled 
in 1782.2 e meteoric rise of Ostend as a commercial entrepôt arose from two 
main factors, both of which were inuenced by the American Revolution. First, 
Ostenders supplied munitions to belligerents owing to its neutrality and prox-
imity to Liège, one of the largest munition manufactories in eighteenth-century 
Europe; and secondly, masking ships under imperial colours and ownership pro-
tected against foreign infractions at sea. roughout the American Revolution, 
Ostend was an indispensable port of call for all warring powers.
e independent Prince-Bishopric of Liège was the source of Ostend’s tre-
mendous success during the Revolution. e capital Liège, as well as the towns 
and hamlets in the environs surrounding the city, bisected the Austrian Neth-
erlands and were a manufacturing hub for small arms, ries, muskets, bayonets, 
and occasionally cannons. Powder mills, nail factories, and riing workshops 
signied the town’s way of life. Along the Vesdre River alone, forty dierent 
workshops carved out barrels for ries. e region produced 240,000 guns on 
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average per year for export abroad.3 All belligerents sourced weapons from Liège. 
e thirteen American colonies were the most in need. ey suered from the 
lack of powder mills and ammunition producers in general. Consequently, pro-
curing arms became a major patriot priority. In little more than two months in 
1775, the Committee of Safety in Pennsylvania spent nearly £25,000 procuring 
necessary weapons for their militia.4 is was excellent news for Liège—and 
for Ostend. Benjamin Franklin, as a Pennsylvanian agent, fullled orders with 
weapons from Liège and before long, he received unsolicited samples and prom-
ises from Liègeois manufacturers hoping for a “channel of arms for the Free 
States of America.”5
e completion of the system of canals and roadways connecting Liège with 
Ostend on the eve of the Revolution allowed for easy transportation of the mu-
nitions, especially aer the Dutch prohibited military exports.6 Initial arms 
tra c between Liège and North America took a circuitous route via Lisbon. 
British, French, and Habsburg agents in the Portuguese capital tracked the con-
signments destined for North America.7 In 1776, the Mayor of Liège declared, 
“our traders, great and small, are giving work to our men; we see nothing but 
crates of guns in the streets.”8 Liège’s bustling streets in 1776 actually represented 
a low point of munitions exports. In subsequent years, an extraordinary amount 
of weaponry transited the Austrian Netherlands to supply the War of American 
Independence. By the end of the war, Ostend had shipped around two million 
pounds of munitions.9 e War of American Independence turned the region 
into a protable powder keg.
From 1781 until the end of the war, Ostend was the only neutral port along 
the northwestern European coastline. e maritime convention of “neutral ships 
made neutral goods” protected any ships sailing under the Habsburg ag. Os-
tend merchants oered to “neutralise” foreign vessels through use of the ag. 
is “neutralisation” trade operated in several ways. e simplest measures in-
volved ships entering Ostend where goods would be unloaded and then reloaded, 
which involved new cargo papers stating the goods came from the Austrian 
Netherlands. English ships utilised this method extensively through so-called 
“Algerian passports” obtained at Ostend, which cleared any cargo heading past 
the Iberian Peninsula irrespective of the destination.10 e other method in-
volved re-registering ownership whereby Ostend merchants took ownership of 
a vessel in name only. e owners were neutral, but the ship, captain, and cargo 
remained the de facto property of foreigners. ese “paper” companies operated 
through merchants in the Austrian Netherlands who acted as commissioners for 
large international syndicates. But foreign merchants also relocated to Ostend or 
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established shell companies to reap the same benet. Merchants from Dunkirk 
were the rst wave of such competitors. One Dunkirk trader, François de Vinck, 
masked a eet of 157 ships. His company De Vinck & Co. became the major com-
missioner for European traders to the Atlantic during the Revolution.11
Neutralising ships and masking ownership became so prevalent that a new 
verb emerged: Ostendisieren (to Ostendize).12 is process precipitated an explo-
sion of ship tra c around Ostend. From 1780 to 1783, between 6,000 and 9,000 
ships entered Ostend. is was a remarkable increase from the roughly 480 ships 
which entered each year from 1775 to 1778.13 In 1782, over y foreign rms 
registered their operations in Ostend and the entirety of the Dunkirk shing 
eet had swapped their ag for the imperial one. Ostend authorities issued 1,944 
passports that year and the Admiralty granted rms 268 new passes between 
1781 and 1783. e rise was so great that the walls of Ostend had to be torn down 
and a new neighbourhood and harbour facilities constructed.14 e American 
Revolution ushered in an era of considerable economic growth for Ostend and 
the Austrian Netherlands.
e growth in trade volume increased Ostend’s Atlantic connections. New 
trade avenues opened in the West Indies where the British, Danish, Dutch, 
French, and Swedish sought to supply their colonies through the neutral impe-
rial ag. In 1782 alone, 126 ships listed the Greater Antilles as their destination 
in the Gazette van Gent. From 1778 until 1785, a constant ow of ships travelled 
between Ostend and the Caribbean.15 British traders maintained vital supplies 
of gin, tea, and tobacco from Caribbean plantations to London by migrating to 
Ostend. In 1781, a government report noted how, on a single day, 68,970 pounds 
of tea arrived in London from Ostend.16 Ostend’s merchants even encompassed 
slave traders. Friedrich Romberg became one of the most successful in this trade 
in the Austrian Netherlands.17 Romberg rst sought to capitalise on the bur-
geoning munitions trade to America under his new maritime company Romberg
Fils & Ricour in Ostend but his request to transport arms to St. omas was de-
nied by the authorities in 1782.18 Romberg expanded his eet, with almost half of 
his 327 ships under ownership by established merchants in the Austrian Nether-
lands.19 He then founded a maritime insurance company in Bruges and founded 
two further companies to enter the slave trade; Romberg & Cie in Ghent, which 
focused on forced transportation to Cuba and Saint-Domingue, and Romberg, 
Bapst & Cie at Bordeaux with a German nancier and help from Brussels-based 
bankers, which Romberg fronted through his son Henry. is rm rose to be-
come one of the major slaving houses in France.20 e Ghent-based branch sent 
ten ships from Ostend in 1782 destined for Angola and West Africa.21 Joseph II 
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ennobled Romberg in 1784 for his pioneering eorts, but it was the American 
Revolution to which Romberg owed his success.22
Whilst connections between Ostend and the Atlantic embedded trade links 
with the Caribbean, fewer merchants dared to enter the warzone directly around 
mainland America. Direct trade between the United States and Ostend only oc-
curred towards the close of the war, when safer passage seemed assured. Ostend 
merchants were eager to start, however. John Fottrell, one of the longstanding 
Irish merchants in Ostend, exemplied this cautious excitement. Fottrell planned 
to send a ship, De Stad Weenen, under imperial colours to Philadelphia but feared 
an American ban on British products. He solicited Franklin for advice before he 
continued.23 Franklin could not help Fottrell against the importation ban, but 
he did provide a list of wares and contacts in the United States.24 In his letter to 
Franklin, Fottrell explained how trade with the United States was a matter of 
particular interest for local Ostend magistrates. “In consequence of orders from 
Government,” Fottrell noted, the local authorities wished for him to “acquaint 
all my friends” with Franklin’s information so that “every encouragement and 
facility that can be desired will be granted to the American trade here.”25
Fottrell’s successful trade with the United States spread among Ostend mer-
chants.26 Franklin received numerous petitions from them in quick succession. 
In late January 1783, Jean-Guild Wets, a merchant at Bruges, wrote on behalf of a 
consortium “composed of fourthy of the most Substantial marchants of Flandres 
[sic],” desiring direct trade with the United States.27 e next day, on January 
31, another representative of Veuve d’Aubremé & Fils from Brussels wrote on 
the occasion of “a striking and glorious Epoch in the Annals of the Century” 
and begged of him to send a list of contacts in Boston and Philadelphia.28 A few 
days later, an Irish rm based in Dunkirk and Ostend, Connelly Sons & Arthur, 
informed Franklin of their plan to divert ships from the West Indies towards 
Boston, Charleston, Philadelphia, and New York with linens in exchange for 
tobacco. ey also asked to become American consuls and included a portfolio 
of ten references from American and European merchants.29
Administrators in the Austrian Netherlands were keen to oversee the con-
tinuation of proteering from the American Revolution. When the rst wave 
of emigrant merchants came to trade out of Ostend following the French entry 
into the war in 1778, Prince Georg Adam von Starhemberg, the minister pleni-
potentiary in Brussels, ordered the Council of Finance to start preparing sug-
gestions for how to develop a market presence in North America.30 e short 
memorandum, submitted by Councillor Denis-Benoît, baron de Cazier, argued 
American commerce would benet the Austrian Netherlands but the merchants 
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would organise this themselves. Starhemberg expected more, especially on the 
prospects for direct trade, so he proposed that the treasurer general have it more 
“thoughtfully debated” at the Council of Finance. In the meantime, he for-
warded the memorandum to Kaunitz as “a work of foresight.” Kaunitz’s response 
was muted.31 Unlike Starhemberg, he was more aware of the perilous state of 
neutrality since Lee visited Vienna at the same time Starhemberg forced these 
discussions. Kaunitz thought any advances by Brussels towards the Americans 
would undermine their neutral position, so he ignored further discussion.32 But 
Starhemberg did not relent. Aer further deliberation with his councillors, he 
urged enticements for American traders in order to stimulate business.33 Pressed 
again by Starhemberg, Kaunitz acquiesced at the end of October 1778 but he 
limited Starhemberg’s actions to merely pursuing a commercial relationship 
with the Americans, nothing political.34
Starhemberg felt dissatised with his remit and over the next few years, he 
pushed its limits. For a time, he pursued a channel to Franklin through Jan 
Ingenhousz, but this plan failed due to Ingenhousz’s sojourn to London.35 Kau-
nitz would not countenance any overtures to the dozens of Americans living 
in the Austrian Netherlands so Starhemberg turned instead to the consul in 
Bordeaux for ideas, but nothing came of it.36 By 1781, the conversation had no 
clear direction without accepting a political connection via representation and 
a treaty of commerce.
e issue seemed more urgent than ever following the Fourth Anglo-Dutch 
War and the highpoint of Ostend’s commercial inuence. Prots ran so high 
that it was inconceivable and impractical to relinquish it. Franklin’s indirect 
response to the legal dispute over the Eersten case in the American courts 
seemed to oer a solution. In his letter on the matter, Franklin pointed out that 
legal representation could be ensured through a consul general, who “might at 
all times assist his compatriots with his Counsels and Protection in any Aairs 
they might have in that Country.”37 Ministers in Brussels interpreted this as 
an invitation to send a consul but without requiring a treaty or recognition. 
On March 24, 1782, the Council of Finance met in Brussels to discuss Frank-
lin’s idea.38 eir lengthy memorandum considered the logistical ramications 
of such an undertaking, but unanimously agreed a consul general should be 
established, since it would provide “useful information” and could “support 
the general interests of commerce and direct the speculations of traders in 
the various provinces of the monarchy.” In conclusion, they envisaged a grand 
system of several vice-consuls “given the scope of the United Colonies”; one for 
each American state, under the direction of a Consul General, a “learned man” 
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from the mercantile class who “would be the means by which the government, 
either here [in Brussels] or in Vienna, would gather good information on the 
local circumstances [in America], especially in relation to trade.”39 Starhem-
berg approved the council’s measure and sent it to Kaunitz for deliberation 
with the emperor. His adjoining comment, however, highlighted the problem 
of recognition which was inherent in establishing any formal consular net-
work. Starhemberg sensed Franklin’s plan was “to get our Court to recognise 
the Independence of the United Colonies” which he felt unable to recommend 
“as long as the fate of the Colonies remains undecided.”40 On April 13, 1782, 
Kaunitz discussed the recommendations in an audience with the emperor and 
aerwards replied to Starhemberg. Kaunitz agreed to the necessity of a consul 
for ensuring the future trade with the United States but he could not allow 
any appointment to occur since it risked ruining his role as a mediator. “We 
must rst bide our time,” Kaunitz argued, “until we will see what the fate of 
the colonies will be.”41
e Peace that Would Have Been
May 13, 1779, is not a date well remembered by historians of the American Rev-
olution, but it should be. e Peace of Teschen sealed the fate of Central Europe 
on that day, bringing an end to the War of the Bavarian Succession and prevent-
ing any European war from distracting the Atlantic powers. British dreams of a 
German confrontation which would sap French resources had not materialised 
and thus the aim of forcing France to ght on multiple fronts vanished. Joseph 
II’s hopes were also dashed. His plan to exchange the Austrian Netherlands for 
the Bavarian territories had been thwarted under the terms of the treaty. His 
recompense was a sliver of land called the Innviertel, now incorporated into the 
Archduchy of Austria above the Enns. Joseph and his ministers had spent nearly 
100 million orins in nancing the war.42 e 2,200 square kilometres of the 
Innviertel was a bitter and meagre compensation in return.
May 1779 inuenced the course of the American Revolution in another way, 
too. In her customary note of thanks to the co-mediators of the peace, Maria 
eresa oered the same service to bring about peace between the French King 
Louis and King George in the War of American Independence.43 e oer 
of mediation to an ally who had just arbitrated a humiliating peace seemed a 
strange act. A bemused French ambassador Breteuil certainly thought so. He 
outlined his suspicions to ministers in Paris, believing the Habsburgs sought to 
humble the French and to extract a warmer relationship with Britain at France’s 
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expense.44 e French decided inaction was the best course and simply chose to 
ignore the polite suggestion. A cordial remark maybe, but Maria eresa had 
made the oer with sincerity. It was a sentiment she expressed to her daughter 
Marie Antoinette.45 Advancing in age, she desired peace and stability for her 
dynasty in Europe.
But the mediation oer was also a calculated ploy. Maria eresa still feared 
the inuence of Prussia’s Frederick II, especially as she believed he manoeuvred 
to dislodge her strained, but still necessary, alliance with France.46 A medi-
ator role between the Atlantic powers had a lot to oer her. In this role, the 
Habsburgs would be able to raise themselves above Prussia aer such a calam-
itous war. Whether or not the Americans would gain independence, being the 
arbitrator would put the Habsburgs in a position of strength among the Euro-
pean powers at a time when alliances and rivalries seemed to be shiing. e 
war against Prussia may have ended in Teschen, but the struggle resumed in the 
diplomatic realm. Maria eresa accordingly set about convincing the French 
of her honest intentions through indirect means. She urged her ambassador to 
portray it as a “courtly compliment” from one monarch to another.47 She was, 
as usual, blunter in discussing the matter with Marie Antoinette. She declared 
how her interests were the same as those of the French crown and pressed the 
young queen to ensure the king would accept only her oer.48 Maria eresa’s 
eorts were utterly in vain, however. On May 27, 1779, King Louis graciously 
declined the invitation citing the prior refusal of Britain to accede to a similar 
Spanish-led mediation.49 In reality, rejection stemmed from the French foreign 
minister Vergennes’s distrust of his Habsburg allies since he sensed the upset in 
Vienna caused by the Peace of Teschen.50
Joseph II’s posturing did not help his mother’s eorts any either. e em-
peror had disliked Breteuil’s obstinate attitude over Bavaria from the beginning. 
His regard for the French ambassador had declined following the impertinence 
of the Lee aair, and his barely dry signature on the humiliating treaty at Te-
schen was the nal straw. Joseph disparaged Breteuil whenever he could and 
mentioned as much in his letters to Marie Antoinette so courtiers in Versailles 
would know too.51 Rumours swirled whether Breteuil would quit his post but 
he endured the abuse for several years more—the unfortunate man went on 
to become the French monarchy’s last prime minister on the eve of the French 
Revolution.52 In 1783, Joseph aired his grievances about France in a striking let-
ter to his sister. He believed France had always undermined Habsburg interests 
within and outside the Holy Roman Empire. Joseph had not done the same to 
them. He had not complained even when French enlargements were harmful 
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to Habsburg interests such as the acquisition of Corsica “which had been very 
prejudicial to the interests of the House of Austria and its branches in Italy.”53
Joseph’s frustration with French actions had smouldered before 1779 and then 
severely impaired the French willingness to hand him or his mother primacy in 
potential peace negotiations over America. Joseph’s actions, furthermore, gave 
the French little condence in a fair mediation. During a lengthy conference 
with the Dutch ambassador, for example, Joseph argued for them to abandon 
their anti-British approach, warning of the dangers if the French and Spanish 
were to unseat the British in the Atlantic.54 Making matters worse, Joseph also 
planned a visit to England, which never materialised and perhaps had no other 
reason than to antagonise the French further.55
Whereas Habsburg overtures had fallen on deaf French ears, the situation in 
Vienna gave some encouragement that the British would take up the oer. In 
May 1779, Maria eresa—acting through Kaunitz—ventured the same prop-
osition to the British ambassador Sir Robert Murray Keith, who reported back 
to London that the oer was cordial and open, meaning if they were to decline, 
it would do no harm.56 Months went by before Keith received further instruc-
tion. e British ministers were willing to accept the invitation but stipulated in 
mid-July that foreign support of the colonies must be dropped before negotiation 
could begin; a demand designed to preclude any chance of negotiating their inde-
pendence. Conditional acceptance reected British good faith in the Habsburgs, 
who, they thought, were more pro-British than anything else. But this did not 
mean complete trust was forthcoming. Keith’s rst objective was apprehending 
the origin of the oer. Had Maria eresa thought of it herself or had the French 
some part in it? e answer was paramount as the British suspected France would 
not (or could not) betray American independence, and so any intermediary power 
agreed by them might have accepted this premise already.57
Keith acted quickly. He rushed to the countryside palace at Laxenburg where 
Kaunitz was staying to make his enquiry and signal the conditional acceptance. 
His secretary accompanied him so that he could produce a verbatim report of 
what happened next. Kaunitz conrmed the independent origin of the oer. 
France had no part in it. Instead, the Habsburgs were animated by the desire 
to tend to the “increasing ame,” as Kaunitz characterised the American Rev-
olution.58 His next words were music to British ears. Kaunitz oered to work 
in total “candour and openness” with Keith for a mediation under Habsburg 
supervision. His plan involved renewing the overtures to France and Spain with-
out informing the courts of the British tacit acceptance. Instead, Kaunitz would 
instruct his ambassadors to merely insinuate that the British were willing to 
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accept and that terms of peace must be put forward by all parties. Kaunitz’s plan 
met British expectations since he spoke plainly of the “three courts” (Britain, 
France, and Spain) as the intended participants, ignoring the Americans. Kau-
nitz then moved on to matters more delicate for the Habsburgs: would there be 
a co-mediator and where would such a negotiation be held? Kaunitz made clear 
that the Prussians could not be contemplated, but some other state might join if 
so wished. e venue would be Vienna, pending conrmation. e nal obstacle 
was Breteuil, whose spies, Kaunitz knew, had followed Keith and who would 
raise suspicions about their extraordinary meeting in the countryside. Together 
they concocted a plausible explanation about Keith handing over papers of 
ill-consequence from his latest despatch. Plans concluded, Keith took his leave.59
And so in the idyllic settings of Palace Laxenburg just outside Vienna, the rst 
real hopes had been kindled for an end to the War of American Independence.
Meanwhile, Maria eresa had lost all hope for the mediation. Winning over 
one side was not enough. She felt British interests were too strong in Vienna and 
knew the French would not trust Joseph over the fate of North America.60 “e 
predilection here for England is always manifesting itself more and more,” she 
lamented to her ambassador in Paris.61 In the intervening months, both Maria 
eresa and Joseph sounded out the opinion of Marie Antoinette concerning 
the French position. Only a handful of the letters between her and Joseph sur-
vived the destruction of another revolution, so we are le to wonder what they 
might have discussed during this period.62 Maria eresa’s enquiries, however, 
did survive.63 eir letters reveal a mother and daughter of the same mind on the 
importance of peace for Europe. “My heart desires it more than anything else in 
the world,” Marie Antoinette wrote.64 She did not expect peace any time soon, 
however. In 1779, France had just secured Spanish entry into the war, pitting 
Britain against two continental enemies with a superior combined force at sea. 
From the French perspective, it was time to strike whilst the iron was hot rather 
than time to strike a deal.
Kaunitz pondered the impasse with his subordinates in Paris and Madrid. 
News from the latter was promising. Despite initial rejection, the Habsburg am-
bassador in Madrid, his son Count Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz-Questenberg, 
was optimistic in September 1779.65 He had immediately gone to Spain’s chief 
minister José Moñino y Redondo, conde de Floridablanca, who responded well 
to the idea. Floridablanca tentatively accepted the invitation but would only con-
rm Spain’s participation aer consultation with France.66 Kaunitz-Questenberg 
prodded for an answer two months later but without much luck. In an empty 
memorandum, Floridablanca conrmed general desires for peace and insisted 
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on a congress but revealed precious little in terms of Spain’s demands or think-
ing about how such a meeting could be achieved.67 It had become clear that the 
Spanish would not act alone and would only follow France’s lead, which would 
then entail American participation and in turn scupper any British involvement.
e question became, therefore, how likely was American independence and 
could the British withstand the revolutionaries’ demands for their separation? 
More exposed to the pro-American euphoria around Franklin at the French 
court, Count Florimond Mercy-d’Argenteau believed that the American side 
held the upper hand. At best, their position aorded them “absolute indepen-
dence” and at worst, a modied existence within the British empire. e recent 
troubles in Ireland over the anti-papist acts passed by the British Parliament 
strengthened his opinion.68 Kaunitz thought otherwise. He was more suscepti-
ble to Keith’s opinions on the matter.69 From Kaunitz’s perspective, American 
independence was not at all assured. e British could withstand the nancial 
stresses of the war better than the other belligerents. Prolonged conict would 
lead the powers involved to peace eventually, but he supposed Britain’s situation 
would improve before then.70 As 1779 drew to a close, Kaunitz resolved to await 
any changes in the fortunes of the belligerents, which would then bring about 
the prospects of peace.
Events in 1780 exacerbated Maria eresa’s failure to secure a Habsburg me-
diation. e Habsburgs had been one of the rst to issue such a proposition 
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among the European powers, but they were no longer alone. In December 1779, 
the Russian Empress Catherine II sought to build upon her prestige at Teschen 
by instructing her foreign minister Count Nikita Ivanovich Panin to pursue a 
Russian-mediated peace.71 In March 1780, King Ferdinand IV of Naples-Sicily 
made similar overtures through his representative in London.72 Indeed, by then 
some peace talks had begun. e Spanish had entered the war with limited ob-
jectives—primarily the conquest of Gibraltar and Minorca—and were willing 
to concede their participation as leverage towards these aims in secret negotia-
tions started with an informal British delegation.73 Habsburg o cials tracked 
the course of these meetings intently but sensed nothing would come of them.74
New military developments in North America further frustrated the prospects 
of peace. When the Siege of Charleston ended with the British occupation of 
the city, both Maria eresa and Marie Antoinette despaired. ey were not 
distraught for the American loss—the “miserable defence” of the Americans was 
to be expected from “such bad troops” in Marie Antoinette’s opinion—instead, 
they feared the British victory would protract the war further and diminish the 
chances of Maria eresa’s “long-hoped for” peace.75
Despite renewed pessimism, obstacles, and competition, Kaunitz pursued a 
solo Habsburg mediation throughout 1780. He sought in vain to appease all sides 
by tempting each of them to the table with incompatible or incredible oers. 
In Paris, Mercy-d’Argenteau reportedly proposed an immediate armistice to last 
nine years upon the current status quo.76 In Vienna, Breteuil faced audience aer 
audience with the monarchs on the issue. He conceded nothing and was repulsed 
by the good-cop, bad-cop tactics of Maria eresa and Joseph, where the for-
mer pleaded for peace on behalf of Europe’s salvation and the latter threatened 
Breteuil—over the course of a three-hour interview—with tales of how the Brit-
ish would never accept a sovereign United States and the Spanish would never 
allow such an example in the Americas.77 At home and abroad, the indefatigable 
eorts to secure a sole mediation under the Habsburgs failed time and again.
Events soon took away the initiative from Kaunitz. In January 1780, Admiral 
Rodney relieved the Gibraltar garrison following defeat of the Spanish eet. In 
March, Catherine II founded the League of Armed Neutrality as an open in-
ternational system for neutrals to fend o harassment of their mercantile eets 
by belligerents. e League was detrimental to the British capacity to wage war. 
It marked a stunning failure for the British aim to secure an alliance with Rus-
sia, while it brought France’s Vergennes further pleasure to see Russia not only 
maintain neutrality but to defend it.78 e League’s creation prompted neutral 
powers to join in order to protect their commerce and prots from carrying war 
132 chapter six
supplies to the belligerents. In quick succession, the northern neutrals entered 
the system.79 In November, the Dutch Republic seemed poised to join, but the 
British could not allow one of the largest foreign carrying eets to supply their en-
emies, and so a conscated plan for American aid from a few Dutch nancers was 
trumpeted as a breach of their neutrality and the British declared war before the 
authorised Dutch delegation to St. Petersburg could subscribe to the League.80
e beginning of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war, alongside the War of American 
Independence, marked the lowest point in Britain’s estrangement from the Eu-
ropean powers.81 e Dutch conagration came at an inopportune time for the 
French. Exhausted by the costs of the war and fearful that Spain would abandon 
the ght given the failure to take Gibraltar, the French council decided in De-
cember 1780 that the need for peace had arrived.82 Peace, at last, seemed assured.
Although the belligerents in the war had arrived at the point which Kaunitz 
had long awaited, a sole Habsburg mediation was not guaranteed. In fact, it 
now seemed more unlikely. For one, the belligerent powers had all viewed the 
proposal as Maria eresa’s invention. Her death on November 29, 1780, weak-
ened the credible impartiality of her son and increased French distrust towards 
his intentions. In his private correspondence, Keith wrote candidly about the 
positive change in British fortunes aer Maria eresa’s death. “Our Emperor 
has behaved like an angel ever since his accession,” he exclaimed as he boasted of 
his “friendly disposition to this country, which at this hour is in a state it never 
found itself before.”83 French ministers sought out an eective counterweight. 
e earlier Russian oer (from December 1779) appeared to solve both problems; 
France could sue for peace under a more favourable power, and it would aid their 
standing with Catherine II.84 e Franco-Russian plan was no secret among 
Europe’s courts before the oer had been accepted and widened to Britain and 
Spain. Both Kaunitz in Vienna and British ministers in London had heard the 
rumours from multiple sources and both sides hoped for a compromise.85
Meanwhile, Keith’s new superior in London, David Murray, Viscount Stor-
mont was an Austrophile. roughout the summer of 1780, Stormont tried to 
curry favour with the Habsburgs in the hopes of an alliance.86 In September, 
Keith oered Kaunitz British support for the reopening of the River Scheldt, 
a vital economic waterway in the Austrian Netherlands which had been shut 
o to maritime commerce by Dutch forts since the sixteenth century.87 In re-
turn, Keith demanded Habsburg co-mediation if the Franco-Russian initiative
became real.88 Keith’s overtures chimed perfectly with the Habsburg position.
Joseph and Kaunitz viewed co-mediation as a success. Not only would it honour 
the wish of Joseph’s late mother, but it would allow a recovery of their prestige
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aer Teschen and included the possibility to make the French wince as terms 
were deliberated. Moreover, a co-mediation with Russia furthered the dip-
lomatic pivot pursued by Joseph who favoured warmer relations with Russia, 
working toward an alliance, even, which would enable them to focus on joint 
expansion against the Ottomans.89 Positive reception in Vienna allowed Stor-
mont to demand co-mediation when the Russian oer arrived in London, which 
the Russians readily accepted. e Congress of Vienna seemed, at last, to be 
conrmed. Kaunitz rejoiced at the news, reportedly declaring, “Lord Stormont 
has baptised the baby!”90
Kaunitz worked tirelessly to ensure the Congress of Vienna would be held 
in the summer of 1781. He insisted on all parties putting forward terms for a 
mediation. In a memorandum issued to all courts involved, he tasked them with 
devising terms which they would only accept if they were in the opposing posi-
tion.91 e British were pleased by the call. Stormont endeavoured to inuence 
the co-mediators further towards his cause by oering the Russians the island 
of Minorca and the reopening of the River Scheldt for the Habsburgs.92 A plan 
to award the Habsburgs the island of Tobago was also mooted at one point but 
nothing came of it.93 Kaunitz rebued Keith for such obvious bribes.94
For their part, the French were dismayed by the suggestions emanating from 
Vienna. In mid-February 1781, Breteuil confronted Kaunitz about the trickiest 
question of all: what was to be the fate of the Americans? Kaunitz understood 
that the French position demanded their independence but he also realised this 
was incompatible with British aims. e middle ground, the two men realised, 
might be partition. If some colonies were to become independent and others 
returned to the British, then perhaps both sides could be appeased.95 Kaunitz 
forwarded the plan to Mercy-d’Argenteau wherein Canada would be returned to 
the French, Britain would retain the Carolinas and Georgia, and the rest would 
form a sovereign American republic.96 It is notable that Kaunitz was indier-
ent to American independence. From his perspective, it was merely a hurdle to 
surpass in the negations; if a diminished American state were the result, then 
it would be up to the Americans to survive. Vergennes agreed with the idea but 
felt that it could not originate from the French as it would be too painful to the 
Americans, it would have to come from the mediators instead.97
In March, Joseph met with Breteuil to thrash out the problem of American 
attendance at the Congress of Vienna. Joseph could not reconcile admission of 
the Americans with British opposition. If any congress were to be successful, 
then it had to be restricted to the three powers plus the two mediating courts. Jo-
seph mused through possible solutions with Breteuil.98 What if a separate peace 
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could be arranged? What if the British regained America in exchange for Gibral-
tar? Such thoughts were infeasible but demonstrated Joseph’s dierent think-
ing. Whereas Kaunitz perceived that the Americans had a plausible chance as a 
reduced state, Joseph saw their independence as a bargaining chip. Years before 
he would wage a short war against the Dutch over the issue of the River Scheldt, 
Joseph seemed tempted by the bait laid out by the British.99 John Adams thought 
as much from rumours he heard in Amsterdam. In June 1781, he shrewdly called 
out Joseph’s position. “e Emperor,” he declared, “appears to be more intent at 
present upon taking a fair Advantage of the present Circumstances, to introduce 
a ourishing Commerce into the Austrian Flanders, than upon making Treaties 
with England or waging War in its favour.”100 Meanwhile, Kaunitz continued to 
work on the American conundrum. In a conversation with Breteuil, he hit upon 
the idea of each state sending its own representative rather than a single Amer-
ican representative.101 e idea was shrewd. e Americans would be present, 
perhaps even as plenipotentiaries rather than actual delegates, but they would 
be so divided among themselves that the British could have their separate peace, 
picking o the Carolinas and Georgia following the preferred plan of partition. 
John Adams described this idea decades later as “the most insidious and danger-
ous Plott that was ever laid to insnare Us and deprive Us of our Independence”; 
but for the time being, he had no idea of what Kaunitz planned nor how he close 
he came to seeing it become reality.102
On May 21, 1781, aer many months of diplomatic wrangling, Kaunitz and 
the Russian representative in Vienna, Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn, 
sent o the preliminary terms for peace at Vienna. e Americans were to be 
invited and a separate peace worked out exclusively between them and Britain 
unless either side requested mediation. In trying to please everyone, however, 
Kaunitz pleased none. e call for a one-year armistice upset the French who 
feared the British would consolidate their position, while the absence of any-
thing about Gibraltar alienated the Spanish.103 e British raged at the Amer-
ican invitations. Count Belgiojoso, the Habsburg envoy in London, received a 
thorough dressing down for the impertinent terms.104
is harsh awakening meant that the British outright refused any participa-
tion on these terms and placed their hopes instead on the summer campaigns 
of 1781. e result was disastrous for them as much as it was for concluding 
peace in Vienna. On October 18, 1781, General Charles Cornwallis surrendered 
aer a lengthy siege at Yorktown. e decisive blow collapsed British hopes for 
subjugating America and preventing independence. e defeat also signalled a 
death knell for the Congress of Vienna. e British had lost the ability to hold 
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out and so peace, it seemed obvious, would take place under American, French, 
and Spanish terms. Upon hearing the news, the Spanish special envoy sent to 
Vienna as the provisional representative packed up his bags and le.105 Kaunitz 
attempted in vain to keep alive the prospects for an international summit in 
Vienna. e fall of the North ministry in London in March 1782 conrmed the 
new reality when his successor despatched an envoy to Paris to sue for peace.106
Kaunitz could do little more than concede the ultimate loss of the Habsburgs’ 
cherished congress.
Cold-shouldered by the victors, Kaunitz and Joseph resented the new peace 
plans and abhorred the French disregard for their earnest attempt to secure a 
universal peace. In 1783, Joseph still spoke bitterly of it. “Could France have 
achieved the same and come out of the last war with England with such advan-
tages,” he scorned, “if not for the assuredness and security of my involvement.”107
Stormont had failed to accommodate any meaningful role for his perceived sav-
iour in the new negotiations; the Americans and French refused any mediation 
outright. Besides, Joseph and Kaunitz wanted nothing to do with the new con-
gress. “I am afraid no real assistance can be expected from the Court of Vienna,” 
Stormont despaired, “who are wedded to the system they have embraced, and 
will not suer themselves to see how much their own interests are concerned in 
the great contest in which we are engaged.”108 e great contest over America 
ended not in Vienna but instead in Paris.
Philadelphia in Europe
Writing from Philadelphia almost twenty-ve years aer the end of the Revo-
lution, Count Charles-Albert de Moré—a nobleman and former aide-de-camp 
to Lafayette and Washington—responded with great elation to the news of his 
older brother’s intention to emigrate from Switzerland. His brother’s choice of 
destination, the younger Moré commended, “is the most suitable and certain for 
success,” one where “true pioneers [are] ocking from the most diverse of lands 
in order to make a new life for themselves.” is attractive place, he continued 
with praise, “is the port in which castaways nd shelter and a new, promising 
life.” Despite the resemblance, the port Moré spoke so highly of was not his own 
Philadelphia but instead a place which Moré concluded “is the Philadelphia of 
Europe”—Trieste.109 Trieste merited such a comparison; in 1700 it had still been 
a sleepy trading village nestled along the northernmost end of the Adriatic Sea. 
By the end of the century, it had transformed into a vibrant cosmopolitan centre 
of interregional and international commerce. Such transformation came from 
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the policies of the Habsburgs, who saw the ports of Trieste and Fiume as natural 
entrepôts for international trade. In 1718, Maria eresa’s father removed taris 
to make Trieste a free port in emulation of the Spanish trading hubs on the At-
lantic coast.110 In 1775 during one of his visits, Joseph II named Trieste the main 
port for the hereditary lands and Fiume as the primary outlet for Hungarian 
goods. In this way, his reforms established a geographically closer trade hub and 
lowered reliance on the faraway ports on the North Sea. Triestines received even 
further privileges; a mercantile college and a new stock exchange alongside one 
of the largest docks along the Adriatic coastline.111 By the time of the American 
Revolution, the sleepy harbour had woken up.
e American Revolution excited Triestine merchants for the opportunity 
to trade directly with North America. Previously, Triestine goods went via the 
Atlantic ports, especially Cadiz, and American goods arrived via the British 
Isles and the Austrian Netherlands.112 An independent United States opened di-
rect trading avenues for Trieste’s merchants for the rst time. Habsburg consuls 
across Europe were assiduous to this fact and urged the Triestine governor to ex-
plore this trade. Christian Ludwig Hofer, one such consul in Hamburg, reported 
sales of Bohemian and Silesian goods from there to America, which, he sug-
gested, could be more cheaply supplied from Trieste.113 Within twelve months, 
Hofer sent four more detailed reports including extracts of goods demanded by 
the president of the Congress.114 Merchants in Trieste were supremely aware of 
such possibilities themselves. Months before the adoption of the Declaration of 
American Independence one informed authorities in Vienna that “the current 
situation of the English Colonies in America seems to me to merit considerable 
attention, and more than ever before [. . .] to have commerce, which has espe-
cially made the Dutch and English so rich and respectable.”115 Such insistence 
was not a singular occurrence. Ministers received numerous petitions agitating 
to exploit the revolutionary turmoil. Petitions came from serious members of 
Habsburg society. During the summer of 1782, amid rumours of a denitive 
peace, Jean Gabriel, comte de Raineval et de Fauquembergue proposed a Cen-
tral and North American trading mission to Kaunitz, but received refusal days 
later.116 Johann Zollikofer von Sonnenberg, member of a large Swiss mercantile 
dynasty, proposed several ships for an expedition from Trieste to the United 
States. Joseph personally scrutinised the proposal but eventually rejected it be-
cause of the “extraordinary claims necessary” to fund the operation.117
Domestic petitioners for new transatlantic trade were not alone. Petitions for 
direct trade between Trieste and the United States reached all sides. In Novem-
ber 1779, a local captain introduced the Governor of Trieste Karl von Zinzendorf 
“Wedded to the System ey Have Embraced” 137 
to Dr. George Logan, a Pennsylvanian medical graduate of the University of 
Edinburgh who toured Europe aer his studies.118 Zinzendorf surmised Logan 
was an uno cial “agent of Congress” who “without an audience in Vienna [. . .] 
now comes here to inquire if trade relations between this port and the United 
States might be born aer the peace.”119 In January 1782, Franklin noted an ex-
traordinary meeting in his diary. Willem Bolts, the architect of Habsburg trade 
with the Far East, came to propose how a circumnavigational route might take 
goods from Trieste to China and from there to the United States and back to 
Trieste. Franklin entertained “much Discourse” about the idea and gave Bolts 
“Hopes of it upon a Peace,” but nothing more.120 At the same time, François 
Emmanuel Joseph Baraux, an Antwerp merchant who had relocated to Trieste, 
wrote to John Adams on behalf of the Imperial Privileged Trading Company 
in Trieste. He requested “an extensive list of the best Merchants in the dierent 
towns of America” so his company could “get into a reciprocal, advantageous 
connection.”121 In his reply, Adams noted how aer peace “there will probably be 
a considerable Trade between the several Ports of the United States of America 
and Trieste, through which place I fancy several American Productions will nd 
their Way into the Interior of the Austrian Dominions.”122 In both encounters, 
Adams and Franklin expressed their belief that commerce with Trieste could 
only establish itself once a general peace had been concluded.
Triestine merchants were rather more impatient, however. Ignaz Verpoorten, 
another merchant who had swapped Antwerp for the Adriatic, became the rst 
pioneer. As director of the Trieste and Fiume Sugar Company since 1776, Ver-
poorten had an obvious interest in American markets, but his position also af-
forded him important contact within the local and Viennese administrations.123
rough these channels, he urged for peace in the Americas and support for a 
trading mission to the United States. He met with Zinzendorf to discuss the 
expedition in January 1782.124 In order to realise this scheme, Verpoorten had 
to obtain a patent for the ship’s use of the imperial ensign, granted only by the 
Aulic Chamber (Hoammer) in agreement with the vessel owners, the captain, 
and local o cials—in this case Zinzendorf and the head of the municipal stock 
exchange. Verpoorten applied for the imperial patent for his ship l’Americano, 
which the authorities approved on May 31, 1782, long aer his intended depar-
ture.125 e Americano set sail for the northern Caribbean and Carolinas a few 
weeks later with a crew of twenty and 286 tonnes of goods.126 e Americano
became the rst ship to sail directly between Trieste and the New World. e 
cargo featured textiles, metalwares, glass, and wines for export and imported 
sugar, rum, and indigo from the Caribbean and Carolinas.127 It was a risky but 
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protable venture. Verpoorten established a new company to solidify his gains. 
e Verpoortische Assecuranz und Handlungs-Compagnie received its imperial 
grant on June 21, 1782, and became the rst American-Triestine company as a 
result. e company’s charter reected the seriousness of the ambition to trade 
with the United States. An endowment of four million orins, imperial pro-
tections, and tax exemption on domestic goods set to last for twenty years en-
sured considerable interest in the new rm. News of its announcement made 
front-page headlines in the Wienerisches Diarium and featured in mercantile 
journals in Hamburg and Weimar.128 In early November 1782, Verpoorten sent 
two further ships from Trieste to North America.129
Verpoorten was the rst merchant to trade directly between Trieste and 
North America, but only just. In 1781 three additional applications arrived at 
the Aulic Chamber but they had faltered for one reason or another. In March, 
the Serbian-Greek merchant Jovo Kurtovič had applied for his ship La Città di
Vienna (or La Bella Vienna) but fell foul to scrutiny.130 Safeguarding neutrality, 
Aulic Chamber o cials prevented merchants from trading military contraband 
without o cial sanctions. e respected merchant Count Johann Berchtold de 
Proli, who was part of a famous mercantile dynasty in the Austrian Netherlands, 
scuppered Kurtovič’s application with a disapproving report raising concerns 
over contraband.131 Proli’s damaging report was likely a dubious manoeuvre 
since he had intervened—this time favourably—in another proposal by Johann 
Jakob Kick, the imperial consul in Marseilles and a close associate of the Proli 
family. Kick’s plan intended for the Comte de Cobenzl to sail from Trieste to 
Africa and onwards to North America. Yet there was a hitch with the captain 
and main nanciers of the expedition who were not natural-born imperial sub-
jects. Strict maritime laws prohibited foreign-born subjects from enjoying im-
perial protections—in Verpoorten’s l’Americano mission, six merchants signed 
an a davit to conrm the Italian captain owed his allegiance to the emperor.132
Proli’s interjection argued that Kick and other nanciers were imperial subjects 
and constituted a majority of the interested parties, and, therefore, the mission 
should go ahead. But o cials remained unconvinced. Kick received an outright 
refusal in mid-August.133
A week aer Kick’s application failed, Zinzendorf met with the director of 
the Imperial Privileged Trading Company in Trieste, Johann Heinrich Frohn, 
who, together with Baraux and Proli, proposed another American scheme.134
e new plan involved La Città di Trieste—perhaps the hastily renamed La 
Città di Vienna—under a Milanese captain and backed by prominent Triestine 
and Hungarian nobles such as Count Samuel Gyulay von Maronsnémeth.135
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Recommendation by Zinzendorf preceded o cial approval in Vienna but de-
spite success with the court bureaucracy, no further records exist of their mission 
to America. By 1783, the Aulic Chamber had received four proposals for direct 
trade between Trieste and America, two of which gained approval.
Direct trade with North America arose out of its perceived protability, but 
how valuable was this new trade? Statistical tables showing Trieste’s imports 
and exports are patchy throughout the eighteenth century, but thankfully a sta-
tistical table compiled in 1783 upon the arrival of a new governor shines light 
on the initial year of Triestine-American commerce.136 Administrators already 
recognised the economic contributions of North America by listing it under 
a separate heading, l’Amérique Septentrionale, which they further subdivided 
into the “Antilles” or “America Septentrionale.” e table also allows for precise 
valuation as it shows the amount and value of each product. In 1783, forty-nine 
products featured under the “America Septentrionale” heading, ranging from 
ironware to gypsum, and from quicksilver to luxury woods. Textiles formed the 
largest export group (thirty-two percent of American exports) with a value of 
30,400. Textiles combined with glassware (fourteen percent) and agricultural 
equipment (seven percent) comprised the majority of exported goods to the 
United States. It is likely that this table reects Verpoorten’s voyages to North 
America in 1782 since he carried a large amount of agricultural and metalwares 
for a Boston rm.137
Table 1 below reveals Verpoorten’s strategy of carrying diverse goods to Amer-
ica, as forty-six other products constituted the remaining y percent of export 
value. On a national scale, this trade already represented the size of a large-scale 
rm. e rm Artaria & Co., for example, was the rst major music publishing 
house in the Vienna. In 1787, the company’s stock value totalled 74,373 and 
made the owner Domenico Artaria one of “the richest merchants in Vienna.”138
e twofold larger income from the United States made Verpoorten and other 
merchants in Trieste comparatively richer and underlines the reasons behind the 
popularity and excitement over his new American trading company.
Triestine merchants sourced a mix of domestic and foreign products to export 
to the United States. Administrators distinguished goods between “prodotti della 
Germania” and “commercio di Economia” to delineate products imported from 
abroad (commercio) and those sourced from markets within the Holy Roman 
Empire (Germania).139 Domestic products featured textiles from Bohemia and 
metalwares from Carinthia and Styria whilst foreign products included dolci
(currants, raisins, sultanas) and legno bosso or legno scodano (boxwood and unsea-
soned wood). Wood products originated from around the Adriatic region whilst 
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currants came from the Eastern Mediterranean. Merchants sourced these goods 
to export almost exclusively to American markets. Table 2 below highlights goods 
for which at least one-h of the total import into Trieste was then reshipped to 
the United States. ese products were predominantly industrial or luxury goods.
e commercial importance of the United States is underscored when com-
pared with other international destinations. In 1783, the value of exports to the 
United States amounted to 96,177 or less than one percent of total export value. 
is sum might not appear very high, but it is substantial, especially for a nascent 
trading route. Among Triestine export destinations that year, the United States 
ranked twelh out of twenty total countries. Triestine merchants exported more 
commercial value to the United States than Holland, the West Indies, Malta, 
England, Flanders, Sicily, the Barbary States, or the Republic of Ragusa. e 
Habsburg Monarchy had begun trading ventures to India and China in 1775. 
No separate values were given for either India or China but the combined value 
of exports to these two markets in 1783 was only 26,161 higher than those to 
the United States. In other words, within the rst year of direct American trade, 
Triestine merchants obtained seventy-eight percent of the value of the expedi-
tions to India and China. It was a testament to the protability and desirability 
of the new transatlantic route within the Habsburg ambition to trade globally.
Table 1. Highest Valued Exports to the United States from Trieste, 1783
Product Name (Orig.) Product Name (Eng.)
Percentage of Total 
Exports to US Value ()
Telerie Diversi di Germania German Linens 31.6 30,400
Vetri e Cristalli Glass and Crystals 13.7 13,200
Ferramenta Lavorata Agricultural Tools 7.0 6,750
Rame Copper 3.6 3,497
Lanerie Wools 3.4 3,200
Setarie Millet 3.1 3,000
Cordami Rigging/Cording 2.7 2,613
Acciaro Steel 2.7 2,600
Uvapassa Raisins 2.4 2,331
Solfo Sulphur 2.2 2,118
Source: FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale Akten, Generalia, K. 850 (1780-1785), fols. 
1003-1020.
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Trieste remained a predominantly Mediterranean port, however. e vast ma-
jority of export value lay in the Italian regions around Venice, Ferrara, Lombardy 
and the Papal States. No more than ve percent of total export value owed be-
yond the Mediterranean. ese destinations included India, China, the United 
States, the West Indies, England, the Dutch Republic, the Austrian Netherlands, 
Hamburg, and the United States. When compared to these other extra-Mediter-
ranean destinations, however, the importance of the United States market be-
comes clearer; the United States ranked rst in value.140 It cannot be doubted that 
for such initial commercial connection, the United States quickly outperformed 
other trade routes which had been established for far longer. is rapid rise vali-
dates the interest of Triestine merchants to capitalise on new transatlantic com-
merce and to gain prots from the newly independent United States of America.
Conclusion
e later years of the American Revolution provided two ports of the Habsburg 
Monarchy with unparalleled economic opportunities. Neutrality had been a dif-
cult position to maintain in the early stages of the war, but as new belligerents 
entered the war, neutrality became an increasingly benecial stance. New direct 
trading routes, either through novel mercantile initiatives in Trieste or the in-
ux of masked shipping via Ostend, allowed Habsburg merchants the unique 
chance to prot from the chaos of revolution. Access to Atlantic markets opened 






Percentage of Product’s Total 
Original Import to Trieste Value ()
Spongie Sponges 74.9 250
Solfo Sulphur 64.2 2,118
Verderame Copper sulphate 29.8 382
Cordami Rigging/Cording 24.0 2,613
Galla Gall 23.9 1,560
Vino ordinario Ordinary Wines 21.7 299
Capari [Capperi] Capers 21.4 126
Source: FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale Akten, Generalia, K. 850 (1780-1785), fols. 
1003-1020.
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opportunities for Habsburg merchandise. e desire to maintain these new av-
enues of trade fuelled debates among Habsburg ministers on the best methods 
to secure it for the long term. e rst ideas of o cial relations between the 
Habsburg Monarchy and the United States were born out of these debates which 
rested upon the establishment of diplomatic ties through treaties of commerce 
and consular representation.
Yet the impatience to recognise the United States did not outweigh the consid-
eration for international conventions. If peace remained elusive, so did any pros-
pect of Habsburg interaction with an independent United States. e same elusive 
peace evaded the best eorts of the Habsburg rulers themselves along with Prince 
Kaunitz who ardently sought to utilise the international desire for peace to their 
benet. e failed hopes for a Congress of Vienna in 1782 represented the end to a 
serious initiative on behalf of the Habsburgs to end the War of American Indepen-
dence under their mediation in Vienna. e rationale for doing so included little 
consideration for American independence and was more concerned with appeas-
ing the belligerents into entering peace talks which remained the primary aim of 
Kaunitz’s eorts. He failed in this process and in doing so, ensured the Peace of 
Vienna became the Peace of Paris as we remember it today.
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Ch a pter Sev en
“A New Set of Merchants”
e Development of Postwar Commerce between the Habsburg
Monarchy and the United States of America, 1783–1785
O n February 4, 1783, Great Britain recognised the independence of the United States of America and agreed to an armistice. e news reached Vienna within two weeks.1 On February 18, the emperor pon-
dered this news in his correspondence with his ambassador in Paris. Joseph II 
did not concern himself with the political fallout at all. “e object of trade with 
the Americans,” he noted instead, “will be of the greatest importance for the 
future.”2 ese words foreshadowed the primacy that economic interests would 
assume when it came to the relationship between his lands and those of the new 
United States. In other words, attentiveness to the importance of transatlantic 
commerce replaced dicult political considerations of neutrality. As a result, the 
years between 1783 and 1785 witnessed growing mercantile speculation across 
the whole Habsburg Monarchy, from Ostend to Trieste, from Fiume to Florence. 
Joseph’s memorandum initiated a new policy for a new age, as economic con-
cerns trumped the ideological gulf between monarchy and republic. Benjamin 
Franklin’s America and Joseph’s Austria no longer seemed so far apart.
Central to this new world of opportunity for the Habsburg Monarchy were 
those who sought to bridge the transatlantic divide: the traders, the fundraisers, 
the businessmen, the sailors, and the chancers. Together they embarked upon 
commercial ventures which bound together Habsburg ports and American cit-
ies. Collectively they were what Franklin deemed “a new set of merchants [who] 
have grown up into business.”3 In some cases, these undertakings consolidated 
trading lines forged during wartime. Others resurrected older pre-war economic 
ties that had been disrupted by revolutionary mayhem. Yet for many, trading 
with America meant something ground-breaking, untested, tempting, and 
now possible for the rst time. Merchants at all of the major Habsburg ports of 
144 chapter seven
Livorno, Ostend, and Trieste were ready to reframe, renew, or to establish for the 
rst time commercial ties to the newly independent United States.
Integrating events and a urry of activities in these ports into the picture 
of early American independence reveals the wider connectedness that indepen-
dence ushered forth for the former thirteen colonies. e American Revolution 
was not just an event with political ramications, but also one with deeply inter-
woven economic reverberations. In creating a new nation, the American Revolu-
tion also created a new state with commercial interests to be incorporated into 
the balance of power in eighteenth-century Europe. American independence 
was a new world replete with new friends, new foes, and among them, a new set 
of merchants.
Livorno: Attempts at Reconnection
Commercial connections had existed between Livorno and North America long 
before the outbreak of the American Revolution. North American vessels were 
a frequent sight at the Tuscan port; y of them had arrived between 1770 and 
1774 alone.4 Many carried cod from New England sheries along with a small 
amount of American goods. Dating back to the 1740s, this trade, modest at 
rst, had been cemented by a generation of sailors and merchants by the time of 
the Revolution. And then it all came to a halt. War disrupted these trade ows, 
and merchants crossing the seas in either direction found it increasingly hard 
to avoid predatory British, Spanish, and French ships seizing their wares. For 
Filippo Mazzei, the most ardent proponent of Tuscan-American trade, nothing 
could be done until the cessation of ghting came about ocially in 1783.5
e man who led the Livornese charge to return to American markets was 
Antonio Francesco Salucci. e rm he fronted, Salucci & Figlio, had lost the 
ship La Prosperità to the British already in 1779 and his associate Sebastino V. 
Salucci had been embroiled in a court case over another ship, the Teti, captured 
by the Spanish in 1780. Spurred on by peace, Antonio was determined to reig-
nite Tuscan transatlantic commerce. He purchased a large brig and christened 
it Il Diligente, which set sail for Philadelphia in May 1783. When it successfully 
returned to Livorno in December with a cargo of tobacco, wax, and dyewood, 
it became the rst successful Tuscan ship to sail to the United States for some 
time.6 Condence restored, Salucci wrote to Franklin with excitement in Au-
gust 1784. He was proud to inform him about the “ourishing Commerce be-
tween our Tuscan State and your united States of America.”7 He was certain 
“no State in Europe is better calculated” for such commerce “as we have almost 
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every article Europe furnishes and can take o  in Return every American pro-
duce.” Success emboldened Salucci. He sent further ships to the United States. 
Il Diligente repeated its transatlantic journey in February 1784, this time to Vir-
ginia.8 l’Etruria le Terricciola (near Livorno) for Philadelphia and followed a 
more innovative route, selling Tuscan goods in Philadelphia before sailing up 
to Boston for cod and arriving back in Livorno in January 1785. e largest of 
the three ships, the 500 tonne Teresa Geltrude repeated the same route between 
1784 and 1785.
Ministers in Vienna followed the success of these voyages intently. Although 
the Grand Duchy of Tuscany fell under a secundogeniture ruled by the emper-
or’s younger brother, the representatives of the Viennese court kept ministers 
aware of the latest developments.9 Ocials in Vienna hoped to understand the 
vitality and nature of commerce with the sovereign United States and Tuscany. 
ey wished to know the substance of this direct trade and its prospects for 
enriching the lives of the Tuscan inhabitants. e actions of Tuscan merchants, 
aer all, could inform similar projects of traders in the hereditary lands of the 
Habsburg Monarchy. Moreover, as subjects of an autonomous state, these mer-
chants were also competitors for the domestic vendors in the Habsburg lands. 
Such concerns spoke to the tight nexus between the economic and political 
realms where mercantilist instincts of one nation could jeopardise the political 
interests of another, even between states ruled under the same dynasty.
In 1785, Salucci expanded his prospective voyages: La Cinque Sorelle and Il Dil-
igente to Virginia; l’Etruria and the Teresa Geltrude to Boston.10 Salucci & Figlio
had clearly established a foothold in the transatlantic trade with the United States, 
and his rm’s promoters felt potential gains were still to be made. at year, Salu-
cci selected a young associate within the rm, Filippo Filicchi, as the company’s 
representative in the United States. Filicchi received a share of the prots under a 
new subsidiary company, Filicchi & Co., and the support for a three-year mission 
in America. Prior to Filicchi’s departure, Salucci & Figlio had used the New York 
house William Seton & Co. as their primary contact and goods handler in the 
United States. Filicchi arrived in New York in mid-summer but did not stay there 
for long. He undertook trips to Philadelphia, Boston, and Providence, Rhode Is-
land, in order to scout out lucrative trades and send back valuable reports.11
Filicchi’s tenure in the United States certainly benetted Salucci & Figlio
through the supply of information but upon his return to Livorno in 1788, he 
learned that the pioneering rm had gone bankrupt. e legal battle over the 
Teti in the Spanish courts had rumbled on since 1780 and the mounting legal 
costs ruined company nances.12 From the ashes of one company grew another, 
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however. e collapse allowed Filicchi to act with full autonomy and he returned 
to the United States a year later as the partner in a new rm, F. & A. Filicchi, 
established with his brother. e new rm picked up the American trade from 
Salucci & Figlio and, thanks to Filicchi’s rsthand knowledge, became the most 
successful transatlantic company in Livorno.13 In a testament to his importance, 
Filicchi became the American consul for Livorno in 1794, aer years of repeated 
attempts to gain that oce.14 e Filicchi and Salucci endeavours were the suc-
cess stories of the initial postwar years in Tuscan-American relations. On the 
ocial level, however, the outlook was less optimistic.
Attempts at a commercial treaty between Tuscany and the United States 
began in October 1783 when members of Congress instructed American com-
missioners to pursue treaties with several European nations, including various 
Habsburg territories. Recognising the sovereignty of Tuscany under the terms 
of Habsburg secundogeniture, the Americans pursued a separate treaty with the 
Grand Duchy. Yet all of these schemes were beset with diculties. In the Tus-
can case, the American commissioners—Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and 
omas Je erson—sounded out feelings in Florence through Francesco Favi in 
late September 1784.15 Finding a warm reception to the idea, they forwarded the 
treaty proposal to Favi in December. e proposed dra was in fact a copy of the 
semi-concluded treaty with Prussia, which they hoped would serve as a model for 
Tuscany and elsewhere.16 e Tuscans responded enthusiastically and returned 
an amended version in April of the following year.17 Je erson led the deliber-
ation on the counter-proposals and compiled a summary on the alterations.18
Further debates within the American circles rolled on until they submitted 
their Observations to Favi in response.19 Another round of wrangling came from 
the Tuscan side in the form of a forty-six-page Nuova minuta del trattato (New 
treaty dra) with further revisions.20 By the time Je erson and Adams came 
to study the latest proposals, nearly a year had elapsed since the initial o er to 
Tuscany. Je erson seemed displeased. “e order of the articles,” he complained 
to Adams, “is entirely deranged and their direction almost totally changed.”21
Je erson believed nothing could be rescued from the Tuscan negotiations. In a 
letter Je erson wrote to Filippo Mazzei in the summer of 1785, he noted how any 
prospect of a “rational connection” with Tuscany was now “barren.”22
Diculties on the Tuscan side had arisen as soon as the American commis-
sioners had made overtures in September 1784. Although Pietro Leopoldo was 
receptive to schemes aimed at enhancing his dominion, he rst sought the opin-
ion of local ocials.23 One of them, a Livornese tax inspector named Fierallmi, 
expressed doubts that any worthwhile o er could be made to the Americans. 
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Tuscans could not give them much incentive beyond proposing equal status with 
all other merchants in the city, he argued.24 is issue became more pressing 
when the American proposals reached Florence. Favi had insisted to his su-
periors that the Americans understood the concerns of Fierallmi and that no 
extraordinary privileges could be granted to American merchants; their latest 
response, however, seemed unaware of this limitation. ings came to a head 
when the governor of Livorno Count Federigo Barbolani di Montanto received 
the dra treaty and proceeded to comb through the articles individually.25 Bar-
bolani found many points to be entirely incongruent with Tuscan customs. His 
extensive commentary on Article Four laid out this dissonance clearly. One pro-
vision stated that trading benets were to occur for Tuscan and American ships 
arriving in the ports of the two nations. Barbolani pointed out how this under-
mined the Tuscans who lacked a sucient eet and would trade many goods 
indirectly aboard vessels belonging to other nations.26 Furthermore, he worried 
that American vessels would hold an unequal advantage over Tuscan merchants 
since they would have the benets of the treaty in addition to the rights of every 
nation at Livorno. In e ect, he argued, this would also go against the American 
insistence, according to Favi, that both Tuscany and the United States would 
be equals in the treaty. e only solution Barbolani saw was to establish an “un-
limited reciprocal freedom” between them which would include Tuscan and 
American goods on any vessel and only to the degree which Tuscany held with 
other nations already.27 Barbolani and Fierallmi’s insights, as part of the Nuova
minuta di trattato, were what Je erson likely referred to as the “deranged” order 
and “changed” direction of the negotiations. Both sides had reached an impasse.
Barbolani resisted further overtures. In February 1785, an intrepid American 
entrepreneur, Eliphalet Brush, visited Tuscany. John Quincy Adams described 
him as “full of vivacity and life.”28 Indeed he was. Originally from Connecti-
cut, where he had served during the early part of the war, Brush had turned 
to a commercial life in New York.29 Brush had met the Adamses—father and 
son—in Amsterdam in 1781 when he rst toured Europe on behalf of his New 
York rm Broome, Platt & Brush.30 Four years later, Brush travelled again to 
drum up trade for the company. Livorno seemed a prime target. Brush regarded 
Tuscany as an “emporium” of Mediterranean goods, which sold wares “better 
calculated for our [American] market than any other.”31 In Livorno, Brush met 
with Barbolani as well as with the Grand Duke in Florence.32 He spoke of the 
“great advantages” of trade between the United States and Tuscany.33 Brush even 
presented a list of suitable goods; Tuscan oil, hemp, and silks o ered for Ameri-
can cod, tobacco, and spermaceti.34 But the mission created the impression that 
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the American commissioners had sent Brush to restart the stalled negotiations. 
Pressed by Tuscan ocials, Brush explained how he lacked any ocial powers to 
conclude a treaty and acted purely as a private agent. Nevertheless, he had made 
a good impression in Tuscany, since several individuals supported his subsequent 
mission to Naples where he chased the same scheme.35
Agents such as Brush were part of a concerted e ort to re-establish and ex-
pand the pre-war economic ties between North America and Tuscany. e en-
thusiasm for this reinvigorated connection came from both sides as Tuscans such 
as Salucci and Filicchi tried to enact the wartime dreams of Mazzei. Motivated 
by potential success, these venture capitalists sought out old and new markets 
and contacts on the other side of the Atlantic. Yet this mercantile impulse did 
not translate into a tangible political connection in the form of a commercial 
treaty. e stumbling block for any such agreement lay in the personal negotia-
tions between American and Tuscan ocials. As will be discussed later, Je er-
son’s outlook on the entirety of the Habsburg Monarchy clouded his approach to 
such dealings. Meanwhile, Tuscan ocials like Barbolani interpreted American 
demands as incompatible with their own pre-existing arrangements. e Tuscan 
case is the rst instance—but not the last—in US-Habsburg relations where a 
disconnect appeared between two sides and between economic entrepreneurs 
and political representatives.
Ostend: Prosperity or Poverty?
In 1783, the postwar fate of Ostend erupted onto the pages of the Augspurgische
Ordinari Postzeitung. It was an open question for one of the largest ocial news-
papers of the Holy Roman Empire: would prosperous Ostend survive the Peace 
of Paris? An April edition carried the rst murmurings of impending ruin. “One 
can easily discern that they are partisan,” noted the editors who reported on the 
relocation of many Dutch traders following the peace. “Whilst it is true that 
Ostend cannot remain so prosperous,” they conceded, “American independence 
will certainly keep Ostend aoat.”36 By the end of the year, reports began to 
contradict this prediction, though the editors attempted to minimise the neg-
ativity: “Ostend’s trade has fallen since the end of the war, as foreseen, but not 
by so much that the trade is not higher than before the war began.”37 Another 
issue detailed how Ostend had become one of “the most spacious and convenient 
ports in Europe.”38 In Vienna, the newspapers there had little to say about the ru-
mours of harder times for Ostenders. As far as the public were informed, one of 
the richest Habsburg ports would continue to thrive. Indeed, one article noted 
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how America “drunken with joy” about peace continued to import vast amounts 
from Ostend.39 So what did, in fact, lay ahead for Ostend? Prosperity or poverty?
e answer depended in part on the actions of ocials who sought to main-
tain the benets gained during the Revolution. In 1781, the Brussels government 
elected to found a new committee to oversee the recent surge in international 
trade.40 Under the superintendence of the Secretariat of State and War, the six 
members of the new Comité de Commerce Maritime had dealt with the inunda-
tion of paperwork associated with the blossoming trade. Now the committee 
would play a leading role in dening the port’s postwar position. On January 23, 
1783, Minister Plenipotentiary Prince Georg Adam von Starhemberg ordered 
committee members to investigate ways “to render permanent a portion of the 
advantages already existing, to multiply resources and relations, and to make 
greatest use possible of the current circumstances, namely the imminent peace 
and, seemingly, the independence of the United States of America.”41 Starhem-
berg’s request reveals the apparently low ambition—or, perhaps, realism—with 
which the Brussels ocials approached the matter: he aimed to preserve “a por-
tion” of the advantages. It was already taken as a matter of fact that not all the 
wartime gains could be sustained.
ree of the six committee members responded to Starhemberg’s request.42
Two of them proposed standard measures such as lowering tari s on American 
goods and ensuring domestic cargo suitable for Atlantic markets.43 One of them 
proposed something quite di erent. Henri Deplancq had been a member of the 
committee since its inception and, like the others, held high-ranking positions 
elsewhere in the Brussels government. In his case, he also served on the Coun-
cil of Finance and as the director of the Board of Customs.44 In pondering the 
Ostend question, Deplancq explored the situation with great scope and prag-
matism. In his Mémoire submitted to Starhemberg, there were opportunities 
as well as challenges.45 First of all, Deplancq argued some countries should be 
written o  without hesitation. Russian trade amounted to nothing more than 
a small exchange in sawdust whilst trade with Denmark-Norway centred on 
craysh. Great Britain and the Dutch Republic always presented the greatest 
challenges from their dominant commercial positions, which was “very ruinous” 
for the Austrian Netherlands unless importations from these nations could be 
reduced.46 e stagnant position with France, Portugal, and the Mediterranean 
states was unlikely to change except negatively as French traders moved back to 
Dunkirk. Spain represented a small hope for improvement since port duties were 
low enough to allow a sliver of protable trade in places like Cadiz, so Deplancq 
saw North America as the only real chance for growth.
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Deplancq advocated shiing interests from the Caribbean to the United 
States. He predicted that before long, France and Britain would raise tari s to 
protect their islands as the Dutch had already done. As he concluded, “with 
this uncertainty, it seems to me that is premature to form any policy on Carib-
bean trade and that it is enough to merely watch for what happens next.”47 e 
stabilised position of the United States of America as a fully independent and 
sovereign nation allowed for more opportunity. Deplancq felt American trade 
was “extremely interesting” as it gave all European traders an equal playing eld. 
is meant Flemish textiles would fare well. In return, rice and tobacco could 
be sourced from the Carolinas and Virginia. He noted that American tobacco 
might harm the nascent Flemish tobacco industry which had sprung up to meet 
domestic demand during the war, but that it could be reshipped for a prot if the 
American price was low enough.48 To these ends, he argued it was necessary to 
gain representation and a treaty with the Americans as soon as possible. He even 
envisioned a system where there would be three consuls in the United States: 
one each in New York and Charleston with a central authority in Philadelphia 
to oversee them.49 In Deplancq’s view, a focus on the United States clearly de-
marcated the way forward.
In deciding the best course for the economy of the Austrian Netherlands, 
Starhemberg had chosen not to rely solely on his councillors. His directive also 
included merchants. Seven responded, with the imperial consuls in London, An-
tonio Songa, and Dunkirk, François Joseph de Lattre, also providing input.50 As 
for the merchants, William Herries of the rm Herries, Keith & Co. in Ostend 
suggested the founding of a national bank in order to serve as guarantor on pro-
spective voyages to North America.51 Others sought government support in terms 
of subsidies and lower tari s.52 e most interesting proposition was the desire to 
acquire an island in the Caribbean. Several respondents backed the idea including 
Herries and de Lattre along with Charles André Melchior de Proli, the widow 
(Veuve) van Schoor, and Friedrich Romberg in Brussels.53 e latter two seemed 
especially keen, perhaps given their slave trading activities.54 ey insisted any-
where would do and Van Schoor included a list of suitable places from Curaçao 
to Honduras, and from Mexico to Suriname. De Lattre held the island of Tobago 
more rmly in mind. All proponents argued this would ensure continued access 
to the Caribbean, maintain a competitive advantage, and would open a beach-
head into the United States markets and possibly into Spanish North America 
via the Mississippi river. In spite of these perceived benets, the Brussels gov-
ernment declined further consideration on the grounds that foreign pressures to 
abandon colonial ambitions had been too great in the past and the sums needed 
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to purchase an island such as Tobago, if the French could even be persuaded of re-
linquishing it, as well as the non-existent navy to protect it, would be enormous.55
Starhemberg may have felt his grand survey of opinions had been a failure, but 
he dutifully sent the reports on to Vienna. ere, as in Brussels, the merchants’ 
either tepid or harebrained schemes met with little enthusiasm. In this light, De-
plancq’s more calculated approach appeared the most reasonable and suitable way 
forward. e need for a solution had become more urgent in Brussels following 
the news that Spanish port authorities had begun making conditions increasingly 
unfavourable for foreign traders. e singular hope for improved European com-
merce receded with news of complications in selling Flemish cargo onboard the 
Danish ship Anne Sophie in March 1783. To make matters worse, the ship had 
been sailing to Philadelphia via the Spanish ports and, as one Ghent merchant 
involved in the transaction claimed, costs had now risen by twenty to twenty-ve 
percent as a result.56 Ocials struggled to nd alternatives but nothing appeared 
practical beyond Deplancq’s suggestion to send consular representatives.
In the meantime, the prevailing thought was that the merchants themselves 
would preserve trade with North America. is notion was not without merit. 
Merchants had a clear incentive to continue transatlantic trade. Flemish rms es-
tablished partnerships in the United States to secure their presence in American 
markets. is involved either starting business associations with American rms 
or sending a representative to the United States. e rst Ostend rm to take this 
direction was Herries, Keith & Co. run by two Englishmen, George Keith and 
William Herries. ey sent over John Paterson—about whom little is known—to 
travel between Charleston and New York for one to two years. In anticipation of 
his mission, they focused on their contacts in England to reach out to Americans, 
most notably through an associate to William Temple Franklin.57
In the immediate postwar period at least four additional Flemish companies 
followed the example of Herries, Keith & Co. e rm of Liebaert, Baes, Derd-
eyn & Co. established a partnership with Mark Prager in Philadelphia, the son 
of the Amsterdam-London family conglomerate run by Yehiel Prager, which had 
traded through Ostend during the Revolution.58 Prager proved highly e ective 
in Philadelphia. George Washington described him as a “gentleman engaged 
extensively in trade” and recommended him to his friends aer Prager had won 
Washington’s approval within a year of his arrival.59 It was one of many useful 
friendships throughout Prager’s time in America.60 Whereas during the war 
Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co. had sent ships along the lucrative route to the 
Caribbean, their new partner advised them of better opportunities. In this case, 
Liebaert & Prager—as the new association was known—specialised in trading 
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American wheat to Lisbon in exchange for Portuguese wines to Ostend.61 Prag-
er’s e orts were diluted, however, by the ongoing court case over the Eersten, 
which sapped his energies and forced him to lobby Congress on at least one 
occasion.62 In 1785, the rm su ered another court case involving another ship, 
l’Empereur, diverting Prager’s attention yet again.63 Beset with diculties, the 
partnership did not outlast the 1780s as Mark Prager traded under his own com-
pany by 1791.64 Its existence, however short, still demonstrated the tenacity and 
new direction of Ostend rms postwar.
Firms across the Austrian Netherlands mirrored the new American initiatives 
of Herries, Keith & Co. and Liebaert & Prager. In Antwerp, De Heyder, Veydt & 
Co. formed a close connection through the insurance house of James Vanuxem 
in Philadelphia.65 Vanuxem functioned as the main insurer and his son’s future 
father-in-law, Herman Joseph Lombaert of Ghovaere & Lombaert, served as the 
clearinghouse for De Heyder, Veydt & Co. in North America.66 rough these 
two unocial partners, De Heyder, Veydt & Co. sold large amounts of textile 
goods from Lier and Antwerp and earned a prot of around twenty-ve per-
cent on their North American sales.67 New connections such as these required a 
great deal of trust and transatlantic cooperation between rms without formal 
business ties or which lacked a connubial link.68 e De Heyder, Veydt & Co.-
–Vanuxem–Ghovaere & Lambaert trading nexus ultimately proved too decient 
in trust as business ceased in 1787 and arguments erupted over the payment of 
debts.69 Seeking to continue their exports to the United States, De Heyder, Veydt
and Co. sold o  their remaining stock via Samuel Wetherill & Sons in Phila-
delphia but failed to attract any other substantial partnerships.70 e failure to 
sustain such bonds of business conrmed what the British envoy in Brussels, 
George Byng, Viscount Torrington, had to say about the trade with the United 
States: “e want of faith in the Americans—and the various stories told of the 
dishonesty of their merchants, will prove a great obstacle to any condence [as] 
these wary people here are not easily inclined to risk their money.”71 Given the 
British reluctance towards American independence and the e orts in the 1780s 
to regain much of the lost American commerce, Torrington was undoubtedly 
prejudiced against such endeavours. His words, however, reected the dicult 
reality in establishing viable long-term connections across the Atlantic in the 
late eighteenth century.
Philadelphia attracted the greatest postwar interest, but other American cities 
became prospective sites also. One Ostend ship, the Ceres, arrived in Norfolk, 
Virginia, in 1786, for instance.72 e largest port in the southern states, Charles-
ton, became the focal point of other concerted e orts to establish a beachhead 
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in American markets. Two Flemish rms established connections with com-
panies in the city. ese connections proved rather poor, however. In the rst 
instance, Charleston functioned as an indirect port of call for the Ostend rm 
De Kuyper, which sailed its namesake ship to Philadelphia in 1784. ere, the 
company’s associates, Pennsylvanian partners Biddle & Tellier, sold the Flem-
ish goods and loaded the De Kupyer with our and other provisions for sale in 
Charleston and Curaçao before it would return from South America to Ostend 
a year later.73 is exchange meant that whilst an Ostend ship technically arrived 
in Charleston, it was carrying on an intra-American trade rather than beginning 
a new transatlantic venture between Charleston and Ostend. e second case 
attempted to achieve direct transatlantic trade but failed to sustain it. A native 
of Ghent founded the rm De Surmont in Charleston sometime in late 1783 
or early 1784 and received the ship Jacoba et Isabella from Ostend in mid-1784 
carrying a variety of Flemish goods to exchange for tobacco.74 e expedition 
faltered in protability since the company’s director understood little about the 
tari s in South Carolina and barely made anything from the trade. He sold his 
wares at cost and returned home with the ship.75 South Carolina seemed too 
distant an opportunity for the merchants of the Austrian Netherlands.
Whilst the rms De Kuyper and De Surmont failed in their attempts to trade 
with a second American city, there were other merchants in the Austrian Nether-
lands who traded with North America but did not establish any lasting presence. 
At least een ships sailed from Ostend to the United States between July 1783 
and 1788.76 Compared to four ships that sailed to the Caribbean from 1783 to 
1785, this number was signicantly higher and represented the shi away from the 
Caribbean for Ostend traders.77 Merchants in the Austrian Netherlands sensed 
the new direction in trade. Applications to be the Habsburg consul in the United 
States arrived on Deplancq’s desk from 1782 onwards.78 But Deplancq recom-
mended that these pleas be le unanswered until the American situation had sta-
bilised and a policy regarding consular presence had been worked out in Vienna.79
At the same time, merchants approached American representatives to 
open Flemish trade with the United States. Sir Robert Herries penned a 
forty-eight-page memorandum on the prospects of British and Flemish goods 
in American markets which he sent to Silas Deane in 1783.80 Edward Browne, a 
British subject in Ostend, approached John Adams for the position of American 
consul and enlisted other merchants in London to support his cause.81 Browne’s 
desire rested on the wish to continue trade with William Lee, who had retired to 
his Green Spring plantation in Virginia during the summer of 1783.82 eir bond 
was one of friendship as well as business. Lee’s wife Hannah Philippa Ludwell 
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Lee and their children moved in with the Browne family at Ostend and Lee en-
trusted a large sum of money to Browne, which he could draw upon more easily 
than sending remittances from across the Atlantic.83 Together with Dennis de 
Berdt, a merchant friend from Lee’s London days, the trio sought to rehabilitate 
Virginian trade through exporting Flemish and British goods via Ostend in re-
turn for cheap tobacco from Lee’s Virginian neighbours.84
Yet by 1785, the venture had produced little. Lee su ered a wave of personal 
tragedies; rst, the death of his wife as she was about to embark from Ostend to 
America in 1784 and then the slow erosion of his eyesight which had worsened 
upon his return to Virginia, so much so that he could not read by candlelight. 
Plans were waylaid by the unhelpful nature of transatlantic communication, too. 
In 1785, Lee had already complained to Browne that he had not heard from him 
for over a year when he wrote bluntly and painfully,
It seems that added to the other misfortunes that have persecuted me in a 
successive habit for two years past, I have lost a friend; a loss that at my time 
of life is generally not easy to be repared [sic] and in my Case perhaps it is 
impossible, but I will still address you by that sacred title.85
Lee’s loss subsided with his receipt of a handful of letters from Browne during 
the years up to 1788. ey reveal how little of their plans actually transpired. 
rough Browne’s company Browne & Perryman, Lee managed to trade Ma-
deira wines instead, meaning the trade had nothing to do with Ostend except for 
Browne’s presence as his European agent.86 e Madeira trade, however, did not 
prove successful as Lee’s contacts in Brussels reported that they su ered losses 
on the venture.87 By the late 1780s, Lee seemed unable to lead a new direction. 
In 1791, he underwent a rudimentary cataract operation which rendered his eyes 
useless. Blind, enfeebled by the many years of travel and the personal devastation 
of his wife’s death, Lee died in 1795. e man who had once been a celebrity in 
Vienna, the rst representative of the United States to the Habsburg lands, and a 
self-exiled resident in Brussels, could achieve no further meaningful connection 
in the postwar years.
Lee and Browne were not the only American merchants to attempt transat-
lantic trade from Ostend, however. e New York merchant Nicholas Low made 
a concerted e ort. Prior to the end of the war, Low had no commercial ties with 
Ostend. But an unsolicited letter from an English mercantile rm in Ostend, 
William Williams & Co., got his attention, even though Low did not reply to 
the opportunity to sell “tobacco, rice, turpentine, slaves, and indigo” through 
the rm.88 Instead, by 1785, Low had made contact with the Antwerp rm of 
“A New Set of Merchants” 155 
Werbrouck & Mellerio through whom he procured hats to sell in Philadelphia.89
e venture made good returns and Werbrouck & Mellerio sent a representative 
to Philadelphia the following year to act as their representative with Low and 
his associate, Joseph Lacoste.90 At its peak, however, the collaboration abruptly 
ended, perhaps because Werbrouck & Mellerio operated through their new Phil-
adelphian representative. Low’s Antwerp business dealing was the rare instance 
of an American-led interaction with Ostend.
Most other American merchants shut up shop in Ostend. omas Barclay 
had commanded a large presence in Ostend’s American wartime trade but relo-
cated to Paris where he embarked upon a diplomatic career.91 ree merchants, 
William Bingham, Samuel Ingliss, and Robert Gilmor, had likewise benetted 
from directing ships from Ostend to Philadelphia during the war as Bingham, 
Ingliss & Gilmor. Gilmor operated out of Amsterdam during that period and 
from there he sought to continue direct trade to the United States, particularly 
to his native Baltimore.92 e initiative did not last long as the trio liquidated 
their endeavours in February 1784.93 One American rm showed interest in 
establishing a trade in Ostend but only to a limited degree. In 1784, the Balti-
more rm Samuel & John Smith sent out a circular advertisement titled “A New 
Scene of Commerce has opened with the Country” to thirty-eight European 
port-cities. Re-establishing ties with Great Britain was clearly the priority for 
them but Ostend featured as one of the six non-British ports featured on their 
roster. Nothing came of it.94
No American presence lasted in Ostend beyond 1786. Symptomatic of the 
attitude by the late 1780s, a petition to omas Je erson to use Ostend as the 
main entrepôt for Irish commerce in 1785 went without reply.95 e heydays of 
American trade at Ostend ended in these postwar years. Whereas wartime pro-
duced a boom for Ostend’s transatlantic trade through the international use of a 
neutral naval ag, the peace that followed brought hardship and ruin as foreign 
merchants upped sticks and returned to their respective countries. In most cases, 
it was a foreseeable result—one questioned openly in the Augsburg press and 
resoundingly answered by poverty rather than prosperity. What was unforeseen, 
however, was the tenacity of local merchants to continue the good times and to 
ght for a piece of the lucrative American trade. Like many Habsburg moments 
in the American Revolution, Ostend and its transatlantic trade was a brief epi-
sode of boom and bust, but it was one which mattered greatly and a ected the 
course of action vis-à-vis the Americans during this decade. Ostend’s commer-
cial rise was instrumental in shaping the urgency from ministers in the Austrian 
Netherlands for a political connection between the Habsburg Monarchy and 
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the United States. Its fall would cement an eventual malaise about the utility 
of America on the eve of a homegrown revolution in the Austrian Netherlands. 
Ultimately, it would not be until the Napoleonic Wars that commerce would 
again pick up and Congress would deem a consular representative necessary in 
the former Austrian Netherlands.96
Trieste: e Maturity of Direct Trade
By the time of the Treaty of Paris, only two groups of Triestine merchants had 
been successful in their aims to established direct trade between America and 
the Adriatic: Frohn and Baraux on the one hand, and Verpoorten and his new 
company on the other. Verpoorten was in fact the only Trieste trader to com-
plete a roundtrip with the crossing of his l’Americano in 1782. He was among the 
new set of merchants but by no means alone. e voyages of La Città di Trieste
and l’Americano during the war (see chapter 6) signalled new opportunities to 
other merchants in Trieste. Spurred by his example, this new generation of post-
war merchants now sought to consolidate and expand the direct transatlantic 
trade between Trieste and the United States.
Domenico Francesco Belletti, a merchant of considerable repute, became 
one of the most enthusiastic merchants for transatlantic trade. Belletti directed 
Trieste’s Mercantile Insurance Chamber and headed the rm Belletti & Zaccar
Compagnie which traded extensively in the Levant.97 Belletti began a furious let-
ter campaign to Franklin in order to secure his appointment as the ocial consul 
for the United States.98 Belletti’s rst letter, written in February 1783, spoke of 
his admiration for the American republic.99 Belletti obviously intended to at-
ter Franklin, wishing to be “employed in the service of your respectable Repub-
lic here and across the whole Austria Littoral in the role of a Consul General, 
through which [ows] the commerce of your states with that of our august Mon-
arch.”100 Belletti received no response from Franklin but persisted regardless. In 
April, Belletti sent Franklin four letters within eighteen days, demonstrating his 
seriousness in establishing his own trade with the United States. In his rst letter, 
Belletti outlined his lobbying e orts to convince the emperor of the viability of 
American trade and his company’s preparations to trade goods from the heredi-
tary lands and the Levant.101 His nal three letters took an increasingly desperate 
tone, pleading with Franklin for a letter of recommendation and at least a show of 
support for his commercial expedition. Met again with silence, Belletti mustered 
support from the French consul in Trieste but this letter arrived too late to help.102
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Despite Belletti’s inclusion of two recommendations—including one by Count 
Karl von Zinzendorf—Franklin did not seem to care.103 His rescue came from 
intervention by Charles André Melchior de Proli, an inuential merchant and 
banker in the Austrian Netherlands, who lobbied Franklin successfully in May 
1783 to procure American contacts for Belletti’s venture.104
Belletti’s commercial expedition had many backers. A conglomeration of 
successful merchants formed around him including Antonio Rossetti along 
with Giacomo Francesco Maria Gabbiati and the Flemish-born Ambrosius 
von Strohlendorf, the head of the Triestine stock exchange. ese sophisticated 
pioneers acquired the right connections both geographically and politically to 
obtain trade with the United States. Rossetti and Gabbiati functioned as Levan-
tine contacts, Belletti pushed Franklin for support though Proli, and Strohlen-
dorf provided the ship for the mission, La Capricieuse.105 is ship had crossed 
the Atlantic from Ostend in 1781 but Stohlendorf repurposed it to “go to Amer-
ica.”106 For the expedition, the quartet planned to sail under imperial colours and 
therefore had to rst navigate treacherous court scrutiny before navigating ocean 
waves. Belletti once again began a furious campaign. He personally travelled to 
Vienna to submit the application to the Aulic Chamber in May 1783. One im-
mediate problem occurred. e intended captain of the ship, George Simpson 
was a Scottish-born sailor and not an imperial subject. e quartet arranged 
for Frohn and Baraux to exert their inuence. In their attestation, they praised 
Simpson’s qualities and argued for honourary citizenship.107 e directors also 
addressed secondary concerns over smuggling arms since, as one treasury ocial 
noted, America was still “presently full of soldiers from all over the world.”108
Eventually the ocials granted the patent but, as in previous cases, it included 
a list of prohibited goods.
With clearance awarded for the mission, Belletti wrote to Franklin again in 
September 1783. “It is certain,” he declared, “the Port of Trieste has more than 
any other port a very solid commercial enterprise with America.”109 Simpson set 
sail that month with Franklin’s letters of introduction.110 La Capricieuse became 
the largest Triestine vessel to sail directly to the United States with 350 tonnes of 
cargo. Upon arrival in Philadelphia, Simpson brokered contact with the inuen-
tial merchant and nancier Robert Morris, the Superintendent of Finance, and 
with the trading house Bache & Shee, operated by Franklin’s son-in-law Richard 
Bache and his associate John Shee. Bache & Shee handled most of the goods 
from La Capricieuse. Franklin’s son-in-law was delighted at this opportunity and 
thanked his father-in-law for,
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Your kind introductions in the Mercantile line [which] have thrown a 
pretty large scene of business into Bache & Shee’s hands, and we have a 
good prospect before us of its being protable, [as] our connections with 
Trieste in the Empire of Germany [Holy Roman Empire], are likely to be 
very considerable, and our prospects very attering.111
Bache & Shee operated as distributors, selling the Triestine products easily. 
On December 10, 1783, the Pennsylvania Gazette listed the rst advert of goods 
from La Capricieuse featuring “dates, spices, and currants” brought from the 
Levant and sold by the shopkeeper Samuel Garrigues in Philadelphia.112
Simpson and the quartet developed an ingenious strategy for increasing their 
yields from the American trade. Sailing out of Trieste with Simpson was a Cap-
tain Wouters, a native of Antwerp who travelled to Baltimore over the winter of 
1783 and purchased an American ship which they renamed the Comte de Brigido
in honour of the new governor of Trieste, Pompejus Brigido von Bresowitz.113
Wouters took command of this vessel laden with American products, and they 
le their respective ports in late summer 1784. Both ships arrived in Trieste 
on November 9, 1784.114 News of their arrival and the success of the venture, 
especially the method of one-out, two-back travelled fast through the Habsburg 
lands. Governor Brigido wrote a letter to Bache & Shee thanking them “for their 
friendship and support which they [gave] Cap. Simpson during his stay.” In it, 
he expressed his joy at “our commerce between our countries which has been 
started and will become more considerable” given “the remarkable boundaries 
of the New Republic and the New World.”115 Belletti, Simpson, and the other 
backers shared the same opinion and embarked on planning their next voyage.
e success of La Capricieuse depended upon the quality and suitability of 
the merchandise for sale. Fortunately, the statistical table of 1783 provides an 
insight into which wares sold well. Although it is unclear which voyages the table 
includes, the gures allow for some indication of overall trends commensurate 
with the Capricieuse expedition. Firstly, metalwares from Carinthia and Styria 
produced some of the largest prots (see table 3 below).
Most of these metal goods focused on agricultural use and accounted for a 
tenth of the net worth exported to the United States in 1783. Metalwares sold 
exceedingly well in Philadelphia. According to Wouters, iron strips used for con-
structing barrels achieved a y percent return on their original value.116 Amer-
ican traders purchased these products since iron manufacturing in the United 
States had not yet matched the Austrian standard. e rich opportunities of the 
American markets prompted one of the Styrian sailors to write home to an ac-
quaintance in Graz. He shared his “absolute conviction that the American trade 
“A New Set of Merchants” 159 
o ers the biggest advantages possible for the emperor’s merchants,” especially,
he noted, because “it is commonly known that American factories desperately
need Austrian goods [and] what is more, few factories even occupy this Repub-
lic.” Editors of the Wienerisches Diarium published the letter, commenting that 
other merchants were following suit.117
Indeed, another ship from Antwerp, La Poste, arrived on July 21, 1784, laden 
with iron strips and bands ( fer spaté en ruban) produced by one of the best iron 
manufactories in the Austrian Netherlands.118 e ocial Habsburg represen-
tative in Philadelphia (discussed in the next chapter) explained that the high 
quality of these goods as well as the comparatively low wages in Austrian mines 
gave ironware a signicant advantage over the competition from British and 
Swedish iron producers.119
Carinthia, Styria, and the Austrian Netherlands were not the only Habsburg 
provinces to absorb the new American trade. Manufactories in Bohemia as well as 
the former Habsburg territory of Silesia benetted from direct transatlantic trade. 
ese provinces predominantly accessed Atlantic markets through Hamburg, but 
Prussian aggression drove Bohemian merchants to trade along southern routes via 
the Mediterranean.120 Under this old system, merchants constantly complained of 
their prots being eroded by Spanish trading houses.121 Direct trade from Trieste 
to American markets proved one of the simplest and most cost-e ective avenues for 
inland Central European manufacturers, so much so that Silesian manufacturers 
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under Prussian rule also elected to redirect their commerce towards Trieste. Tex-
tiles and glass products were the principal goods exported to the United States 
from these areas. Glass products included crystal goblets and various tumblers that 
were already noted across Europe for their ne quality. Textiles—hats, ne cloths, 
clothing, drapes, and linen—became the second most successful product overall.122
e direct trading value of linens amounted to 30,400 Austrian Gulden ( ) alone 
in 1783.123 Bache & Shee initially produced returns of around forty percent on these 
goods. Such business attracted considerable interest. Karl Anton Fitz, a textile fac-
tory owner in Budišov, Moravia, brokered personal contact with Bach & Shee in 
Philadelphia through the Simpson-Wouters mission, for example.124 e ability to 
trade directly proved irresistible.
Simpson and Wouters reinvested prots from exports to purchase the main 
import from the United States: tobacco. Eighteenth-century Europeans im-
ported large quantities of tobacco, and inhabitants of the Habsburg Monarchy 
were no di erent. Domestic production of tobacco in the Habsburg lands cen-
tred around the Hungarian plains. However, Hungarian producers cultivated 
a di erent species that was less desirable than the American variety. Europeans 
preferred the taste of “English” tobacco to the so-called “Bauern-Tabak” (farm-
er’s tobacco) grown in Hungary.125 Tobacco cultivation and selling was also heav-
ily regulated in the Habsburg Monarchy. e government legalised tobacco in 
1701 but exercised a state monopoly over sales and the distribution of licenses in 
the Austrian lands for much of the century. In 1783, the state monopoly became 
a permanent feature, ending only with the Republic of Austria’s accession to the 
European Union in 1995.126
In the Hungarian lands, a more liberal regime persisted despite attempts to 
install the same state-controlled monopoly. Looser regulation and private in-
dustry enabled constant cultivation following the rst tobacco factory in 1722, 
but also exposed Hungarian producers to greater e ects in market uctuations. 
ere was both opportunity and peril at stake. When war interrupted produc-
tion and exportation from North America, Hungarian tobacconists rushed to 
supplant the fall in American supplies which forced European consumers to 
accept whatever variety of tobacco was on o er. ere was still a preference for 
American tobacco when it could be had, which caused some shipments of Hun-
garian tobacco to be cancelled or returned, but scarcity of American tobacco cre-
ated a signicant boom for Hungarian merchants.127 Tempted by easy success, 
the director of the Austrian tobacco monopoly, even resigned his post in order 
to devote himself to trading tobacco out of the Hungarian port of Fiume in 
1777.128 By 1783, revenues from Hungarian tobacco reached the unseen heights 
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of nearly three million orins in value.129 For entrepreneurs in Hungary, the 
boom was a golden opportunity since many other Hungarian products received 
harsh tari s from Vienna in order to protect Austrian industry.130 Yet, with the 
cessation of hostilities, boom inevitably turned to bust as American exportation 
resumed and Hungarian suppliers could not compete with the inux of cheaper, 
more popular American tobacco, which traders like Simpson and Wouters now 
returned through local ports.131
Merchants and Hungarian ocials did not relinquish their hopes of reviving 
the Hungarian tobacco sector, however. As part of a programme to stimulate the 
Hungarian economy in anticipation of his great institutional reforms of 1785, 
Joseph II allowed some e orts to alleviate the position of the tobacco farmers 
in their postwar plight.132 Tolls were lowered on the main road to Fiume and a 
new watermen’s guild enabled smoother transit on rivers.133 e man oversee-
ing these improvements was the new Governor of Fiume, Count Pál Almásy 
von Zsadány who thought the Simpson-Wouters expedition o ered Hungarian 
farmers a renewed opportunity. Almásy requested the pair gather tobacco seeds 
from Virginia and Maryland so that they might be used and tested in Hungar-
ian elds where, he hoped, the better American species would thrive and could 
compete in European markets.134 ough Almásy got his seeds, it was too late. 
e tonnes of tobacco leaf Simpson and Wouters brought back conrmed the 
insurmountable inferiority of Hungarian tobacco. e new direct trade between 
Trieste and America guaranteed the plentiful and cheap supply of American 
tobacco and ensured that Hungarian production would only serve smaller do-
mestic and regional markets within the Habsburg lands and Central Europe.135
Fond memories of the boom times during the American Revolution remained 
rm in many Hungarian minds into the nineteenth century and many hoped 
to still challenge the American predominance in European markets.136 By then, 
however, Southern politicians and planters sent out “special tobacco agents” to 
ensure their hegemony continued in places like the Habsburg Monarchy.137
Although results of the Simpson-Wouters mission proved hard for Hungar-
ians, it was an all-round achievement for Triestine merchants. e quartet was 
keen to continue their exploits and so, as 1785 began, both ships again sailed for 
Philadelphia and Baltimore, reaching their destinations by March 1785 with a 
similar but more rened cargo.138 is was the rst time Trieste merchants had 
directly exported to Baltimore and before the year was out, advertisements for 
Bohemian glassware appeared in the city’s newspaper.139 Triestine merchants 
now had a foothold in two ports of the United States. Based on this success, 
there was enough conviction to form an entirely new company specically 
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designated for transatlantic trade. In July 1785, Belletti, Simpson, and Strohlen-
dorf formed a new “quartet’” alongside newcomer Karl von Ma ei, the Mal-
tese and Papal consul in Trieste. Together they established the Compagnia di
Commercio per l’America Settentrionale also known as the Compagnia Austria-
co-Americana (Austrian-American Trading Company), and served as its board of 
directors.140 Announcements reverberated across Austria and America that sum-
mer.141 e founding of the Society was a massive undertaking with an initial 
fund of 500,000 divided into 1,000 shares costing 500 each. Participation in 
such a rm was therefore restricted to the wealthy mercantile and noble classes. 
e rst general assembly took place in Trieste in November 1785. e founding 
of the Austrian-American Trading Company and its stock o er made news in 
Vienna and across continental Europe.142
In order to establish such an undertaking, privileges and permission had to 
be obtained from the Aulic Chamber. e quartet submitted a charter for ap-
proval at the same time they went public with the initiative. Governor Brigido 
supported their application. In August, Brigido wrote to the emperor personally 
about the company and petitioned him to grant them ocial privileges. Brigido 
explained in the most positive terms how the “several well-meaning, intelligent 
and experienced merchants” came together to form the company aer the suc-
cessful Philadelphia mission, which had “by no means completely satised their 
patriotic zeal.”143 In addition, Brigido stressed how the rm’s previous mission 
had “exported almost exclusively domestic products, of which there is the great-
est abundance” and added,
e important utility of [this] impending enterprise, and the honesty with 
which the direction of the new commenced trading society is arranged, 
impresses me so much that I cannot refrain from recommending this new 
enterprise of the highest grace and mercy unquestionably.144
Brigido went a step further than simply endorsing the latest mercantile proj-
ect with the United States. Given the numerous applications, missions, and fer-
ment then present in Trieste, he advised the emperor,
A new commerce on such rm grounds and for the greatest mutual util-
ity may not fail, especially if Your Majesty, with all righteousness, per-
mits maximum protection, and in the meantime achieves at establishing 
friendly agreement with the Republic of the United States of America 
much wanted on the most permanent footing.145
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e application met with success in Vienna. Joseph sanctioned the status of 
a privileged company in early September 1785, thereby acknowledging their en-
deavours as something of value to the state.146 In essence, the conferment seemed 
a realisation of Joseph’s original aim of extending trade with the Americans back 
in 1783. By 1785, he had been fully convinced of the merits of such a trade. At the 
same time as Joseph received Brigido’s petition, he held an audience with Gilbert 
du Motier, marquis de Lafayette, who later, with joy, informed Je erson that 
American commerce “was a great object” in the emperor’s mind. Indeed, Joseph 
was not the only one in Vienna xated on this topic. Lafayette also informed 
Je erson of a visit from Kaunitz who had come to speak to him “very willingly” 
about the substance of American trade.147 Lafayette’s visit was coincidental; the 
court had already set on the priority of trade with the new United States, and 
Trieste had played a fundamental role in establishing that conviction.
e maturity of direct trade between Trieste and the United States repre-
sented a fundamental cornerstone in the Habsburg attitude towards pursuing 
a political connection between the two states. Triestine merchants had been 
equally tenacious as Ostend and Livornese traders in forging direct ties with 
North America and, crucially, in convincing local and Viennese ocials of the 
worthiness of their endeavours. e Austrian-American Trading Company 
Figure 12. View of the free port of Trieste 
by Ferdinand Runk and Anton Herzinger (ca. 1800)
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embodied the new, emboldened spirit of transatlantic opportunity rife in Tri-
este and with ocial imperial support of its missions. e rapidity and intensity 
of transatlantic trade with the United States in these postwar years ensured the 
United States remained one of the most valuable commercial routes outside of 
the Mediterranean for the imperial entrepôt on the Adriatic.
Conclusion
e development of postwar commerce between the Habsburg lands and the 
United States of America took place in the three major ports of Livorno, Ostend, 
and Trieste. In those towns, new merchant adventurers aimed to prot from the 
opportunities ushered in by American independence. Major American ports, 
from Charleston to Boston, became targets of Habsburg mercantile ambitions. 
In several cases, Habsburg merchants established considerable footholds in the 
American economy by sending representatives, entering partnerships, and creat-
ing contacts with American businesses. ough in some cases these connections 
proved short-lived, their existence testies to the extensive commercial spaces in 
which both the Habsburgs and Americans operated.
In spaces beyond the Atlantic—in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the 
North Sea—merchants created new trade ows, and, in the case of Tuscany, ex-
panded upon the earlier trading scene. e e ects of this postwar commerce em-
anated from these centres and a ected wider regional markets. In the Habsburg 
Monarchy, this produced positive and negative e ects. e hopes of reviving a 
Hungarian tobacco market crashed aer the reintroduction of cheap, popular 
American tobacco. Yet, in Transylvania, new ventures inspired local business-
men to seek out their own routes to American markets.148 As Franklin had put it, 
a “new set of merchants” had come into existence. e zeal and determination of 
the mercantile classes to exploit the new situation in North America impressed 
the ruling elites who supported such initiatives at the state level. In Trieste, of-
cials even wrote to the emperor in support of the newly established trading 
company. e belief in an independent United States as a source of economic 
potential emerged from the mercantile world, moved into the political realm, 
and combined to create an urgency to nourish this nascent trade.
In the postwar aermath, the question of American commerce loomed large 
in the minds of administrators across the Habsburg Monarchy. Emperor Jo-
seph II pondered its “greatest importance” already in 1783 and Prince von Kau-
nitz sought out Lafayette to parley with him about the subject a few years later. 
e successful missions of traders both during and aer the war convinced a 
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previously hesitant bureaucracy of the need for a political connection in order 
to defend and sustain the protable commercial ties to the United States. e 
emerging urgency was, however, one-sided. Although American merchants at-
tempted trade with Habsburg markets such as Ostend, these e orts paled in 
comparison to the overwhelming interest of Habsburg merchants and adminis-
trators in the United States. It was a signicant development given the American 
insistence on brokering contact with the Habsburgs during the War of Ameri-
can Independence and the mission of William Lee in 1778. During the Amer-
ican Revolution, the question for Habsburg ocials had been how to mitigate 
against the negative e ects while proting from the neutral carrying trade. Now, 
in a time of peace, the question had become how to secure Habsburg trade as one 
among equals. e time for action had arrived.
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Ch a pter Eight
“If His Imperial Majesty Should ink Fit”
e First Habsburg Representatives in the United States of America,
1783–1789
A n ordinary house in New York City hosted an extraordinary meeting in the late summer of 1785. A middle-aged father and his seventeen-year-old son entered a parlour room 	tted with a large 
wooden table in the centre. On top were eleven glasses of 	nest Madeira wine. 
eir host, who towered over them at an impressive 6'6", rose to greet them but 
failed to oer the opulent drink on display. Instead, he boasted how the wine 
had been a personal gi from the marquis de Lafayette, given to his colleague 
who sat stubbornly in one corner of the room, his facial scars on show. Two more 
men looked on from the leisure of a chaise lounge. All of them, the father noted 
later, “mutilated” their ears with silver pendants and pierced each nostril with 
large silver rings which distracted from faces covered in bear’s grease and black 
hair powdered copiously, but unevenly, with dazzling red vermillion. e host’s 
attire also struck him as worthy of record; the gentleman who stood through-
out the entire meeting wore a dark blue robe overlaid with delicate red, yellow, 
and white lines whilst around his neck hung a solid gold English gorget and 
fourteen rows of decorative brown beads. e gentleman also showed o these 
beads to his guests, pressing them into their hands for a short while. When asked 
where someone might acquire such ornaments, the gentleman faced the son and 
with a piece of chalk drew a large map on the table, pointing out to the boy the 
distances from his house to Fort Schuyler and from there to Schenectady, to 
Albany, and 	nally, to the lands of his own Oneida Nation. “370 miles,” the 
boy counted. But the Oneida chief had not realised the distance his two guests 
had already come; he had just lectured the son of the 	rst representative of the 
Habsburg Monarchy to the United States.1
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Such an encounter resulted from the Habsburg desire to secure trade with 
the United States, and the fear of losing it. At the start of 1783, the Habsburg 
Monarchy had no commercial representatives in the United States for its avid 
mercantile traders whatsoever. By the end of that year, three individuals resided 
permanently in the new United States for this purpose, but only one functioned 
in any ocial capacity as far as the Habsburgs were concerned. None of them, 
however, gained bilateral recognition and likely for this reason, their presence 
in the early republic has been overlooked by historians. ese individuals, their 
families, their missions, and their fates, however, merit a detailed account. e 
establishment of commercial representation in the United States was a major 
step for the Habsburg Monarchy in acquiring formal ties with the Americans 
and protecting the nascent trading links between both lands. Prior to 1783, only 
two other places beyond the Mediterranean commanded enough attention to 
warrant consular representation form the Habsburg Monarchy. Both places were 
in East Asia. e missions of 1783 were the 	rst representations of the Austrian 
Habsburgs in the Americas.2 e pivot towards North America, and the eorts 
undertaken to create an ocial presence there, reected the new primacy of 
commercial interests for Habsburg ocials beyond Europe. Following the con-
clusion of peace, the United States became the focus of economic aspirations 
beyond European seas.
Representation brought the Habsburgs more gains than anticipated. New 
contacts, such as the meeting with the Oneida leaders, created opportunities 
previously unimagined in Vienna. e window into American society, com-
merce, and industry also brokered new understandings of fragility and com-
petition within the American economy. Yet the highly compartmental nature 
of the Habsburg Monarchy aected the ability to construct eective policy 
that would take advantage of these economic opportunities. Divisions over 
representation in North America between regional ocials in the Austrian 
Netherlands and imperial ocials in Vienna was an important symptom of 
this discord. Distrust within the bureaucracy and mercantile communities of 
the Habsburg Monarchy not only resulted in more commercial representation 
in the United States than anywhere else beyond Europe but also exposed the 
continued importance of American commerce and the rising struggle to retain 
its bene	ts. e 	rst Habsburg representatives in the United States signi	ed the 
scramble to harness the bounty of transatlantic trade among imperial ministers 
and merchants alike.
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e Internal Debate over Representation
Commercial connections forged by merchants during and aer the Revolution 
indicated the potential richness of the American market. In the Austrian Neth-
erlands, the carrying trade produced an exuberant wealth and the same gains 
incentivised merchants at Trieste towards the 	rst direct trading ventures with 
American ports. ese merchants were not alone, however. Across Europe, mer-
chants and government ocials recognised the need to solidify their share of 
lucrative transatlantic trade with the United States and to impede the share of 
other nations. Habsburg merchants like Bertin de Jaure were the 	rst to panic 
at the mercantilist manoeuvres of other European states. He petitioned the re-
gional government in Brussels for action by opening up direct relations with 
the Americans and securing representation in the United States.3 In April 1782, 
the minister plenipotentiary in Brussels, Prince Georg Adam von Starhemberg 
recognised the threat, siding with merchants who begged for some kind of 
treaty protection by arguing for representation in the United States.4 His plan 
chimed with the recommendations of the Council of Finance in Brussels which 
advocated a large consular system in the United States with the aim of direct-
ing trade from the individual states to the Habsburg lands. A system of several 
vice-consuls, one for each American state, under the direction of a consul gen-
eral, ideally in Philadelphia, would be enough in their opinion.5
Benjamin Franklin’s apparent support spurred on Starhemberg’s actions. 
For his part, it seemed that Franklin invited treaty negotiations and a consular 
system from the Habsburgs.6 Yet Franklin could not speak for the Americans 
entirely. American diplomacy was still a rather ad hoc business throughout this 
period when the lack of uni	ed central institutions hampered the development 
of concrete foreign representation. During the War of American Independence, 
members of the Continental Congress had appointed several envoys to the Eu-
ropean powers but did not enjoy fully reciprocal relations with many of them. 
Franklin became the 	rst accredited diplomat to France in 1779 but he con-
tinued to respond to other matters and foreign requests.7 Under the Articles 
of Confederation and Perpetual Union adopted by Congress in March 1781, a 
new Department of Foreign Aairs would oversee the administration of diplo-
matic ties and the creation of American consuls abroad. Yet the system proved 
weak and ineective given the lack of empowerment for the secretary of foreign 
aairs and his ministers overseas. Such problems would not be solved until the 
introduction of the federal constitution in 1787.8 By the eective conclusion of 
the war, very little had cemented the American diplomatic presence in Europe or 
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smoothened the process of conducting foreign relations back home in Philadel-
phia.9 Expanding commerce remained at the heart of American foreign interests 
but, given the nature of American diplomacy, the urgency had to come from the 
Habsburgs side in order to broker relations.10
e timing seemed right in 1782, but without the consent of the emperor or 
State Chancellor Prince von Kaunitz, nothing could be done. e problem for 
the ministers and merchants of the Austrian Netherlands was that the Viennese 
ocials did not share the same sense of urgency. From their view, North Ameri-
can trade was in a nascent state. Although Kaunitz agreed it would be “advanta-
geous for the [Austrian] Netherlands, and for the other States of his Majesty, to 
have a Consul in the United American Colonies,” he remained steadfast on his 
decision to wait “to see what the fate of the colonies will be.”11 e disapproval 
dampened ambitions but also raised concerns in Brussels.
On November 30, 1782, Great Britain concluded the Preliminary Articles of 
Peace with the United States, now internationally recognising its former colo-
nies as a sovereign and independent state. For ministers in the Austrian Nether-
lands, the news removed any doubts over treating with the Americans. In Brus-
sels, Starhemberg was convinced the Habsburgs needed to act soon in order to 
secure their share. Merchants continued to press for representation; the latest, 
Pierre-Jean Bouvier from Namur, who established his apothecary business in 
Port-au-Prince in Saint-Domingue, nominated himself for the role of “Consul 
Imperial” for the Americas.12 On January 22, 1783, Starhemberg wrote another 
letter, but not to Kaunitz, whose cool feelings he remembered. Instead, he di-
rectly contacted the imperial ambassador Count Florimond Mercy-d’Argenteau 
in Paris to set the wheels in motion. Starhemberg concocted the story that the 
emperor had asked him to report on the possibilities and necessities of trade with 
the Americans, but he hinted,
It would be easy to respond eectively to one or the other of these issues if 
we had here, as there also, some sort of emissary or US agent, who I can con-
fer secretly or at least discuss this important subject with, but the failure of 
this means I will only be able to tell His Majesty of general things and not 
provide a concise enough answer.13
Starhemberg explained to Mercy-d’Argenteau how Franklin once suggested 
such an arrangement but because “we had too much to fear from England,” 
the discussion was dropped. Starhemberg urged Mercy-d’Argenteau to open 
channels with the Americans and make insinuations towards beginning such 
an arrangement. Yet such actions without ocial sanction from Vienna were 
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dangerous. Seemingly aware of this, Starhemberg instructed Mercy-d’Argenteau 
not to make “mention of anything” to courtiers in Vienna and, secondly, any 
“insinuations with Mr Franklin ought to be only in the manner of a conversa-
tion which could never comprise yourself.” Finally, perhaps most tellingly of all, 
Starhemberg ordered Mercy-d’Argenteau to “kindly burn this letter.”14
Starhemberg’s ploy was risky on multiple levels. First, he acted without per-
mission. His actions subverted imperial authority. If Mercy-d’Argenteau’s insin-
uations on his behalf came across as an oer of Habsburg recognition before the 
ocial treaty of peace had been concluded, then it would change the emperor’s
policy without his consent. Second, Starhemberg’s actions ignored diplomatic
norms. Unlike other European powers, the Habsburgs could not approach an-
other nation, especially leaders of a recent rebellion and new republic, unless it
was in response to a solicited oer.15 Joseph II was Holy Roman Emperor and
held dozens of other titles. His position as an emperor, a king of kings, was in-
tended to outrank all other rulers.16 In essence, the emperor could not go knock-
ing on the door of the Americans, although Starhemberg seemed to be prying
the door open already.
Given the risks associated with Mercy-d’Argenteau’s delicate operation, it 
is not known what exactly occurred. Any mission report Starhemberg would 
have received most assuredly burned in his 	replace—presuming he followed 
his own instructions. Mercy-d’Argenteau likely received the letter in early Feb-
ruary of 1783 and did indeed raise the conversation with Franklin, but again, 
no material proof or correspondence from either side survives. is scenario, 
however, explains Starhemberg’s next action. A few weeks later, he sent o a 
proposal to his superiors in Vienna arguing for “the conclusion of a Treaty of 
Commerce and Amity with the American States without delay and the prompt 
sending of an accredited Minister or Resident to America” in order to represent 
the Habsburgs.17 Starhemberg outlined his reasoning, noting that the Ameri-
cans would be friendly to such an oer but without giving away his actions with 
Mercy-d’Argenteau. Starhemberg even nominated his preferred candidate for 
the position of consul general. Indeed, the ministers in Brussels had already run 
an internal search for suitable candidates.18
Starhemberg’s rashness troubled Kaunitz. In presenting the proposal to the 
emperor on March 19, Kaunitz appended a large memorandum outlining his 
concerns. Although Kaunitz agreed it was “desirable to both sides for the swi 
connection to be made, it cannot be done for the time being.” Kaunitz cau-
tioned, “It is necessary for the American States to take the 	rst steps to your 
Imperial Majesty on account of their status of recognition, until then there can 
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neither be an accredited person sent to the United States nor a Treaty concluded 
with them.”19 e question of recognition posed a problem in Kaunitz’s mind, 
especially since diplomatic etiquette and rank held sway over Habsburg ocials’ 
desire to obtain American commerce. At the same time, Kaunitz acknowledged 
the rising need to secure American trade for the Monarchy and meditated an 
interim solution to this issue:
In order not to lose any time for all practical and preparatory steps towards 
a trade connection, however, between the hereditary lands (Erblände) and 
the American States, it would be best in my opinion, to send an ocial 
Commercial Advisor to America entrusted to learn about the terrain and 
to prepare the 	rst principles for mutual recognition and commerce, and 
only then, when the recognition of American sovereignty has been made by 
Your Majesty, will he be bestowed with a ministerial character.20
Kaunitz masterfully articulated several profound changes to Starhemberg’s 
strategy within these few lines. First, he reoriented the focus to the hereditary 
lands and, by their sole mention, promoted their interests over the Austrian 
Netherlands. Secondly, Kaunitz eectively divorced representation from the 
conclusion of a commercial treaty. e new title of “commercial advisor” rather 
than consul general absolved any requirement for Habsburg recognition since 
it became a non-diplomatic undertaking. is stopgap, in essence, solved the 
troublesome issue of American recognition and imperial diplomatic hierarchy 
whilst, hopefully, laying the groundwork for commercial connections between 
the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States.
Kaunitz, however, held reservations about Starhemberg’s suggestion of who 
should be sent, and his objections again reected the rising sense of competition 
between the dierent regions of the Habsburg Monarchy. Starhemberg had nom-
inated Baron Frederick Eugene de Beelen-Berthol. Beelen, an experienced bu-
reaucrat in the provincial administration for over twenty years, served as secretary 
for the Council of Finance in Brussels where he draed ocial reports, copied 
letters, and understood the commercial interests of the Austrian Netherlands as a 
result.21 He also spoke several languages, including English.22 Starhemberg knew 
Beelen had served as a secretary to Kaunitz during his ambassadorship in Paris 
in the 1750s and hoped this would secure favour for Beelen in Vienna. He was 
mistaken. Kaunitz strongly advised against his old colleague’s promotion to the 
new post. Kaunitz feared that Beelen would represent only the Austrian Nether-
lands at the expense of the interests of the hereditary lands. He argued that Beelen 
“is someone wholly unsuited for the position, since the entire hereditary lands 
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and their mercantile interests are completely unknown to him.”23 Kaunitz had 
a major problem in dislodging Beelen as the main candidate, however, as Beelen 
had ocially applied for the post in February.24 Kaunitz hastily nominated one of 
his civil servants, Franz Anton von Blanc, but the emperor approved Beelen as his 
new “Counsellor of Commerce and Navigation” for North America on March 
22, 1783.25 Kaunitz had lost the 	rst battle but did not give up the 	ght.
e administrations in Brussels and Vienna also clashed over the instructions 
for Beelen’s unique mission to Philadelphia. e Habsburg Monarchy had not 
established a position in such a capacity ever before. In Brussels, Starhemberg 
set to work immediately and deliberated in conjunction with the Privy Council 
and the Committee of Maritime Commerce before news of Beelen’s acceptance 
by the emperor had reached them.26 Together they draed a set of twenty-two 
points for Beelen’s projected 	ve-year term. e 	rst nine articles explained Beel-
en’s presumed role, with the very 	rst instruction being entirely incongruent 
with Kaunitz’s view. It stated the primary aim of “the Imperial Minister” was 
the creation of a treaty of commerce and amity with the Americans on prin-
ciple of mutual reciprocity. e subsequent eight points clari	ed Beelen was 
to report on the sales of listed goods which the Austrian Netherlands wished 
to trade with North America and the goods which might interest merchants 
in Ostend for importation. ese opening articles also outlined two sensitive 
objectives. Firstly, Beelen was to negotiate a reduction of the two-and-a-half-
percent American tari on exports for Ostend merchants. Secondly, he was to 
discover whether any commercial treaty could extend their rights to trade with 
the Antilles via American ships. Caribbean trade was, aer all, an important 
consideration given the intense commerce between there and Ostend during 
the war. However, Starhemberg noted that France’s commercial treaty with the 
Americans did not aord such privileges.
Articles ten to thirteen highlighted Beelen’s role and seniority. Although he 
was subservient to the Privy Council in Brussels, he would enjoy superiority 
over all imperial subjects and merchants as the sole “sovereign ocer” in North 
America. His designation, other than that of “Imperial Minister,” was “Consul 
General” as he would advise on how to establish future vice-consuls. Articles 
fourteen to sixteen allowed him to speculate on any mercantile enterprise during 
his tenure, and he would also report any potential speculative ventures to Brus-
sels. Beelen’s main task was to supply Brussels with constant reports on relevant 
American commercial developments. e 	nal 	ve articles dealt extensively with 
these reports’ structure and composition. Firstly, he was to order them into top-
ics concerning either regions or speci	c goods and the news relating to them. 
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Article eighteen stipulated that all reports should be written in French as to 
avoid the delay of translation or inaccuracies in expression. Two articles outlined 
that he was to keep a rolling record of all European ships entering American 
ports and to collect all American trade ordinances. e 	nal instruction con-
tained the only mention of the hereditary lands, ordering reports into two cate-
gories, one for the Austrian Netherlands and one for the hereditary lands, with 
duplicates of the latter to be sent to Vienna. In short, the instructions compiled 
by Starhemberg and his associates focused entirely upon the advantages and rep-
resentation of merchants in the Austrian Netherlands with very little attention 
to the concerns of those in the hereditary lands.
Unsurprisingly, Kaunitz amended these instructions. He made several alter-
ations before he returned them to Starhemberg. Beelen’s instructions grew to 
a total of thirty-eight points. Speci	c references to merchant circumstances in 
the Austrian Netherlands gave way to equal provisions made for merchants in 
Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary. In the 	rst redra, perhaps as a con-
cession, Beelen provisionally received “the commission of consul of the emperor 
and the honour of an accredited person by His Majesty to the Congress of the 
United States of America.”27 is description ensured Beelen’s status as the 	rst 
Habsburg representative to the United States. e 	rst 	ve instructions retained 
many of the general points: to communicate American commercial opportuni-
ties for the emperor’s subjects and render any assistance for his merchants and 
their interests in North America. Articles six to twelve now referred exclusively 
to the Austrian Netherlands whilst the interests of the hereditary lands featured 
in the remaining twenty-six articles. It took until June for his formal instruc-
tions to be accepted by the Brussels and Viennese administrations, but Brussels 
ocials began preparing for Beelen’s departure in late May already.28 In the de-
cision to appoint a Habsburg representative to the new United States, Brussels
ocials had forced the issue and led the way. In doing so, an internal division
arose over the mission in the Habsburg Monarchy.
e Mission of Baron de Beelen-Berthol
On July 6, 1783, Beelen le Brussels for Paris with his secretary Pierre Gour-
land.29 Beelen’s wife Jeanne-Marie érèse (née de Castro-y-Toledo) and his two 
sons, François Eugène and Constantin Antoine, and their daughter Clemencé 
Auguste accompanied them.30 e departure severed a family as the Beelens 
le behind their other two daughters, érèse Eugénie de Beelen-Berthol and 
Philippine Josephine de Beelen-Berthol.31 In Paris, the Beelens stayed with 
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Mercy-d’Argenteau close to the Tuileries Palace. Mercy-d’Argenteau instructed 
Beelen further, procured letters of recommendation, and introduced the fam-
ily to John Adams.32 On August 1, they arrived at Le Havre and boarded the 
George Washington. From there, they 	rst sailed to Poole, England, before sail-
ing to Philadelphia.33 However, Beelen was not the only European commercial 
agent heading across the Atlantic. at month, the Saxon representative Philipp 
ieriot also made his crossing.34 In September, the Portuguese representative 
departed as well.35 e haste in Brussels had not been in vain; the Habsburg 
Monarchy ensured their representative became one of the 	rst to arrive. Yet 
the in	ghting between Brussels and Vienna made Beelen’s mission harder than 
those of his contemporaries who worked for a single administration.
On September 9, the Beelen-Berthol family reached the United States—a 
week aer the country formally obtained independence following the Treaty of 
Paris. e voyage was dicult, especially for Beelen. His situation deteriorated 
upon arrival in Philadelphia.36 e city convulsed under the “Fall Fever” which 
at its height that autumn claimed the lives of thirty people per day. Less than 
twenty-four hours before their arrival, Franklin’s son-in-law warned that “more 
frequent changes to Hot and Cold were never known in America.”37 Weakened 
by the transatlantic crossing and now in the midst of an epidemic, Beelen fell 
ill. Matters were complicated further by their accommodation. First, the fam-
ily lodged with a well-known hotelier James Oellers—a trader from Aachen 
whose brother, a priest in Brussels, might have been their only connection. In 
the spring, they moved into their own house at 578 Front Street on the banks of 
the Delaware River.38 Luckily, Beelen made a recovery a few short weeks aer his 
arrival, but if he had died, the mission and the family’s new American life would 
have been over before it began.
Philadelphia in the 1780s must have been an unfamiliar sight to the Beel-
ens. ere was a simple charm compared to the elaborate surroundings they 
had le behind: the grand boulevards of Paris, the medieval streets of Brussels, 
or their ancestral Bellenhof manor house. is was certainly the impression for 
the younger son, Constantin Antoine, who had reportedly played with the dau-
phin of France during his father’s tutelage with Mercy-d’Argenteau.39 Young 
Constantin kept a record of his impressions in his sketchbook.40 e local ora 
and wildlife surrounding his new rustic homestead piqued his interest as did the 
	gure of George Washington whose likeness he also sketched.41 Appearance was 
everything for the family. Beelen made good use of his title in all correspondence 
and kept his private life in the same vein. He noted in a letter to his relatives 
back home that his living room was the only one in Philadelphia to be covered 
in damask wallpaper.42
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Before long, Beelen got to work. On September 24, 1783, he met with Ralph 
Izard, the former envoy to Tuscany. Beelen and Izard had a mutual acquaintance in 
common, the Tuscan representative Francesco Favi, who had prepped Izard ahead 
of his Tuscan mission and had now supplied Beelen with his letter of introduction. 
at evening, Izard presented Beelen at a dinner party in the home of Robert Mor-
ris, an important Philadelphian merchant and the superintendent of 	nance in the 
United States. e French ambassador, Anne-César de la Luzerne also attended. 
In Philadelphia, just as in Vienna, the dinner table was an important site of con-
versation and connection, but this could also be an embarrassing site for hierarchy. 
During the meal, Morris confronted Beelen with a dicult question: what exactly 
was his role in the United States? Not wanting to tread on the toes of la Luzerne, 
an ocial ambassador, Beelen stuck to Kaunitz’s prescribed line that he was a trade 
commissioner seeking to encourage commerce with the Habsburg Monarchy.43
e resulting conversation went well enough for Beelen to have something to write 
home about. e following day he began the 	rst of his numerous reports.
Meanwhile, antagonisms continued over Beelen’s mission in Vienna. e Vien-
nese press took a sceptical view. e Wiener Blättchen newspaper referred point-
edly to Beelen as the “Niederlander” (“the Dutchman”) and remarked how he was 
“without any accreditation” in America.44 Earlier in the month, the Wienerisches
Figure 13. Baron Frederick Eugene de Beelen-Berthol, the 	rst ocial 
representative of the Habsburg Monarchy in the United States of America
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Diarium had noted a major problem for Beelen’s mission: the American Congress 
was not in the city.45 One of the fundamentals of Beelen’s mission was to enable a 
treaty of commerce between the two countries and report on American legislative 
activities. However, in the months before Beelen’s arrival, a band of militiamen had 
gathered in protest and marched on Philadelphia because the almost-bankrupted 
government had not honoured their service payments. e event became known 
as the “Philadelphia Mutiny” and caused congressmen to ee 	rst to Princeton, 
New Jersey and later to Annapolis, Maryland.46 Congress became an itinerant 
assembly moving between cities and would not meet again in Philadelphia until 
the constitutional convention was organised four years later in 1787.
roughout the turmoil of the early republic’s politics, Beelen did his utmost 
to follow congressional events, however. By October 1783 he compiled the 	rst 
list of congressional acts related to commerce for his superiors in Brussels. Beelen 
also collected regional ordinances from state assemblies. ese changes in reg-
ulations were of great importance in order to inform Habsburg merchants of 
uctuations in American prices or taris.47 In the early years of Beelen’s mission, 
the port of Charleston became a particular concern where merchants enjoyed 
a booming trade fuelled by the postwar reconstruction of plantations. Impor-
tation of necessary agricultural equipment was a particular object of interest. 
Merchants in Ostend responded quickly to Beelen’s advice, sending the Jacoba et
Isabella in mid-1784. Beelen wrote favourably of this venture and recommended 
further voyages from Ostend and Trieste. 48
Beelen’s mission reected the need for rapid responses to changing economic 
situations. In South Carolina, French merchants from the Antilles created a 	-
nancial bubble by using illicit tactics to undercut foreign merchants in the plan-
tation reconstruction business.49 As a result, they oversaturated the market, de-
pressed export prices, and threatened the economy. Charleston ocials responded 
with ordinances restricting imports, which naturally harmed the opportunity for 
Habsburg trade with the southern states. Concerned for potential trade, Beelen 
received further instructions to provide solutions for the Charleston ordinance. 
Although Beelen met with Secretary of Foreign Aairs John Jay whilst in New 
York to protest on behalf of the Ostend trading companies, he reported that 
nothing more could be done.50 By mid-1785, Beelen reported similar initiatives 
by the state legislatures in Massachusetts and North Carolina and called strongly 
on the emperor to secure a treaty of commerce to avoid any further exclusion 
from American trade.51 American economic volatility represented a continual 
concern for Beelen and his superiors. Beelen voiced concerns over paper money 
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and its susceptibility to counterfeiting, and the Brussels administration looked 
sceptically at the health of American 	nances as a result.52 In expressing unease 
over the circulation of paper money, the Habsburgs were no dierent from other 
European observers who fretted over the instability of paper notes compared 
to hard currency. Saddled with debt aer the War of American Independence, 
state legislatures resorted to raising money by 	at through the issuing of printed 
notes and raising loans. Americans were aware of the negative connotations and 
the eect on foreign relations, but the problem persisted until the rati	cation of 
the Constitution and the consolidation state debts into a national de	cit.53 Yet 
Habsburg ocials were willing to overlook these concerns as long as reasonable 
returns could be made on trade with the United States. Beelen’s reports were an 
inuential factor in deciding on the probability of those returns.
rough his friendship with Morris, Beelen gained privileged knowledge on 
the commercial state of the union, but in 1784 Congress abolished Morris’s posi-
tion as superintendent of 	nances. Beelen wrote to Brussels dismayed that three 
	nancers in New York, whom he did not know, were now in charge.54 Yet Beelen 
did befriend several congressional presidents including Richard Henry Lee and 
Elias Boudinot.55 Beelen’s reputation spread quickly, thanks in part to Morris’s 
letter of endorsement to Congress. In November 1784, Henry Lee stopped in 
Philadelphia where Beelen “took the opportunity to spread promotions for the 
Ostend merchants.”56 One of the earliest instances of Beelen’s renown came from 
Commodore John Paul Jones who visited Beelen before he departed for Paris 
and requested letters of recommendation to the emperor since he intended to 
travel to Vienna.57 Such instances reveal how Beelen’s reception by Americans 
in Philadelphia was more on par with the reception of an ocial representative 
rather than just a mere “commercial advisor.” In other words, Americans in-
terpreted Beelen’s mission as a de facto form of representation despite his best 
intentions (and instructions) to act in a non-diplomatic manner.
Important friends mattered, but Beelen also ventured to the new congres-
sional location in New York City in September 1785 in order to monitor the 
situation more closely. Beelen brought along his eldest son. It was at this point 
the father-and-son duo met with the leaders of the Oneida, the Native American 
nation who travelled there to petition Congress about encroachments on their 
lands.58 Beelen described the opportunity as “too favourable to let it escape” and 
arranged the meeting under “the pretence of a foreign traveller” wishing to learn 
more about the Oneida.59 His true motive, however, aimed at 	nding new ave-
nues of trade between the Native Americans and the Habsburg Monarchy. In 
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his reports aerwards, he propositioned the emperor continually about opening 
direct trade with the Oneida. One of his main arguments stemmed from their 
importance in the fur trade:
e fact that peace between the many dierent and numerous wild nations 
has occurred, seems worthy of our attention, given the amount of interest 
in furs of Your August Monarch’s subjects in several of Your kingdoms and 
Hereditary States [and because] they will soon be able to get the best price 
from our direct navigation from Trieste.60
Beelen’s suggestion might seem fanciful, but it was entirely serious and en-
tirely in accordance with his instructions to 	nd new commercial opportunities. 
Beelen argued for the suitability and viability of such a trade. In his meeting with 
the four Oneida gentlemen, he learned what products might be exchanged with 
them “and neighbouring friends” for furs, vermillion, and jewellery. Beelen le 
the meeting inspired but “with still many questions to ask.” 61
Beelen maintained his fascination for direct trade between the Habsburg 
Monarchy and Native American nations. His frequent reports featured details 
about Indigenous developments and economic situations as a result. Beelen mon-
itored and described, for instance, the American commercial endeavours with 
the Chippewa, Delaware, Ottawa, and Wyandotte Nations which culminated in 
the Treaty of Fort MacIntosh in 1785.62 In a private letter to Count Belgiojoso, 
the new minister plenipotentiary in Brussels, he stressed the peace between the 
formerly warring nations.63 He later expanded this report to include a full sum-
mary of the political alliances between the Mohawks and Cohnawaghans which 
“brought peace to the Great Lakes Region” and bode well for future trade.64 And 
to drive home the point, Beelen studied their treaties with the British and argued 
that these could serve as a model, should the emperor be willing to agree to it. 
In doing so, Native American trade appeared to be a consequential advantage 
for the Habsburgs based on its one ocial’s interaction with the United States.
In addition to his observations of Native American nations, Beelen also main-
tained a strict surveillance of other European nations’ political interactions with 
the United States. Beelen listed all foreign consuls who resided in the United 
States by the end of 1784 and informed his superiors each time a signi	cant de-
velopment occurred.65 One of his earliest reports that year detailed ieriot and 
the Saxon project for a commercial treaty with the United States.66 In Novem-
ber, he followed the arrival of Antoine René Charles Mathurin, comte de Laforêt 
as the French Consul in Charleston and covered the nomination of John Tem-
ple as the British Consul General.67 In September 1785, Beelen 	led a lengthy 
Table 4.  Distribution of Topics in Baron de Beelen-Berthol’s 
Reports, 1784–1789
Year Date Topics Pages Trade Politics Foreign Misc.
1784 25 Apr. 19 96 13 4 0 2
12 Aug. 12 83 7 3 2 0
22 Sep. 11 77 6 0 3 2
14 Nov. 11 74 4 2 5 0
13 Dec. 9 37 4 1 3 1
Total 62 367 34 10 13 5
1785 21 Mar. 17 175 11 1 3 2
17 Jun. 40 135 15 8 15 2
10 Sep. 17 152 9 4 4 0
20 Oct. 3 20 2 0 0 1
Total 77 482 37 13 22 5
1786 25 Feb. 24 166 15 3 4 2
19 Jun. 25 141 16 3 5 1
12 Sep. 16 100 6 1 6 3
22 Dec. 15 88 4 4 6 1
Total 80 495 41 11 21 7
1787 20 Mar. 17 70 8 4 0 5
24 May 16 81 7 5 2 2
28 Jul. 12 82 7 2 1 2
7 Nov. 11 35 9 1 1 0
Total 56 268 31 12 4 9
(Cont.)
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memo on the “public character” of Don Diego de Gardoqui, who became the 
	rst Spanish envoy to the United States.68 Beelen even monitored Spanish pol-
icies within South America.69 In 1786, he provided Vienna with information 
regarding the conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce between Prussia and the 
United States, which (as discussed in the next chapter) had profound conse-
quences for US-Habsburg relations.70 Beelen also monitored European trade 
with the individual states. He scoured almanacs, newspapers, and local adver-
tisements for lists of ships in major American ports and collated these into his 
quarterly reports. At 	rst, he only covered Philadelphia, but he rapidly began to 
monitor most major ports such as Baltimore, New York, and Charleston but also 
smaller hubs like New London, Connecticut, and Hampton, Virginia.71 Beelen’s 
exhaustive eorts to catalogue maritime trade in America undoubtedly made his 
reports one of the most insightful views into early American economic life for 
ministers and merchants in the Habsburg lands.
Beelen’s reports resulted from the diligence of a man who did the job of the 
entire consular system which had been envisaged in Brussels in 1782. He sent de-
tailed information drawn from 	rst-hand inquiries, carefully curated material, 
and painstakingly summarised these details into comprehensive memoranda. 
Although many other European nations established consular and diplomatic 
relations with the United States during this period, their correspondences do 
Year Date Topics Pages Trade Politics Foreign Misc
1788 22 Mar. 13 81 4 3 3 3
31 May 13 64 7 2 3 1
28 Sep. 12 35 8 1 3 0
27 Dec. 13 56 4 3 4 2
Total 51 236 23 9 13 6
1789 27 Mar. 12 28 6 4 2 0
22 Jun. 11 55 4 3 2 2
Total 23 83 10 7 4 2
Grand Total 349 1,564 176 62 77 34
Source: HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, K. 182b, K. 182c, K. 182d, and K. 182e.
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not appear to match the quality and quantity of Beelen’s reports. Neither the 
British consul John Temple nor the Swedish representatives supplied their re-
spective courts with more information than Beelen.72 As a result, Beelen’s mis-
sion ensured that the Habsburg Monarchy was among the most well-informed 
of the European powers on the political, domestic, international, and economic 
developments of the early United States. It might be hard to imagine the breadth 
and depth of Beelen’s eorts, but table 4 above shows a breakdown of Beelen’s 
reports from the United States.
It is clear that Beelen maintained a high level of commitment and profes-
sionalism in his role in the United States. He sent 1,564 pages back to Europe 
during his mission. Half related to trade, in accordance with his main role as a 
commercial advisor, but the second most important topic of discussion regarded 
the actions of other foreign representatives, reecting Beelen’s political purpose 
as well. Beelen’s reports usually travelled via Le Havre and Bordeaux to Mer-
cy-d’Argenteau who forwarded them to Brussels. is communication route was 
slow. On average, Beelen’s reports took about four months to arrive. On a few 
occasions, Beelen used ships going directly to Ostend or asked trustworthy cap-
tains sailing to London to pass reports to the Habsburg embassy there.73 In 1784, 
he sent 	ve bundles back to the Austrian Netherlands, but from then on settled 
into the regular rhythm of one large quarterly report. Although Viennese min-
isters were privy to these reports, not all arrived at the State Chancellery—early 
reports from 1783 are still missing from the Viennese archive as a result.74 Beelen 
had only one direct interaction with Kaunitz, concerning Triestine competition 
with French and Swedish merchants.75 For the entirety of the mission, Beelen re-
ceived orders directly from Belgiojoso in Brussels and addressed reports to him.
In Brussels, Beelen’s reports were treated with great interest and seriousness. 
During the planning stage for the mission, several members of the Committee 
for Finances had suggested founding a completely new committee which would 
compile the results of Beelen’s reports and see to their implementation.76 Henri 
Deplancq, the high-ranking bureaucrat and director of the Board of Customs, 
received the task of combing through Beelen’s recommendations.77 From De-
plancq and Belgiojoso in Brussels, Beelen’s reports were disseminated across 
the Habsburg lands. In the Austrian Netherlands, the administration shared 
Beelen’s suggestions with local industrialists such as the owners of a fabric fac-
tory in Tournai who received a copy of Beelen’s report on “the use of carpets 
in North America.”78 Likewise, Kaunitz forwarded relevant duplicates to the 
Aulic Chamber as well as to governors in Trieste and Fiume, who shared these 
amongst local merchants.79 Indeed, Beelen followed his instructions to send 
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reports concerning the whole geographic spread of mercantile interests for the 
emperor’s subjects. In fact, from 1783 to 1786 the majority of his reports dealt 
speci	cally with the commerce of Habsburg lands outside the Austrian Neth-
erlands.80 Several reports detailed prospects for Hungarian or Tuscan trade in 
the United States.81 Beelen also responded to requests from the hereditary lands, 
such as Governor Pál Almásy von Zsadány’s request for tobacco seeds in Fiume. 
Beelen, in this regard, took seriously his role as representing all imperial sub-
jects. He even supported eorts fostering cooperation between the regions of 
the Habsburg Monarchy. For instance, when it became clear iron goods were 
extremely pro	table in American markets, Beelen informed Belgiojoso that it 
would be prudent for manufacturers in Namur to contact merchants in Trieste 
to learn from their experiences and not to compete against one another.82
Beelen jealously guarded his position as the ocial representative of all 
Habsburg subjects, and nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in his in-
teractions with the Simpson-Wouters mission from Trieste. When La Capricieuse
arrived in late 1783, Simpson called on Beelen in Philadelphia. Both men seemed 
threatened by each other’s presence and mission. Simpson, although courteous, 
clearly saw Beelen’s presence as an obtrusion from the Brussels administration. 
During his stay in Philadelphia over the harsh winter of 1783, George Simpson 
attempted to build his own connections outside of Beelen’s circle, through his 
contact with the 	rm Bache & Shee. In a subsequent report to Belgiojoso, Beelen 
complained that Simpson had been so active that local merchants confused him 
for the representative from Trieste. e 	nal straw came when the Pennsylvania 
Gazette also confused the pair on two occasions, and Beelen requested con	rma-
tion that he was still the only legitimate imperial representative.83 It was a telling 
symptom of the compositional nature of the Habsburg Monarchy playing out 
in North America. Although plagued by diculties arising from the internal 
tensions between dierent regions of the Habsburg Monarchy, Beelen’s mission 
ful	lled its brief. Beelen acted as the diligent observer for Habsburg ocials 
in North America. His mission represented the concerted eort to scout out 
American trading possibilities and to secure the ties already existing between the 
Habsburg lands and the sovereign United States of America.
Rival Imperial Missions
Beelen faced a more serious challenge to his authority from subsequent indi-
viduals who acted as additional representatives for trade between the Habsburg 
Monarchy in the United States. One of them disembarked from La Capricieuse. 
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Franceso Taddeo Reyer represented various merchants in Trieste but predom-
inantly worked as the main contact for the Austrian-American Trading Com-
pany (see chapter 7). When Simpson and Captain Wouters le for Trieste, 
Reyer acted as their spokesman. His primary preoccupation concerned the dis-
tribution of goods through Bache & Shee and helping to expand this enterprise 
with their new associate Charles Lennox in Baltimore. Reyer spent several years 
in Philadelphia as their agent.84 Upon his return to Trieste in 1786, Reyer kept 
in touch with his American colleagues who became instrumental for his later 
career. In 1788, Reyer founded a new 	rm to trade in the West Indies, which 
made him one of the major traders in Trieste. He also invested in a cane sugar 
manufacturing business near Wiener Neustadt and relied upon his American 
associates to act as blockade runners during the Napoleonic Wars, when he 
shipped goods from the United States and Britain to Eastern and Central Eu-
rope. He subsequently established company branches in London, Spain, the 
United States, and the Far East by sending family members to act as his in-
formers and representatives. e house of Reyer & Schlick developed into one of 
the largest importers of colonial goods for Habsburg markets, acquiring sugar, 
coee, cotton, rum, and spices.85 In the 1830s, Reyer became the 	rst president 
of the Austrian Lloyd.86 If it were not for Reyer’s formative experiences in the 
United States, the Austrian Lloyd would not have developed into such a suc-
cessful worldwide enterprise.
Reyer’s departure from Philadelphia wrought great diculties for the mer-
chants of the Austrian-American Trading Company and testi	es to the inde-
pendence Reyer held from Beelen. In 1787, now without their self-appointed 
representative, two merchants, Antonio Righettini and Giacomo Serera, wrote 
to Beelen on behalf of the company since they had not heard from Bache & Shee
for over six months. “e great distance does not serve them an excuse for their 
silence,” they complained, “since it is our opinion that a more exact correspon-
dence is required than if we were situated closer to each other.”87 e rest of 
the letter conveyed the seriousness of the situation. Bache & Shee had failed to 
pay their share of the latest sales. Distressed, Righettini and Serera empowered 
Beelen “for this purpose, as for any other . . . [with] full power and declare that 
all steps taken by you will be recognised and well received by us.”88 is promo-
tion for Beelen reects how the merchants of the Austrian-American Trading 
Company had not seen Beelen as their representative beforehand.
A further challenge to Beelen’s authority in the United States came from 
another representative. Not content with Beelen as sole representative, Kau-
nitz supported the parallel mission of the wealthy Austrian warehouser and 
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commercial advisor to the emperor in Vienna, Joseph Paul von Weinbrenner.89
Weinbrenner was eager to establish his own trading ties with the United States, 
and he tried to secure Franklin’s help in creating a commercial presence in 
America. In February 1783, he informed Franklin that he and others in Vienna 
desired to trade freely with American merchants who are “happy and abundant” 
with goods like cotton and tobacco.90 Weinbrenner needed solid information, 
however. He asked Franklin for a list of suitable mercantile houses in Boston, 
Philadelphia, and New York that would entertain his business. Franklin ignored 
this request, as he did so many other merchant pleas, but Weinbrenner tried 
again a few months later.
In this second attempt, Kaunitz supported Weinbrenner by enlisting the help 
of Jan Ingenhousz, the great American partisan in Vienna who had Franklin’s ear. 
Kaunitz instructed him to pass on Weinbrenner’s message again and Ingenhousz 
did as ordered, explaining to Franklin how he was to “press [you] for the favour 
of an answer.”91 is time Franklin responded, but not with the merchant list the 
trio hoped for in Vienna. Instead, Franklin insisted his absence from America 
“for these last twenty-	ve years” had robbed him of all useful acquaintances.92 By 
the time Franklin’s reply arrived in June, Weinbrenner had selected the Bohemi-
an-born Joseph Donath, a fellow freemason, to be his agent in America.93 Donath 
had sucient experience from his work in one of Vienna’s mercantile houses.94
Before the end of the month, the Ingenhousz-Weinbrenner team again pressed 
Franklin, this time for letters of recommendation for this new commercial agent, 
who, they informed him, “will set out in a few weeks for Philadelphia, New York, 
and Boston, where he will spend two years.”95 Donath duly travelled to Hamburg 
where he departed on August 15 for Philadelphia, just two weeks aer Beelen had 
commenced his trip. He arrived carrying samples of Weinbrenner’s products of 
shoes, hats, fabrics, and Bohemian glassware, which he intended to sell or trade 
for furs. He set up a shop on a corner of Chestnut Street and reported back on the 
sales directly to Weinbrenner and Kaunitz in Vienna.
Beelen and Donath failed to strike an amicable chord. e two men met in 
person sometime before April 1784 and although Beelen described him as an 
“intelligent man,” he was dismayed that Donath had not registered with him 
upon arrival.96 Beelen extracted the details of Donath’s mission, which he then 
reported to his superiors in Brussels. Donath’s instructions, Beelen noted, stip-
ulated he should explore the fur markets of North America and try to establish 
a connection directly to these markets for the Bohemian lands. Beelen had lit-
tle faith that he would succeed, given Donath’s paltry salary and harsh winter, 
which prevented any venture until the summer months. “For these reasons,” he 
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concluded, “this is a lost year, and Mr. Weinbrenner would have been wiser to 
send his emissary three months sooner.”97 Beelen gave Donath little encourage-
ment whatsoever.
Donath, by contrast, cooperated well since he oered Beelen the use of his 
prospectus of fabrics. Beelen secured samples, which he passed along to Belgio-
joso, noting how “our Flemish fabric merchants might 	nd them useful when 
deciding their cargoes for America.”98 Beelen monitored Donath’s activities 
throughout the successive months. In one report, he noted how Donath’s prod-
ucts performed well and Weinbrenner made a thirty percent pro	t on Bohemian 
fabrics, but remarked this was lower than the forty percent margin attained by 
the Bohemian and Silesian drapes brought over on La Capricieuse.99 e pair 
met again where Donath explained his urgent need to procure furs. Beelen de-
lighted in demonstrating his advanced knowledge over Donath. He informed 
Brussels how he had to explain that the cheapest but highest quality furs were 
to be found in upstate New York. is scheme was, in other words, Beelen’s idea 
to trade with the Oneida. Donath subsequently travelled several times along the 
line the Oneida chief had drawn for Beelen’s son, through New York to Albany 
and Schenectady. Donath planned future ventures to Fort Pitt and Fort Detroit 
in search of suitably inexpensive fur producers amongst the Native Americans, 
but his time was up as Weinbrenner’s original commission expired in 1785.
Donath chose to remain in the United States, however. He continued life 
as a merchant in Philadelphia, eventually forming his own business as Donath
& Co., which acted as a conduit for Habsburg goods. In October 1786, Don-
ath recognised his indebtedness to Franklin by presenting him with a case of 
Hungarian wines.100 In time, Donath’s Bohemian wife Rosalia joined him in 
Philadelphia where they raised three children as Donath expanded his commer-
cial empire.101 At Spring Mill on the Schuylkill River, he acquired several acres 
of land and dabbled for a while in apiary.102 He traded extensively but above all 
handled wares from Central Europe.103 ough he maintained commercial ties 
in the Habsburg lands, his intellectual world shied 	rmly towards the Ameri-
can republic. In a series of letters to his friend František Antonín Steinský—who 
had befriended Franklin in 1780—Donath pondered the dierence between his 
former and adopted homelands. He called out Steinský, somewhat playfully, as 
being complicit in an intolerable regime. “As a public professor,” he declared, 
“it is your duty to keep out every ray of light and darken even darkness itself.” 
By contrast, Donath enjoyed “the birth right of every American,” namely free-
dom.104 Donath’s choice to remain and continue his new life in the United States 
would not be the last time a Habsburg national made this decision.
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e representative missions of Reyer and Donath were a continuation of pri-
vate 	rms establishing their own contacts in the United States. Firms in Tus-
cany and Ostend had utilised their own partners and employees as commercial 
representatives in the United States; Reyer and Donath’s missions, however, 
were more direct challenges to the imperial authority of Beelen. e directors of 
the Austrian-American Trading Company preferred Reyer’s handling of their 
business aairs and only turned to Beelen once he returned whereas Donath’s 
presence represented a direct rebuke to Beelen’s position. Weinbrenner’s posting 
of Donath to Philadelphia with Kaunitz’s support reected the perceived fears 
of Beelen’s suitability to serve the interests of all of the Habsburg lands equally 
and not just the Austrian Netherlands. ese fears were of course unwarranted 
and Beelen demonstrated a clear desire to improve the commerce of all the em-
peror’s territories, but the existence of these concerns in 1783 had resulted in two 
rival private representatives who sought to improve trade for their respective 
employers above all else.
e Demise of the Beelen-Berthol Mission
In 1787, Beelen’s tenure as the ocial commercial advisor in the United States 
came up for review since his instructions stipulated a 	ve-year term. On February 
29, 1787, Henri de Crumpipen, Vice-President of the Privy Council instructed 
Count Balthazar de Proli, the brother of Charles André Melchior de Proli who 
interceded for Belletti’s La Capricieuse expedition in 1783, to compile a summary 
report on Beelen’s mission within a year. Initially, the plans from 1782 called for 
a renewal or replacement to be made, but in light of the deteriorating relation-
ship Proli’s report would inuence whether the mission would continue at all. 
One year later, Proli submitted his initial 	ndings followed by a more detailed 
report in April 1788.105 e 	rst prognosis seemed favourable: Beelen had duti-
fully ful	lled his oce and supplied Brussels with a steady and valuable stream 
of information. Proli, however, was critical. Although Beelen’s diligence and as-
sessments had their value, the results did not justify the enormous costs of the 
mission especially in light of collapsing trade between the Habsburg lands and 
North America.106 “It is certain the stay of Mr Beelen in this distant country has 
never produced any advantage proportionate to the expense which it causes,” he 
argued, and he was uncertain whether a treaty of commerce could now change 
anything.107 Proli drove home this fact with a table enumerating the origins of 
all the ships entering American ports according to Beelen’s reports.108 “Out of 
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1,076 foreign vessels,” Proli declared, “only seventeen of His Majesty’s ships have 
arrived there in four years.”109 e futility seemed clear.
When Beelen’s half-brother Maximilien de Beelen visited Vienna in 1787, 
he learned that the Brussels administration contemplated recalling Beelen and 
reappointing him to a lower position. Maximilien failed to disclose his conver-
sation directly to Beelen but did mention it to his son-in-law Charles François 
Maurice de Janti who immediately warned Beelen. As a result, or perhaps be-
cause his commission neared its projected end, Beelen began to stress the state of 
his poor health in the covering letters of his reports. In September 1788, Beelen 
explained, “I have, Sir, the misfortune of not being able by fault of ill-health to 
produce for Your Excellency a more extensive and re	ned work under my usual 
zeal” and divulged news of a surgery he had undergone to alleviate a tumour 
“which compresses my stomach and must be cleared.”110 Beelen's strategy was to 
appear too sick to once again cross the Atlantic.
In June 1790, a 	nal report ended Beelen’s mission. e “unfortunate Beelen” 
had been “abandoned” without payment or instructions since the ocial end 
of his mission in 1787, though his reports continued until the last was sent on 
June 22, 1789. In spite of his diligence and the copious information provided to 
the Habsburg administration, US-Habsburg trade by the close of the decade 
was negligible. Beelen’s mission was “therefore without object” and the recom-
mended policy became a reliance on merchants to “make their own arrange-
ments with the United States.”111 e need for representation had ended. On 
July 30, 1790, Brussels noti	ed Beelen of his mission’s termination. He was com-
mended for “the ardour and intelligence shown” in his mission, but it was over 
and he must prepare to return home. Beelen’s mission represented in many ways 
the pinnacle of the Habsburg determination to establish a commercial footing 
in North America during the 1780s. e demise of the mission ensured Beelen 
remained the sole ocial Habsburg representative to the United States in the 
eighteenth century.
In February 1791, Beelen received his contractual termination but he pro-
tested any journey to the Austrian Netherlands, citing his ill-health and debts 
which he still owed in America.112 By 1792, he had won the 	ght for his future. 
Aer Joseph II’s death in 1790, his brother Pietro Leopoldo succeeded him 
briey as Leopold II before his own sudden demise led to his son becoming em-
peror in July 1792. e new Emperor Francis II granted Beelen a state pension 
and the freedom to choose whether or not to return. Beelen had good reason 
to forsake Europe. Life in the United States had been a glorious foundation 
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for the Beelen family. Con	rming the suspicions of some in Brussels, Beelen 
had invested in American land speculation.113 He bought and developed a large 
plot of land in Pennsylvania straddling Chester and Lancaster counties where he 
constructed several sawmills and established a botanical garden. e main house 
became known by locals as “the castle” on account of its grandeur and style.114
In addition to this estate, Beelen owned ten land tracts in Philadelphia County, 
a vast 2,100 acres in Western Pennsylvania, and a further 2,000 acres each along 
the Scioto River in Ohio and the Green River in Kentucky. In the 1790 cen-
sus his “castle” property listed thirty-four occupants alone. e spending spree 
also included a two-hundred-and-	y-dollar property in Hellam, Pennsylvania 
which Beelen purchased in February 1798. e Beelens even helped 	nance the 
building of a local Catholic church. In the late-1790s, the Beelens relocated to 
another lavish property in Bottstown, West Manchester—then on the edge of 
York Town in York County, Pennsylvania—a red brick house surrounded by 
groves of Lombardy poplar trees. e house no longer stands, but along South 
Forrest Road in the old Bottstown section of nowadays York, Pennsylvania, 
some of these trees still grow.115 Around that time, Lewis Miller, a local folk art-
ist, witnessed the Beelens driving in their “	ne phaeton” coach to Sunday mass 
at Conewago Chapel. He later sketched the impressive sight from memory.116
On his estates, Beelen acquired many indentured servants. His household of 
thirty-four individuals likely counted many whom he owned in this fashion. In 
March 1795, for example, Beelen leased one of his servants, Amos Michael, to 
another local landowner for $19.10s.117 His 	nal estate accounts of 1805–1806 
listed his fortune at $10,471.118 All this proves to an undeniable extent that the 
Beelens lived a prosperous lifestyle aer the termination of his mission.
Wealth did not shield the Beelens from disease. In summer 1804, yellow fever 
swept the United States and the Beelen family fell sick. On September 11, the 
baroness died before her son Francis, who lived in faraway Millerstown, arrived 
on horseback despite suering from the disease himself. ough Francis missed 
his mother’s last moments, he witnessed the agonising decline of his father over 
the next six months. On the morning of April 5, 1805, Frederick Eugene de 
Beelen died of kidney failure brought on by the fever. His body was taken to 
Conewago Chapel immediately and le outside for fear of contamination. at 
evening, the parish priest arranged for two enslaved people to bury the body 
and erect a marble slab over the gravesite.119 It was enslaved people who interred 
the 	rst representative of the Habsburg Monarchy to the United States. When 
Beelen died, the Habsburgs had no ocial representation in the United States. 
It took thirty-three years until another baron, Wenzel Philipp de Mareschal, 
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presented his credentials in October 1838 that the Habsburgs 	nally had full 
representation in the United States.120
Conclusion
Baron Frederick Eugene de Beelen-Berthol represented the Habsburg Monar-
chy as a commercial advisor in the United States for almost six years. He went 
beyond his brief to seek out new economic opportunities for the Habsburgs 
in North America. His detailed reports facilitated a direct exchange between 
Habsburg ministers and merchants with their counterparts and interested 
parties in the United States. His mission manifested the concentrated eorts 
to gain a foothold in the United States by the Habsburgs. Beelen, the sole 
state-appointed representative, was the vanguard of this new venture, and his 
diligent investigations fuelled the interests of others in the Habsburg Monarchy. 
It placed the Habsburg Monarchy on par with other European powers seeking 
to reap the bene	ts of commerce with a new sovereign American republic. Al-
though those bene	ts proved to be elusive and ultimately marginal, the lure of 
expectation drew Habsburg ministers to take bold steps and considerable ex-
pense in establishing a permanent mission in the Americas for the 	rst time.
Beelen’s responses to the Simpson and Donath infringements illustrate the 
tensions that haunted the Habsburg initiatives in the United States. It was a 
dynamic also at work between Brussels and Vienna. It is telling of not only the 
importance of American commerce but also the diculties in dealing with an 
emerging nation. Habsburg eorts to secure part of American trade involved 
both state-led and privately initiated endeavours. Merchants in Trieste as well 
as industrialists in Vienna like Weinbrenner launched their own crusade to se-
cure transatlantic trade with the United States. From Ostend to Trieste, Namur 
to Styria, Brussels to Fiume, there was an insurmountable wave of interest in 
the United States developing in the mercantile and political classes within the 
Habsburg Monarchy. is broad economic interest had large repercussions for 
the development of the relationship between the new United States and the 
Habsburg Monarchy. Up until now, economics had been the driver, but the 
government in Vienna felt compelled to take the lead. A treaty of commerce 
had to be achieved.
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“A Triing Personage”
omas Jeerson and the Second Struggle for Recognition between the
Habsburg Monarchy and the United States of America, 1785–1786
O n March 30, 1826, less than a hundred days before his death, omas Je
erson wrote his last letter to then President of the United States John Quincy Adams. Adams, as he so o	en did, had sought 
advice from Je
erson; this time, he had inquired about the elder statesman’s 
role as a diplomat in Europe and procuring commercial treaties with the Euro-
pean powers in the 1780s.1 Je
erson replied with an extensive summary of the 
international situation then facing the new republic. In a moment of openness 
with his New England colleague, Je
erson made a curious admission about the 
Habsburg Monarchy. “Austria,” he noted, “became desirous of a treaty with us, 
and her Ambassador pressed it o	en on me, but our commerce with her being 
no object, I evaded his repeated invitations.”2 Je
erson wrote no more on the 
subject. Yet both his actions and attitudes towards the Habsburg Monarchy echo 
louder than these elusive words and illuminate the fatal struggle in the relation-
ship between the new United States and the Habsburg Monarchy; one in which 
Je
erson played the most decisive, but destructive of roles.
Je
erson is widely acknowledged as a central gure in the establishment of 
the United States of America, perhaps even the central gure for some, as he 
was the primary author of the Declaration of American Independence and an 
enigmatic emblem for the new nation proclaiming freedom whilst also enslaving 
thousands. But without doubt, Je
erson was the pivotal gure in determining 
American relations with the Habsburg Monarchy.3 It was largely in his hands 
that the issue fell during his time serving as the United States’ minister plenipo-
tentiary in France. Yet in the popular mind, his irtations with Maria Cosway 
seem all too o	en his only discernible activity in Paris.4
“A Triing Personage” 191 
at said, as crucial a gure as Je
erson was for the shape that US-Habsburg re-
lations ultimately took, he was not the only factor. Great diculties lay in navigat-
ing diplomatic norms between an entirely new nation on the one hand andstates 
of the ancien régime on the other; one endowed with a cohort of inexperienced 
diplomats up against life-long aristocratic politicos. ese two worlds collided on 
Je
erson’s watch in the mid-1780s. For centuries, Europe had acclimatised to the 
New World, but it had always been a subservient relationship. Now, largely under 
Je
erson’s management, the Old World had to accept a new-world member as an 
equal. None found this process more treacherous than the Habsburgs, but they 
trod this path diligently, inveigled by visions of economic enhancement.
Attempts Towards a Commercial Treaty
roughout the 1780s, Joseph II’s foreign policy oscillated between half-realised 
plans. First was his reignition of the project to trade away the territory of the 
Austrian Netherlands for the Bavarian lands, which came to nought. Second, he 
attempted to reopen the River Scheldt to commerce—which had been denied 
by international at since the late sixteenth century, crippling Antwerp’s com-
merce—despite the tensions it created with the Dutch Republic. ird, a new 
alliance with Russia in 1781 brought with it unnished schemes for Joseph, such 
as the so-called “Greek Project” of Catherine II, which would carve up Ottoman 
territory in the Balkans and restore the Byzantine Empire under her grandson. 
e period was a turbulent shi	ing between Joseph’s expansive reform agenda 
at home and semi-realised plans abroad, which Joseph’s biographer Derek Beales 
acknowledges was “contemptible in its manner as in its achievement.”5 One goal 
remained constant, however. e aim of securing American trade was a con-
tinual focus. In February 1783, he outlined his desire to shore up transatlantic 
commerce with the United States and noted how American trade “will be of 
the greatest importance for the future.”6 e early months of 1783 witnessed 
the turnaround in US-Habsburg relations when the Habsburgs committed to 
sounding out ties with the United States.
e only problem, however, was the Habsburgs could not be seen to initiate 
contact with the Americans. For one thing, the cessation of hostilities had not 
yet been converted into an internationally ratied treaty. e Treaty of Paris 
was signed in September 1783 and ratied by the Americans in January and the 
British in April 1784 during which time European powers scrambled to secure 
a share of commerce with the new sovereign American state. International legal 
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norms of European states had emerged earlier in the century as more concrete 
codications of the laws of war and nations.7 In this line of thinking, the Amer-
ican entry into the European international system had to follow the established 
doctrines of international law and relations. Intervention in another state’s af-
fairs—in this case, in Britain’s a
airs via the recognition of the United States by 
approaching them for a commercial treaty—broke the accepted norms of the 
inherent rights of nations and of the international jus gentium.8 ere could be 
no formal conversations between the Americans and Habsburgs in early 1783 
until a formal peace had been pronounced. Moreover, the preeminence of the 
Habsburg dynasty as elected rulers of the Holy Roman Empire caused further 
problems. e conventional diplomatic order of preference among European 
powers dictated that the Holy Roman Empire—and by extension, Joseph II—
traditionally took precedence before all other Christian nations and was only 
below the Roman papacy in order of preference as a universalist and imperial 
title.9 In other words, the Habsburgs as an imperial dignity took precedence over 
the new American state and were the higher power. Such ranks and deference 
mattered to the Habsburg dynasty, especially in dealings with other imperial 
dignities such as Russia, Persia, and later, Napoleonic France, although these 
norms were not properly stablished until the early nineteenth century.10 ey, 
therefore, could not be seen to interact with a lesser power—especially former 
“rebels.” No matter how much they desired American commerce, the Americans 
had to be seen to make the rst o
er.
Americans were aware of this obstacle. Back in 1779, John Adams had ex-
plained to members of Congress how international concerns meant Joseph “will 
be one of the last Powers to acknowledge our Independence.”11 In April 1783, 
he renewed his warning. “e Emperor has an inclination to treat with us,” he 
informed his friends at home, “but the House of Austria never makes the rst 
Advances.”12 Yet Congress neglected to act and initiate the rst step by the early 
months of 1783. With pressure mounting from the fears of losing the lucrative 
commerce gained during the war, the imperial ambassador in France, Count 
Mercy-d’Argenteau, had no option but to nd a discreet and indirect channel 
with the Americans and try to provoke an o
er to negotiate.
In early 1783, Mercy-d’Argenteau attempted to broker these indirect channels. 
He rst sought communication through the Tuscan representative in Paris, Fran-
cesco Favi, and the Tuscan legation. Favi acted as the representative for the viceroys 
of the Austrian Netherlands and consul for the Republic of Ragusa.13 ese three 
roles gave Favi the exibility to contact the Americans, unlike Mercy-d’Argenteau. 
On his insistence, Favi cultivated a close friendship with Benjamin Franklin. e 
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link provided much information. Even Jan Ingenhousz was surprised to learn 
from Favi’s reports, which passed from Tuscany to Vienna, that Franklin was de-
termined to make a southern tour of Europe and stop in Vienna before his nal 
departure back to the United States.14 ree of Favi’s reports from January and 
February detailed the Americans’ European treaty e
orts.15 rough Favi, Mer-
cy-d’Argenteau created the backchannel which enabled him to correspond with 
the Americans without breaking diplomatic norms.
Mercy-d’Argenteau’s headache, however, was that Franklin as minister to 
France and Adams as minister to the Dutch Republic had no powers to deal with 
the Holy Roman Empire or the Habsburg Monarchy. His second option was more 
convoluted but aimed at securing a connection with someone who he believed to 
be the empowered minister: Francis Dana. Congress had appointed Dana to St. 
Petersburg with instructions to treat with the powers of the League of Armed 
Neutrality, which included the Habsburg Monarchy.16 Mercy-d’Argenteau’s coun-
terpart there, Count Johann Ludwig von Cobenzl, would lead the negotiations 
whilst Adams advised Dana “immediately to communicate your Mission to the 
Minister of the Emperor” to ensure wheels started turning. 17 Unknown to Adams 
and Mercy-d’Argenteau, however, Dana was not properly empowered. He declined 
Adams’s request since he believed he had “no authority to make any commercial 
Treaty with the Emperor.”18 Adams did not receive Dana’s letter until May 1783, by 
Figure 14. Portrait of the imperial ambassador to France, Count 
Florimond Claude Mercy-d’Argenteau by an unknown artist.
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which time Mercy-d’Argenteau had reported gleefully to Starhemberg, “I regard 
the communication between these gentlemen and myself as open.”19 Miscommu-
nication, as always, seemed to threaten the relationship between the Habsburg 
Monarchy and the United States.
Believing Mercy-d’Argenteau had a diplomatic channel, ministers across the 
Habsburg Monarchy worked towards an American treaty. In Brussels, Star-
hemberg and his councillors hosted William Lee.20 On February 18—the same 
day Joseph issued his American priorities to Mercy-d’Argenteau—Lee wrote to 
Adams with the news, “I am advised from very good authority that the Emperor 
is desirous of entering into a treaty of commerce with the United States of Amer-
ica on terms of quality and mutual advantage.” Lee explicitly warned Adams 
about the issue of the order of preference,
It is an invariable rule with the Court of Austria never to make Ocially 
the rst advances to any other Sovereign Power, therefore if Congress ap-
prove of a Commercial Treaty being enter’d into with his Majesty, it is 
necessary that the formal Proposition for that purpose shou’d be rst made 
on the part of America.21
In Vienna, when Ingenhousz wrote to Franklin about the Weinbrenner mis-
sion, he also hinted that propositions about a commercial treaty from Vienna 
were imminent since it was the court’s wish “to get a share of that source of 
riches, enjoyed formerly by England alone.”22 Meanwhile, news broke across Eu-
rope of Beelen’s mission to the United States. e overtures from the Habsburg 
side were hard to ignore.
When the Dana-Cobenzl route appeared closed, however, Adams did not 
admit to his mistake nor did he alert Mercy-d’Argenteau to the problem.23
Mercy-d’Argenteau waited but broke his silence as negotiations for the Treaty 
of Paris concluded. On the evening of July 3, 1783, Adams sat at his desk dra	ing 
his latest report to Secretary of Foreign A
airs Robert R. Livingston, when his 
servant interrupted him with the arrival of a guest. Mercy-d’Argenteau came 
in response to Adams’s previous unannounced visit whilst Mercy-d’Argenteau 
was out in order to thank the imperial ambassador for his role in the peace ne-
gotiations. e fact that Adams had called on him rst gave Mercy-d’Argenteau 
the pretext of returning the favour as if the Americans had initiated contact—it 
had only taken from January to July. Mercy-d’Argenteau made it clear he vis-
ited in a personal rather than ocial capacity to form “an acquaintance” with 
Adams, which he hoped would be improved into “a more intimate one.” e pair 
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quickly “fell into a Conversation of an hour” and ran “over a variety of Subjects” 
including migration to the United States and the “sober, frugal & industrious 
Character” of the inhabitants of the Habsburg Monarchy.
Mercy-d’Argenteau’s friendliness surprised Adams since Mercy-d’Argenteau 
spoke frankly throughout.24 One subject dominated the conversation: potential 
trade. Adams shared Mercy-d’Argenteau’s ideas about it advantages and routes 
via Trieste, Fiume, and the Austrian Netherlands. Mercy-d’Argenteau’s expe-
rience as an estate owner appealed to Adams’s farmer side and impressed upon 
Adams the value in such a trade.25 e amicable session ended with Adams’s 
invitation to a future dinner. His newfound friendship bewildered him. He got 
back to his report, where the last line he had written talked of “a Treaty of Com-
merce with Great Britain.” 26 Adams, however, turned his mind to securing one 
with the Habsburgs as well.
Ten days later, on July 13, 1783, Adams wrote the rst of two memoranda 
on his ideas and impressions about such an opportunity with the Habsburgs. 
Adams had considered a commercial treaty seriously in the intervening days. He 
believed Joseph had clearly “caused to be intimated, several ways, his inclination 
to have a Treaty of Commerce with us” and he outlined ve reasons why such a 
deal would be advantageous,
1. Because, as Emperor of Germany, and King of Bohemia & Hungary, he is
at the head of one of the greatest Interests & most powerfull Connections
in Europe [. . .]
2. Because the present Emperor is one of the greatest men of this Age [. . .]
3. Because that, if England should ever forget herself again so much as to
attack us, she may not be so likely to obtain the Alliance or Assistance of
this Power against us [. . .]
4. Because the Countries, belonging to this Power upon the Adriatic Sea, &
in the Austrian Flanders, are no inconsiderable Sources of Commerce for
America [. . .]
5. Because, altho’ we have at present a pleasant & joyfull prospect of friendship 
& uninterrupted Alliance with the House of Bourbon, which I wish may 
never be obscured, yet this friendship & Alliance will be the more likely 
to continue unimpaired for our having the friendship & Commerce of the 
House of Austria: [. . .] we may nd in the Alliance of Austria, England and 
Holland a resource against the Storm. Supernumerary Strings to our Bow 
& provisions against possible Inconveniences, however improbable, can do 
us no harm—27
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Adams made clear his reasoning for a commercial treaty with the Habsburgs 
in these lines. He recognised the true importance and inuence of the Habsburgs 
among the European states. From the American perspective, Adams regarded 
the Habsburg Monarchy as one of the greatest powers in Europe. Joseph II’s 
titles were not only reections of his own power but were also markers of how 
deeply enmeshed the Habsburg Monarchy was within the European balance 
of power. Moreover, Adams saw him as a suitable and respectful ally whose 
character he admired. He was also convinced of the wealth of the Austrian 
Netherlands as a result of his repeated visits on his way back and forth to the 
Dutch Republic from Paris. His reasoning also demonstrated the e
ects of his 
friendly conversation with Mercy-d’Argenteau who evidently assured Adams of 
the value of commerce in places such as Trieste in Adriatic. Finally, a Habsburg 
alliance allayed Adams’s own concerns about the French inuence in American 
international strategy. He famously disagreed with the French foreign minister 
Vergennes during his time as a commissioner at the French court and, unlike 
some other American leaders (Je
erson in particular), he was not of a French 
persuasion or outlook.28 Anticipating the emerging split between Federalists 
and Democratic Republicans in later years, Adams already voiced his concerns 
over the true intention of France and sought other European allies to counteract 
French inuence over American diplomatic and commercial relations with other 
powers. In this e
ort, Adams considered the Habsburg Monarchy a worthy and 
appropriate partner.
Adams urged this connection to be made as soon as possible, even suggesting 
sending an American envoy to Vienna. He had clearly been taken in. Joseph was 
“one of the greatest men of this Age,” Adams extolled.29 In his second memo-
randum, sent the following day, Adam continued his praise. “e Emperor is 
vastly powerful” and, Adams predicted, would soon expand his dominion into 
the Ottoman territories alongside Russia, in reference to the growing sabre rat-
tling against the Turks and the “Greek Project” of the Empress Catherine II.30
Adams believed this would produce “a great Revolution in the Commerce of Eu-
rope,” where trade would revolve around the Danube, Don, and Dnieper Rivers 
owing into the Black Sea. If successful, Adams foresaw “this would be such an 
Accession of Wealth, Commerce and Naval Power” that it certainly merited the 
consideration of fostering relations with the Habsburgs in case these plans ever 
became a reality.31
Franklin also recommended a commercial treaty with the Habsburgs. A 
week a	er Adams, he also wrote to Livingston. “I have it also from a good 
hand at the Court of Vienna,” Franklin informed him, “that the Emperor is 
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desirous of establishing a Commerce with us from Trieste as well as Flanders, 
and would make a Treaty with us if proposed to him.”32 ere is no mystery 
who Franklin’s “good hand” was. Back in April, Ingenhousz had informed him 
of Mercy-d’Argenteau’s new powers to treat with the Americans. He divulged 
more, sharing the news that the “Emperour is ready to acknowledge the united 
states as a souverain and independent power as soon as you or any one authorised 
makes any Steps towards that purpose [sic].”33 It was another indirect route uti-
lised by the Habsburgs to prod the Americans into action. Franklin, in a very 
similar vein to Adams, noted his excitement over the prospect of a commercial 
connection. “Many useful Productions and Manufactures of Hungary may be 
had extremely cheap there” he argued to Livingston.34 Both Adams and Frank-
lin were convinced of the necessity to conclude a treaty with the Habsburgs and 
lobbied their insistence with Congress.
In late October 1783, Congress members decided to empower Adams and 
Franklin to enter into negotiations with Joseph’s representatives. ey ordered 
them to announce “the high sense which the United States in Congress assem-
bled entertains of his exalted character and eminent virtues, and their earnest de-
sire to cultivate his friendship, and to enter into a treaty of amity and commerce 
for the mutual advantage of the subjects of his Imperial Majesty, and the citizens 
of these United States.”35 e sedentary pace of transatlantic communication 
Figure 15. Portrait of John Adams as a diplomat by John Singleton Copley (1783)
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subsequently delayed arrival of these new and crucial instructions, however.36
Mercy-d’Argenteau began to question the sincerity of his American counter-
parts in the meantime. Had they ignored the emperor’s overtures? On October 1, 
1783, he had confronted the French foreign minister Vergennes about the lack of 
American rapidity. Mercy-d’Argenteau recorded Vergennes’s response verbatim 
and forwarded it to State Chancellor Prince von Kaunitz in his latest update on 
the situation. e reason, he echoed, was Franklin, “who is old, tired of business, 
and careless,” and the other commissioner, John Jay, “lacks energy and vivacity,” 
leaving only Adams “who cannot be entirely trusted since his veins are lled 
with English blood.”37 Vergennes was of course biased given his ill rapport with 
Adams but Mercy-d’Argenteau lacked any other clue or answer on the state of 
the negotiations.
Franklin ended Mercy-d’Argenteau’s diplomatic purgatory nine months later 
on July 30, 1784. “By various Circumstances been long delayed,” Franklin stated 
unashamed, he could now communicate the desire to “cultivate the friendship of 
his Imperial Majesty” and begin negotiations.38 To add to Mercy-d’Argenteau’s 
probable relief, Franklin informed him “the late Governor of Virginia,” omas 
Je
erson, would join Adams as a commissioner. Mercy-d’Argenteau acted hastily 
to account for the lost time. First, he responded magnanimously to Franklin’s 
letter. “e sentiments which the Emperor entertains for the United States of 
America,” he replied, “make me foresee the satisfaction which his Majesty will 
have in entering into engagements with them.”39 He quickly informed Kaunitz 
and requested new instructions for negotiating.40 Kaunitz’s response took an-
other month since he had to consult the emperor about his nal decision rst, 
and to do so required a full account of the situation. In his report, Kaunitz re-
iterated the problem of recognising a former “rebel” nation, especially since the 
Treaty of Paris still awaited proper ratication.41 Kaunitz maintained only when 
American sovereignty was assured “in a legal manner throughout the whole of 
Europe by the peace treaty” could negotiations begin.”42 In addition, he reaf-
rmed the order of international precedence whereby “the American States 
should make the decent rst steps to be recognised by Your Majesty as true in-
dependent sovereigns.”43 Such comments demonstrated the Habsburg commit-
ment to upholding the international norms and diplomatic conventions among 
European powers. Kaunitz, who had absorbed the ideas of leading theorists on 
international order during his education, valued these norms in his interaction 
with the Americans.44 Furthermore, Kaunitz articulated how representatives of 
the United States had to respect the order of preference enjoyed by the imperial 
dignity of the Habsburgs. In his mind, an advance by the Americans had to be 
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made formally to the Habsburgs. is rigidity of diplomatic etiquette reected 
the dicult incorporation of a new nation into the international order of the
ancien régime.
Kaunitz, however, thought it prudent to prepare terms for a hypothetical 
treaty despite the unrecognised status of the United States. He recommended 
any agreement must “for the most part consist of only generalised stipulations.”45
Any special articles of the negotiation, Kaunitz opined, needed discussion with 
the composite regions of the Habsburg lands, including the Bohemian and Hun-
garian Chancelleries and especially the Austrian Netherlands.46 e emperor re-
garded Kaunitz’s proposal lukewarmly. “A Commercial Treaty with those Amer-
icans,” he scribbled in the margins, “will not be much use for our country, but the 
conditions may be discussed.”47 Joseph’s tepidness belied his earlier enthusiasm 
over American commerce and his support of the ocial mission of Baron de 
Beelen-Berthol
 to Philadelphia but reected his latest intention to exchange 
Bavaria for the Austrian Netherlands, his realm which stood arguably the most 
to gain from such a treaty. Such an exchange project had been a perennial pre-
occupation for Joseph, who had failed to acquire the Bavarian lands during the 
War of the Bavarian Succession in 1778, as it would have granted him a more 
solidied border to the West and an additional elector within the Holy Roman 
Empire.48 Nevertheless, he consented to the preparations for an American treaty.
Kaunitz forwarded the good news to Mercy-d’Argenteau in early September 
1784.49 In Kaunitz’s version it was indeed good news; he omitted the emperor’s 
lukewarm response and instead instructed Mercy-d’Argenteau to inform Frank-
lin that Joseph “had gladly heard the demand of the United States, and would 
gladly o
er his hands to all these states, as the foundation of a mutually friendly 
agreement and the commercial interactions of subjects on both sides.”50 Simulta-
neously, Kaunitz informed the various regional chancelleries of the negotiations. 
He requested information be shared with ocials in the Austro-Bohemian, 
Hungarian, and Transylvanian regions so they might o
er their specic “insight 
and early expressions” on any future treaty with the United States.51 is con-
sultation of the entire Habsburg lands not only resulted from the compositional 
nature of the monarchy but also reected the belief of ocials in Vienna that 
American trade might benet the Monarchy as a whole. Lastly, Kaunitz issued 
orders to Count Ludovico Barbiano di Belgiojoso, who replaced the retiring 
Starhemberg as the minister plenipotentiary in Brussels, to contact, instruct, 
and advise Mercy-d’Argenteau during negotiations with the Americans.52
In late September, Mercy-d’Argenteau acknowledged his new powers from 
Kaunitz, but in his reply he noted three problems. e rst was the health of 
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Franklin, whom he explained “is very sick on sand and stone,” a reference to 
Franklin’s troublesome problems with gout. e second was the appointment 
of Je
erson, who Mercy-d’Argenteau did not know because Je
erson had failed 
to report to him a	er his arrival.53 is was the rst news of Je
erson’s arrival 
to reach Vienna as well as the rst sign of disconnect between the two men. e 
nal issue was Kaunitz’s deferral to Belgiojoso and requests from the various 
chancelleries, which le	 Mercy-d’Argenteau with “no other choice but to await 
these further orders.”54 In the meantime, Mercy-d’Argenteau forwarded a copy 
of his new powers to Franklin. Crucially, Mercy-d’Argenteau informed him of 
Kaunitz’s decision to delegate to Belgiojoso and to gather information from the 
chancelleries. “When the Particulars respecting this Matter shall be sent me,” 
he wrote, “I shall instantly communicate them and I avail myself of this oppor-
tunity to renew the Assurances.”55 Franklin interpreted this as an instruction to 
wait on Brussels before anything could be done further.56 is simple misunder-
standing threatened the entire undertaking, but nobody realised it at the time.
omas Je
erson Lies
On September 13, 1784, the new minister plenipotentiary in Brussels, Count 
Belgiojoso, received his new instructions. He turned to the Treasurer General 
and member of the Comité de Commerce Maritime, Baron de Cazier, who helped 
process Beelen’s reports. Cazier presented his preliminary dra	s of commercial 
expectations for a treaty on October 21, 1784.57 A week later, Belgiojoso sent on 
the results to Mercy-d’Argenteau who informed Kaunitz of the dra	 for the 
rst time on November 6. Kaunitz responded with provisions particular to the 
merchants in Trieste and Fiume.58 e internal competition over the regional in-
terests of the Habsburg Monarchy had not ceased. Yet, from a wider perspective, 
everything had begun to take shape. It only required the Americans to respond 
in kind. At this point, however, the Habsburg dynasty could still not be seen 
to initiate such negotiations as their imperial dignity and order of preference 
outranked the Americans. Mercy-d’Argenteau received everything by late No-
vember, but he did not pass the stipulations onto the Americans since it was their 
turn and duty to start the negotiations proper. Any action by him would jeop-
ardise Habsburg preeminence. As 1784 turned into 1785, the pressure to conclude 
a treaty with the Americans rose ever higher; that year the Austrian-American 
Trading Company had begun in Trieste and Beelen’s reports detailed the endless 
potential in North America. No overture came from the American side, how-
ever. And this was the moment when Je
erson entered the fray.
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Je
erson had arrived in Paris in August 1784 as a representative in commer-
cial negotiations and then succeeded Franklin on May 17, 1785, as the American 
minister to France. Je
erson’s rst introduction to the French court had been 
relaxed. His enjoyment came more through the salons where Franklin’s inu-
ence had won him “a door of admission [. . .] to the circle of literati.”59 His friends 
were primarily these literati.60 As Franklin departed France in July 1785, and 
a	er Adams’s appointment to London, Je
erson became the sole American rep-
resentative. is situation gravely a
ected the negotiations with the Habsburgs.
Je
erson’s original outlook on American commercial relations recognised the 
postwar challenges facing the United States in 1783. At this time, Je
erson ac-
knowledged the necessity in re-establishing international commerce but viewed 
foreign commercial connections as supplementary to the agrarian basis of the 
American economy. International trade was not the path to prosperity, but a 
secondary motor, in his thinking. Je
erson’s primary concern was preventing 
reconnection with British merchants since, he feared, such a commercial reunion 
could reduce the Americans’ hard-won independence. Je
erson, as part of the 
congressional “Committee of ree” responsible for dra	ing the new commer-
cial strategy, favoured a wide engagement with as many friendly European na-
tions as possible in order to preserve their economic independence from Britain. 
is strategy aimed at converting Europe to the “commercial principles of the 
Figure 16. Portrait of omas Je
erson as Minister to France by Mather Brown (1788)
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American Revolution”—that is, foreign relations predicated upon mutually 
advantageous trade.61 Congress, as a result, listed sixteen nations, practically 
most of Europe, for American representatives to treat with equally. Je
erson 
saw this goal as “part of a system, wise and advantageous if executed in all its 
parts,” that would achieve the economic connections needed to guarantee con-
tinued independence.62 In some sense, when Je
erson succeeded Franklin and 
inherited his half-negotiated plans in the summer of 1785, his political outlook 
still engendered him towards treating with all European powers, including the 
Habsburg Monarchy.
Yet Je
erson’s thoughts changed during his negotiations for commercial trea-
ties. He neither stuck to his idealistic vision of an agrarian America nor acted 
in a strict realist fashion. Instead, Je
erson reacted to commercial o
ers from 
European nations with a rationalist mindset, driven above all by his sense of 
whether it was in the best interests for the ideal future of the United States. 
Such pragmatism came to dene Je
erson’s later statecra	, but it was brought 
home to him during these years in Paris when he began to appreciate the relative 
weakness of the United States.63 It was a lesson other Americans were learning as 
they adjusted to the new American borders in the Midwest and encountered sti
 
opposition from European neighbours.64 Je
erson’s own humble pragmatism is 
clear in his diplomatic negotiations with the European states. He soon felt the 
principle of mutually advantageous trade should necessitate treaties with pow-
ers most valuable to the United States: powers with territory in the Americas. 
Trade benets from these nations, he believed, were numerous and bountiful. 
As a result, he gave greater importance to the Portuguese treaty than a Habsburg 
deal; Portugal was an Atlantic power whereas the Habsburgs were not. Swe-
den, owning the island of St. Eustatius in the Caribbean, also superseded the 
Habsburgs whose lack of Atlantic possessions led him to dismiss their commerce 
as inconsequential. Je
erson’s hierarchical thinking certainly guided his actions 
in the negotiations.
Je
erson’s aversion towards treating the Habsburg Monarchy as a priority 
began to show immediately. In September 1785, Je
erson received a letter from 
the marquis de Lafayette, which detailed his friendly audience with Joseph (see 
chapter 7). Lafayette had seized this opportunity to act as an unocial trade 
ambassador for the young republic. “I directed, and sometimes forced the con-
versation,” he revealed to Je
erson, resulting in the discovery of the emperor’s 
preference for “liberal treaties, [which] would open the door to American impor-
tations in order to pay for Austrian goods.” at same evening, Kaunitz had ap-
proached Lafayette. e pair discussed the situation of American and Austrian 
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goods—Kaunitz knew already from Beelen’s reports—but Lafayette noticed he 
was bemused. “Why,” asked Kaunitz in cutting straight to the point, “don’t they 
make advances to us?” Lafayette could only respond that the Americans had 
done so, but as Kaunitz claried, their “demand had been an indirect one.” In 
other words, Kaunitz was dissatised with the American initiation since it had 
largely been Mercy-d’Argenteau who orchestrated contact and requests up until 
then. Habsburg ministers were meant to be responders not the initiators. He 
made clear to Lafayette that nothing could go on “without reciprocity.”65 In his 
eyes, it was a matter of fairness and of mutual respect. Lafayette recommended 
swi	 action but relied on Je
erson to communicate the news to Adams in Lon-
don and to Congress across the Atlantic.66
Je
erson, at rst glance, complied. On September 24, he conveyed Lafayette’s 
ndings to Adams. Yet the placement—a few short lines sparing any detail at the 
end—and his overall tone reveal his hesitation about a Habsburg treaty. “In the 
present unsettled state of American commerce,” Je
erson declared, in reference 
to the new opportunities and challenges for trade with Europe, he wanted to 
“avoid all further treaties except with American powers. If Count Merci [sic] 
therefore does not propose the subject to me, I shall not to him nor do more 
than decency requires if he does propose it.”67 Je
erson’s words here are striking. 
He openly declared his intention to counteract congressional instructions “to 
cultivate the Friendship of his imperial majesty” with a treaty. Je
erson also 
demonstrated his disdain for such a treaty owing to the limited inuence of the 
Habsburg Monarchy in the Atlantic and the Americas. Lastly, Je
erson’s playing 
dumb to Mercy-d’Argenteau’s request was rather coy, since he was fully aware 
of the diplomatic etiquette that dictated the interactions with the Habsburg 
ambassador. Je
erson’s deceit emerged again a few weeks later as he reported 
Lafayette’s letter to John Jay, Congress’s new foreign secretary. In the sole line 
Je
erson spared for the news, he mentioned “a possibility of an overture” from 
the Habsburg court. He omitted a full explanation of the present state of the 
negotiations.68 In this initial action by Je
erson, we can already discern the sen-
timents he expressed to John Quincy Adams forty years later.
Je
erson had a problem, however. Lafayette’s visit to Vienna had not only 
revealed the deadlock but had sprung Kaunitz into action. Lafayette informed 
Je
erson, “I am apt to think he [Kaunitz] may order His Ambassadors to talk 
with you or Mr. Adams.”69 Indeed the order came. On October 1, 1784, Kaunitz 
informed Mercy-d’Argenteau about the Austrian-American Trading Company 
in Trieste which required better trading terms in order to compete successfully 
with foreign merchants in the United States. Kaunitz requested that he discuss 
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this matter urgently with Je
erson.70 For Mercy-d’Argenteau, this provided yet 
another headache. By mid-October he admitted his diculties to Kaunitz. He 
had been unable to full these instructions due to Je
erson’s “continued lengthy 
absences.”71 Although Je
erson undertook several tours of Europe during his 
time as minister in France, these absences were in fact Je
erson’s attempts to 
“avoid all further treaties” with non-Atlantic powers.72
e evasion worked. Je
erson’s preference for the salons and infrequent at-
tendance at the regular diplomatic corps events made it easy for him to elude 
Mercy-d’Argenteau. It took until January 1786 for Mercy-d’Argenteau to meet 
with Je
erson and discuss the situation. Mercy-d’Argenteau’s frustration must 
have eroded his usual decorum since the confrontation was not very diplomatic 
by Je
erson’s account. “e imperial ambassador took me apart the other day,” 
he complained to Adams. He explained Mercy-d’Argenteau’s anger that he had 
not received anything for “about eighteen or twenty months” since correspond-
ing with Franklin in September 1784. e seriousness of the deadlock became 
clear to all. Mercy-d’Argenteau had promised to pass on the preliminary arti-
cles once his superiors in Brussels and Vienna had nalised them, but he still 
expected the next move to come from Franklin, or Franklin’s replacement on 
the American side. Je
erson refused to take accountability for this mishap. He 
explained to Mercy-d’Argenteau that “we had always supposed it [the o
er to 
negotiate] was unanswered and had therefore expected the next step from [you].” 
Mercy-d’Argenteau became angry, especially since Je
erson informed him that 
his negotiation powers were set to expire.73 Mercy-d’Argenteau and Je
erson 
ended their conversation without either one accepting fault but with plenty of 
animosity. at evening, Mercy-d’Argenteau sent his secretary, Franz Paul von 
Blumendorf, to deliver to Je
erson a copy of his last correspondence with Frank-
lin to extricate any negligence from his side.74
Je
erson fretted over the next steps since he still wished to avoid concluding 
a treaty with the Habsburgs. He relied upon Adams in London for instruction, 
especially as Mercy-d’Argenteau continued to “make advances” and he endeav-
oured to “evade” until he could receive word from Adams.75 Je
erson’s fears 
were becoming real. Mercy-d’Argenteau’s assiduity made him “anxious” to re-
ceive Adams’s advice. Unfortunately for Je
erson, Adams’s response was slow. 
By early February, he had still not heard anything. He prodded Adams again, 
stressing how he was “anxious” to receive an answer.76 Finally, Adams’s reply 
came a few weeks later. He implored Je
erson to act without delay. “I am clearly 
for treating with the Emperor’s Ambassador immediately,” he explained, “and 
even for the [Austrian] Netherlands only, although it would be better to extend 
“A Triing Personage” 205 
it to all the rest of his Dominions.” Adams could not have given a clearer line of 
instruction to Je
erson, especially with his nal lines on the matter, “I pray you 
to proceed in the Business, as fast as you please. Treaties commercial with the 
two Imperial Courts [meaning Brussels and Vienna] cannot possibly do us any 
harm that I can conceive.”77 Adam’s sentiment contrasted sharply with Je
er-
son’s. Adams had experienced the Austrian Netherlands in person and had been 
convinced of commerce with the Habsburg lands from his interactions with 
Mercy-d’Argenteau. On the other hand, Je
erson, who had no such experience, 
felt the opposite and continued to stall.
Je
erson interpreted Adams’s line “as fast as you please” liberally. He received 
Adams’s response amid his preparation for one of his rst European tours.78 He 
le	 Paris for London in mid-March without a single word to Mercy-d’Argenteau. 
In a letter to Jay, Je
erson later accounted for his inaction, explaining, “o 
I received Mr Adams’s opinion in favour of our proceeding in the treaty [. .  .] 
those which called me to London, a treaty with Portugal, was more import-
ant.”79 Here Je
erson clearly articulated how the the Atlantic dimension was 
of greater importance in his commercial calculations. For Je
erson, this was a 
matter of priority and the Habsburgs counted for little in his mind compared 
to the potential trade from a country such as Portugal. His own personal pref-
erences overrode the advice from Adams to seal the treaty with the Habsburgs 
and his trip to London allowed gave him the perfect excuse to stall yet again. 
Notwithstanding his personal preferences, there was little excuse for his failure 
to inform Mercy-d’Argenteau. Je
erson was away for seven weeks.
In the meantime, Mercy-d’Argenteau prepared for Je
erson’s return. He re-
ported to Kaunitz on the latest developments, hinting at Je
erson’s duplicity. 
A	er explaining their rst meeting, he mentioned Je
erson’s revelation that his 
commission would expire on May 12 but he hoped “something denite” could be 
accomplished by then.80 Kaunitz too had been diligent. e nal treaty proposal 
had been conrmed by the various chancelleries and laid before the emperor as 
the basis for negotiations.81 “His Majesty has deigned to approve the conclu-
sion of a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States,” he declared to 
Belgiojoso and Mercy-d’Argenteau.82 e highly compartmental nature of the 
Habsburg Monarchy made for a convoluted process, but one which could have 
come to a happy conclusion if not for the expiration of Je
erson’s commission.
Je
erson returned to Paris twelve days before his powers were due to expire. 
Mercy-d’Argenteau sought him out urgently but when they did meet, he was 
gravely disappointed. Je
erson protested that no negotiation could be completed 
in the time remaining. Mercy-d’Argenteau pleaded for an extension or for the 
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negotiations to continue until Congress could renew them, but Je
erson sig-
nalled that nothing could be done.83 Je
erson’s mind had been rmly xed. On 
May 10, he reported the meeting to James Monroe, reiterating his belief that “no 
great good” could be gained from such a treaty despite his congressional instruc-
tions and Adams’s optimism.84 Je
erson’s economic prejudice deterred him from 
completing the treaty negotiations with the Habsburg Monarchy. In the end, his 
determination prevailed and Mercy-d’Argenteau admitted defeat. It was like a 
game of chess where one grandmaster had won by running out the clock.
Relations deteriorated between Mercy-d’Argenteau and Je
erson from this 
point onward, reecting the greater dissolution of Habsburg interest in the 
United States. e Prussians had some indirect role in this divergence. ey con-
cluded a commercial treaty with the United States in September 1785. Belgiojoso 
heard of this from Beelen, who relayed the news from New York in February 
1786, when Congress was poised to ratify the treaty.85 How could the Amer-
icans nalise a deal with the Prussians and not the Habsburgs? Mercy-d’Ar-
genteau received fresh orders to confront Je
erson again. “[One of the] greatest 
deceptions,” decried Mercy-d’Argenteau in his report to Kaunitz, “the American 
Minister, Mr Je
erson, as I asked him, seemingly would not admit to this actu-
ality!”86 Je
erson indeed denied all knowledge of the Prussian-American treaty 
despite his signature on the parchment. In other words, he lied. And his response 
outraged the Habsburg minister and cemented the end of their interaction.
ere were several reasons behind the failure to conclude a commercial treaty 
between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States. Miscommunication 
existed on both sides. Ocials from both states awaited replies without real-
ising their own need to act. Almost a year was lost between 1784 and 1785 be-
cause Mercy-d’Argenteau waited on Franklin’s reply and vice versa. Protocol was 
another reason. Kaunitz’s adherence to diplomatic preeminence undoubtedly 
caused these delays. Yet the Americans were cognizant of this practice and cer-
tainly knew the onus fell on them. But the political arrangement of both states 
also caused delay. On the one hand, negotiations with the Americans were a 
matter for the whole Habsburg Monarchy and entailed input from various re-
gional administrations. Ministers in other nations obtaining treaties (Denmark, 
Prussia, Portugal, Sweden for instance) did not encounter such an obstacle.
On the other hand, the American situation caused similar delays. Con-
gress worked through three commissioners before Je
erson and Adams be-
came responsible for negotiating with European courts. Added to this were 
the slow communications between them and across the Atlantic as well as the 
need to consult Congress. e two-year commission period proved a decisive 
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element, curtailing negotiators and allowing Je
erson an excuse. His critical 
delays brought on either through absence or aversion exacerbated this time 
constraint. Crucially, Je
erson’s decision to travel to London to nalise the 
Portuguese treaty not only constituted delay at a critical juncture but was a 
conscious evaluation of its importance over a treaty with the Habsburgs. Jef-
ferson’s actions make clear his negativity toward a potential treaty with the 
Habsburg Monarchy and his deliberate action to avoid its realisation. Je
er-
son’s predisposition and his actions ultimately undermined the e
orts to bring 





erson’s actions clearly wrecked the chances of a conclusive commercial treaty 
between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States of America in the 1780s. 
His actions helped set back the progress of US-Habsburg relations for a gener-
ation. In the immediate period before the outbreak of revolutionary maelstrom 
across Europe, this decade represented the opportune moment for such com-
mercial ties to be cemented before the convulsions of war waylaid any Habsburg 
interest or ability in transatlantic trade with the Americans. Je
erson’s delib-
erate mishandling, therefore, derailed the negotiations and ultimately set the 
Habsburgs on the path to be the last European great power to recognise and 
establish formal ties with the United States.
Je
erson’s aversion seemingly arose from his prioritisation in concluding 
treaties with European powers which had possessions in the Atlantic. e 
Habsburgs, without much of a foothold in the Atlantic, could not o
er Ameri-
cans very much in his mind. Unlike Adams, he did not have the conviction of po-
tential Habsburg commerce in the eastern Mediterranean or along the Danube 
nor did he share Franklin’s positive outlook formed by years of incessant mer-
cantile enquires from the Habsburg lands and his friendship with people like the 
court physician Jan Ingenhousz. Instead, Je
erson acted upon his own instincts 
and according to his own sense of political economy and commercial utility.87
Rather than outright deny the Habsburgs a right to negotiate, Je
erson shied 
away from interpersonal conict and preferred to undermine the negotiations 
via dilatoriness and deception. To be sure, Je
erson’s thoughts on international 
commerce were inuential, but he was not entirely consistent with his own pri-
orities. Seeing this thinking as the reason for his aversion to a Habsburg treaty 
is plausible but does not account why Je
erson concluded a treaty with Prussia 
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in September 1785—a power without any American stakehold.88 Why, then, did 
Je
erson allow a treaty with Prussia but not one with the Habsburg Monarchy?
Considering only Je
erson’s geopolitical thought is an incomplete expla-
nation of his foreign policy as minister in France. It was only one calculation 
among many in his mind at the time. Je
erson’s personal outlook also heavily 
shaped his negotiations with European powers. Je
erson was informed not just 
by his interactions as a diplomat but also as an observer and individual living 
in Europe. His digestion of news, politics, and personal relations also shaped 
his diplomatic outlook. His perception of contemporary events gave rise to an 
intrinsic “mental map” of European powers that inuenced his interaction as 
a diplomat. An individual’s mental map reects the cognitive biases and en-
vironmental framework constructed from the world around them.89 In Je
er-
son’s case, such worldviews may have been unwarranted or misinformed but 
were nonetheless his perception and outlook. Je
erson’s interaction with the 
Habsburg Monarchy is a clear articulation of this inuence. Je
erson’s views of 
the Habsburg Monarchy fundamentally a
ected his interactions in negotiating 
a treaty with the Habsburg Monarchy. Nowhere is this more acute than in his 
discussions of Joseph II through his private and personal correspondence.
e gure of the emperor was pivotal in shaping Je
erson’s perception of the 
wider Habsburg Monarchy as a potential economic partner. Joseph, as a head 
of state, signied the values and position of the Habsburg Monarchy. At the 
beginning of the 1780s, there were many commonalities between the two men. 
ey were both men of the enlightenment and believed in its core values. Joseph’s 
reform e
orts in domestic matters impressed Je
erson greatly. His Tolerance 
Patents, for example, issued rst by Joseph in 1781 granted limited freedoms to 
religious non-Catholic minorities for the rst time.90 Similarly, Joseph’s ardent 
anti-papal inclination reduced the monastic inuence in education and chimed 
with Je
erson’s sensibilities on the separation of church and state, something 
which he formulated in his Notes on the State of Virginia around the same time.91
From these “public acts,” Je
erson concluded on more than one occasion that 
Joseph’s character was “far above the level of common men.”92 ere were other 
Americans who agreed with Je
erson about Joseph’s early reign. Adams and 
Franklin both let their positive opinions be known. Jay wrote well of Joseph’s re-
forms and how “he seems to be seriously preparing to be great and formidable.”93
Gouverneur Morris, a Massachusetts congressman and later successor to Je
erson 
in Paris, viewed Joseph’s eastern ambitions as something benecial to the United 
States, especially if a commercial connection with the Habsburg Monarchy could 
be obtained through a treaty. “As an American,” he declared, “it is my hearty wish 
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that she [Catherine II] and the Emperor may e
ect their schemes, for it will be 
a source of great wealth to us, both immediate and future.”94 Je
erson, however, 
viewed these plans with disapproval. If they did come to pass, then he likened it 
for people there as an exchange of “one set of Barbarians for another.”95 Although 
Je
erson had seen some good in the emperor at the beginning of the 1780s, he 
increasingly acknowledged some poorer tendencies of Joseph II.
As the 1780s progressed, Je
erson gradually viewed Joseph as an unwise and 
ine
ective gure. “We have here under our contemplation,” he wrote in De-
cember 1784, “the future miseries of human nature, like to be occasioned by the 
ambition of a young man, who has been taught to view his subjects as cattle.”96
Je
erson viewed Joseph’s diplomatic e
orts critically. “It is a pity,” Je
erson re-
marked, “the emperor would not conne himself to internal regulation, in that 
way he has done much good.”97 Je
erson witnessed the news of half-completed 
designs on Europe with disapproval. As he conded to one friend, Joseph “is a 
restless, ambitious character, aiming at everything, preserving in nothing, taking 
up designs without calculating the force which will be opposed to him, and drop-
ping them on the appearance of rm opposition.”98 Je
erson viewed this lack of 
attentiveness in Joseph’s foreign policy as indicative of a man oddly “whimsical,” 
“bizarre, and eccentric, particularly in the dog-days.”99 Je
erson saw these aws 
transpire into “perilous” situations for the emperor as he “dwindles to that of a 
petty bully, and is marked, as his enemies denote it, with eccentricity and incon-
sistence.” “If he persists,” Je
erson concluded in a letter to George Washington, 
“the probable combination against him seems to threaten his ruin.”100
As Je
erson’s time in Paris continued, his views of Joseph diminished further. 
is “triing personage,” as he referred to him, seemed to grow weaker by his 
endless schemes, especially, Je
erson noticed, in the Holy Roman Empire. In 
1785, the rulers of Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover joined together to form what be-
came known as the Fürstenbund or League of Princes aimed as a bulwark against 
the emperor’s expansionist policies as espoused in his desires on Bavaria and the 
corrupt election of Joseph’s brother to the powerful Electorship of Cologne.101
e more Je
erson learned of the Fürstenbund from the salons and newspapers 
of Paris, the more Je
erson realised it weakened Joseph, leaving him in “a soli-
tary situation” and “much wounded.”102 As a union of smaller provinces united 
against the tyranny of an overbearing gurehead, the Fürstenbund certainly en-
joyed some sympathy from Je
erson who delighted at the successive victories 
that thwarted Joseph’s plans on Bavaria and within the Holy Roman Empire. 
To Je
erson, the League was perhaps a vindication of the belief in the success of 
confederacy against tyranny and resonated with own part in the struggle against 
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Great Britain. In August 1785, Je
erson believed Joseph had been tarnished by 
the Fürstenbund. “In truth,” Je
erson concluded, “he undertakes too much.”103
Je
erson perceived Joseph’s ambitious nature as his most glaring detraction as 
it o	en brought him into disadvantageous conagrations. Joseph’s preoccupa-
tion with reopening the River Scheldt to free commerce caused an international 
scene. e resulting small war between the Austrian Netherlands and the Dutch 
Republic in October 1784, known as the “Kettle War” since only an iron kettle 
was struck by cannon re, was one clear example in Je
erson’s mind. From his 
viewpoint, Joseph’s decision to sail two warships into Dutch waters in protest of 
the closed River Scheldt had escalated an already precarious situation.104 Je
er-
son’s perception of Joseph increasingly became one of a despot and warmonger 
as a result. He complained of Joseph’s bellicose nature to several friends. “Not 
a circumstance can be produced, not a symptom mentioned in the conduct of 
the emperor which does not breathe a determination for war,” he declared.105
Je
erson acknowledged Joseph as a particular threat to European stability. Jo-
seph’s schemes would sooner or later provoke further war.106 He explained to 
Franklin that it was merely a question of “with whom the emperor will pick the 
next quarrel.”107
Taken together, these impressions were a consistent feature of Je
erson’s 
time in Europe. From his arrival in August 1784 to the failure of the treaty in 
May 1786, Je
erson digested contemporary events and, with increasing disdain, 
conceived of an insolent emperor determined to destabilise the international 
community through his grand designs. e emperor’s reputation and actions 
a
ected Je
erson’s perception of the viability of the Habsburg Monarchy as an 
international partner. ese geopolitical concerns eroded Je
erson’s condence 
in Ostend and Trieste as desirable trading locations.
Further south, Je
erson’s Mediterranean views were undoubtedly inuenced 
by Filippo Mazzei, his neighbour in Virginia during the early to mid-1770s. In 
1778, Je
erson had written to Richard Henry Lee,
In the present very prosperous situation of our a
airs I have thought it 
would be wise to endeavour to gain a regular and acknoleged [sic] access in 
every court in Europe, but [of all] the Southern [ones]. e countries bor-
dering on the Mediterranean I think will merit our earliest attention. ey 
will be the important markets for our great commodities of sh, wheat, 
tobacco, and rice. [. . .] I have been led the more to think of this from fre-
quent conversations with Mazzei, whom you know well, and who is well 
acquainted with all those countries.108
“A Triing Personage” 211 
By 1785, Je
erson’s Mediterranean views had altered. In Europe, he had come 
to increasingly appreciate (and abhor) the threat of piracy sanctioned by the Bar-
bary States along the north African coastline. “Our trade to Portugal, Spain, 
and the Mediterranean is annihilated,” he despaired. e alternative trading op-
tion (in Je
erson’s mind) was Ostend. But the war clouds over the nearby River 
Scheldt persuaded Je
erson against such an entrepôt for trade. In his response 
to William Wenman Seward’s scheme to make Ostend the major trading con-
duit to the United States for Irish goods, Je
erson explained he could not think 
why the more “dangerous” port o
ered any more benet than the French port 
Lorient, “which,” Je
erson argued, “is a freeport and in great latitude, which is 
nearer to both parties.”109 e major ports of the Habsburg Monarchy dealing in 
transatlantic trade were therefore of little interest to Je
erson.
Moreover, Je
erson was personally far more insulated from the Habsburg 
lands. “I know of none, have no correspondent or even acquaintance at Ostend,” 
he wrote at one point.110 True, Je
erson did not command the attention of Eu-
rope in the same way as Franklin. As a result, he did not inherit the same net-
works as Franklin. Compared to him, Je
erson had very few attachments to Vi-
enna. e main conduit for Franklin had been Jan Ingenhousz but as Franklin 
ended his time in Paris so did this vital interpersonal link. Although Franklin 
and Ingenhousz relied on Je
erson to relay their correspondence, Je
erson did 
not strike up any personal friendship with Ingenhousz. is disconnect was de-
spite his regard for the scientist to “whose researches the lovers of science are so 
much indebted.”111 In contrast to the scores of letters exchanged between Frank-
lin and Ingenhousz, Je
erson’s writing to Ingenhousz amounted to a mere two 
letters and were simple expressions of regard attached to the latest parcel or letter 
from Franklin. Je
erson clearly did not make use of Ingenhousz despite Frank-
lin’s advice that Ingenhousz was “a proper Correspondent in case he [Je
erson] 
should have anything to insinuate to that Court.”112 e loss of Ingenhousz for 
Je
erson severely limited his connection to Vienna.
Je
erson’s relative obscurity in comparison to Franklin also exacerbated this 
disconnection. e vast volume of correspondents Franklin enjoyed from across 
the Habsburg lands were not so interested in Je
erson, a man of far less renown 
in Vienna than his predecessor. Whereas Franklin had received over two hun-
dred letters from Habsburg inhabitants during his time in Europe, Je
erson 
could count only a handful. Moreover, Je
erson’s only impressions of the inhab-
itants of Vienna were secondary through Lafayette’s 1785 letter and a conversa-
tion with John Adams’s son-in-law Colonel William Stephens Smith, who had 
travelled to Vienna in late 1785 with the future South American revolutionary 
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Francisco de Miranda.113 Smith had been captivated by Joseph’s simple manner 
and disregard for pomp during his observations of him at the opera. “You very 
rarely see any person, not even the military looking,” he noted, “this is very sin-
gular.” Smith spent the duration of the entire opera wondering how such a tow-
ering dynastic gure could be so normal and humble. “In a republic,” he noted, 
“Washington is reverenced and adored by all[; . . .] in a tyrannical government, as 
Prussia, Le Roi, is their terrestrial God and his subjects will freely sacrice their 
lives to his caprice and humour.” e fact that Joseph “laid aside the pomp and 
parade” yet still commanded such respect from his subjects greatly impressed 
Smith and rattled his developing political views. A military man, Smith previ-
ously felt that display, rank, and pageantry were essential to a ruler’s persona, but 
he now began to question whether this was entirely correct. Joseph II, who ruled 
a “mild government though not republican but not tyrannical either,” could have 
important “lessons for republicans” back home, he concluded.114
If Smith shared these imperial impressions with Je
erson during his stop in 
Paris on his return to London, then they did not produce any e
ect. Federalists 
like Adams and Smith might have been wooed by the gure of the emperor but 
Je
erson, a republican, was not.115 Je
erson became diametric to Joseph. His 
perception of the Habsburg Monarchy during the 1780s gave rise to his apathy 
for any kind of political connection. is reason in addition to his developing 
thoughts on political economy is a more complete explanation for his lethargic 
and dilatory tactics used in his interactions with Mercy-d’Argenteau.
Conclusion
Je
erson’s intercession in the struggle for recognition via a commercial treaty 
between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States underscores how per-
sonalities and styles of diplomacy undermined the economic interests of two 
states. Je
erson occupied a pivotal role in the negotiations for a treaty. Under 
Franklin, negotiations had progressed comparatively smoothly. Franklin’s in-
teractions with Mercy-d’Argenteau as well as his informal network in Vienna 
provided a comfortable base for both the American and Habsburg negotiators 
to work from. is situation changed suddenly following Je
erson’s arrival. His 
absence and then personal awkwardness in the encounters with Mercy-d’Argen-
teau were detrimental. As we have seen, his evolving personal biases certainly in-
formed these interactions as well; Je
erson’s disdain for the emperor and his ac-
tions combined with his thoughts on the future political economy of the United 
States to produce an ardently negative attitude towards a treaty of commerce 
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with the Habsburg Monarchy. Je
erson’s attitude stood in stark contrast to the 
more open and favourable perspective of his joint negotiator John Adams, but 
his role as the main interlocutor in Paris enabled him to dodge, stall, and ulti-
mately derail negotiations. e result was great annoyance on the Habsburg side, 
exacerbated by the discovery of the conclusion and then deceitful concealment 
of the treaty with Prussia by Je
erson. As a consequence, Je
erson’s interactions 
with the Habsburg Monarchy marked a watershed moment in US-Habsburg re-
lations. No longer would the Habsburg Monarchy seek a diplomatic connection 
with the United States. No longer would the Habsburg reach into the Atlantic 
be pursued. e interests of the revolutionary era had come to a close and a new 
era of divergence had begun. It would last well into the next century.
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“I Am Happy Only When I Can Find a New World 
for Myself”
e Residue of Revolution in the Habsburg Lands, 1787–1795
W hen Thomas Jefferson returned to the United States in late 1789, he harboured plans to renovate his mountain-top home at Monticello and his other property at Poplar Forest, Virginia. He 
was inspired by the classical architecture of Europe in his designs for more lavish 
plantation houses. Although delayed by his appointment as the rst Secretary 
of State, Jeerson realised his architectural plans over the course of the 1790s 
and much of the early 1800s. Both houses at Monticello and Poplar Forest made 
extensive use of natural light.1 At Monticello, Jeerson masterfully employed 
architectural designs to allow for an abundance of light. Standing in the central 
hallway, one can view the outside in four directions thanks to Monticello’s multi-
ple glass doors and windows. For Jeerson, the harmony of natural light satised 
not just the practical purpose of illumination but also reected the man himself 
as an enlightened thinker in tune with the natural world.2 roughout his ren-
ovations, Jeerson relied upon Joseph Donath to meet his construction needs. 
Donath, the former representative of the Weinbrenner rm in Vienna, supplied 
much of the glass needed for the windows of Jeerson’s estate. Jeerson used 
Donath’s company in Philadelphia because he preferred the quality of Bohemian 
glass to any other.3 Beginning in 1792, he made the rst of several orders which 
continued over two decades. In total, Jeerson obtained at least 1,630 panes of 
Bohemian glass and paid Donath hundreds of dollars for his service.4 ere was 
a certain amount of irony in this transaction as well. Jeerson, the man who 
viewed Habsburg trade as having little value, now imported one of the staple 
Habsburg products at an inated price since Donath secured his glass orders 
through Hamburg rather than Trieste merchants.5 It was the price Jeerson paid 
for having subverted the commercial treaty with the Habsburg Monarchy.
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Jeerson’s subversion helped usher in a long period of malaise in US-Habsburg 
relations, a period which stretched deep into the nineteenth century and argu-
ably characterised the entirety of the relationship.6 Jeerson’s snub of Count 
Mercy-d’Argenteau undoubtedly produced economic consequences. By the time 
the treaty negotiations between him and Mercy-d’Argenteau failed, many other 
European states had already or were beginning to benet from ocial relations 
with the United States: France (1778), the Dutch Republic (1781), Sweden (1783), 
Prussia (1785), and Portugal (1786). As other nations also established relations 
with the United States in the 1790s and 1800s, such as Denmark (1796) and 
Russia (1803), the Habsburg Monarchy increasingly diverged from the transat-
lantic world. Without the advantages and protection of a treaty of commerce, 
Habsburg merchants found themselves unable to compete in North American 
markets. Styrian iron was more costly than comparable Swedish ironware; Le-
vantine goods owed more cheaply to the United States via ports in France and 
Spain which enjoyed lower taris; and Flemish merchants realised their textiles 
could not compete with the mass of other products. Bohemian glass proved the 
sole outlier. Besides Jeerson, Donath also supplied the architect Henry Latrobe 
with Bohemian glass for many new federal buildings in Washington, DC, in-
cluding the White House.7 But Bohemian glass was not enough to sustain an en-
tire trade route alone, especially one which now relied upon ports to the North 
rather than Trieste.
From 1786 onwards, direct transatlantic ventures from the lands of the 
Habsburg Monarchy slowly ceased operating. In Trieste, Ignaz Verpoorten’s 
company collapsed spectacularly with debts of over 200,000 in 1786. at 
same year, the Austrian-American Trading Company ended. Its leaders sought 
emergency capital from Vienna, but with prots waning and the four directors 
deemed too “greedy and unscrupulous” by locals in Trieste, no rescue came.8 e 
situation in Ostend fared little better. Ephrain Murdoch, a “furious partisan 
of the American cause” who traded from there to Philadelphia and Virginia, 
moved his business to Dunkirk in 1787. Francis Bowens, who had carried mail 
for Franklin during the war and sent ships to Philadelphia and Baltimore, de-
clared bankruptcy at the same time. By the end of the decade, the agreement 
between the rm Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co in the Austrian Netherlands 
and their associate Mark Prager in Philadelphia had collapsed.9 Undermined by 
private representation and diminishing ocial belief in the benet of American 
commerce, the Habsburg Monarchy’s designated representative in the United 
States, Baron Frederick Eugene de Beelen-Berthol, ended his mission in 1789. 
Meanwhile his brother Maximilian de Beelen-Berthol advised the minister 
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plenipotentiary in Brussels that the port of Ostend would be ruined imminently 
“if measures are not taken to prevent it.”10 e brief window of opportunity for 
Habsburg entrepreneurs in the Atlantic created by the turbulence of the Amer-
ican Revolution was over by the end of the 1780s.
Habsburg interest in transatlantic trade waned in subsequent years. Dynastic 
succession changed the outlook in some ways. Aer Joseph II died unexpectedly 
in 1790, his younger brother Pietro Leopoldo (the Grand Duke of Tuscany) who 
had favoured American constitutional ideals succeeded him as Leopold II. How-
ever, he too died suddenly in March 1792. His son and Joseph’s nephew, Francis 
II, reigned during the heady years of the French Revolution and the subsequent 
Napoleonic Wars that briey brought the Habsburg Monarchy to its knees with 
humiliating military defeats and several territorial losses including the coastline 
along the Adriatic. Waging war against the revolutionary turmoil in Europe 
dened Francis II’s early reign and sapped his attention for much else. American 
interests, which once commanded serious attention at the Viennese court, now 
took a back seat. Aer Beelen’s mission ended, Giuseppe Mussi, a Milan-born 
merchant residing in Philadelphia, petitioned the Aulic Chamber to become 
Beelen’s replacement, but his application was refused. In their concluding re-
sponse, ministers explained the new Emperor Francis’s view that “no advantage 
would be gained from formally accrediting any person with the Congress which 
had been so favoured by his late Majesty Emperor Joseph.”11 Francis did not 
alter his view in 1794 when Mussi reapplied or in 1796 when another merchant 
requested the same honour.12 Habsburg merchants evidently remained more in-
trigued by North American commerce than the state did.
Across the Atlantic, the opposite was true. American ocials sought to secure 
trade with the Habsburg port of Trieste. In 1797, Washington appointed Kon-
rad F. Wagner as the rst American consul.13 A few years later, the rst docu-
mented American vessel arrived to unload cotton, sugar and coee.14 e growth 
of American imports in subsequent years convinced Viennese ocials of the 
need for an American representative. In 1804, Francis received the proposition 
again but declined to act.15 It was not until aer the restoration of the Illyrian 
provinces and the acquisition of Venetian territory following the Congress of 
Vienna that ended the Napoleonic wars in 1815 that Francis decided to entertain 
the idea.16 However, the process of nding and appointing a consular representa-
tive proved dicult as the lead candidate did not wish to end up in the United 
States.17 e issue was nally resolved in 1820 with a consular ocer ocially 
named in New York but by then Habsburg representation in the Americas func-
tioned through Count Emanuel Joseph Eltz, the rst ambassador to Brazil.18
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By that time the Habsburgs lagged behind other European powers in es-
tablishing American representations. Helvetia (Switzerland), for example, en-
joyed an ocial representative presence in the United States long before the 
Habsburgs.19 Much like the time of the American Revolution, Central European 
rms became impatient and arranged their own private representatives. e Im-
perial Tobacco Monopoly (Österreichische Tabakregie) named Antonio E. Perez 
as a representative in New Orleans aer 1815. Perez was so eective that he even 
provided Viennese ocials with reports and made suggestions for the further 
expansion of Habsburg diplomatic posts in the Americas.20
e economic imperative to connect with the United States of America 
declined concurrently with the political belief in the United States as a viable 
sovereign nation. During the 1780s, Viennese newspapers discussed at length 
the poor state of the American economy and political system. e new republic 
seemed enfeebled and beset with political calamities. e Philadelphia mutiny 
of 1783, Shay’s rebellion of 1786–1787, as well as reports of paper money further 
compounded the image of a destitute situation.21 Some Hungarian and Flem-
ish newspapers featured similar disparagements.22 e negative depiction of 
America angered John Adams who decried how “all the Gazettes of Germany 
teem with Lies to our Disadvantage.”23 Fictitious or not, the air of negativity 
stuck. Beelen’s reports painted a dire picture. In 1785, he commented how the 
president-elect of Congress was “in such tottering state of health” that it was 
doubtful “whether and when” he would be able to assume oce. By contrast, 
Beelen, besotted with the idea of Habsburg-Native American commerce, for-
warded laudatory descriptions of the Muscogee Creek and a portrait of their 
former leader Mico-Clucco whose title was “equivalent to our title of emperor.”24
e impression of instability and weakness rendered through these mediums 
further eroded the Habsburg resolve to form any political connection with the 
United States. By 1787, Joseph II asked, “What has the Revolution given them?” 
during the height of the Constitutional Convention that summer. “Nothing,” 
he retorted, “but general imbecility, confusion, and misery.”25
By the late 1780s, Habsburg ministers became increasingly weary of the neg-
ative eects of American independence. Concerns rose over emigration in the 
direction of the Atlantic rather than to the Habsburg provinces in the East. 
roughout the eighteenth century, recruitment plans to populate the neo ac-
quista of the eastern Habsburg territories competed against transoceanic des-
tinations.26 Aer independence, the desire to emigrate to the new American 
republic increased. From his vantage point in London, Adams sincerely believed 
that “half of Germany,” which to Adams included the Habsburg territories, was 
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on “tiptoe” ready “to y to America for relief.”27 e writer Dositej Obradović 
from the Banat of Temesvar desired to emigrate to America, as did Jan Ingen-
housz from Vienna.28 A sovereign United States seemed a temptation even to 
members of the imperial court. In 1783, a member of the Imperial Aulic Council 
(the Reichshoat), one of the most powerful institutions within the Holy Roman 
Empire, petitioned Franklin for help in retiring to the United States since he 
knew the new nation would need “experienced and accomplished men” such 
as himself. His preference was for Georgia, either of the Carolinas, or even Vir-
ginia, “if it were not too remote.”29
In London, the Habsburg consul Antonio Songa sounded alarm over the 
siren calls of transatlantic migration. In February 1783 already, he argued how 
the issue of emigration was more pressing than ever as “Americans will try in 
every possible way to induce people from all the countries of Europe.” Songa 
foresaw how, post-Revolution, the United States would expand its industry and 
require an even greater skilled workforce. “[is] emigration, which the inde-
pendence of America may cause, is perhaps the rst point which Europe must 
endeavour to prevent,” he noted. e second point Songa observed had to do 
with the futility of ordinances and laws to prevent emigration. “ere are always 
ways to escape these laws,” he reminded his superiors. Instead, Songa suggested 
Habsburg ocials should be braced to sacrice their “lowest inferior workers” 
to “American temptations.”30 Conrmation of Songa’s fears and predictions 
rang true following similar reports by Beelen. Within a year of his arrival in 
September 1783, Beelen observed the eects of American westward expansion 
into the newest counties of North Carolina annexed from Cherokee lands. e 
soil there was rich, the rivers plentiful, and the air clean but the land sparsely 
populated. e solution for the landholders, Beelen reported with alarm, rested 
on recruiting migrants from the Habsburg lands. “It is my knowledge,” Beelen 
stated, “that seven emigrant subjects of Your Majesty the Emperor—natives of 
the environs of Ghent, Kortrijk, Brussels and further—have already arrived at 
Philadelphia since my sojourn in this country.”31 Combined with the perceived 
political instability of the post-independent United States, such fears stoked the 
emerging negative view of America among Habsburg ocials.
In the war’s aermath it became increasingly clear that all of Europe had 
cause to fear the repercussions of the American Revolution. Beginning in the 
1780s, successive waves of revolutionary ferment stalked the Habsburg lands. 
ese rebellions were either reactive against the far-reaching Josephine reforms 
or the perceived injustices within Habsburg society. All of them were united 
by parallels to the American example. In 1784, an uprising broke out among 
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villagers in the mountains of Transylvania where tensions between the dier-
ent ethnic groups in the region—Hungarian Szekels, German-speakers (known 
as Transylvanian Saxons), and Romanians oen referred to as Wallachians—
reached a tipping point. Wallachians had rst appealed to the Habsburg mon-
arch for a redress of grievances via several delegations to Vienna but when the 
imperially sanctioned extension of privileges proved dicult to enact back in 
Transylvania, the ghting started.32 Although Joseph had been sympathetic to 
their pleas, he now instructed the imperial army to restore order and end the 
bloodshed. In December 1784, two of the Wallachian leaders of the rebellion 
faced execution aer they issued a proclamation demanding an end to the exces-
sive abuses by feudal lords and the distribution of their lands to local peasants.33
Although the Principality of Transylvania had suered several spikes of social 
unrest in the eighteenth century,34 observers in and outside the Habsburg Mon-
archy regarded Horea’s rebellion, as it became known, as something dierent. 
In 1785, the sensationalist writer Jacques-Pierre Brissot drew the most obvious 
parallels between the Transylvanian situation and the American Revolution. He 
penned an imputation against Joseph II, alleging the emperor had denied the 
right of protest to the Wallachians by crushing the rebellion. In Brissot’s eyes, 
the revolt was a “beautiful monument erected to liberty” which followed the 
American example before them. “ey [the Wallachians] must say,” he argued “if 
the American has been able, why not I?”35 If the propositions of the Wallachians 
were unjust, Brissot further explained, “it must also be said that the declara-
tions of the United States of America were equally unjust for they are exactly 
the same.”36 Brissot’s comparison of the two rebellions in defence of peoples’ 
rights echoed louder in Europe than the actual uprising itself. German and Ital-
ian translations quickly followed, bringing the criticism of the emperor’s policy 
more directly to his subjects. In doing so, Brissot not only made Habsburg in-
habitants aware of the parallels between their situation and the successful Amer-
ican Revolution, but he also made clear the rights Americans now enjoyed as a 
result of their independence. Article IV of the Maryland constitution of 1776 
adorned the frontispiece of his pamphlet.37 Purposefully selected by Brissot, it 
spoke directly to the Wallachian struggle: “Whenever the ends of government 
are perverted and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of 
redress are ineectual, the people may and, of right, ought to reform the old or 
establish a new government.”38
Inspiration from the American Revolution existed across the Habsburg lands. 
e War of American Independence, in the eyes of many Habsburg inhabitants, 
had not been a bloody conict or civil war but rather the just defence of liberty 
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against tyranny and a virtuous struggle to protect the inherent rights of the 
governed. Nowhere was this impression of the American Revolution stronger 
than in the Austrian Netherlands, where the inherent rights of subject became a 
ashpoint in the late 1780s. At the beginning of that decade, Joseph had endeav-
oured to reform the ancient customs and archaic privileges of the various estates 
under his dominion in order to create “just one body, uniformly governed.”39
In the Austrian Netherlands this entailed sweeping reforms aiming to rid the 
region of, as one historian has candidly phrased it, the “museum of late-medieval 
corporate liberties.”40 Joseph’s centralising crusade overhauled judicial, political, 
and religious apparatuses, provoking severe discontent at rst and then open 
disagreement with the provincial estates. Aware of the mounting resistance to 
his plans, Joseph consoled his ministerial representative in Brussels by saying “do 
not be discouraged, dear Count, we will struggle together for the good of the 
state.”41 e people of the Duchy of Brabant within the Austrian Netherlands, 
however, saw to it that they were discouraged. Students’ protests erupted over 
the proposed changes to the seminary in Louvain/Leuven and they were joined 
before long by the estates themselves who issued a deant proclamation against 
the continual abrogation of their endowed rights.42
Amid the growing furour in Brabant, many leaders of the resistance drew par-
allels to their situation with the American Revolution. Information coming to 
subjects in the Austrian Netherlands via newspapers had been more pro-Ameri-
can in tone than elsewhere in the Monarchy. American constitutionalism seemed 
a realistic model based on coverage in the pages of the Courrier de l’Escaut, among 
others.43 ose opposed to the Josephinian reforms emphasised the favourable 
results of the American Revolution, an event which had enriched the Austrian 
Netherlands, aer all. At the outbreak of unrest in early 1787, Charles Lambert 
d’Outrepont, a member of the provincial council of Brabant, gave a rousing 
speech which later reached the populace in print. In his view, the eighteenth cen-
tury was one of revolution. Liberty had shone in Corsica and Poland before being 
extinguished; only America had been successful and now it was the time for the 
inhabitants of Brabant to decide whether or not to li the torch.44 D’Outrepont 
expounded the opportunities awaiting the people of the Austrian Netherlands 
if they would only follow the “American example” and embrace a “government 
which approaches republicanism rather than despotism.”45
D’Outrepont was the rst among a chorus of resistors who lauded the Amer-
ican cause as their rightful counterpart. A ood of lyrical verses hit the streets 
which Habsburg ocials collected assiduously before forwarding them to 
ministers’ desks in Vienna.46 “Be born free, fear the shackle, imitate America!” 
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instructed one placard; “I invite you without mercy, Poor Belgians, [and] Ty-
rannical Emperor, follow America,” demanded one more; and “Poor Belgian 
people,” announced another, “do as in America: shake o the yoke of your em-
peror!”47 In Vienna, Kaunitz fretted they would actually succeed in imitating 
the Americans. If such a situation were to pass, he worried, then the people of 
the Austrian Netherlands who, he thought, enjoyed “so many attractive pros-
pects for independence,” could join the Americans as “the happiest peoples in 
the universe.”48
Two major anti-reformist groups emerged in the spring of 1787: the “tradition-
alists” and the “democrats.”49 Common to both parties was a consensus on the 
relevance of the American example.50 e rst group called for the defence of the 
ancient privileges against Joseph’s modernising reforms and coalesced around the 
Estate of Brabant member Hendrik van der Noot, whose nickname—perhaps 
derogatorily—in Vienna was “the Franklin of the Austrian Netherlands.”51 e 
second group centred on the more radical jurist Jan-Frans Vonck who argued in 
favour of reform but not without the democratic consent of those he governed. 
e “Vonckist” or “Democrats,” as this group became known, clung more tightly 
to the American model.52 Some within this circle had either attempted to ght 
for the Revolution or had seen action in the War of American Independence.53
Leading pamphleteers advocated emulation of the United States as resistance 
turned towards revolt and open rebellion throughout 1788 and 1789.54 When 
the Vandernootists and Vonckists merged to form a revolutionary committee in 
1789, they issued a manifesto on behalf of Brabanters in October 1789 “written 
in the spirit of the American Declaration of Independence.”55 e declaration 
led to the short-lived United Belgian States (Verenigde Nederlandse Staten/États-
Belgiques-Unis) a few months later. Both the name and the resulting constitution 
directly referenced the American beacon across the Atlantic.56
Revolution in the Austrian Netherlands helped the American Revolution to 
resonate even more loudly through the Habsburg lands. Although ultimately 
crushed by Habsburg forces within a year of existence, the road to the United 
Belgian States had created a lasting impression on Habsburg inhabitants. A 
young Hungarian noble named Gergely Berzeviczy passed through Brussels 
during the rst stirrings of rebellion in 1787 and remarked how “upliing” it 
was to witness the “courage and resolve” among the people “for the sake of free-
dom.”57 e scenes in Brussels only served to strengthen the democratic con-
victions of Berzeviczy, who was returning to Hungary aer a sojourn to the 
British Isles. “England,” he noted at the same time as he watched with interest 
the “ferment” in Brussels, had “shaped my political understanding and opinions, 
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which had previously been unclear.”58 Upon arrival in Buda, Berzeviczy became 
an ardent advocate of consensual governance at a time when Hungarians de-
fended their relationship and rights under Habsburg rule.
Like many of his fellow Hungarian noblemen, Berzeviczy believed in pur-
ported parallels between Hungary under the Habsburgs and the Americans 
formerly under British rule. e idea was so widespread that one Göttingen pro-
fessor, who had taught many Hungarians, bemoaned how much he had suered 
from hearing about this “pet idea of the Hungarian aristocracy.”59 Hungarian 
nobles clung to the persistent ction that Hungary was an independent king-
dom ruled only via a personal union with a member of the House of Habsburg.60
Rulership existed only with consent of the ruled in this train of thinking. When 
abuses by the ruler forced the ruled to break that contract, then any dissent was 
lawful and even necessary, as the Americans had shown. Joseph’s imposition 
of reforms prejudicial to the Hungarian people constituted, so the logic ran, a 
rejectable abuse of power.
In the summer of 1789, Berzeviczy gave a speech in which he advanced the 
notion that Joseph had repeatedly infringed upon the rights of Hungarians; his 
list of grievances was a clear imitation of the Declaration of American Inde-
pendence, of which he had obtained a handwritten copy during his travels.61
He elaborated on these charges aer Joseph’s death in early 1790 when eective 
change in Hungary seemed possible. His pamphlet De dominio Austriae in Hun-
garia (On the rule of Austria in Hungary) specically referenced the United 
States and United Belgian States as examples of people “blessed by freedom” 
aer years of subjugation. When rule turned to tyranny, their rebellions seemed 
“natural” and righteous in Berzeviczy’s eyes.62
By the time Berzeviczy’s De dominio Austriae passed privately among liberal 
circles in Hungary, the revolutionary scene in Europe had changed, however. 
e French Revolution in July 1789 captivated many Hungarians much like 
the American Revolution had previously done. One Hungarian poet, János 
Nagyváthy, considered the present moment in 1790 as the beginning of a future 
utopia for Hungarians. Imagining himself as an observer in the year 1900 and 
looking back on history, he saw how freedom had begun rst with the English, 
then the Americans, followed by the French, and nally the “noble-hearted” 
Hungarians.63 ere were those who were determined to bring the example of 
the American Revolution to Hungary sooner than Nagyváthy envisioned.
Radical elements within Hungarian society were labelled “Jacobin” at the 
time for their inspiration by the French Jacobin faction of anti-royalists. is 
group, however, also took considerable inspiration from the Americans. Among 
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them was the legal theorist József Hajnóczy, whose pamphlets urged liberal civic 
and juridical reform in the Hungarian lands. His ties to American revolutionary 
thought stretched back earlier than his political writings. During the War of 
American Independence, Hajnóczy had received a commission from the Hun-
garian magnate Ferenc Széchényi to assemble a library for his county seat. Today 
it forms the core of the Hungarian National Library and contains some of the 
rarest Americana from this period, which means that Hajnóczy took an avid 
interest in obtaining American works.64 Hajnóczy also utilised his employer’s as-
sembled materials for his own personal systematic study.65 His fascination with 
American political principals continued up to the French Revolution, when he 
supplied material and articles to the periodical Hadi és Más Nevezetes Történetek
(Military and other notable stories), which had looked favourably on the new 
American republic throughout the 1780s. Hajnóczy supplied the editors with his 
personal copy of the French translation of omas Paine’s e Rights of Man for 
reprinting in 1791.66 Reecting his legal background, Hajnóczy also published 
his own works extolling the wisdom and virtue of the American laws. In one, 
he recommended introducing a Hungarian version of the Virginia statute for 
religious freedom. “ere is no doubt,” he declared, “that this law, breathing 
with humanity, could take root here just the same as there.”67
Hajnóczy’s admiration for American laws and his desire to implement them 
in Hungary brought him into contact with the future “Jacobin” circles. Central 
to this group was Ignác Martinovics, who, while less intellectual than Hajnóczy, 
was just as passionate about the American example. Historians generally identify 
Martinovics as the rst embodiment of the Age of Revolutions in the Habsburg 
Monarchy, without realising his proper motivations or his alleged “conspiracy” 
movement.68 Descended from a Habsburg-Serbian family, Martinovics taught 
natural sciences at the University of Lemberg (Lviv) where he was admitted 
as a Freemason in the “Honest Man” lodge. He became engrossed in masonic 
mythology and helped propagate the proliferation of lodges across Hungary 
in the 1780s. Martinovics led a double life, however. He had been recruited by 
the court intelligence service in Vienna to inltrate and report on the masonic 
movement. In 1792, Martinovics led a report with the director of court in-
telligence, alleging a list of names of the Viennese Illuminati who swore oaths 
to defend “in writing, in speech and with arms the current situation of France 
and America against all despots.”69 In other reports, he warned of a growing 
“French-American fever” in the Habsburg lands.70
Although Martinovics worked as an informer for the Habsburg court, he 
remained loyal to revolutionary ideas, explicitly referring to the United States 
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as the “immortal American Republic” and ranking foreign rulers against 
Washington or Paine.71 In one of his most incendiary pamphlets, Martinovics 
encouraged aristocrats to introduce changes “in the Pennsylvanian way,” and 
lauded the results of the American constitution. “I adore the Philadelphia 
Convention,” he stated openly.72 e boldness of his prose had alienated Mar-
tinovics from the court and cost him his position as an informer, but it did 
not matter much. In 1794, he began actively recruiting members for his own 
societies, modelled aer the Jacobin clubs in France.73 He named Hajnóczy as 
one of four directors and co-authored pamphlets calling for the overthrow of 
monarchism. According to the radicals, sovereignty rested entirely within the 
people, who were responsible to exercise it themselves, and not the monarchy.74
Habsburg authorities might have tolerated allusions to American constitu-
tionalism and the defence of rights but emulating the seditious extremism 
of the French Jacobins triggered a crackdown. Faced with arrest and certain 
death, Martinovics surrendered himself and betrayed his accomplices who 
were subsequently located and arrested. In May 1795, he and six others—in-
cluding Hajnóczy—were publicly executed in Buda.
Figure 17. e execution of the Hungarian “Jacobins” in 1795
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e execution of the Hungarian Jacobins marked a point when the American 
Revolution could no longer serve as an open ambition. Works by the most prom-
inent American revolutionaries that had been permitted during the 1770s and 
1780s now entered censorship lists for the rst time. Franklin’s novel e Speech 
of Polly Baker from 1747 received a retroactive ban in 1794, followed by a French 
translation of his autobiography.75 Books published as late as 1827 on American 
themes showed evidence of censorship.76 Following the executions, the Bishop 
of Agram (Zagreb) Miska Verhovacz, a councillor named Jakob Szecsenacz, and 
the jurist Paul Lukács were all arrested for their ownership of texts by omas 
Paine or for publishing works related to Franklin.77 e poet, Mihály Vitéz 
Csokonai, expressed his despair at the changing freedom in 1795. In a letter to 
a friend following his expulsion from the Reformed College of Debrecen on 
account of his liberal ideas, he wrote:
I, an exile in my own country, carry on my days in boredom. I am happy 
only when I can nd a New World for myself, and build there a Republic, 
a Philadelphia. At least there, like Franklin, I can snatch lightning from 
heaven and the sceptres from tyrants.78
e conservatism of the 1790s and 1800s could not completely eradicate the 
legacy of the American Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy, however. “I still 
hold to the great American sage, Franklin,” Csokonai admitted privately to a 
liberal friend in 1803.79 And adherents of American ideals discovered new ways 
of conveying its ideas. Berzeviczy, who had narrowly avoided the fate of Ha-
jnóczy and Martinovics, focused instead on the economic power of the United 
States and frequently used it as validation for his free-trade plans for the Hun-
garian lands.80 Praise of American military gures such as George Washington 
became the new focal point as he embodied the more positive virtue and patri-
otic good of the Revolution. When Hungarian-Americans later chose to erect a 
monument to a prominent American in Budapest, they chose Washington who 
best represented “the embodiment of both American ideals, and of the ideal 
of Hungarians on both sides of the Atlantic.”81 Franklin, who throughout this 
period was the paragon of the Revolution, underwent a sanitised retelling during 
the early years of the post-Napoleonic order. A biographical account by Ferenc 
Szilágyi, published in Transylvania in 1818, presented Franklin rst and foremost 
as a scientist and publicist who happened to play some role in the Revolution’s 
course.82 For a generation of later Hungarian nationalists and revolutionaries 
such as Count István Széchenyi and Lajos Kossuth, Franklin represented only 
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a moral gure through his writings and sayings.83 His revolutionary activity no 
longer mattered in the way it once had.
Residents in the Habsburg Monarchy never lost sight of the American 
Revolution. Its ame smouldered but was not extinguished. e dilution of the 
explosiveness of the rst revolutionary experience in Central Europe during the 
early nineteenth century ultimately gave way to a period of greater unrest. In the 
revolutions of 1848–1849, the United States again became a symbol of a utopia cre-
ated out of courageous adherence to righteous, unalienable principles.84 Kossuth, 
the new “Washington of Hungary,” solicited American support by nurturing a 
Hungarian martyrology in which the Emperor Francis Joseph I became George 
III and the Hungarians were either the Puritans seeking freedom and liberty or 
republicans in search of their independence.85 In Habsburg Lombardy, protago-
nists agitating for reform and Italian nationalists aiming for independence both 
drew inspiration from the American example. ey aimed to break the lucrative 
state monopolies in order to gain political leverage. e tobacco boycott, begun 
on New Year’s Day in 1848, allowed an easy parallel to the infamous Boston Tea 
Party. “Franklin’s fellow citizens abstained from tea; as of today you ought to re-
fuse tobacco,” ran the refrain.86 For moderates like Carlo Cattaneo, who initially 
resisted Italian unication in favour of greater autonomy for Lombardy within the 
Habsburg system, American federal government served a possible blueprint for the 
future. Like many Milanese publicists and jurists, Cattaneo interpreted the Amer-
ican Revolution as a useful justication for federalisation and as a balm against the 
more fervent calls for secession and unication with the Italian peninsula.87 Cat-
taneo and his companions were not alone in nding an American model. In 1849 
and in 1906, two separate plans would have reformulated the Habsburg Monarchy 
towards a federalised American structure.88 From the immediate post-Napoleonic 
aermath known as the Vormärz to the twilight decades of Habsburg rule in Cen-
tral Europe, the American political example and its republican style of government 
continually beckoned.89
e American experiment shone gradually brighter as the antithesis to the 
old regime in Europe. At his nadir aer successive defeats by Napoleon, Emperor 
Francis reportedly said that he should emigrate to America to atone for his po-
litical failings.90 If true, the emperor was implying that the United States was a 
suitable punishment for his inability to defend the principles of monarchy and 
his imperial power. Many of his subjects were inclined to disagree. Travellers and 
migrants from the Habsburg Monarchy in the United States recognised it as a 
land entirely dierent to their own. Some, like Joseph Donath, began to question 
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their former homeland. People there, in his estimation, were “deprived of civil 
liberty” and “vassals” who required “the ame of liberty” to spread among them.91
Writing from Philadelphia in his “happy hemisphere,” he looked upon the scene 
of Europe and Francis’s coronation in July 1792 with great haughtiness. “What 
animal is the emperor?” Donath asked his friend in Prague before concluding 
that the emperor was, “in plain English, a butcher of men.”92 Being in America 
conrmed or awoke such bias in Habsburg migrants looking back on their land 
of origin. Maria von Born, daughter of the celebrated Transylvanian mineralogist 
Ignaz von Born, spent twenty years in the United States. She returned to Vienna 
in 1815 and disapproved of its poor education system, its lack of public welfare, and 
the insucient intelligence of its inhabitants. “How has Vienna fallen behind,” 
she exclaimed, “because young America is growing up fast!”93
e lure of America as a promised land, a free land, became increasingly 
stronger throughout the nineteenth century. e Austrian poet Nicholas Lenau 
characterised his emigration to the United States as a journey “towards free-
dom.”94 István Széchenyi extolled America as “the country where the Rights of 
Mankind are most equal and where the constitution is best.”95 He desired most 
of all to travel to the United States in the 1830s but like many compatriots, he 
faced discouragement and prevention from Viennese authorities who distrusted 
the inuence of the American republic in an era aer the French Revolution. e 
Austrian Chancellor Prince Klemens von Metternich thought Széchenyi bizarre 
for wanting to visit America and viewed his travel plans with suspicion. In his 
personal diary, Széchenyi decried such derision. “By heaven, there are people who 
do not understand that some want to visit a free country!”96 ough Metternich 
and his colleagues could dissuade Széchenyi from his American travels, subse-
quent generations of Habsburg minsters could not prevent the ever-rising tide 
of movement between the Habsburg lands and the United States. Széchenyi’s 
oldest son, Béla Széchenyi, realised his father’s dream by touring the northern 
United States during the American Civil War and publishing an instructive 
account of his journey in Hungarian, which extolled the marvels of American 
progress.97 In the second half of the nineteenth century, the trickle of migration 
turned into a ood. By the outbreak of World War I in 1914, nearly four million 
Habsburg subjects had crossed the Atlantic for a new life in the nation forged 
by the American Revolution. Few were aware, however, that tens of thousands 
of them migrated along the Adriatic-Atlantic route rst established during the 
selfsame revolutionary period.98
Like them, we too may have lost sight of the Habsburg moment in the 
American Revolution, but simply because it is forgotten does not reduce its 
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importance. If we are to understand the Age of Revolutions, we must appreci-
ate the areas where revolutionary sentiments smouldered for longer rather than 
erupted on short fuses. e American Revolution exerted a profound inuence 
on the eighteenth-century Habsburg Monarchy. Lives were shaped by its war, 
fortunes were made in its shadow, and policies altered in its wake. e Revo-
lution was a dicult opportunity, a challenge of adaptation for the Habsburgs 
as much as it was an invitation to emulate the Atlantic powers of Europe. e 
American Revolution and its inuence in the Habsburg lands did not come out 
of nowhere, but rather through a sustained and intensive interest by people made 
curious by the events and rhetoric from across the ocean. e impulse to chase 
economic gains cemented the Monarchy’s interests further into the Atlantic, 
but this imperial outreach was short-lived. e Habsburg exigency of securing 
new relations with a sovereign United States faltered at the hands of omas 
Jeerson, who, unlike some of his contemporaries, viewed the monarchy with 
a critical eye. Nevertheless, in the later decades of the eighteenth century, the 
embers of revolutionary zeal smouldered on to are up on distinct occasions 
throughout the Monarchy’s existence. Infused with the radicalism of the French 
revolutionary movement, the original American imprint within the Habsburg 
mentality could no longer continue unchallenged. e once revolutionary pull, 
which had animated so many individuals across the Habsburg lands during the 
1770s and 1780s, succumbed to the ideological pressure of the 1790s and emer-
gence of a new reactionary conservatism at the dawn of a new century.
When young Benjamin Silas Arthur Schuster came of age during this period, 
his world was fundamentally dierent from the one of his parents. In theirs, the 
American example shone like a beacon, and they were unafraid to declare openly 
their enthusiasm for its cause, bold enough to name their “petit Américain” aer 
its illustrious leaders and daring enough to inform Franklin of their prayers for 
him and his fellow revolutionaries. In place of their world was a new regime, 
tighter and more reactionary to the revolutionary murmurings such actions 
could divulge. It was a stark cry from the Habsburg Monarchy of the 1770s and 
1780s which harboured interested enthusiasts such as the Schusters and where 
even the rulers themselves read the latest thoughts of American leaders. We may 
never know whether Benjamin S. A. Schuster lived on with pride in his name, 
becoming a “grand Américain,” or whether he chose to conceal it, shunning his 
godfathers in absentia. But we do know the reality of an expansive revolutionary 
movement which aected greatly the inhabitants of the Habsburg lands and, for 
a time, compelled many of them towards a more open, oceanic, and expansive 
interaction with the world. ough the Habsburg moment in the American 
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